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English	Abstract			 Most	 comparative	 studies	 of	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 have	 focused	 on	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	 Nishida’s	philosophy	 with	 later	 Heidegger’s	 thought.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising	 since,	 of	 all	 Western	 philosophers,	 Nishida	 probably	resonates	most	with	the	 later	Heidegger	after	the	“turn”	(Kehre).	But	is	there	also	a	common	ground	between	Nishida	and	
early,	pre-turn	Heidegger?	The	 present	work	 attempts	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 this	 question	 by	 uncovering	 their	 earlier	 critical	engagements	with	 transcendental	philosophy	during	 the	 late	1920s.	More	specifically,	 it	 aims	 to	articulate	 the	extent	 to	which	they	still	work	within	a	traditional	transcendental	framework	and	the	ways	in	which	they	attempt	to	go	beyond	this	in	their	transformations	of	transcendental	philosophy.	For	Heidegger,	my	focus	is	his	project	in	Being	and	Time	(1927).	For	Nishida,	I	focus	on	his	theory	of	basho	as	developed	in	two	of	his	works	from	the	late	1920s,	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing	(1927)	 and	The	Self-aware	 System	of	Universals	 (1930).	My	 aim	 is	 to	 show	 the	ways	 in	which	 Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	
transformation	 and	 Nishida’s	 chorological	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 resemble	 and	 differ	 from	 each	other.		 I	begin	by	clarifying	the	essence	of	the	“traditional	transcendental	framework.”	From	an	examination	of	Kant	and	Husserl,	I	draw	three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy:	(1)	transcendental	philosophy	is	a	search	for	the	foundation	of	our	experience	and	knowledge,	(2)	it	employs	transcendental	reflection,	and	(3)	it	entails	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	
world	from	the	naive	realist	view	of	the	world	as	existing	independently	of	us	to	seeing	the	world	as	existing	only	insofar	as	it	 is	 constituted	by	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 Taking	 these	 criteria	 as	 a	 heuristic	 device,	 I	 then	question	 the	 extent	 to	which	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 work	 within	 a	 traditional	 transcendental	 framework	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 they	attempt	to	go	beyond	it.			 Firstly,	I	argue	that	they	both	saw	the	importance	of	seeking	a	kind	of	transcendental	foundation.	But	while	Dasein	is	still	a	kind	of	transcendental	subjectivity	that	“constitutes”	the	world	in	the	sense	that	it	is	world-disclosing,	I	argue	that	absolute	nothingness	 is	no	 “subjectivity”	 that	 “constitutes”	 objects	 since	 there	 is	 absolutely	no-thing	 that	 can	be	 said	 to	constitute	 objects.	 Secondly,	 while	 they	 both	 seek	 a	 transcendental	 ground	 through	 transcendental	 reflection,	 they	 also	render	it	a	matter	of	disclosing	and	awakening	to	one’s	factical	situation.	Yet,	unlike	Heidegger,	for	Nishida,	transcendental	reflection	must	 begin	with	 our	 facticity	 and	 historicity	 but	 it	must	 not	 end	 there.	 It	must	 delve	 deeper	 and	 reveal	 the	absolute	no-thingness	of	our	being.	Thirdly,	for	both	thinkers,	transcendental	philosophy	essentially	alters	the	naive	realist	view	 of	 the	 world.	 For	 Heidegger,	 we	 come	 to	 see	 the	 world	 through	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 (Dasein),	 one	 whose	ontological	 constitution	 is	 articulated	 as	 disclosedness	 to	 the	 world,	 factical,	 and	 is	 always	 already	 projecting	 its	possibilities	upon	the	world.	In	other	words,	we	come	to	see	the	world	through	Dasein’s	being-in-the-world.	For	Nishida,	however,	we	come	to	see	the	world	through	absolute	no-thingness.	This	is	not	at	all	equivalent	to	saying	that	we	come	to	see	the	world	as	absolutely	nothing	as	if	to	imply	a	nihilistic	position.	Rather,	we	come	to	the	self-realization	that	“I”	am	the	place	of	 absolute	no-thingness	wherein	 “reality”	 realizes	 itself.	 In	 this	way,	 I	 argue	 that,	while	having	much	 in	 common,	Nishida’s	 chorological	 transformation	 is	 more	 radical	 than	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 one.	 Ultimately,	 the	 radicalness	 of	Nishida’s	 transformation	 lies	 in	 its	 enigma,	 namely	 that	 transcendental	 reflection	 brings	 us	 back	 in	 touch	with	 the	non-
reflective	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.			
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Danish	Abstract			 De	fleste	comparative	studier	om	Heidegger	og	Nishida	har	fokuseret	på	sammenfald	og	forskelle	mellem	Nishidas	filosofi	og	den	sene	Heideggers	tænkning.	Dette	er	ikke	overraskende	da	Nishida,	blandt	alle	vestlige	filosoffer,	nok	minder	mest	om	den	sene	Heidegger	efter	dennes	“vending”	(Kehre).	Men	kan	der	også	findes	ligheder	mellem	Nishida	og	den	tidlige	
Heidegger,	 altså	 før	 sidstnævntes	 ”Kehre”?	 Denne	 afhandling	 forsøger	 at	 belyse	 dette	 spørgsmål	 ved	 at	 fremstille	 deres	tidligere	arbejder	med	transcendental	filosofi	i	slutningen	af	1920’erne.	Mere	nøjagtigt	forsøger	afhandlingen	at	beskrive	i	hvilken	grad	de	to	kan	siges	stadigvæk	at	arbejde	indenfor	en	traditionel	transcendental	 forståelsesramme	og	endvidere	måderne,	på	hvilke	de	forsøger	at	bryde	ud	af	den	gennem	deres	transformationer	af	transcendentalfilosofien.	I	Heideggers	tilfælde	fokuserer	jeg	på	hovedværket	Væren	og	Tid	(1927).	I	Nishidas	tilfælde	fokuserer	jeg	på	hans	teori	om	basho	som	udviklet	i	to	af	hans	værker	fra	de	sene	20’ere,	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing	(1927)	og	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals	(1930).	 Det	 er	 mit	 mål	 at	 vise,	 på	 hvilke	 måder	 Heideggers	 hermeneutiske	 transformation	 og	 Nishidas	 “korologiske”	
transformation	af	den	transcendentale	filosofi	ligner	og	adskiller	sig	fra	hinanden.		 Jeg	begynder	med	en	afklaring	af	essensen	af	den	“traditionelle	 transcendentale	 forståelsesramme.”	Gennem	en	undersøgelse	af	Kant	og	Husserl	opridser	jeg	tre	kriterier	for	transcendental	filosofi:	(1)	transcendental	filosofi	er	en	søgen	efter	grundlaget	for	vor	erfaring	og	viden,	(2)	den	anvender	transcendental	reflektion,	og	(3)	den	leder	til	en	forandring	af	
vores	forhold	til	verden	fra	den	naive	realismes	overbevisning	ifølge	hvilken	verden	anskues	som	eksisterende	uafhængigt	af	os,	til	at	den	ses	som	eksisterende	kun	såfremt	den	er	konstitueret	af	en	transcendental	subjektivitet.	Med	udgangspunkt	i	disse	kriterier	spørger	jeg,	i	hvilken	grad	Heidegger	og	Nishida	kan	siges	at	arbejde	indenfor	en	traditionel	transcendental	forståelsesramme,	og	i	hvilken	grad	de	forsøger	at	bryde	ud	af	den.		 For	det	første	argumenterer	 jeg	 for	at	de	begge	så	vigtigheden	af	at	 lede	efter	et	slags	transcendentalt	grundlag.	Men	 hvor	 Dasein	 stadigvæk	 forbliver	 en	 art	 transcendental	 subjektivitet	 der	 ”konstituerer”	 verden,	 forstået	 som	verdensafdækkende,	argumenterer	jeg	for	at	den	absolutte	intethed	ikke	er	en	”subjektivitet”	der	”konstituerer”	objekter,	fordi	 der	 er	 absolut	 ingen-ting,	 der	 kan	 siges	 at	 konstituere	 objekter.	 For	 det	 andet,	 altimens	 de	 begge	 leder	 efter	 et	transcendentalt	grundlag	gennem	transcendental	refleksion,	gør	de	det	også	til	et	spørgsmål	om	at	afdække	og	opvågne	til	ens	 faktiske	 situation.	 For	 Nishida,	 ulig	 Heidegger,	må	 den	 transcendentale	 refleksion	 begynde	med	 vores	 fakticitet	 og	historicitet,	men	den	kan	ikke	ende	der.	Den	må	dykke	dybere	og	afsløre	vores	værens	absolutte	intethed.	For	det	tredje,	i	følge	 begge	 tænkere	 ændrer	 transcendental	 filosofi	 fundamentalt	 den	 naive	 realismes	 verdensbillede.	 Ifølge	 Heidegger	begynder	vi	at	se	verden	gennem	den	transcendental	subjektivitet	(Dasein),	hvis	ontologiske	konstitution	artikuleres	som	verdensafdækkende,	faktisk	og	som	altid	allerede	udkastende	sine	muligheder	i	verden.	Med	andre	ord,	begynder	vi	at	se	verden	gennem	Daseins	væren-i-verden.	Men	ifølge	Nishida	begynder	vi	at	se	verden	gennem	den	absolutte	intethed.	Dette	er	overhovedet	ikke	det	samme	som	at	sige,	at	vi	begynder	at	se	verden	som	absolut	intet,	altså	som	en	form	for	nihilistisk	position.	Snarere	opnår	vi	den	indsigt,	at	”jeg”	er	den	absolutte	intetheds	sted,	i	hvilken	”virkeligheden”	realiserer	sig	selv.	På	 denne	 vis	 argumenterer	 jeg	 for,	 at	 selvom	 de	 har	 meget	 til	 fælles,	 så	 er	 Nishidas	 korologiske	 transformation	mere	radikal	end	Heideggers	hermeneutiske.	Alt	i	alt	skal	radikaliteten	af	Nishidas	transformation	findes	i	dens	gåde,	nemlig	at	den	transcendentale	refleksion	tager	os	tilbage	til	den	ikke-refleksive	oplevelse,	der	eksister	før	subjekt-objekt	skellet.	 	
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Works	by	Martin	Heidegger	All	works	by	Heidegger	are	cited	from	the	Gesamtausgabe	(abbreviated	as	“GA”)	except	for	Sein	und	Zeit,	where	I	cite	from	the	standard	Max	Niemeyer	edition.	The	abbreviation	is	followed	by	volume	and	page	number.	In	the	text,	I	have	given	the	pagination	from	the	original	German	first	followed	by	a	slash	and	pagination	from	the	English	translation,	wherever	available.	I	have	followed	the	available	English	translations	in	my	citations.	Full	information	about	the	works	is	given	in	the	Bibliography.		 GA	10	 Der	Satz	vom	Grund	GA	20	 Prolegomena	zur	Geschichte	des	Zeitbegriffs	GA	24	 Die	Grundprobleme	der	Phänomenologie	GA	26	 Metaphysische	Anfangsgründe	der	Logik	im	Ausgang	von	Leibniz	GA	41	 Die	Frage	nach	dem	Ding:	Zu	Kants	Lehre	von	den	transzendentalen	Grundsätzen		
	 	 (Wintersemester	1935–1936)	GA	56/57	 Zur	Bestimmung	der	Philosophie:	1.	Die	Idee	der	Philosophie	und	das		 	 		 	 Weltanschauungsproblem	GA	63	 Ontologie	(Hermeneutik	der	Faktizität)	GA	65	 Beiträge	zur	Philosophie	(Vom	Ereignis)	(1936–1938).	SZ		 Sein	und	Zeit		
Works	by	Nishida	Kitarō	All	works	by	Nishida	are	cited	from	the	Nishida	Kitarō	Zenshū	[Complete	Works	of	Nishida	Kitarō]	(abbreviated	as	“NKZ”).	The	abbreviation	is	followed	by	volume	and	page	number.	In	the	text,	I	have	given	the	pagination	from	the	original	Japanese	first	followed	by	a	slash	and	pagination	from	the	English	translation,	wherever	available.	I	have	often	revised	the	available	English	translations	in	my	citations	for	the	purpose	of	literal	precision.	When	the	English	translations	were	not	available,	I	have	translated	the	passages	myself.	Full	information	about	the	works	is	given	in	the	Bibliography.		 NKZ	1	 Zen	no	kenkyū	[An	Inquiry	into	the	Good],	Shisaku	to	taiken	[Thought	and	Experience]	NKZ	2	 Jikaku	ni	okeru	chokkan	to	hansei	[Intuition	and	Reflection	in	Self-awareness]	
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Introduction			 Martin	 Heidegger	 (1889-1976)	 and	Nishida	 Kitarō	 (1870-1945)	 are	 two	 of	 the	most	 influential	philosophers	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 While	 coming	 from	 very	 different	 cultural	 and	 intellectual	backgrounds,	they	both	took	up	the	task	of	overcoming	the	Western	metaphysical	tradition.	Compared	to	Heidegger,	Nishida	has	yet	to	gain	acknowledgment	in	the	academic	world.	Sadly	enough,	his	philosophy	has	not	even	gained	the	acknowledgement	 it	deserves	within	 Japan,	where	 it	originated.	One	reason	for	this	neglect	is	the	difficulty	of	understanding	Nishida’s	philosophy.	If	Heidegger	is	difficult	to	read,	Nishida	is	almost	incomprehensible	for	many,	even	in	Japanese.1	But	one	should	not	take	this	as	a	sign	that	Nishida	was	 confused.	 As	 Ueda	 Shizuteru2	states	 in	 “The	 Difficulties	 of	 Reading	 Nishida,”	 the	 difficulty	 is	 a	reflection	of	the	difficult	project	Nishida	set	for	himself.3	Not	unlike	Heidegger,	in	order	to	break	with	the	Western	 metaphysical	 tradition,	 Nishida	 felt	 the	 need	 to	 create	 his	 own	 language.	 But	 what	 makes	Nishida’s	 language	 particularly	 difficult	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 his	 thinking	 developed	 between	 the	 two	 very	different	traditions	of	the	East	and	West.	On	the	one	hand,	he	was	firmly	rooted	in	the	Eastern	Buddhist	tradition	 and	 especially	 in	 Zen	 Buddhism	where	 the	 practice	 of	 “non-thinking”	 is	 said	 to	 be	 the	 key	 to	understanding	 reality.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 he	 was	 “philosophizing”	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 engaging	 in	 the	reflective	practice	of	philosophy	carried	out	in	the	Western	philosophical	tradition.	As	Ueda	nicely	puts	it,	Nishida	was	 a	 Zen	 practitioner	 philosophizing	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 a	 philosopher	 practicing	 Zen.4	He	also	notes	that	such	an	attempt	to	think	between	the	two	poles	is	comparable	to	later	Heidegger’s	attempt	to	 think	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 very	 different	 ways	 of	 saying,	 “thinking”	 (Denken)	 and	“poetizing”	 (Dichten).5	Indeed,	 of	 all	 Western	 philosophers,	 Nishida	 probably	 resonates	 most	 with	 the	later	Heidegger	after	the	“turn”	(Kehre).			 It	is	not	surprising,	then,	that	most	comparative	studies	of	Heidegger	and	Nishida	have	focused	on	comparing	 and	 contrasting	 Nishida’s	 philosophy	 with	 later	 Heidegger’s	 thought.6	For	 example,	 Ōhashi	Ryōsuke	has	argued	that	the	later	Heidegger’s	idea	of	“Dasein”	as	the	place	of	the	“event”	or	“happening”	
																																								 																				
1	Kobayashi	Hideo,	a	Japanese	literary	critic,	famously	criticized	Nishida’s	writings	in	1939,	saying	that	although	they	are	of	
course	not	written	in	a	foreign	language,	they	are	also	not	written	in	Japanese	(1968,	p.	84).	
2	All	Japanese	names	in	this	work	(except	in	the	bibliography)	are	written	in	the	Japanese	order	of	family	name,	followed	
by	given	name.	
3	Ueda1994,	pp.	231-241.	
4	Ibid.,	p.	194.	
5	Ibid.,	p.	235.	
6	Admittedly,	most	of	the	comparative	studies	have	been	attempted	by	Nishida	scholars	and	not	by	Heidegger	scholars.	
This	fact	also	shows	that	Nishida	has	yet	to	gain	acknowledgment	outside	the	circle	of	scholars	working	within	Japanese	
philosophy.	
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(Ereignis)	of	being	itself	is	comparable	to	Nishida’s	idea	of	“the	self-determination	of	the	world”	(sekai	no	
jikogentei)	 developed	 from	 the	 mid-1930s.7	More	 recently,	 John	 Krummel	 has	 compared	 the	 “quasi-religious”	language	that	both	employ	in	discussing	the	“original	wherein”	of	human	existence.	On	the	one	hand,	from	the	1930s	onwards,	Heidegger	speaks	of	“the	sacred”	that	clears	space	for	beings	to	appear.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 in	 the	 1940s,	 Nishida	 comes	 to	 relate	 this	 place,	 what	 he	 calls	 “the	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness,”	 to	 the	 “absolute”	 (zettai)	 or	 “god”	 that	 envelops	 the	 world	 as	 its	 place	 through	 its	 own	“kenotic	 self-negation.”8	Others	 have	 also	 noted	 the	 affinity	 between	 Heidegger’s	 notions	 of	 “clearing”	(Lichtung)	or	“openness”	(Offenheit)	and	Nishida’s	idea	of	the	“place	of	nothingness”	(mu	no	basho).9	It	is	worth	noting	that	most	of	these	studies	also	focus	on	the	later	period	of	Nishida’s	thought,	from	the	1930s	onwards.		 But	can	we	also	find	common	ground	between	Nishida	and	early,	pre-turn	Heidegger?	Ōhashi	seems	to	answer	in	the	affirmative,	noting	that	Nishida’s	thought	took	a	similar	turn	to	Heidegger’s.	For	Ōhashi,	the	 significance	of	Nishida’s	 philosophy	 in	 the	history	of	 philosophy	 is	 to	be	 found	 in	his	 “bashoronteki	
tenkai,”	or	 “turn	 to	basho.”10	According	 to	Ōhashi,	 this	was	a	 turn	 from	“seeing	 the	world	 from	the	self,”	which	 included	Nishida’s	 earlier	 position,	 to	 “seeing	 the	world	 from	 the	world,”	 developed	 in	 the	mid-1930s.	Indeed	in	1934,	Nishida	writes	that	his	earlier	work,	The	Self-aware	Determination	of	Nothingness	of	 1932,	 “still	 remained	 in	 the	 standpoint	 of	 seeing	 the	world	 from	 the	 individual	 self.”11	Thus,	 just	 as	Heidegger	later	turned	away	from	“Dasein”	as	the	place	of	the	human	understanding	of	being,	Nishida	also	turned	 away	 from	 “seeing	 the	world	 from	 the	 individual	self.”	Heidegger	 later	 expressly	 stated	 that	 this	
																																								 																				
7	Cf.	Ōhashi	1995,	chapter	2	(“Nishida	to	Haidegaa”	[Nishida	and	Heidegger]).	
8	Krummel	2010.		
9	See	for	example:	Andrew	Feenberg	(1999)	and	Elmar	Weinmayr	(2005).	For	a	concise	yet	comprehensive	overview	of	the	
comparative	studies	until	now,	see:	Krummel	(2010,	note	4).	
10	It	is	not	easy	to	translate	what	Ōhashi	calls	“bashoronteki	tenkai.”	The	issue	concerns,	on	the	one	hand,	how	one	should	
translate	Nishida’s	“basho”	and,	on	the	other	hand,	how	one	should	interpret	Ōhashi’s	understanding	of	Nishida’s	basho.	
As	we	will	see	in	Chapters	5	and	6,	“basho”	in	Japanese	literally	means	“place.”	In	this	work,	I	have	sometimes	translated	
“basho”	as	place	and	other	times	kept	the	original,	when	I	felt	that	it	was	better	to	emphasize	that	it	is	Nishida’s	specific	
term.	Some	commentators	writing	in	English	have	rendered	the	term	as	“topos”	(e.g.	Yusa	(1986	&	1987),	Baek	(2008),	
and	Maraldo	(2015)).	Accordingly,	we	might	translate	Ōhashi’s	“bashoronteki	tenkai”	to	“topological	turn.”	However,	
Krummel	has	pointed	out	that	the	meaning	of	Nishida’s	“basho”	is	closer	to	Plato’s	“chōra”	than	to	“topos.”	According	to	
Krummel,	“for	the	ancient	Greeks,	topos	is	the	physical	location	that	a	material	thing	happens	to	occupy	at	the	moment	
and	that	is	independent	of	its	being.	Chōra,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	field	that	gives	room	for	such	localities	and	provides	
the	contextual	significance	for	things”	(2015,	p.	203).	If	we	follow	his	interpretation,	which	I	am	sympathetic	to	and	which	
I	believe	Ōhashi	would	be	also,	we	might	render	his	“bashoronteki	tenkai”	as	“chorological	turn.”	But	for	the	sake	of	
simplicity,	I	have	here	given	a	simple	rendering	as	“turn	to	basho.”	
11	NKZ	7,	p.	210.	The	quotation	is	taken	from	the	preface	to	Fundamental	Problems	of	Philosophy	Continued	(The	
Dialectical	World)	published	in	1934.	
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turn	 was	 a	 turning	 away	 from	 transcendental	 thinking.12	While	 Nishida	 himself	 does	 not	 make	 such	statement,	 the	 same	 could	 be	 said	 of	 his	 turn.	 For	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida,	 then,	 the	 turn	 in	 their	thinking	seems	to	have	been	related	to	the	engagement	with	the	transcendental	tradition.		 The	present	study	goes	in	the	same	direction	as	Ōhashi’s	in	the	sense	of	opening	up	the	common	ground	between	Heidegger	and	Nishida.	But	instead	of	comparing	the	nature	of	the	“turn”	in	their	thought,	I	focus	on	their	early,	“pre-turn”	period.13	I	attempt	to	shed	light	on	this	further	common	ground	between	Heidegger	and	Nishida	by	uncovering	their	earlier	critical	engagements	with	transcendental	philosophy.	In	recent	years,	Heidegger	scholars	have	begun	to	speak	of	the	“transcendental	Heidegger.”14	It	has	come	to	be	recognized	that,	at	least	during	the	Marburg	period	(1923-1928),	Heidegger	was	still	 largely	working	within	the	 framework	of	 transcendental	philosophy.	Thus,	 though	there	 is	yet	 to	be	a	consensus	on	this	matter,	 it	 is	 nowadays	 less	 controversial	 to	 read	 Being	 and	 Time	 (1927)	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 critically	appropriate	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Yet,	 “transcendental	 Nishida”	 is	 still	 an	 undeveloped	 idea	 in	Nishida	scholarship.	On	the	one	hand,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	early	Nishida	critically	engaged	with	neo-Kantianism	and	Fichte	as	well	 as	Hegel	 and	Kant.	On	 the	other	hand,	however,	 the	extent	 to	which	Nishida’s	ideas	of	jikaku	and	basho,	both	developed	in	the	period	of	this	engagement,	are	continuous	with	the	transcendental	tradition	is	still	a	matter	awaiting	clarification.			 Accordingly,	 in	 this	 work,	 I	 propose	 to	 articulate	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida’s	 critical	 engagements	with	transcendental	philosophy	during	the	late	1920s.	More	specifically,	I	aim	to	articulate	the	extent	to	which	they	still	work	within	a	traditional	transcendental	framework	and	the	ways	in	which	they	attempt	to	go	beyond	 this	 in	 their	 transformations	of	 transcendental	philosophy.	For	Heidegger,	my	 focus	 is	his	project	in	Being	and	Time.	For	Nishida,	I	focus	on	his	early	theory	of	basho	as	it	was	developed	in	two	of	his	 works	 from	 the	 late	 1920s,	 From	 the	 Acting	 to	 the	 Seeing	 (1927)	 and	 The	 Self-aware	 System	 of	
																																								 																				
12	Cf.	Contributions	to	Philosophy	(From	Enowing),	§§132-134	(GA	65,	pp.	250-254).	
13	In	fact,	it	is	controversial	whether	such	a	“turn”	really	exists	in	Nishida’s	thought.	On	the	one	hand,	there	can	be	no	
denying	that,	in	the	1930s	and	‘40s,	as	his	concern	moves	away	from	epistemological	problems	towards	the	socio-
historical	world,	Nishida	comes	to	revise	his	earlier	views.	And	it	is	true	that	his	statement	in	1934	points	to	an	important	
change	in	his	thinking.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	whether	this	change	amounts	to	a	“turn”	comparable	to	Heidegger’s	
Kehre	as	Ōhashi	suggests	is	somewhat	questionable.	It	seems	to	me	that	Nishida’s	“topological	turn”	took	place	already	in	
the	late	1920s.	Perhaps	it	was	only	later	that	he	came	to	fully	appreciate	the	nature	of	this	turn	as	“seeing	the	world	from	
the	world.”	Nonetheless,	I	would	submit	that	a	revolutionary	“topological	turn”	(or	chorological	turn)	takes	place	in	the	
late	1920s	that	was	then	further	developed	in	the	1930s	and	‘40s.	But	I	will	not	be	concerned	with	this	issue	in	this	work.	
14	The	collective	effort	to	bring	attention	to	the	topic	goes	back	to	a	conference,	“Heidegger	and	Transcendental	
Philosophy,”	held	at	Rice	University	in	2003.	The	manuscripts	from	the	conference	were	then	compiled	in	a	book	under	
the	title,	Transcendental	Heidegger	(2007),	co-edited	by	Jeff	Malpas	and	Steven	Crowell.	This	volume	has	greatly	
contributed	to	the	acknowledgment	of	the	significance	of	the	transcendental	in	Heidegger’s	thought.	
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Universals	(1930).15	By	comparing	and	contrasting	their	engagements,	I	attempt	to	shed	light	on	the	ways	in	which	their	transformations	of	transcendental	philosophy	resemble	and	differ	from	each	other.		 But	 at	 this	 point	we	must	 clarify	why	 examining	 this	 period	of	 their	 thought	 is	worth	our	 time.	After	all,	one	may	wonder,	didn’t	both	of	them	come	to	see	the	limits	of	their	earlier	approach?	To	begin	with,	 both	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 Being	 and	 Time	 and	 Nishida’s	 theory	 of	 basho	 in	 the	 late	 1920s	 are	important,	at	the	very	least,	for	understanding	the	trajectory	of	their	thought.	But	apart	from	that,	they	are	also	 significant	 for	 understanding	 the	 possibilities,	 as	 well	 as	 possible	 limitations,	 of	 transcendental	philosophy	 itself.	For,	as	 I	will	be	arguing,	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida	attempt	 to	 transform	traditional	forms	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 in	 important	 respects.	 Thus,	 their	 critical	 engagements	 with	transcendental	philosophy	reflect	their	attempts	to	overcome	the	Western	metaphysical	tradition	by	still	working	 within	 but	 also	 going	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 transcendental	 framework.	 In	 this	 way,	 at	 least	during	this	period,	both	thinkers	believed	in	the	possibilities	of	transcendental	philosophy,	namely	that	it	
could	 clear	 the	 way	 towards	 overcoming	 the	 Western	 metaphysical	 tradition,	 if	 it	 were	 transformed.	Therefore,	 if	 the	 later	 period	 of	 their	 thought	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 possible	 limitations	 of	 transcendental	philosophy,	 the	 earlier	 period	 goes	 some	 way	 towards	 illuminating	 its	 possibilities.	 Since	 the	 present	work	focuses	only	on	the	earlier	period,	the	possible	limitations	of	transcendental	philosophy	will	not	be	thematized.			 Before	 turning	 to	 an	 outline	 of	 the	 work,	 I	 will	 discuss	 its	 approach.	 When	 one	 engages	 in	comparative	 philosophy	 that	 attempts	 to	 articulate	 a	 non-Western	 tradition	 in	 light	 of	 some	Western	philosophical	concept,	one	must	be	especially	careful	not	to	make	the	fatal	error	of	“recreating	the	other	tradition	in	the	image	of	one’s	own,”	as	Littlejohn	writes	in	the	entry	on	“Comparative	Philosophy”	in	The	
Internet	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy.	16	This	 error	 is	 based	 on	 the	 chauvinistic	 assumption	 that	 the	 other	tradition	is	just	doing	the	same	or	similar	thing	as	“we”	are	doing,	thus	failing	to	understand	the	other	for	its	 own	 sake.	 Now,	 one	 may	 suspect	 that	 I	 am	 in	 danger	 of	 doing	 this	 by	 interpreting	 Nishida	 as	 a	transcendental	 philosopher,	 which	 is	 certainly	 a	 Western	 concept.	 However,	 such	 a	 worry	 can	 be	immediately	 dismissed	 since	 it	 simply	 fails	 to	 see	 what	 John	 Krummel	 calls	 the	 “eclectic	 nature”	 of	Nishida’s	 philosophy.17	Namely,	 one	 of	 the	 characteristic	 features	 of	 Nishida’s	 philosophy	 is	 that	 it	developed	out	of	critical	appropriations	of	ideas	from	various	sources,	not	only	from	the	Eastern	Buddhist	
																																								 																				
15	Though	this	book	was	published	in	1930,	it	is	a	collection	of	essays	published	between	1928	and	1929.	
16	Littlejohn:	http://www.iep.utm.edu/comparat/#SH3a	(accessed	August	15,	2016).	
17	Krummel	2015,	p.	4.	
5	
	
tradition	 but,	 in	 fact,	 especially	 from	 the	 Western	 philosophical	 tradition.18	Thus,	 we	 find	 Nishida	borrowing	terms	such	as	“pure	experience”	(William	James),	“a	priori”	(Kant	and	neo-Kantians)19,	“noesis-noema”	(Husserl),	while	employing	them	in	a	rather	peculiar	manner	 for	 the	purpose	of	articulating	his	own	 position.	 Nishida’s	 critical	 engagement	with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 also	 part	 of	 this	 eclectic	nature	of	his	philosophy.	Therefore,	my	attempt	to	articulate	the	“transcendental	Nishida”	is	in	essence	no	different	from	articulating	the	“transcendental	Heidegger.”	At	the	same	time,	however,	it	is	also	important	to	note	that	I	have	no	intention	of	claiming	that	Nishida	and	Heidegger	alike	were	only	working	within	the	bounds	 of	 a	 traditional	 transcendental	 framework.	 It	 is	 my	 aim	 to	 articulate	 their	 critical	 (this	 is	 the	crucial	 word)	 engagements	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Accordingly,	 the	 present	 work	 takes	 its	departure	 from	 the	 understanding	 that,	 in	 their	 critical	 engagements	 during	 the	 late	 1920s,	 both	Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 work	 within	 but	 also	 attempt	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 traditional	 transcendental	framework	 through	 a	 kind	 of	 transformation.	 The	 study	 therefore	 begins	 with	 a	 clarification	 of	 the	“traditional	transcendental	framework.”		 This	work	 is	divided	 into	 three	parts.	The	 first	part	 consists	of	 a	preliminary	 study	of	Kant	 and	Husserl’s	transcendental	philosophies	(Chapters	1	and	2);	the	second	part	deals	with	Heidegger’s	critical	engagement	with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 (Chapters	 3	 and	4);	 and	 the	 third	 part	 examines	Nishida’s	critical	engagement	thereof	in	comparison	with	Heidegger’s	(Chapters	5	and	6).	I	assume	that	most	of	my	readers	are	less	acquainted	with	Nishida’s	thought	than	with	Heidegger’s.	Thus,	I	first	present	Heidegger	and	 then	Nishida,	making	 references	 to	 Heidegger’s	 ideas	where	 the	 association	may	 be	 helpful	 to	 the	reader.	The	main	comparative	part	of	the	study	is	undertaken	in	Chapter	6.		 In	Part	I,	I	pose	the	question,	what	is	transcendental	philosophy?	In	Chapter	1,	I	examine	two	cases	of	 transcendental	 philosophy:	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 philosophy	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	phenomenology.	 In	 Chapter	 2,	 I	 work	 out	 the	 essence	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 based	 on	 the	investigations	 in	Chapter	1.	 I	 choose	Kant	and	Husserl	not	only	because	 they	are	 representatives	of	 the	tradition	 but	 also	 because	 they	 are	 two	 key	 figures	 that	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 engaged	with.	 In	Chapter	1,	I	argue	that	Kant’s	contribution	lies	in	introducing	a	new	question	to	the	problem	of	knowledge	(“How	 is	 synthetic	 a	 priori	 knowledge	 possible?”)	 and	 seeking	 the	 answer	 through	 transcendental	
																																								 																				
18	See	also,	Davis	(2013	and	2014).	
19	See	my	article,	“Nishida	ni	okeru	‘a	priori’	gainen”	[Nishida	on	the	“a	priori”	concept]	(2015b).	There,	I	analyzed	
Nishida’s	appropriation	or	reinterpretation	of	“a	priori”	during	the	period	from	1916	to	1926,	when	the	term	was	most	
employed.	I	argued	that	he	reinterprets	the	(neo-)Kantian	a	priori	as	the	unifying	constitutive	principle	of	our	various	kinds	
of	experience,	which	is	not	merely	posited	as	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience,	but,	also,	given	in	our	
intuitive	experience.		
6	
	
reflection,	 namely	 a	 second-order	 reflection	 into	 the	 a	 priori	 subjective	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 our	knowledge	 of	 objects.	 I	 then	 identify	 Husserl’s	 main	 differences	 from	 Kant	 in	 his	 insistence	 on	 the	phenomenological	 method,	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction,	 its	 descriptive	nature	 and	 its	 appeal	 to	 intuitive	 evidence.	 I	 further	 articulate	 the	 specific	 sense	 in	 which	 Husserl’s	transcendental-phenomenological	 method	 is	 reflective.	 I	 argue	 that,	 for	 Husserl,	 the	 transcendental-phenomenological	epoché	and	reduction	are	the	specific	methods	that	together	constitute	transcendental	reflection.			 In	Chapter	2,	I	draw	out	three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy	based	on	the	investigations	in	Chapter	1.	(1)	Transcendental	philosophy	is	a	search	for	the	foundation	of	our	experience	and	knowledge.	Transcendental	 foundationalism	 differs	 from	 other	 kinds	 of	 foundationalism	 in	 that	 the	 foundational	relation	is	understood	in	terms	of	transcendental	priority,	i.e.	transcendental	subjectivity	has	priority	over	the	world	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 constitutes	 the	 latter’s	meaning.	 (2)	 It	 employs	 transcendental	 reflection.	Transcendental	reflection	 is	a	second-order	reflection	that	does	not	 thematize	objects	straightforwardly	to	determine	their	real	properties	but,	rather,	thematizes	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	of	 objects.	 (3)	 It	 entails	 an	 alteration	 of	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world.	 One	 of	 the	 important	 metaphysical	implications	of	transcendental	philosophy	is	that	it	awakens	us	from	the	naive	realist	view	of	the	world	as	existing	 independently	 of	 us	 to	 seeing	 the	 world	 as	 existing	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 constituted	 by	transcendental	subjectivity.			 Parts	 II	 and	 III	 deal	 with	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida’s	 critical	 engagements	 with	 transcendental	philosophy	respectively.	The	three	criteria	are	employed	as	a	heuristic	device	to	determine	the	extent	to	which	they	work	within	a	traditional	transcendental	framework	and	the	ways	in	which	they	attempt	to	go	beyond	it.		 In	Part	II,	I	first	articulate	Heidegger’s	project	in	Being	and	Time	(Chapter	3)	and	then	examine	his	critical	 engagement	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 (Chapter	 4).	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 proposed	 project	 in	
Being	and	Time	is	to	clarify	the	meaning	of	being	in	general	(i.e.	the	task	of	fundamental	ontology)	by	way	of	 first	 undertaking	 a	 hermeneutic	 phenomenology	 of	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein.	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	begin	by	examining	the	transcendental	orientation	of	Being	and	Time	in	light	of	the	three	criteria.	I	argue	that	Heidegger’s	project	 is	 transcendental	 insofar	 as:	 (1)	 it	 is	 foundational	 in	 the	 sense	 that	Dasein	has	transcendental	priority	over	the	world,	(2)	it	employs	transcendental	reflection	to	disclose	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience,	and	(3)	it	brings	about	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	from	the	naive-realist	view	to	an	understanding	that	world-disclosure	depends	on	Dasein’s	being.	I	end	by	drawing	out	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 to	 see	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 he	
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attempted	 to	 go	 beyond	 a	 traditional	 transcendental	 framework.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 core	 of	 this	transformation	lies	in	the	radicalness	of	hermeneutic	reflection.		 In	 Part	 III,	 I	 present	 an	 outline	 of	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	 (Chapter	 5)	 and	 examine	 his	critical	 engagement	with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 (Chapter	 6).	 I	 argue	 that	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	
basho	 in	 the	 late	 1920s	was	 an	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 theory	 of	 knowledge	 that	 avoids	 various	 sorts	 of	subjectivism.	He	sought	to	secure	the	objective	validity	of	knowledge	by	showing	that	our	knowledge	of	objects	 ultimately	 presupposes	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness,	 i.e.	 by	 grounding	 our	 knowledge	 of	objects	 in	 the	 experience	 of	 “transcendent	 objects,”	 that	 is,	 the	 experience	 of	 oneself	 as	 absolute	 no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	 itself.	 In	Chapter	6,	 I	 first	examine	the	transcendental	orientation	of	Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho.	 Then,	 I	 draw	 out	 his	 chorological	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	
philosophy.	 (I	 adopt	 Krummel’s	 rendering	 of	 “basho”	 as	 “chōra.”)	 While	 the	 general	 structure	 of	 this	chapter	parallels	 that	of	Chapter	4,	 I	will	here	contrast	Nishida’s	position	with	Heidegger’s.	 I	argue	that,	unlike	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 Being	 and	 Time,	 which	 still	 stays	 close	 to	 the	 core	 of	 traditional	transcendental	philosophy,	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	radically	transforms	all	three	criteria.	(1)	It	is	foundational,	but	only	in	the	weak	sense	that	absolute	nothingness	is	still	seen	as	a	transcendental	ground.	(2)	It	employs	a	transcendental	reflection	that	is	radically	transformed	through	chorological	reflection	to	disclose	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience.	(3)	It	brings	about	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	
the	 world	 from	 our	 naive	 belief	 in	 the	 independent	 existence	 of	 objects	 and	 the	 world,	 to	 our	 direct	experience	 with	 the	 world	 in	 pure	 experience,	 rather	 than	 seeing	 the	 world	 through	 transcendental	subjectivity.	 In	 the	 final	 part,	 I	 clarify	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 and	 Nishida’s	chorological	 transformations	of	 transcendental	philosophy	are	comparable	whilst	different	 in	 important	respects.	 I	 argue	 that,	 if	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 was	ultimately	 the	 result	 of	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	 facticity	 of	 our	 being,	 Nishida’s	 chorological	transformation	of	it	was	the	result	of	the	acknowledgement	of	the	absolute	no-thingness	of	our	being.			 In	 the	 Conclusion,	 I	 recapitulate	my	 findings	 by	 asking	 how	 their	 hermeneutic	 and	 chorological	transformations	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 possibilities	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 that	may	 in	 fact	 reveal	 its	limitations	in	later	Heidegger	and	Nishida.		
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Chapter	1:	Transcendental	philosophy	in	Kant	and	Husserl	
Introduction	Before	we	can	proceed	to	address	the	question	whether	Heidegger’s	project	in	Being	and	Time	and	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	 is	 transcendental	or	not,	what	 is	meant	by	 ‘transcendental’	must	 first	be	clarified.	Here,	however,	we	are	already	confronted	with	a	host	of	difficulties.	First	of	all,	we	do	not	have	in	hand	 a	 ready-made	 definition	 of	 the	 transcendental	 nor	 do	 we	 have	 a	 general	 agreement	 as	 to	 what	transcendental	 philosophy	 is.	 The	 understanding	 of	 what	 it	 attempts	 to	 do,	 its	 essential	 features,	 etc.	simply	 diverges	 amongst	 philosophers	 who	 identify	 themselves	 as	 either	 working	 within	 or	 without	‘transcendental	 philosophy.’	 Some	 historical	 figures	 that	 have	 identified	 themselves	 as	 transcendental	philosophers	include	Kant,	the	German	idealists	(e.g.	Fichte,	Schelling,	Hegel),	Neo-Kantians	(e.g.	Rickert,	Cohen)	 and	 some	 phenomenologists	 (e.g.	 Husserl).	 There	 are	 also	 more	 recent	 defenders	 of	transcendental	philosophy	coming	from	the	phenomenological	tradition	(e.g.	J.	N.	Mohanty,	David	Carr)	as	well	as	the	analytic	tradition,	specifically	in	the	philosophy	of	science	(e.g.	Michael	Friedman).	The	above	brief	list	of	names	alone	suffices	to	show	that	transcendental	philosophy	is	an	umbrella	term	that	covers	a	wide-range	 of	 philosophers	 coming	 from	 various	 philosophical	 backgrounds	 and	 specifically	 with	 very	different	 metaphysical	 views.	 Moreover,	 most	 of	 these	 thinkers	 would	 probably	 not	 be	 happy	 being	categorized	under	the	same	label	with	the	others	in	the	list.	This	leads	us	to	the	following	worry:	Is	there	a	common	thread	 that	 runs	 throughout	such	diverse	views?	Or	are	 these	views	bound	 together	by	 family	resemblance?	 In	 relation	 to	 this	 point,	 there	 is	 the	 further	 difficulty:	 How	 should	 we	 even	 proceed	 to	pursue	the	question	of	whether	there	is	a	common	thread	or	if	it	is	a	case	of	family	resemblance?	Indeed,	there	 is	 even	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 term	 is	 being	 applied	 to	 wholly	 different	 phenomena	 and	 hence	nothing	really	binds	them	together.	The	following	investigation,	however,	proceeds	under	the	conviction	that	 there	 is	 in	 fact	 an	 essence	 pertaining	 to	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 But	 needless	 to	 say,	 such	conviction	 cannot	 simply	go	without	 some	 sort	of	 justification.	Accordingly,	 this	 chapter	will	 serve	as	 a	way	towards	unraveling	the	essence	of	transcendental	philosophy.	How	then	should	we	proceed?	Although	it	is	ideal	to	go	through	all	of	the	views	raised	earlier,	I	will	only	focus	on	two.	Yet,	such	narrowing	down	should	not	at	all	be	taken	as	evidence	for	the	inadequacy	of	the	approach.	For	one	thing,	a	 comprehensive	 study	 of	 all	 the	 instances	 is	 impossible	 not	 just	 practically	 but	 also	methodologically.	This	is	because	the	criteria	required	for	identifying	the	instances	is	exactly	what	we	are	seeking.	But	it	is	also	 not	 necessary	 to	 do	 so	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 our	 project.	 We	 are	 not	 seeking	 a	 comprehensive	 all-inclusive	notion	of	transcendental	philosophy	but	only	one	that	 is	sufficient	to	seek	out	Heidegger’s	and	
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Nishida’s	relation	to	transcendental	philosophy.	Therefore,	for	the	sake	of	our	investigation,	I	will	limit	the	scope	to	two	cases:	Kant	and	Husserl.	I	have	specifically	chosen	these	two	cases	not	only	because	they	are	representatives	of	 the	 tradition	but	because	 they	are	 two	key	 figures	 that	one	necessarily	comes	across	when	comparing	Heidegger’s	and	Nishida’s	relation	to	transcendental	thought.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	Kant	and	Husserl	were	 influential	on	 them	both,	 though	 in	different	ways.	Regarding	Nishida,	however,	there	are	other	figures	in	the	transcendental	tradition	that	arguably	had	more	influence	on	him,	such	as	Hegel	and	Fichte.	I	will	touch	on	their	influence	on	Nishida	in	Part	III	when	we	examine	Nishida’s	project	but	for	the	purpose	of	Part	I,	I	have	limited	my	focus	to	the	common	denominators.	In	the	following,	we	will	first	look	at	Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy	and	then	proceed	to	examine	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology.	 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 pave	 the	 way	 towards	 unraveling	 the	 essence	 of	transcendental	 philosophy.	 The	 subsequent	 chapter	 will	 then	 proceed	 to	 articulate	 the	 essence	 of	transcendental	philosophy	based	on	the	investigations	in	this	chapter.	
	
1 Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy	
1.1 Against	the	way	of	ideas		 Kant	 is	 generally	 regarded	 as	 the	 father	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 due	 to	 his	 systematic	construction	 of	 a	 radically	 novel	 approach	 in	 philosophy.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 he	 came	 up	 with	 a	completely	 new	 set	 of	 philosophical	 problems	 by	 ignoring	 the	 tradition	 before	 him.	 Just	 like	 any	 good	philosopher	(at	least	in	my	definition	of	the	term),	he	followed	the	minds	of	his	predecessors	and	in	doing	so,	he	saw	the	importance	of	the	problems	that	they	were	grappling	with.	Kant’s	novelty	lies	not	in	setting	forth	new	problems	but	in	seeing	the	old	problems	in	a	completely	different	light.		The	cardinal	problem	that	Kant	had	inherited	was	the	problem	of	how	knowledge	of	the	world	is	possible.	This	problem	of	knowledge	is	a	specifically	modern	problem	insofar	as	it	arose	from	the	theory	of	 ideas	 originating	with	 Descartes.	 Philosophers	 before	 Descartes	 naturally	 held	 the	 view	 that	we	 are	directly	in	touch	with	the	world.	Without	going	into	the	details,	it	was	the	skepticism	regarding	such	naive	realism	that	led	to	Descartes’	discovery	of	the	ideas.	Descartes’	theory	of	ideas,	at	least	traditionally,	has	been	interpreted	as	a	representationalist	view.1	According	to	this	interpretation,	Descartes	subscribed	to	the	view	that	we	are	immediately	aware	of	ideas	and	only	mediately	aware	of	external	objects.	To	put	it	
																																								 																				
1	There	are	recent	scholars	who	have	proposed	an	alternative	reading	of	Descartes’	position.	Rather	than	interpreting	
Descartes	as	a	representationalist,	they	have	interpreted	him	as	a	direct	realist.	Cf.	Nadler	(1989)	and	Yolton	(1975).	I	will	
leave	this	issue	aside.	
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another	 way,	 the	 immediate	 objects	 of	 all	 forms	 of	 consciousness	 are	 ‘ideas’	 (which	 are	 either	mental	states	 or	 mental	 entities),	 and	 these	 ideas	 refer	 to	 something	 beyond	 themselves,	 i.e.	 they	 represent	objects.	 Such	 a	 representationalist	 view	 of	 consciousness	 is	 also	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 “way	 of	ideas.”	This	was	a	view	shared	by	many	modern	philosophers	such	as	Locke,	Berkeley	and	Hume,	though	they	disagreed	on	the	nature	of	these	ideas.	Now,	since	these	ideas	are	somehow	given	to	the	subject	and	it	is	only	via	ideas	that	we	become	aware	of	objects,	the	crucial	problem	was	to	figure	out	how	this	could	be	carried	out.	In	other	words,	the	pressing	question	was:	How	can	ideas	represent	external	objects?	Or	formulated	 differently:	 How	 can	 ideas	 or	 representations	 (I	 use	 these	 terms	 interchangeably	 for	 my	purposes	here)	correspond	to	objects?	The	modern	problem	of	knowledge	arose	in	this	context.	Namely,	what	justifies	our	knowledge	of	the	external	world	if	there	is	a	veil	between	us	and	the	world?		Most	commentators	on	Kant	agree	that	what	distinguishes	Kant	from	his	predecessors	is	that	he	breaks	with	this	tradition.	But	rather	than	denying	the	existence	of	ideas	and	representations	altogether	and	returning	to	the	pre-modern	naive	view	that	we	are	somehow	directly	in	touch	with	the	world,	Kant	addressed	a	completely	different	question	than	the	problem	of	representation.	Transcendental	philosophy	begins	 with	 Kant’s	 discovery	 of	 this	 new	 question.	 As	 David	 Carr	 puts	 it,	 transcendental	 philosophy	“attempts	to	revamp	the	philosophical	project,	attempts	to	pose	new	questions	rather	than	provide	new	answers	to	old	questions.”2	Instead	of	asking	how	representations	can	correspond	to	objects,	Kant	asked:	
How	 is	 representation	 possible	 at	 all?	 Here,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 that	 the	 two	 questions	 are	radically	different.	The	traditional	question	asks	how	a	mental	state	or	a	mental	entity	can	correspond	to	something	completely	different	from	itself,	i.e.	non-mental	objects.	The	problem	with	this	question	is	that	it	inevitably	gives	rise	to	skepticism	regarding	the	external	world,	namely	Cartesian	skepticism.	If	we	only	have	 direct	 knowledge	 of	 ideas	 or	 representations	 and	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 external	world	 is	 always	indirectly	inferred,	how	can	we	be	certain	that	our	representations	really	correspond	to	objects?		One	way	to	reply	to	the	skeptic	is	to	dismiss	the	question	as	ill-founded.	When	various	attempts	to	solve	a	problem	have	failed	to	succeed,	then	it	is	always	a	good	tactic	to	ask	whether	it	isn’t	the	problem	itself	that	is	problematic.	This	is	indeed	where	we	find	Kant’s	success.	Rather	than	warding	off	the	skeptic	by	 trying	 to	 come	 up	 with	 a	 good	 reply	 and	 thereby	 admitting	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 question,	 Kant	dismissed	 the	 question	 to	 begin	 with.	 In	 this	 sense,	 though	 Kant’s	 argument	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	refutation	 of	 skepticism,	 it	 must	 be	 kept	 in	 mind	 that	 Kant	 was	 not	 trying	 to	 prove	 what	 the	 skeptics	doubted,	namely	whether	or	not	we	have	knowledge	of	the	external	world.	To	attempt	such	proof	would	be	to	admit	that	such	proof	is	wanting.	Rather,	he	saw	that	such	proof	is	unnecessary	for	it	was	based	on	
																																								 																				
2	Carr	1999,	p.	31.	
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questionable	assumptions	about	the	way	the	mind	works	in	its	relation	to	the	world.	Instead	of	assuming	that	the	mind	is	equipped	with	representations	that	somehow	reach	out	to	the	world,	he	began	with	the	less	controversial	view	 that	we	are	 in	possession	of	 some	a	priori	knowledge,	 i.e.	knowledge	 that	holds	universally	and	necessarily.	The	success	of	mathematics	and	the	natural	sciences	at	the	time	was	taken	as	evidence	 for	 this.	Accordingly,	 granted	 that	 there	 is	 synthetic	a	priori	knowledge,	namely	universal	and	necessary	knowledge	that	 is	not	merely	tautological	but	adds	to	our	body	of	knowledge,	the	question	to	ask	was	how	 this	 is	 possible.	Moreover,	 in	 reorienting	 the	 problem	 this	way,	Kant	was	 questioning	 the	very	conception	of	knowledge	and	representation,	i.e.	what	knowledge	and	representation	are	in	essence.	To	quote	Carr	again:	Kant	is	more	concerned	with	what	such	knowledge	is	rather	than	whether	we	have	it.	In	this	sense	his	question	would	be	prior	to	that	of	the	skeptic.	The	what	question	is,	if	you	will,	a	question	of	essence	rather	than	existence,	of	possibility	rather	than	actuality.3	While	 this	 prima	 facie	 looks	 like	 Kant	 is	 avoiding	 what	 seems	 like	 the	 most	 important	 issue,	namely	the	actuality	of	representation	or	knowledge	rather	than	their	mere	possibility,	this	is	so	only	on	the	 face	of	 it.	 Firstly,	 in	questioning	 the	possibility	of	 representation,	Kant	was	 reconfiguring	what	 is	at	stake.	In	other	words,	he	was	redefining	what	“representations”	are.	As	Frederick	Beiser	writes:		For	 Kant,	 no	 idea	 is	 simply	 given,	 but	 all	 are	 constructed,	 the	 products	 of	 more	 basic	 synthetic	activities.	[…]	Representation	is	never	something	simple,	basic,	and	given,	but	it	is	always	something	complex,	derived,	and	constructed.4		This	is	not	to	say	that	Kant	claimed	that	our	mind	constructs	representations	on	its	own	with	no	external	input.	On	the	contrary,	representations	are	products	of	our	mind’s	spontaneity	and	receptivity.	The	mind	actively	organizes	 the	material	 given	 to	us	 from	outside	 the	mind.	As	 the	 famous	quote	goes,	 “thoughts	without	 content	 are	 empty,	 intuitions	without	 concepts	 are	 blind”	 (A51/B75)5.	 And,	 as	 Lee	 Braver	 has	rightly	 noted,	 Kant’s	 discovery	 does	 not	 lie	 in	 the	 rather	 uninteresting	 claim	 that	 our	 mind	 makes	 a	contribution	to	experience.	No	one	was	denying	that	the	mind	contributes	to	our	experience.	For	example,	Descartes	and	Locke	both	took	secondary	qualities	as	arising	from	our	contribution	to	experience.6	What	marks	 Kant’s	 position	 is	 that,	while	 all	 of	 these	 thinkers	 took	 the	mind’s	 contribution	 to	 be	 a	 negative	
																																								 																				
3	Ibid.,	p.	48.	
4	Beiser	2002,	p.	134.	
5	I	follow	the	standard	practice	of	referring	to	the	pages	of	the	Academy	Edition.	These	are	given	in	both	the	English	and	
the	German	versions	on	which	I	draw.	
6	Braver	2007,	p.	36.	
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contribution	that	distorts	reality,	Kant	took	this	to	be	essential	for	our	knowledge	of	reality.	Namely,	Kant	reversed	 the	 idea	regarding	what	 the	mind	does:	 “Kant’s	revolution	 is	 to	 find	 this	contribution	not	only	acceptable	 but	 in	 fact	 essential	 for	 knowledge.” 7 	In	 this	 way,	 in	 questioning	 the	 possibility	 of	representation,	Kant	was	asking	how	it	is	possible	that	knowledge	of	objects	essentially	involves	the	work	of	our	minds.	Furthermore,	Kant	was	specifically	interested	in	a	particular	type	of	knowledge:	knowledge	of	objects	that	holds	necessarily	and	universally	or,	to	use	Kantian	language,	a	priori	synthetic	knowledge.	Hence,	the	question	“How	is	representation	possible	at	all?”	is	further	transformed	into,	“How	is	synthetic	
a	priori	knowledge	possible?”	Therefore,	it	is	not	correct	to	say	that	Kant	was	avoiding	the	issue	concerning	the	actuality	of	 representation	since	he	was	 indeed	giving	a	positive	account	of	 it,	 albeit	a	different	one	from	that	of	his	predecessors.8		Moreover,	 it	 is	 in	 this	 regard	 that	Kant	has	been	acclaimed	 to	have	reconciled	 the	 two	opposing	schools,	 rationalism	 and	 empiricism.	 And	 it	 is	 common	 to	 hear	 that	 this	 is	 where	 Kant’s	 greatest	accomplishment	 lies.	 To	 put	 the	 opposition	 rather	 crudely,	 while	 rationalists	 demanded	 universal	 and	necessary	knowledge	apparently	unattainable	through	experience,	empiricists	insisted	on	the	necessity	of	experience	 for	 knowledge.	 Kant	was	 able	 to	 reconcile	 these	 two	 positions	 by	 claiming	 that	 knowledge	depends	 on	 experience	 but	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	would	 lack	 content	without	 the	material	 given	 in	experience.	 In	other	words,	universality	and	necessity	were	granted	by	 the	mind’s	a	priori	 contribution	while	still	affording	the	mind’s	openness	to	the	world.	Secondly,	 and	 related	 to	 the	 first	 point,	 it	 is	 not	 true	 that	 Kant	 was	 avoiding	 the	 issue	 of	 the	actuality	of	representation	since,	in	questioning	the	possibility	of	representation,	he	introduced	a	different	dimension	to	the	picture,	so	to	say,	that	in	fact	reveals	the	actuality	of	the	representation	in	a	new	light.	Simply	put,	while	Kant’s	predecessors	were	working	with	two	categories,	the	subjective	and	the	objective	or	 the	 mental	 and	 the	 physical,	 Kant	 introduced	 a	 new	 category:	 the	 transcendental.	 While	 his	predecessors	were	concerned	with	how	a	subjective	(or	mental)	thing	can	correspond	to	an	objective	(or	physical)	 thing,	 Kant	 questioned	 how	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 subjective	 and	 the	 objective	 together	constitute	our	knowledge.	Accordingly,	he	questioned	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	synthesis	of	the	subjective	 and	 the	 objective	 (or	 the	 mental	 and	 the	 physical)	 and	 sought	 the	 answer	 in	 the	 newly	discovered	 transcendental	 realm.	 Put	 differently,	 in	 questioning	 the	 possibility	 of	 representation,	 he	sought	 the	 answer	 in	 neither	 the	 subjective	 nor	 the	 objective	 (or	 the	mental	 and	 the	 physical)	 but	 the	
transcendental	dimension,	so	to	say.	To	be	sure,	this	does	not	yet	clarify	how	the	introduction	of	this	new	
																																								 																				
7	Ibid.,	p.	37.	
8	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	how	Kant’s	view	of	representations	differs	from	his	predecessors’,	see	Beiser	(2002).	
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transcendental	 dimension	 reconfigures	 the	 actuality	 of	 representations,	 but	 we	 will	 come	 back	 to	 this	point	later.	Hereto	we	have	seen	that	Kant	introduced	a	new	question	(“How	is	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	possible?”)	 and	 a	 new	 dimension	 (the	 transcendental)	 in	 addressing	 the	 problem	 of	 knowledge.	 But	 in	order	 to	 understand	Kant’s	 originality	 in	 full,	we	must	 get	 a	 grip	 on	what	 this	 new	dimension	 actually	amounts	 to.	 Namely,	 what	 is	 the	 transcendental?	 Moreover,	 I	 have	 been	 freely	 using	 the	 word	“transcendental”	 to	qualify	 “dimension”	and	“realm”	up	to	 this	point,	but	 the	word	qualifies	many	other	things:	 knowledge,	 inquiry,	 argument,	 philosophy,	 etc.	 In	 fact,	 there	 is	 one	 concept	 that	 is	 particularly	important	for	clarifying	the	exact	meaning	of	this	term	insofar	as	it	defines	the	specific	method	employed	in	transcendental	philosophy:	transcendental	reflection.	Accordingly,	in	the	following,	let	us	see	what	Kant	has	to	say	about	this	transcendental	reflection	in	relation	to	other	kinds	of	reflection.			
1.2 Transcendental	reflection	in	Kant		 Reflection,	 as	 generally	 understood	 in	 philosophical	 discourse,	 is	 the	 turning	 back	 of	consciousness	onto	itself.	But	reflection	can	be	further	distinguished	into	various	kinds	depending	on	how	it	 turns	 back	 onto	 itself	 and	 what	 is	 thematized	 as	 a	 result.	 A	 typical	 kind	 of	 this	 turning	 back	 of	consciousness	onto	itself	 is	 introspection,	or	“inner	sense”	(innere	Sinn)	as	Kant	calls	 it	 in	the	Critique	of	
Pure	Reason	(Kritik	der	 reinen	Vernunft,	 hereafter	Critique).	While	we	 use	 our	 outer	 sense	 to	 represent	objects	that	are	external	to	us,	it	is	with	inner	sense	that	we	represent	to	ourselves	our	own	mental	states.	According	to	Kant,	whilst	distinguished	vis-à-vis	the	forms	required	for	providing	representations	(space	for	outer	sense	and	time	for	inner	sense),	both	senses	give	us	representations	of	“objects”	in	a	broad	sense.		Just	as	outer	sense	gives	us	representations	of	external	objects,	 inner	sense	provides	representations	of	ourselves	as	objects.	But	this	is	not	the	only	way	we	can	become	aware	of	ourselves.	As	Kant	says,	“this	[i.e.	inner	sense]	presents	even	ourselves	 to	consciousness	only	as	we	appear	 to	ourselves,	not	as	we	are	 in	ourselves”	(B152-153).	What	Kant	is	alluding	to	here	is	the	distinction	between	ourselves	as	objects	(“as	we	appear	to	ourselves”)	and	ourselves	as	subjects	(“as	we	are	in	ourselves”).	Inner	sense	makes	us	aware	of	ourselves	only	in	the	former	way	but	not	the	latter.	Since	inner	sense,	in	a	similar	vein	to	outer	sense,	makes	 us	 aware	 of	 ourselves	 as	 objects	 and	 only	 as	 objects,	 Kant	 designates	 such	 consciousness	 of	
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ourselves	as	“merely	empirical,	forever	variable”	(A107).9	Let	us	call	this	kind	of	reflection	(introspection	or	 inner	 sense)	 “empirical	 reflection”	 as	 others	 have	done10	since	 it	 is	 consciousness	 turning	 back	 onto	itself	 and	 takes	 itself	 as	 objects	 for	 further	 empirical	 investigation	 (e.g.	 it	 inquires	 about	 the	 real	properties	 of	my	 perception,	 its	 causal	 origins,	 etc.).	We	 can	 also	 call	 this	 reflection,	more	 specifically,	“psychological	 reflection”	 as	 it	 is	 in	 psychology	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 reflection	 is	 typically	 employed	 to	investigate	the	real	properties	of	the	mind.	In	 the	 appendix	 to	 the	 Transcendental	 Analytic	 of	 the	Critique	 titled,	 “On	 the	 Amphiboly	 of	 the	Concepts	 of	 Reflection,”	 Kant	 introduces	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 reflection	 to	 empirical	 or	 psychological	reflection	 (A260-263/B316-319).	 He	 calls	 it	 “transcendental	 reflection”	 (transzendentale	Überlegung	or	
Reflexion)	and	gives	the	following	characterization:		The	 action	 through	which	 I	make	 the	 comparison	 of	 representations	 in	 general	with	 the	 cognitive	power	in	which	they	are	situated,	and	through	which	I	distinguish	whether	they	are	to	be	compared	to	 one	 another	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 pure	 understanding	 or	 to	 pure	 intuition,	 I	 call	 transcendental	
reflection	[transzendentale	Überlegung].	(A261/B317)	Since	this	definition	is	not	very	straightforward,	some	explanation	is	fitting.	Kant	believed	that	a	specific	kind	of	reflection	is	required	prior	to	making	any	sort	of	judgment.	As	he	says:	“all	judgments,	indeed	all	comparisons,	require	a	reflection	 [Überlegung],	 i.e.	distinction	of	 the	cognitive	power	to	which	the	given	concepts	belong”	(A261/B317).	What	he	 is	referring	to	by	reflection	here	 is	not	 the	empirical	reflection	that	we	 have	 seen	 earlier	 but	what	 he	 calls	 transcendental	 reflection.	 Let	 us	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	we	make	the	statement,	“This	cup	is	blue.”	Kant	is	saying	that,	in	order	to	be	able	to	make	this	judgment	and,	indeed,	 in	 order	 to	 even	 be	 able	 to	 compare	 the	 two	 representations	 “cup”	 and	 “blue,”	 we	 must	 first	deliberate	and	work	out	which	cognitive	faculty,	i.e.	understanding	or	sensibility,	each	belongs	to.	In	other	words,	 it	 is	only	because	we	come	to	know	through	deliberation	that	cups	are	sensible	objects	to	which	color	concepts	can	apply	that	we	are	able	to	make	this	statement	in	a	meaningful	way.	We	would	be	failing	to	properly	employ	transcendental	reflection	if	we	were	to	say,	 for	example,	“Causes	are	blue,”	since	we	otherwise	 know	 that	 causes	 are	 non-sensible	 things	 and	 hence	 cannot	 take	 on	 color.	 Transcendental	reflection,	 according	 to	 Kant,	 is	 thus	 the	 deliberation	 of	 representations	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 cognitive	faculty	to	which	they	belong.		
																																								 																				
9	In	the	same	context	Kant	calls	this	“empirical	apperception”	and	distinguishes	it	from	“transcendental	apperception”	
which	is	the	consciousness	of	ourselves	as	subjects.	Since	my	focus	here	is	on	the	distinction	between	empirical	and	
transcendental	reflection	and	not	so	much	on	the	modes	of	self-consciousness,	though	closely	related,	I	have	left	out	the	
discussion	about	apperception	here.	
10	E.g.	Schnädelbach	(1977)	and	Mohanty	(1985).	
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But	then,	how	exactly	is	this	different	from	empirical	reflection?	Kant	explains:	
Reflection	(reflexio)	does	not	have	to	do	with	objects	themselves,	in	order	to	acquire	concepts	directly	from	 them,	 but	 rather	 is	 the	 state	 of	 mind	 in	 which	 we	 first	 prepare	 ourselves	 to	 find	 out	 the	subjective	conditions	under	which	we	can	arrive	at	concepts.	(A260/B316)	Again,	what	Kant	 is	 referring	 to	with	 “reflection”	here	 is	 specifically	 “transcendental	 reflection”	and	not	any	other	kind.	For	we	have	seen	that	empirical	reflection	is	indeed	concerned	with	some	kind	of	“objects	themselves,”	i.e.	our	own	mental	states.	Instead	of	taking	a	domain	of	objects	with	a	view	to	determining	its	 properties,	 transcendental	 reflection	 inquires	 into	 the	 subjective	 conditions	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	representations	 with	 a	 view	 to	 determining	 its	 source,	 i.e.	 whether	 it	 belongs	 to	 understanding	 or	sensibility.	Transcendental	reflection,	understood	in	this	way,	is	in	accordance	with	the	oft-quoted	definition	of	transcendental	knowledge	given	in	the	Introduction	to	the	Critique:	I	call	all	cognition	transcendental	that	is	occupied	not	so	much	with	objects	but	rather	with	our	mode	of	cognition	of	objects	insofar	as	this	is	to	be	possible	a	priori.	(A	11-12/B25)		Transcendental	knowledge	is	not	a	priori	knowledge	of	objects	themselves	but	a	priori	knowledge	of	our	
cognition	of	objects.	Some	have	given	expression	to	this	distinction	by	resorting	to	a	terminology	used	by	the	 neo-Kantians,	 Nicolai	 Hartmann	 and	 Theodor	 Adorno:	 intentio	 recta	 and	 intentio	 obliqua.	 In	 the	context	of	distinguishing	transcendental	inquiry	from	all	first-order	inquires,	for	example,	Steven	Crowell	makes	use	of	this	terminology:		First-order	 inquiries	 –	whether	 empirical	 like	 physics	 and	psychology	 or	 a	 priori	 like	mathematics	and	metaphysics	–	are	carried	out	in	an	 intentio	recta	and	they	establish	the	real	properties	of	their	objects.	Transcendental	critique,	in	contrast,	asks	how	it	is	possible	that	such	first-order	thinking	can	yield	 knowledge,	 and	 it	 deals	with	 objects	 and	 their	 properties	 only	 in	 a	 reflective	 intentio	obliqua	concerned	with	what	makes	them	cognitively	accessible.11		Whatever	else	the	terms	may	signify,	I	take	it	that	Crowell	with	some	others12	has	used	the	term	intentio	
recta	to	basically	denote	our	consciousness	of	objects	(whether	they	be	physical,	psychical,	mathematical	or	 metaphysical)	 while	 using	 intentio	 obliqua	 to	 signify	 the	 consciousness	 of	 the	 subjective	 aspects	 of	cognition	or,	more	precisely	put,	the	subjective	conditions	 for	the	possibility	of	our	cognition	of	objects.	I	add	 the	 latter	 qualification	 since	 psychological	 reflection	 also	 inquires	 into	 the	 subjective	 aspects	 of	
																																								 																				
11	Crowell	2013,	p.	11.	
12	E.g.	Mohanty	1985,	p.	xviii.	
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cognition	yet	is	a	version	of	the	intentio	recta	insofar	as	it	is	an	investigation	into	the	mind	understood	as	some	kind	of	an	object	or	entity	existing	in	the	world.	Intentio	obliqua,	in	this	context,	specifies	a	second-order	consciousness	 that	 looks	 into	 the	subjective	conditions	of	our	cognition	of	objects.	The	 important	observation	 to	 note	 is	 that,	 whether	 it	 be	 reflection,	 knowledge,	 critique,	 inquiry	 or	 anything	 else,	whenever	 the	 qualification	 “transcendental”	 is	 added,	 it	 means	 that	 the	 concern	 is	 not	 so	 much	 with	objects	 themselves	but	with	 the	subjective	conditions	 for	 the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	objects.	 In	this	 sense	 (and	 I	want	 to	 stress	 this	point	 as	 it	 is	 important),	 the	transcendental	essentially	designates	a	
second-order	discourse.		 Transcendental	knowledge	is,	 furthermore,	designated	as	the	a	priori	knowledge	of	our	cognition	of	 objects.	 This	 means	 that	 transcendental	 knowledge	 is	 the	 necessary	 and	 universal	 knowledge	 of	 our	cognition	 of	 objects.	 Importantly,	 however,	 a	 priority	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 designate	 transcendental	knowledge.	Mathematical	knowledge,	for	example,	is	a	priori	but	not	transcendental.	What	distinguishes	transcendental	 knowledge	 from	 other	 a	 priori	 knowledge	 is	 that	 it	 is	 essentially	 concerned	 with	 our	cognition	of	objects.	Accordingly,	to	rephrase	our	earlier	formulation:	transcendental	reflection	is	a	second-
order	reflection	into	the	a	priori	subjective	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	objects.	In	 the	 same	 section	where	 Kant	 introduces	 transcendental	 reflection,	 he	 raises	 another	 kind	 of	reflection	that	is	to	be	distinguished	from	both	empirical	and	transcendental	reflection.	He	calls	this	third	kind	of	reflection,	“logical	reflection.”	Logical	reflection	is	“a	mere	comparison”	(A262/B318)	in	which	“we	simply	 compare	our	 concepts	with	 each	other	 in	 the	understanding”	 (A279/B335).	 It	 is	 through	 logical	reflection	 that	 we	 come	 to	 see,	 for	 example,	 that	 the	 concepts	 “blue”	 and	 “color”	 are	 related	 through	inclusion,	 i.e.	 that	 “blue”	 is	 a	 concept	 that	 is	 contained	 in	 the	 concept	 “color.”	 Therefore,	 in	 logical	reflection,	 “there	 is	 complete	 abstraction	 from	 the	 cognitive	 power	 to	which	 the	 given	 representations	belong”	(A262/B318).	Logical	reflection,	then,	is	a	mere	logical	deliberation	that	abstracts	away	from	the	source	of	the	representations.				Having	laid	out	the	three	kinds	of	reflection	discussed	by	Kant,	namely	empirical,	transcendental	and	logical	reflection,	we	are	now	in	a	position	to	see	in	what	way	Kant	was	original	with	his	answer	to	the	problem	of	knowledge	and	more	specifically	to	the	question,	how	is	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	possible?	To	 begin	 with,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 answer	 cannot	 be	 sought	 through	 logical	 reflection,	 for	 a	 logical	analysis	 of	 the	 concepts,	 “synthesis,”	 “a	 priori,”	 and	 “knowledge,”	 can	 yield	 no	 more	 than	 what	 the	concepts	already	entail,	and	the	possibility	of	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	is	simply	not	entailed	in	any	of	the	 concepts,	 either	 taken	 individually	 or	 together.	 Accordingly,	 the	 possibility	 of	 synthetic	 a	 priori	knowledge	can	only	be	investigated	through	empirical	or	transcendental	reflection.	It	is	here	that	we	can	
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identify	Kant’s	true	contribution.	For	Kant	sought	the	answer	to	the	above	question	in	the	transcendental	
and	not	the	empirical.	In	other	words,	Kant	was	specifically	seeking	the	a	priori	conditions,	which	were	not	real	properties	of	objects	but	that	which	makes	possible	our	knowledge	of	objects	and,	hence,	is	second-order.	 Therefore,	 Kant’s	 originality	 lies	 in	 discovering	 transcendental	 reflection	 as	 the	 specific	 kind	 of	method	to	seek	out	the	answer	to	the	question,	how	is	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	possible.	
	
1.3 The	status	of	the	transcendental:	psychological	vs.	logical	interpretation		 As	we	have	seen	above,	one	of	the	important	facets	of	the	Kantian	legacy	is	to	have	delineated	the	transcendental	dimension	 in	contrast	 to	the	 logical	and	the	empirical.	We	have,	moreover,	seen	that	the	transcendental	designates	 a	 second-order	 inquiry	 insofar	 as	 it	 turns	away	 from	objects	 themselves	 and	inquires	into	their	conditions	of	possibility.	In	this	way,	Kant	seems	to	have	successfully	found	a	novel	way	to	 deal	with	 the	 old	 problem	of	 knowledge.	 Yet	 despite	 the	 alleged	 discovery	 of	 the	 transcendental,	 its	exact	nature	still	seems	elusive.	The	question	remains:	What	are	these	conditions	that	make	possible	our	knowledge	of	objects?		Kant	did	not	in	fact	give	a	decisive	answer	but	instead	wavered	between	two	conceptions.	These	two	rather	different	 conceptions	are	most	notable	 in	 the	Transcendental	Deduction	where	he	discusses	the	status	of	 the	categories	and	the	differences	are	reflected	 in	the	A-	and	B-editions	of	 the	section.	The	two	 conceptions,	moreover,	 have	 become	 a	 touchstone	 that	 divides	Kant’s	 successors.	 In	 the	A-edition,	Kant	traces	the	origin	of	the	categories	in	the	threefold	synthesis	of	the	mind,	namely	the	apprehension	of	representations	 in	 intuition,	 reproduction	 in	 imagination	 and	 recognition	 in	 concepts.	 In	 the	 B-edition,	however,	 the	 spontaneity	 of	 understanding	 is	 emphasized	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 others.	 The	 first	interpretation	takes	Kant’s	appeal	to	the	threefold	synthesis	in	the	A-edition	to	indicate	the	psychological	origin	 of	 the	 categories.	 According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 often	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 psychological	
interpretation,	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 are	 nothing	 but	 our	 cognitive	operations.	 What	 makes	 possible	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 is	 what	 we	 happen	 to	 be	 equipped	 with.	 This	would	 further	 imply	 that	 Kant	 is	 committed	 to	 the	 fallacy	 of	 psychologism,	 i.e.	 the	 attempt	 to	 ground	logical	 laws	 on	 psychological	 laws.	 Yet	 this	 interpretation	 is	 hardly	 in	 line	 with	 the	 description	 of	 the	transcendental	that	we	have	already	seen,	namely	that	it	is	a	priori	and	that	it	is	a	second-order	inquiry.	If	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	knowledge	of	objects	are	nothing	but	our	cognitive	operations,	then	transcendental	inquiry	reduces	to	psychological	inquiry,	i.e.	a	first-order	empirical	inquiry	into	our	minds.	
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Furthermore,	the	psychological	interpretation	fails	to	account	for	the	objective	validity	of	the	categories.	The	 aim	 of	 the	 Transcendental	 Deduction	 was	 precisely	 to	 show	 that	 the	 categories	 are	 not	 only	 the	necessary	 structures	 of	 our	mind	 but	 that	 they	 also	 hold	 for	 all	 rational	 beings	 and	 are	 the	 necessary	structures	 of	 objects.	 As	 Beiser	 rightly	 notes,	 even	 if	 the	 attempt	 in	 the	 Deduction	 is	 a	 failure,	 the	psychological	interpretation	must	first	contend	with	the	Deduction	itself	and	provide	an	account	of	why	it	was	a	failure.13		The	second	interpretation,	often	called	the	logical	interpretation,	takes	the	B-edition	seriously	and	avoids	these	difficulties	by	maintaining	a	purely	logical	reading	of	the	transcendental.	The	proponents	of	this	 interpretation	 see	 that	 so	 long	 as	 one	 is	 interested	 in	 how	 cognition	makes	 knowledge	 of	 objects	possible,	 one	 is	 stuck	 in	 a	 first-order	 inquiry	 since	 this	 entails	 investigating	 the	 mind’s	 faculties	 and	activities.	As	a	result,	the	question	of	cognition	is	replaced	by	that	of	the	justification	of	some	beliefs.	The	conditions	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 then	 amount	 to	 the	 truth-conditions	 of	 our	judgments.14	This	 interpretation	 is	 supported	 by	 Kant’s	 famous	 employment	 of	 the	 juridical	 distinction	between	the	quid	juris	and	quid	facti,	the	question	of	right	and	question	of	fact	(A84/B116).	“By	what	right	do	concepts	relate	a	priori	to	objects”	(i.e.	what	justifies	our	beliefs	about	the	world)	is	a	different	question	from	that	which	questions	the	factual	or	causal	origin	of	those	concepts.	Only	the	former	is	relevant	to	the	transcendental	deduction	of	concepts.	As	Kant	explains:		I	 therefore	 call	 the	 explanation	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 concepts	 can	 relate	 to	 objects	 a	 priori	 their	transcendental	deduction,	and	distinguish	this	from	empirical	deduction,	which	shows	how	a	concept	is	acquired	through	experience	and	reflection	on	it,	and	therefore	concerns	not	the	lawfulness	but	the	fact	from	which	the	possession	has	arisen.	(A85/B117)	This	 distinction	 between	 the	quid	 juris	and	quid	 facti	was	 later	 emphasized	 by	Hermann	 Lotze	 and	 the	neo-Kantians.	Lotze	maintained	that	we	must	distinguish	between	the	realms	of	existence	(or	matters	of	fact)	 and	 validity.	 To	 ask	 about	 the	 truth	 or	 validity	 of	 a	 judgment	 is	 quite	 different	 from	asking	 about	matters	of	fact.15	Following	Lotze,	both	the	Marburg	school	and	the	Baden	school	of	neo-Kantians	agreed	that	the	questions	of	being,	factuality,	and	causality	are	different	sorts	of	questions	from	those	regarding	validity,	value	and	normativity.	They	believed	that	psychologism	in	logic	could	only	be	avoided	by	seeing	that	 the	transcendental	 investigates	not	 the	 former	but	 the	 latter.	 In	 this	way,	 the	neo-Kantians	gave	an	unambiguous	 characterization	of	 the	 transcendental	 by	 identifying	 it	with	 the	normative.	Reformulated	
																																								 																				
13	Beiser	2002,	pp.	168-169.	
14	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	170.	
15	Cf.	Lotze	1884,	§§	316-317.	
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and	revived	by	the	neo-Kantians,	transcendental	inquiry	therefore	designated	second-order	inquiry	as	the	
normative	(and	thus	a	priori)	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	objects.		Perhaps	the	biggest	advantage	the	logical	interpretation	has	over	the	psychological	is	that	it	does	justice	 to	 the	 defining	 aspect	 of	 the	 transcendental,	 namely	 its	 second-order	 status.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	then	 that	 this	 interpretation,	 specifically	 with	 its	 emphasis	 on	 normativity,	 has	 gained	 much	 support	among	 contemporary	 Kantian	 scholars	 and	 transcendental	 philosophers	 alike.	 Steven	 Crowell,	 for	example,	supports	this	interpretation	in	his	formulation	of	Kant’s	transcendental	project:		Kant’s	 project	 is	 not	 concerned	with	 the	 real	 relation	 between	 a	 representation	 and	 its	 object	 but	solely	with	the	cognitive	claim	advanced	in	it,	and	the	question	of	how	knowledge	is	possible	is	not	a	factual	but	a	normative	one.	It	does	not	look	for	some	causal	connection	between	mind	and	world	but	investigates	how	a	concept	can	hold	of	something	–	not	“how	can	something	represent	an	object?”	but	“how	can	it	do	so	correctly?”16	When	the	transcendental	is	fleshed	out	in	terms	of	justification	and	normativity,	however,	transcendental	philosophy	 begins	 to	 look	 as	 if	 it	 deals	 exclusively	with	 the	 epistemological	 problematic.	 One	may	 not	think	 this	 is	 a	worry	 since	what	 prompted	 Kant	 to	 begin	with	was	 nothing	 other	 than	 the	 problem	 of	knowledge.	 But	 one	 must	 be	 careful	 in	 characterizing	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 philosophy	 as	 purely	epistemological.	While	it	can	hardly	be	doubted	that	Kant	was	interested	in	the	problem	of	knowledge,	it	is	 controversial	whether	 that	was	Kant’s	 sole	 interest.	Or	 better	 put,	 it	 is	 highly	 questionable	 that	Kant	believed	 that	 the	 question	 regarding	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 can	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 question	regarding	 the	 ontological	 constitution	 of	 objects.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 point	 that	 deserves	 a	 separate	section	below	since	it	has	implications	for	the	scope	of	transcendental	philosophy.		 But	 before	 turning	 to	 this	 point,	 there	 is	 another	 point	 worth	 mentioning	 regarding	 the	 two	interpretations.	 Although	 the	 logical	 interpretation	 is	 more	 appealing	 than	 the	 psychological,	 there	 is	room	to	question	whether	we	can	do	away	with	the	latter	side	altogether	in	defining	the	transcendental.	For,	granting	that	normativity	and	factuality	are	different	issues,	the	very	idea	of	normativity	only	makes	sense	against	the	backdrop	of	our	actual	activities.	What	is	a	norm	if	it	is	not	a	norm	for	our	conduct?	As	Beiser	says:	
																																								 																				
16	Crowell	2013,	p.	11.	
21	
	
The	very	 idea	of	a	norm	is	 that	of	a	constraint	on	activity;	and	the	very	 idea	of	a	rule	 is	 that	which	governs	 or	 imposes	 limits	 on	 conduct.	 So	 if	 there	were	 no	 activity	 or	 conduct,	 there	would	 be	 no	purpose	in	invoking	the	idea	of	a	norm	or	rule	in	the	first	place.”17		Or	more	succinctly	put	 in	a	different	paper:	“‘Ought’	 implies	 ‘can’,	so	that	 if	people	cannot	act	on	norms	they	lose	all	their	validity.18	Indeed,	the	very	idea	of	truth-conditions	of	our	judgments	is	dependent	on	the	fact	 that	 we	 can	 make	 true	 and	 false	 judgments.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 possibility	 of	 synthetic	 a	 priori	knowledge	entails	not	only	its	logical	but	real	possibility.		Beiser	subsequently	argues	that	neither	the	logical	nor	the	psychological	interpretation,	taken	on	its	own,	can	provide	a	complete	picture	of	the	transcendental.	They	are	not	mutually	exclusive:		We	 can	 consider	 the	 transcendental	 as	 both	 logical	 and	 psychological,	 as	 laying	 down	 constraints	both	about	how	we	ought	to	think	and	about	how	we	must	do	so	[vis-à-vis	the	activities	of	our	mind].19		This	 is	 indeed	the	 lesson	to	 learn	from	the	one-sidedness	of	 the	two	interpretations:	 the	transcendental	must	 encompass	both	 transcendental	 logic	and	 psychology.	To	be	 sure,	 one	of	 the	main	 challenges	 that	this	 then	 creates	 is	 to	 account	 for	 how	we	 can	 appeal	 to	 our	 acts	 of	 cognition	without	 falling	 into	 the	pitfalls	of	the	psychological	interpretation.	Transcendental	psychology,	in	the	way	Kant	had	envisioned	it,	also	had	 its	own	problems	such	as	 the	entire	matter	of	 the	 faculties	of	 the	mind.	These	challenges	were	taken	up	by	Husserl	who	developed	the	phenomenological	version	of	transcendental	philosophy	to	which	we	will	turn	shortly.	But	before	we	do	so,	let	us	turn	to	the	aforementioned	question	regarding	the	scope	of	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy.	
	
1.4 The	scope	of	transcendental	philosophy:	epistemological	vs.	ontological	reading		
	 It	has	often	been	assumed	that	transcendental	philosophy	is	a	discipline	in	epistemology	and	not	
ontology.	Let	us	recite	Kant’s	famous	definition	of	the	transcendental:		I	call	all	cognition	transcendental	that	is	occupied	not	so	much	with	objects	but	rather	with	our	mode	of	cognition	of	objects	insofar	as	this	is	to	be	possible	a	priori.	(A11-12/B25)		
Prima	facie,	insofar	as	transcendental	philosophy	is	characterized	by	a	turning	away	from	objects	to	our	a	priori	 knowledge	 of	 them,	 the	 claim	 that	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 essentially	 epistemological	 does	
																																								 																				
17	Beiser	2002,	p.	172.	
18	Ibid.,	p.	16.	
19	Ibid.,	p.	174.	
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seem	 legitimate.	 Historically,	 what	 made	 this	 epistemological	 reading	 dominant	 was	 the	 neo-Kantians’	logical	 interpretation	 and	 their	 identification	 of	 the	 transcendental	 with	 normativity.	 On	 this	 account,	transcendental	 conditions	 are	 equivalent	 to	 normative	 conditions	 and,	 as	 a	 corollary,	 transcendental	philosophy	 is	 primarily	 epistemological.	 Now,	 if	 the	 conditions	 that	 make	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	possible	are	merely	normative	conditions	with	no	ontological	commitment,	as	some	neo-Kantians	would	supposedly	 contend,	 then	 these	 conditions	would	 determine	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 but	not	 the	way	objects	are	 in	themselves.	According	to	this	view,	transcendental	philosophy	has	no	 implications	for	the	nature	of	objects.	Ontology	would	stand	outside	the	realm	of	transcendental	philosophy.		The	following	key	statement	in	the	beginning	of	the	Transcendental	Analytic,	however,	attests	that	this	understanding	of	the	scope	of	the	transcendental	proves	too	minimal:		The	 conditions	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 experience	 in	 general	 are	 at	 the	 same	 time	 conditions	 of	 the	
possibility	 of	 the	 objects	 of	 experience,	 and	 on	 this	 account	 have	 objective	 validity	 in	 a	 synthetic	judgment	a	priori.	(A158/B197)		Here,	Kant	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 transcendental	 conditions	determine	not	only	our	knowledge	of	objects	but	also	the	objects	of	our	knowledge.	Moreover,	this	should	not	be	taken	as	indicative	of	an	inconsistency	on	Kant’s	part.	Rather,	these	claims	suggest	that,	when	one	considers	the	full	implications	of	transcendental	inquiry,	it	has	significant	ramifications	on	the	nature	of	objects.		To	begin	with,	insofar	as	the	transcendental	is	an	inquiry	into	the	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	objects,	 it	 is	 simply	 false	 that	 it	has	no	bearing	on	objects.	Admittedly,	 transcendental	inquiry	does	not	inquire	into	objects	in	the	same	way	as	first-order	inquiries	do.	As	we	have	stressed,	the	second-order	status	of	 the	transcendental	ensures	that	 it	 is	essentially	distinguished	from	all	 first-order	inquiries	 of	 the	 empirical	 sciences	 as	 well	 as	 metaphysical	 inquiries	 that	 similarly	 thematize	 objects		(empirical	 or	 metaphysical)	 with	 a	 view	 to	 determining	 their	 first-order	 properties.	 But	 this	 does	 not	entail	that	transcendental	inquiry	is	not	concerned	with	objects	themselves.	We	should	in	fact	take	Kant’s	wording	at	face	value	when	he	says	that	transcendental	knowledge	is	concerned	“not	so	much	with	objects	
as	with	the	mode	of	our	knowledge	of	objects	in	so	far	as	this	mode	of	knowledge	is	to	be	possible	a	priori.”	Kant	is	not	denying	that	the	transcendental	is	concerned	with	objects;	he	is	only	asserting	that	the	concern	is	more	with	our	knowledge	of	objects	than	with	objects.	While	this	still	leaves	open	the	exact	relation	that	pertains	 between	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 and	 objects	 themselves,	 it	 does	 nevertheless	 suggest	 their	close	relation	in	transcendental	discourse.		Indeed,	an	important	point	to	take	from	this	is	that	transcendental	inquiry	into	the	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	objects	is	not	cut	off	from	inquiry	into	objects	in	a	way	that	makes	the	
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latter	inquiry	irrelevant	to	the	former	and	vice	versa.	This	is	indeed	one	of	the	misunderstandings	of	the	exclusively	 epistemological	 reading.	 According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 the	 transcendental	 is	 a	 realm	independent	of	the	realm	of	objects	(both	empirical	and	metaphysical).20	What	is	fatal	about	this	kind	of	understanding	is	that	it	limits	the	scope	of	the	transcendental	in	a	way	that	undermines	the	core	of	Kant’s	discovery.	As	we	have	 seen,	 the	 transcendental	 question	was	 introduced	by	Kant	 in	order	 to	 tackle	 the	problem	 of	 knowledge	 in	 a	 way	 that	 evades	 the	 skeptics’	 charge.	 If	 we	 delimit	 the	 scope	 of	 the	transcendental	 to	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects,	 leaving	 the	 realm	 of	 objects	 unaffected	 by	 our	 question,	transcendental	 knowledge	deflates	 into	 subjective	knowledge	 that	has	no	objective	validity.	This	would	allow	Cartesian	skepticism	to	 loom	again.	 In	 fact,	speaking	of	different	“realms”	 is	altogether	misleading	since	the	distinction	between	the	transcendental	and	the	empirical	(as	well	as	the	metaphysical)	does	not	imply	two	ontological	realms	but	is	merely	a	difference	in	the	levels	of	discourse.	Transcendental	inquiry	is	different	from	metaphysical	inquiry	in	this	sense	since	the	defining	trait	of	the	latter	is	to	thematize	a	distinct	ontological	realm	from	the	empirical.	Rather	than	speaking	of	realms,	it	may	be	helpful	to	speak	metaphorically	of	“dimensions”	as	I	have	done	earlier.	In	fact,	Husserl	also	speaks	of	the	transcendental	as	a	“new	dimension.”21	An	analogy	may	be	helpful	to	clarify	this	point.	When	we	put	on	3D	glasses	to	watch	a	three-dimensional	film,	we	do	not	believe	that	the	glasses	have	somehow	introduced	a	different	reality	from	 the	 two-dimensional	 reality.	 The	 third	 dimension	 enables	 us	 to	 see	 the	 film	 with	 depth	 and	 so	perhaps	with	“more	reality,”	but	it	is	ontologically	the	same	reality	as	the	one	depicted	two-dimensionally.	Likewise,	 the	transcendental	dimension	articulates	the	nature	of	reality	 in	a	different	way	from	how	we	observe	objects	empirically,	but	it	does	not	thereby	introduce	a	new	reality.	Accordingly,	transcendental	inquiry	introduces	not	a	distinct	realm	but	another	dimension	that	sheds	light	on	the	way	objects	are,	not	just	how	they	appear	to	us	but	how	they	are	in	themselves.			It	is	due	to	these	reasons	that	transcendental	inquiry	into	the	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	 of	 objects	 must	 also	 be	 an	 inquiry	 into	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 objects	 of	 our	knowledge.	The	epistemological	reading,	therefore,	can	only	be	endorsed	by	being	blind	to	the	full	import	of	the	transcendental.	Transcendental	inquiry	not	only	reconfigures	what	knowledge	consists	of	but	it	also	fundamentally	redefines	what	objects	are	in	themselves.	This	is	also	why	transcendental	idealism	is	part	
																																								 																				
20	For	example,	Ernst	Cassirer	says:	“The	essential	characteristic	of	Kant’s	transcendental	method	consists	in	the	fact	that	it	
operates	not	in	the	realm	of	empirically	real	things	or	events,	but	purely	and	exclusively	in	the	realm	of	truths	and	their	
ideal	mode	of	validity.”	(1923,	pp.	427-428	[quoted	in	Gardner	2015,	p.	9;	translation	by	Gardner])		
21	Hua	VI,	§32.	All	citations	from	Husserl	are	from	the	Husserliana	(abbreviated	as	Hua),	followed	by	volume	number	
(Roman	numerals)	and	page	number	(or	section	number).	I	have	given	the	pagination	from	the	original	German	first	
followed	by	a	slash	and	pagination	from	the	English	translation,	wherever	this	is	available.	I	have	followed	the	available	
English	translations	in	my	citations.	
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and	parcel	 of	Kant’s	 transcendental	 project.	One	 simply	 cannot	 avoid	 transcendental	 idealism	 if	we	 see	that	the	transcendental	essentially	has	ontological	implications.22		Having	 delineated	 Kant’s	 idea	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology.		
2 Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology	
2.1 Husserl’s	evaluation	of	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy		 How	does	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology	differ	from	Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy?	What	was	Husserl’s	relationship	to	Kant?	Unlike	his	neo-Kantian	contemporaries,	Husserl	did	not	develop	his	 thought	 through	 an	 internal	 development	 of	 Kantian	 philosophy.	 Owing	 much	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 his	mentor,	Franz	Brentano,	was	an	anti-Kantian,	he	was	rather	critical	to	the	whole	Kantian	enterprise	in	his	earlier	 years.	 It	 was	 only	 after	 his	 turn	 to	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 around	 1913,	 when	 Ideas	
Pertaining	 to	 a	 Pure	 Phenomenology	 and	 to	 a	 Phenomenological	 Philosophy	 (Ideen	 zu	 einer	 reinen	
Phänomenologie	 und	 phänomenologischen	Philosophie,	 hereafter	 Ideas	 I)	 was	 published	 that	 he	 became	more	and	more	expressive	about	his	debt	to	the	great	philosopher	and	phenomenology’s	relationship	to	Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy.	In	the	following,	let	us	take	as	our	starting	point	the	published	version	of	a	famous	lecture	held	on	1	March	1924	in	Freiburg	in	celebration	of	the	bicentenary	of	Kant’s	birth.	In	this	 lecture	 titled,	 “Kant	 and	 the	 Idea	 of	 Transcendental	 Philosophy,”	 Husserl	 articulates	 Kant’s	significance	as	he	understands	it	as	well	as	the	reasons	why	he	believes	transcendental	philosophy	must	necessarily	take	the	shape	of	a	transcendental	phenomenology.	This	lecture	will	guide	us	in	understanding	the	 crux	 of	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 phenomenology,	 specifically	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 Kant’s	 transcendental	philosophy.	
	 Husserl’s	 basic	 attitude	 towards	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 stated	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	lecture:	[A]ny	 philosophy	 whatsoever,	 taken	 as	 a	 systematic	 whole,	 can	 assume	 the	 form	 of	 an	 ultimately	rigorous	 science	 only	 as	 a	 universal	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 but	 also	 only	 on	 the	 basis	 of	phenomenology	and	in	the	specifically	phenomenological	method.23		
																																								 																				
22	Furthermore,	once	we	see	that	the	scope	of	the	transcendental	reaches	well	into	the	domain	of	the	ontological,	we	can	
see	that	Heidegger’s	ontological	interpretation	of	Kant’s	Critique	is	not	as	controversial	as	it	may	seem.	Since	Heidegger’s	
interpretation	of	Kant	is	a	controversial	topic	that	deserves	attention	on	its	own,	however,	I	will	not	go	into	any	detail	here.	
23	Hua	VII,	pp.	230-231/10.	
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A	couple	of	 important	points	 can	be	 immediately	extracted	 from	 this	quotation:	 (1)	Husserl	 seeks	after	philosophy	 as	 a	 rigorous	 science,	 (2)	 such	 philosophy	 is	 possible	 only	 as	 a	 universal	 transcendental	philosophy,	 and	 (3)	 such	 universal	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 possible	 only	 on	 the	 basis	 of	phenomenology.	With	regard	 to	 the	 first	point,	one	 should	recall	Husserl’s	essay	 titled	 “Philosophy	as	a	Rigorous	Science”	published	in	1910-11.	In	this	essay,	he	argues	that	it	is	essential	for	philosophy	to	find	its	own	firm	foundation	and	distance	itself	 from	both	naturalism	and	historicism	in	order	to	acquire	the	status	 of	 a	 strict	 and	 rigorous	 science.	 Not	 surprisingly,	 such	 a	 firm	 foundation	 was	 to	 be	 sought	 in	phenomenology.	 In	 the	 1924	 lecture,	 Husserl	 explains	 how	 phenomenology	 as	 an	 eidetic	 descriptive	science	 delineated	 in	 the	 Logical	 Investigations	 (Logische	 Untersuchungen)	 soon	 blossomed	 into	transcendental	phenomenological	philosophy	around	the	time	of	Ideas	I.	Cutting	a	long	story	short,	it	was	Husserl’s	strong	aspiration	for	a	first	philosophy	(i.e.	the	a	priori	science	of	all	sciences)	that	enacted	the	turn	 to	 pure	 transcendental	 consciousness	 as	 the	 fundamental	 source	 of	 all	 knowledge	 and,	 thereby,	allowed	the	purely	descriptive	discipline	to	develop	into	a	transcendental	one.	What	this	means	and	how	this	was	possible	will	become	clearer	in	the	following	pages.	But	my	concern	here	will	not	be	to	trace	the	trajectory	 of	 Husserl’s	 thought.	 Rather,	 the	 aim	 is	 to	 articulate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 transcendental	phenomenology	is	a	critical	development	of	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy.	For	this	purpose,	I	will	be	focusing	on	Husserl’s	evaluation	of	Kantian	philosophy.		 Husserl	 states	 that	 Kant’s	 lasting	 significance	 lies	 in	 the	 “much	 discussed	 but	 little	 understood	‘Copernican’	 turn	 to	 an	 interpretation	 of	 the	 world	 that	 was	 new	 in	 principle	 and	 thereby	 rigorously	scientific”	and,	further,	in	the	“first	grounding	of	the	‘completely	new’	science	belonging	thereto	–	i.e.,	the	transcendental.”24	He	 then	 notes	 that	 Kant	 was	 the	 first	 to	 consider	 science	 “not	merely	 objectively	 as	theories	 of	 objective	 actualities	 and	 possibilities”	 but	 as	 “subjective	 cognitive	 performances	 in	 the	consciousness	generally.”25	In	 this	 lecture,	Husserl	 repeatedly	emphasizes	 this	point,	namely	 that	Kant’s	revolution	 is	 the	 actualization	of	 the	 turn	 “from	 the	naive	positive	 stage	of	world-cognition	 to	 a	world-cognition	 through	 ultimate	 self-consciousness	 of	 cognition.”26 	Put	 differently,	 Kant’s	 transcendental	philosophy	awakened	us	from	the	naive	view	that	the	world	(or	nature)	is	objectively	out	there,	existing	apart	from	us,	to	the	idea	that	it	is	in	fact	an	achievement	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	The	same	point	is	made	 in	 Crisis	 to	 European	 Sciences	 and	 Transcendental	 Philosophy	 (Die	 Krisis	 des	 europäischen	
Menschentums	und	die	Philosophie,	hereafter	Crisis)	published	in	1936:	
																																								 																				
24	Ibid.,	p.	240/17.	
25	Ibid.,	p.	280/50.	
26	Ibid.,	p.	286/55.	
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[Transcendental	 philosophy	 is]	 a	 philosophy	 which,	 in	 opposition	 to	 prescientific	 and	 scientific	objectivism,	goes	back	to	knowing	subjectivity	as	the	primal	locus	of	all	objective	formations	of	sense	and	ontic	validities,	undertakes	to	understand	the	existing	world	as	a	structure	of	sense	and	validity,	and	in	this	way	seeks	to	set	in	motion	an	essentially	new	type	of	scientific	attitude	and	a	new	type	of	philosophy.27	Admittedly,	this	definition	of	transcendental	philosophy	is	given	in	the	context	of	critically	situating	Kant’s	philosophy	 as	 falling	 short	 of	 achieving	 this	 end	 due	 to	 its	 “lack	 of	 radicalism.”28	Likewise,	 in	 the	 1924	lecture	course,	his	appraisal	of	Kant	basically	ends	here.	Since	Husserl’s	 intention	was	never	to	 improve	Kantian	philosophy	 from	within	 the	Kantian	 framework	but	 solely	 to	 “see	Kant	with	phenomenological	eyes,”	 his	 evaluation	 of	 Kant	 is	 clear-cut.	 The	 rest	 of	 the	 lecture	 is	 devoted	 to	 showing	 the	“phenomenological	sense	of	the	Kantian	revolution.”29	It	is	to	this	that	we	shall	now	turn.		 Husserl	marks	Kant’s	shortcomings	in	allegedly	failing	to	penetrate	the	true	foundations,	the	basic	problematics	and	the	ultimately	valid	method	of	a	transcendental	philosophy.	According	to	Husserl,	 this	last	 point	 proves	 to	 be	 fatal.	 In	 Ideas	 I,	 Husserl	 introduced	 the	 phenomenological	 epoché,	 a	 method	 of	“bracketing”	the	existence	of	objects	(and	the	whole	world)	in	order	to	thematize	the	phenomenological	given	 in	 full	 clarity.	 Such	 bracketing	 was	 to	 be	 clearly	 distinguished	 from	 a	 denial	 of	 or	 skepticism	regarding	 the	 existence	 of	 objects	 and	 the	 world.	 It	 is	 rather	 the	 suspension	 of	 the	 general	 positing	character	of	our	“natural	attitude.”	While	we	generally	believe	that	things	are	simply	there,	existing	apart	from	us	regardless	of	our	existence	(a	characteristic	feature	of	the	natural	attitude),	the	phenomenological	
epoché	 leads	 us	 to	 “bracket”,	 i.e.	 put	 out	 of	 operation,	 such	 universal	 belief.	 Since	 this	 procedure	 of	bracketing	 is	a	way	 to	abstain	 from	relying	on	our	beliefs	 in	 the	existence	of	objects	and	 the	world,	 the	
epoché	is	primarily	a	negative	method.	Crowell	underscores	this	point	vis-à-vis	phenomenology’s	exclusive	commitment	to	the	first-person	method:		The	point	of	the	epoché,	then,	is	primarily	negative:	it	precludes	me	from	appealing	in	my	analysis	to	
any	 third-person	 explanatory	 theories	 of	 the	 experience	 in	 question	 (for	 instance,	 causal-genetic	ones),	since	any	such	theory	necessarily	posits	the	existence	of	both	explanans	and	explanandum.	The	
epoché	expresses	 transcendental	 phenomenology's	 commitment	 to	 the	 analytic	 autonomy	 of	 first-person	experience.30			 Once	 we	 have	 bracketed	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 objects	 and	 the	 world,	 then	 the	phenomenological	 givenness	 of	 intentionality,	 i.e.	 the	 meaningful	 structure	 of	 experience,	 can	 be	 fully	
																																								 																				
27	Hua	VI,	p.102/99.	
28	Ibid.,	p.	103/100.	
29	Hua	VII,	p.	237/15.	
30	Crowell	2012,	p.	28.	
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thematized.	 And	 this	 thematization	 of	 the	 purified	 field	 of	 intentionality,	 which	 is	 now	 illuminated	 as	having	 a	noesis-noema	 structure,	 is	 called	 the	phenomenological	reduction.	 In	 the	1924	 lecture,	Husserl	regards	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction	 as	 “the	 most	 fundamental	 of	 all	 methods”31	and	 insists	 that	transcendental	philosophy	necessarily	be	grounded	by	it:		It	 is	 to	 develop	 in	 ultimate	 philosophical	 self-consciousness	 the	 method	 of	 phenomenological	reduction,	 through	 which	 the	 concrete	 thematic	 horizon	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 –	transcendental	 subjectivity	 in	 its	 true	 sense	 –	 is	 founded,	 and	 simultaneously	with	 it	 the	mode	 of	work	 appropriate	 only	 to	 it,	 the	 ordering	 of	 the	 problematics	 arising	 from	 the	 intuitive	 origins	 is	discovered.32		Husserl	 argues	 that,	 despite	 his	 discovery	 of	 subjectivity’s	 synthesis	 and	 having	 practiced,	 “in	 his	 own	naivete,	 genuine	 intentional	 analysis,”	Kant	was	unable	 to	develop	a	 concrete	 analysis	of	 consciousness	precisely	because	he	had	failed	to	execute	the	phenomenological	reduction.	In	positing	the	thing-in-itself,	which	Husserl	 regards	as	one	of	 the	 “‘metaphysical’	 stock	elements	of	 the	critique	of	 reason,”	Kant	was	still	somehow	holding	on	to	our	naive	belief	in	objects	existing	independently	of	us.			 While	 Husserl	 reproaches	 Kant	 for	 lacking	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction	 in	 this	 lecture	 and	takes	 this	 to	 be	 his	 fatal	 flaw,	 the	 failure	 to	 recognize	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction	 in	 fact	 entails	 a	failure	to	see	a	more	basic	feature	of	the	phenomenological	method,	namely	phenomenology’s	appeal	to	
intuitive	evidence	 and	 demand	 for	descriptions.	 Indeed,	Husserl’s	 criticism	of	Kant	 in	 the	Crisis	 revolves	around	this	point	in	relation	to	what	he	calls	Kant’s	“regressive	method”	or,	as	he	writes	more	specifically,	“the	 obscurities	 of	 the	 Kantian	 philosophy,	 about	 the	 incomprehensibility	 of	 the	 evidences	 of	 his	regressive	method.”33	Kant’s	inquiry	begins	with	the	fact	of	certain	scientific	knowledge	and	moves	on,	in	a	regressive	way,	to	the	a	priori	subjective	conditions	that	make	such	knowledge	possible.	Accordingly,	as	Husserl	puts	it	in	the	1924	lecture,	Kant’s	regressive	method	asks:		[U]nder	which	forms	of	concept	and	law	must	an	objective	world	(a	nature)	stand	in	general,	which	is	supposed	 to	 be	 experienceable	 as	 one	 and	 the	 same	 world	 for	 all	 cognizers	 in	 the	 synthesis	 of	possible	experience?34		The	problem	with	such	a	method,	as	Husserl	sees	it,	lies	not	in	the	regressive	method	as	such,	for	this	is	something	that	all	transcendental	inquiries	share,	in	his	eyes,	insofar	as	it	proceeds	from	our	experience	or	 our	 cognition	 of	 objects	 to	 the	 subjective	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 such	 experience	 or	 cognition.	
																																								 																				
31	Hua	VII,	p.	234/12.	
32	Ibid.,	p.	237/15.	
33	Hua	VI,	p.	116/114.	
34	Hua	VII,	pp.	280-281/51.	
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According	 to	 Husserl,	 far	 from	 being	 problematic,	 the	 regressive	 method	 is	 necessary	 for	 any	transcendental	undertaking.			 The	 problem	 with	 Kant’s	 method,	 then,	 is	 that	 he	 does	 not	 have	 a	 way	 of	 providing	 sufficient	evidence	 for	 the	 transcendental	 conditions.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 forms	 of	 intuition,	 the	 categories	 of	thought	 and	 transcendental	 subjectivity,	 all	 of	 which	 constitute	 the	 transcendental,	 are	 reached	 by	transcendental	 arguments	 that	bear	no	 intuitive	 evidence.	Husserl	 observes	 that	 this	was	due	 to	Kant’s	limited	conception	of	“intuition.”	For	Kant,	the	only	kind	of	“intuition”	that	could	be	a	possible	candidate	in	providing	evidence	for	such	conditions	was	“inner	perception”	or	“inner	sense.”	But	inner	perception	was	a	 way	 of	 representing	 our	 mental	 states	 as	 objects	 in	 an	 analogous	 way	 to	 how	 external	 perception	represents	external	objects.	As	we	have	already	seen,	such	a	way	of	perceiving	ourselves	cannot	capture	us	 in	 our	 transcendental	 constitution.	 In	 this	way,	 Kant	 leaves	 us	with	 an	 unattractive	 choice	 between	empirical	or	psychological	intuition	on	the	one	hand	and,	what	Husserl	dubs,	“mythical	concept-formation”	on	the	other.	Hence	Husserl’s	severe	verdict	on	Kant:		He	 [Kant]	 forbids	 his	 readers	 to	 transpose	 the	 results	 of	 his	 regressive	 procedure	 into	 intuitive	concepts,	 forbids	every	attempt	 to	carry	out	a	progressive	construction	which	begins	with	original	and	 purely	 self-evident	 intuitions	 and	 proceeds	 through	 truly	 self-evident	 individual	 steps.	 His	
transcendental	concepts	are	thus	unclear	in	a	quite	peculiar	way,	such	that	for	reasons	of	principle	they	
can	never	be	 transposed	 into	 clarity,	 can	never	be	 transformed	 into	a	 formation	of	meaning	which	 is	
direct	and	procures	self-evidence.35		 If	Kant	had	not	been	bound	to	the	naturalistic	psychology	of	his	time	and	had	allowed	himself	to	seek	 the	 proper	 intuitive	 method,	 the	 regressive	 method	 would	 have	 looked	 completely	 different.	 As	Husserl	puts	it,	it	would	have	been	“not	a	mythically,	constructively	inferring	[schliessende]	method,	but	a	thoroughly	 intuitively	 disclosing	 [erschliessende]	 method,	 intuitive	 in	 its	 point	 of	 departure	 and	 in	everything	it	discloses.”36	To	be	sure,	this	“thoroughly	intuitively	disclosing	method,	intuitive	in	its	point	of	departure	and	in	everything	it	discloses,”	is	a	defining	method	for	phenomenology.	It	is	closely	related	to	what	Husserl	calls	the	“principle	of	all	principles”	in	Ideas	I:	
[E]very	originary	presentative	intuition	is	a	legitimizing	source	of	cognition	 […]	everything	originarily	(so	to	speak,	in	its	“personal”	actuality)	offered	to	us	in	“intuition”	is	to	be	accepted	simply	as	what	it	is	
presented	as	being,	but	also	only	within	the	limits	in	which	it	is	presented	there.37		
																																								 																				
35	Hua	VI,	pp.	117-118/115	(my	italics).	
36	Ibid.,	p.	118/115-116.	
37	Hua	III,	p.	51/44.	
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This	 appeal	 to	 intuition,	moreover,	 goes	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 the	 descriptive	method	 of	 phenomenology.	These	two	defining	features	of	phenomenology	are	encapsulated	in	the	brief	definition	of	phenomenology	that	Husserl	offers	in	Ideas	I:	“phenomenology	is,	in	fact,	a	purely	descriptive	discipline,	exploring	the	field	of	 transcendentally	 pure	 consciousness	 by	 pure	 intuition.”38	From	 the	 above,	 we	 can	 identify	 Husserl’s	main	differences	 from	Kant	with	his	 insistence	on	the	phenomenological	method	which	 is	characterized	by	the	phenomenological	reduction,	its	descriptive	nature	and	its	appeal	to	intuitive	evidence.			 Now,	while	Husserl	argues	with	regard	to	Kant	that	transcendental	philosophy	must	have	its	basis	in	phenomenology	if	it	is	to	be	a	rigorous	science,	Husserl	is	in	fact	claiming	the	opposite	as	well,	namely	that	 phenomenology	 must	 become	 transcendental	 if	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	 rigorous	 science.	 How	 so?	 Husserl	explains	 that	 it	 is	 the	 “radicalism	 and	 the	 universality	 of	 a	 pure	 meditation	 on	 consciousness”	 that	 is	essential	in	discovering	the	transcendental	dimension	of	our	experience	and	making	the	conversion	from	our	natural	way	of	thinking:	If	we	remain	consistent	 in	 this	 sort	of	meditation,	with	a	 radical	 consistency	 that	quite	exclusively	goes	after	subjective	and	intersubjective	consciousness	in	all	its	actual	and	possible	forms,	particular	and	synthetic	forms,	and	quite	exclusively	directs	its	gaze	upon	what	belongs	to	consciousness	in	and	for	itself	–	then	we	are	already	in	the	transcendental	attitude.39		This	 “radicalism”	 and	 kind	 of	 “radical	 consistency”	 is	 further	 defined	 as	 “the	 firm	 resolve	 to	 bring	consciousness,	 consciousness	 in	 its	 pure	 own-essentialness,	 exclusively	 to	 intuitive	 self-comprehension	and	 to	 theoretical	 cognition,	 and	 thereby	 consciousness	 in	 its	 full	 concretion.”40	Put	 this	way,	 it	 is	 clear	that	such	radicalism	is	none	other	than	what	phenomenology	as	an	eidetic	discipline	itself	demands.		 But	if	this	is	the	case,	then	is	Husserl	saying	that	phenomenology	is	by	definition		transcendental?	This	cannot	be	a	plausible	reading	since	it	would	not	square	with	his	own	interpretation	of	his	work	in	the	
Logical	 Investigations	 as	 work	 within	 pre-transcendental	 phenomenology.	 Husserl	 acknowledges	 that,	during	that	time,	he	was	engaged	in	a	descriptive	investigation	of	the	eidetic	structures	of	consciousness	that	still	deserves	to	be	called	phenomenology	(as	opposed	to	psychology	which	is	a	science	of	facts	and	not	 essences)	 but	 that	was	 not	 yet	 transcendental.	 Consequently,	 the	 radicalism	 that	Husserl	 is	 talking	about	 here	must	 have	 to	 do	with	 the	 possibility	 of	 phenomenology’s	 developing	 into	 a	 transcendental	discipline.	Therefore,	transcendental	phenomenology	can	be	understood	as	phenomenology	par	excellence.	
																																								 																				
38	Ibid.,	p.	127/136.	
39	Hua	VII,	p.	254/28	(my	italics).	
40	Ibid.,	p.	254/29.	
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In	this	way,	not	only	does	transcendental	philosophy	demand	a	phenomenological	turn,	phenomenology	too	must	take	a	transcendental	turn.	
	
2.2 Transcendental	reflection	in	Husserl		 When	speaking	about	the	specific	method	employed	in	transcendental	phenomenology,	as	we	saw	above	in	the	1924	lecture,	Husserl	puts	particular	emphasis	on	the	phenomenological	method	insofar	as	that	 is	what	constitutes	the	ultimate	basis	for	philosophy	as	a	rigorous	science.	Moreover,	we	have	seen	that	the	radicalism	of	the	phenomenological	method	is	precisely	what	requires	phenomenology	to	become	a	 transcendental	 discipline.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 phenomenological	method	 par	 excellence	 amounts	 to	 the	
transcendental-phenomenological	 method.	 But	 here	 the	 question	 naturally	 arises:	 how	 does	 reflection	figure	in	the	transcendental-phenomenological	method?	What	does	Husserl	have	to	say	about	reflection	as	a	 method?	 Insofar	 as	 philosophy	 is	 a	 reflective	 endeavor,	 the	 question	 cannot	 be	 avoided.	 And	 it	 is	especially	relevant	in	the	context	of	seeking	out	the	relation	between	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy	and	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology.			 In	 the	 literature,	 we	 find	 mixed	 views	 on	 this	 matter.	 Some	 commentators	 have	 resisted	characterizing	 Husserlian	 phenomenology	 as	 a	 reflective	 endeavor	 because	 of	 its	 possible	misunderstandings.41	Others	 have	 done	much	 to	 identify	 reflection	 as	 the	 defining	 feature	 of	 Husserl’s	version	 of	 phenomenology	 in	 contrast	 to	 others’,	 e.g.	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 phenomenology.42	As	 a	matter	of	fact,	in	Ideas	I,	Husserl	explicitly	claims	that	“the	phenomenological	method	operates	exclusively	in	acts	of	reflection.”43	But	to	be	sure,	one	must	first	clarify	what	Husserl	means	by	reflection	here	before	taking	a	 step	 further	and	asking	whether	Husserl	was	right	about	his	appraisal.	What	kind	of	 reflection	does	Husserl	have	in	mind	in	the	above	statement?			 To	begin	with,	reflection	in	general	is,	in	Husserl’s	words,	a	“bending	of	consciousness	back	upon	itself.”44	This	 bending	back,	moreover,	 is	 necessarily	 and	 in	 a	 certain	 sense	 an	alteration	 of	 the	 original	experience.	When	I	perceive	a	house,	for	example,	my	gaze	is	directed	at	the	house	and	not	the	perceiving	itself.	But	what	happens	when	I	reflect	on	this	act	 is	that	the	perception	itself	becomes	the	object	of	my	reflection	for	the	first	time.	In	this	way,	the	original	“straightforwardly”	executed	acts	become	modified	in	
																																								 																				
41	Cf.	Overgaard	2004,	pp.	49-50.	
42	von	Herrmann	2000.	
43	Hua	III,	p.	162/174.	
44	Hua	VII,	p.	262/35.	
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reflection	in	the	specific	sense	that	in	reflection,	and	only	in	reflection,	these	straightforward	acts	become	accessible	to	us	(at	least	as	the	object	of	my	reflection).	This	is	a	common	feature	of	reflection	in	general.	But	if	one	proceeds	to	say	that	phenomenologists	employ	reflection	understood	in	the	above	sense,	then	phenomenology	 begins	 to	 look	 like	 an	 introspective	 discipline	 concerned	 exclusively	 with	 one’s	 own	mental	acts.	This	 is	 in	 fact	the	or	at	 least	part	of	 the	rationale	behind	Søren	Overgaard’s	claim	that	“one	should	not	overemphasize	the	reflective	character	of	Husserl’s	phenomenology”45:		We	 do	 not	 become	 phenomenologists	 by	 somehow	 shutting	 out	 the	 world	 and	 then	 turning	 to	describe	what	we	 find	 in	ourselves,	 in	our	experiences.	 In	other	words,	 the	difference	between	the	naturally	 attuned	person	and	 the	phenomenologist	 is	not	 that	 the	 former	makes	 first	 order	 claims	such	 as,	 “This	 keyboard	 is	 dirty,”	whereas	 the	 latter	 limits	 himself	 to	 introspective	 reports	 like,	 “I	now	 see	 that	 the	 keyboard	 is	 dirty”	 –	 contrary,	 perhaps,	 to	 some	 of	 Husserl’s	 own	 less	 fortunate	formulations.	 This	 kind	 of	 introspective	 report	 cannot	 serve	 phenomenology,	 because	phenomenology	has	no	interest	in	what	particular	persons	might	be	experiencing	at	particular	points	in	 time;	 its	 interest	 is	 devoted	 to	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 world-constitution,	 as	 explained	above.46		As	Overgaard	emphasizes	here,	the	proper	method	of	phenomenology	is	not	to	be	found	in	introspection	simply	because	 it	 cannot	 serve	 the	purposes	of	 phenomenology.	 Introspection	 can	only	 yield	particular	reports	about	our	own	mental	states	and	furthermore,	 in	doing	so,	one	does	not	question	the	belief	that	mental	 acts	belong	 to	human	beings	who	are	part	 of	 the	world.	Phenomenology,	however,	 is	 an	 eidetic	discipline	 concerned	 with	 “world-constitution.”	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 interest	 of	 phenomenology	 lies	 in	articulating	 how	 the	world	 is	 constituted	 in	 our	 experience,	not	 how	 our	 psyche	works	apart	 from	 the	world.	 Accordingly,	 if	 one	 works	 with	 this	 notion	 of	 reflection,	 one	 has	 to	 either	 altogether	 give	 up	reflection	 as	 the	method	 of	 phenomenology	 or	 otherwise	 give	 an	 exposition	 of	 reflection	 that	 does	 not	have	the	same	downfalls	of	introspection.		Husserl	 takes	 up	 the	 latter	 by	 distinguishing	 between	 what	 he	 calls	 natural	 or	 psychological	
reflection	and	transcendental	reflection.	And	indeed,	 it	 is	only	by	embracing	the	 latter	sense	of	reflection	that	Husserlian	phenomenology	can	properly	be	called	reflective.	Overgaard	also	notes	the	importance	of	making	 this	 distinction	 and	 submits	 that	 Husserlian	 phenomenology	 can	 only	 be	 characterized	 as	reflective	 when	 reflection	 is	 understood	 in	 this	 latter	 sense.	 Moreover,	 the	 important	 point	 about	transcendental	reflection,	according	to	Overgaard,	is	that	what	is	thematized	as	a	result	is	“the	world”	and	
not	our	experience:		
																																								 																				
45	Overgaard	2004,	p.	49.	
46	Ibid.,	p.	48.	
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When	we	are	doing	phenomenology,	we	are	 entering	 (through	 the	epoché)	 into	 a	new	 relationship	with	“the	world”	(cf.	Hua	VI,	p.	147),	a	relationship	that	may	indeed	be	labeled	“reflective.”	It	is,	one	could	say,	the	world	 that	 is	reflected	on,	and	not	our	experiences,	since	it	 is	 in	relation	to	the	world	that	we	 have	 been	 able	 to	 gain	 a	 little	 distance.	 In	 this	 sense,	 and	 –	 I	 submit	 –	 in	 this	 sense	 only,	Husserlian	 phenomenology	 is	 fundamentally	 “reflective”;	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 bases	 itself	 on	(introspective)	reflections	on	thoughts	and	experiences,	in	spite	of	all	appearances	to	the	contrary.47	Yet	 this	 way	 of	 putting	 the	 matter,	 namely	 that	 phenomenology	 deals	 with	 the	 world	 and	 not	 our	experience,	 seems	 to	 now	 underemphasize	 the	 role	 of	 reflection	 in	 phenomenology.	 For,	 although	 one	must	 be	 wary	 that	 phenomenology	 does	 not	 employ	 introspection,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 denying	 that	phenomenology	deals	with	our	experience	and,	accordingly,	that	some	kind	of	reflection	is	at	play.	But	to	be	 fair,	 Overgaard	 is	 not	 altogether	 denying	 the	 reflective	 character	 of	 Husserlian	 phenomenology,	 but	only	 claiming	 that	 it	 is	 reflective	 “in	 a	 less	obvious	way	 than	one	might	be	 tempted	 to	 assume.”48	What	must	be	emphasized	is	that	what	is	thematized	as	a	result	of	reflection	is	not	our	experience	in	separation	from	the	world	but,	as	Overgaard	says,	 “a	new	relationship	with	the	 ‘world.’”	This	new	relationship	and	the	sphere	of	experience	opened	up	therein	is	what	Husserl	refers	to	as	the	transcendental	experience	and	it	must	be	distinguished	from	our	experience	when	we	speak	of	it	in	separation	from	the	world,	i.e.	psychic	
experience.	 The	 fact	 that	many	all	 too	easily	 fail	 to	make	 this	distinction	 is	 apparently	 the	driving	 force	behind	Overgaard’s	 somewhat	misleading	 claim	 that	 phenomenology	deals	with	 the	world	 and	not	 our	experience.	In	order	to	understand	what	is	really	at	stake	here,	we	must	therefore	take	pains	to	clarify	the	above	 distinction,	 and	 this	 can	 only	 be	 done	 by	 first	 articulating	 the	 distinction	 between	 natural	 and	
transcendental	reflection.	It	is	to	the	latter	that	we	shall	now	turn.		 Natural	reflection	is	the	kind	of	reflection	employed	in	the	natural	attitude.	When	one	reflects	in	the	natural	attitude,	the	reflecting	ego	“participates”	in	the	“existence-positing”	of	the	world.	In	looking	at	a	house	and	reflectively	claiming	that	“I	see	the	house,”	I	am	still	living	in	the	belief	that	the	house	and	I,	who	is	looking	at	the	house,	both	exist	as	part	of	the	world.	Although	this	reflection	modifies	my	original	experience	insofar	as	my	perception	is	thematized	then	for	the	first	time,	the	belief	in	the	existence	of	the	house	(and	the	rest	of	the	world	co-given	with	it)	has	not	been	altered	by	the	reflection.	Put	differently,	the	 reflecting	 ego	 maintains	 the	 natural	 attitude.	 Accordingly,	 what	 we	 discover	 here	 are	 our	 acts	pertaining	 to	a	psyche	 that	 is	part	of	 the	psychophysical	being	 in	 the	world.	As	Husserl	 says,	 in	natural	reflection,	 one	 necessarily	 finds	 “‘real,’	 ‘mundane’	 consciousness	 that	 is	 intertwined	 with	 nature.”49	
																																								 																				
47	Ibid.,	p.	50.	
48	Ibid.,	p.	49.	
49	Hua	VII,	p.	267/39.	
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Transcendental	reflection,	on	the	other	hand,	thematizes	consciousness	in	a	completely	different	manner.	Husserl	 explains	 in	 Cartesian	 Meditations	 (first	 published	 in	 French	 under	 the	 title,	 Méditations	
cartésiennes:	Introduction	à	la	phénoménologie)	that	while	in	natural	reflection,	“we	stand	on	the	footing	of	the	 world	 already	 given	 as	 existing,	 […]	 [i]n	 transcendental-phenomenological	 reflection	 we	 deliver	ourselves	 from	 this	 footing,	 by	 universal	 epoché	with	 respect	 to	 the	 being	 or	 nonbeing	 of	 the	world.”50	Instead	of	 living	 in	 the	belief	 that	 the	house	 exists	 together	with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	world,	we	bracket	 this	belief	such	that	we	abstain	from	making	judgments	about	the	existence	of	the	house	and	the	world.	The	result	of	this	transcendental	reflection	is	pure	transcendental	subjectivity.			 But	one	may	here	wonder	how	such	bracketing	of	the	world	could	lead	us	back	to	transcendental	subjectivity	 and	not	 to	 a	 subjectivity	 that	 is	 purified	of	 everything	worldly,	 i.e.	 something	 like	 a	psyche.	And,	 furthermore,	 if	 this	psyche	leaves	out	the	world,	how	can	that	be	the	source	of	world-constitution?		To	 be	 sure,	 this	 brief	 exposition	 only	 outlines	 the	 contours	 of	 what	 is	 required	 to	 actually	 carry	 out	transcendental	 reflection.	 Specifically,	 much	 more	 needs	 to	 be	 said	 about	 the	 transcendental-
phenomenological	 epoché	 and	 reduction	 for	 it	 is	 only	 by	 way	 of	 these	 procedures	 that	 we	 are	 able	 to	employ	 transcendental	 reflection.	 In	 this	 regard,	 these	 are	 the	 fundamental	 pillars	 of	 transcendental	reflection.	In	what	follows,	let	us	take	a	look	at	what	Husserl	has	to	say	about	them,	and	specifically	how	the	transcendental	reduction	differs	from	what	he	refers	to	as	the	“pure-phenomenological	reduction”	or	“psychological-phenomenological	 reduction.”	 Only	 then	 will	 we	 be	 able	 to	 clarify	 the	 key	 distinction	between	 (pure)	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 or	 transcendental	 experience	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 pure	psyche	or	psychic	experience	on	the	other.		
	
2.3 Psychological	phenomenology	vs.	transcendental	phenomenology		 Below,	we	will	be	focusing	on	the	Encyclopaedia	Britannica	article	(hereafter,	EB	article)	that	was	published	as	an	introduction	to	phenomenology.	This	article	was	the	result	of	a	failed	collaboration	with	Heidegger	written	between	September	and	December	1927.	Four	drafts	of	 the	article	exist,	 all	of	which	are	important	material	in	that	they	significantly	reflect	Husserl’s	and	Heidegger’s	different	takes	on	what	constitutes	phenomenology.	For	our	purposes	here,	however,	we	will	not	examine	Heidegger’s	draft	and	his	comments	to	Husserl’s	text	but,	rather,	we	will	focus	on	what	Husserl	had	to	say	and	specifically	on	the	first	draft,	which	was	written	by	Husserl	alone.	This	draft	proves	to	be	especially	relevant	for	us	because	
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the	whole	discussion	is	geared	towards	articulating	the	close	relation	that	pertains	between	psychological	
phenomenology	 and	 transcendental	phenomenology	 and,	 as	 a	 corollary,	 pure	 psyche	 and	 transcendental	subjectivity.	 Clarifying	 the	 difference	 between	 these	 two	 sciences	 is	 of	 utmost	 importance	 in	understanding	the	proper	aim	and	province	of	transcendental	phenomenology.			 According	 to	 Husserl,	 these	 two	 sciences	 are	 like	 sisters	 in	 that	 they	 share	 a	 basic	 method:	
phenomenological	 reflection.	 Husserl	 therefore	 begins	 his	 discussion	 with	 an	 exposition	 of	phenomenological	reflection	and	only	later	gives	an	exposition	of	the	transcendental	reduction,	which	is	decisive	in	distinguishing	the	two.	Phenomenological	reflection	is	explained	as	the	method	that	allows	us	to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 natural	 attitude	 to	 the	 phenomenological	 attitude;	 it	 transforms	 the	 everyday	experience	 of	 being	 involved	 with	 objects	 into	 “phenomenological	 experience,”	 the	 field	 of	 experience	having	an	intentional	structure:	Instead	of	living	in	‘the’	world	directly	in	the	‘natural	attitude’	and,	so	to	speak,	like	‘children	of	this	world’	[…]	we	attempt	a	universal	phenomenological	reflection	on	this	entire	life-process,	be	it	pre-theoretical,	theoretical	or	whatever.51		This	 reflection,	 moreover,	 is	 executed	 by	 way	 of	 “the	 basic	 method	 for	 throwing	 into	 relief	 the	phenomenological-psychological	 field,” 52 	i.e.	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction.	 To	 recapitulate,	 the	phenomenological	 reduction	 is	 a	 leading	 back	 of	 the	 gaze	 from	 things	 out	 there	 in	 the	 world	 to	 the	
consciousness	of	those	things.	In	perceiving	a	tree,	for	example,	my	gaze	moves	from	the	tree	itself	to	my	
perception	of	 it.	The	 ‘of’	here	plays	an	essential	 role.	For	even	 if	 it	 turns	out	 that	 the	perception	was	an	illusion,	it	remains	a	fact	that	the	perception	was	a	perception	of	something	that	appeared	to	be	an	actual	tree.	In	other	words,	the	intentional	structure	remains	regardless	of	whether	the	tree	in	fact	exists	or	not.	Accordingly,	in	order	to	achieve	this	reduction	to	the	intentional	field,	one	must	first	execute	the	epoché	to	abstain	from	the	position-taking	on	the	perceived.			 The	 phenomenological	 reduction,	 furthermore,	 is	 coupled	 by	 the	 eidetic	 reduction	 and	 the	intersubjective	reduction	(reduction	to	pure	 intersubjectivity),	all	of	which	constitute	phenomenological	reflection.	As	a	result	of	these	procedures,	Husserl	explains	that	we	are	led	back	to	the	pure	psyche.	This,	furthermore,	 is	 the	proper	realm	of	pure	psychology	or	pure	psychological	phenomenology.	“Pure”	here	has	 a	 double	 sense	 in	 that	 it	 signifies	 being	 purified	 from	 anything	 non-psychical	 and	 it	 is	 an	 a	 priori	science	dealing	with	essences,	i.e.	it	is	purified	from	particularities.	Accordingly,	pure	psychology	is	said	to	be	analogous	 to	pure	a	priori	physics	such	as	mechanics	or	geometry	(in	 that	 they	are	purified	 from	all	
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that	is	non-physical	and	from	particularities).	And	just	as	a	priori	physics	provides	the	foundation	for	the	empirical	 natural	 sciences,	 pure	 psychology	 provides	 the	 foundation	 for	 empirical	 psychology.	Psychological	phenomenology	(also	called	phenomenological	psychology),	which	studies	the	pure	psyche	in	 a	 phenomenological	manner,	 is	 then	 the	 “new	 science”	 that	 is	 necessary	 for	 securing	 the	 grounds	 of	empirical	psychology.		 But	 phenomenology’s	 role	 is	 not	 exhausted	 as	 an	 a	 priori	 psychological	 discipline	nor	does	 this	capture	the	radicalness	and	true	significance	of	phenomenology.	For	psychological	phenomenology	is	not	yet	transcendental	phenomenology	and,	according	to	Husserl,	it	is	only	as	the	latter	that	phenomenology	establishes	its	unprecedented	role	in	the	history	of	philosophy.	It	is	thus	important	to	distinguish	the	two	sciences.	 As	 Husserl	 says,	 “[b]ecause	 transcendental	 and	 psychological	 phenomenology	 have	fundamentally	different	meanings,	they	must	be	kept	most	rigorously	distinct.”53	What	Husserl	means	by	the	two	sciences	having	different	meanings	is	that	they	serve	different	purposes.	The	aim	of	psychological	phenomenology	 is	 to	 articulate	 the	 essential	 structures	 of	 the	 pure	 psyche	 and,	 hence,	 is	 “born	 of	 a	concern	for	establishing	a	radically	scientific	psychology.”	As	we	have	seen,	psychological	phenomenology	provides	 the	 foundation	 for	 empirical	 psychology	 and	 thus	 secures	 the	 scientific	 rigor	 of	 psychology.	Transcendental	 phenomenology,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 the	 aim	 of	 “reforming	 philosophy	 into	 a	 strict	science”	 by	 articulating	 the	 meaning	 and	 validity	 of	 the	 world	 as	 it	 is	 constituted	 by	 the	 functions	 of	consciousness.	 The	 difference	 can	 also	 be	 cashed	 out	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 scope:	 the	 transcendental	problematic	is	much	broader	since	its	concern	is	not	limited	to	a	specific	region,	i.e.	the	psyche,	but	rather	extends	 to	 all	 possible	 regions.	And	 in	 that	 sense,	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 is	 an	 a	priori	 science	that	provides	the	foundation	for	all	sciences,	not	just	psychology.			 Despite	 these	 differences,	 however,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 strong	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 two	 sciences,	psychological	and	transcendental	phenomenology,	can	still	be	called	sisters.	For	Husserl	tells	us	that	they	in	fact	share	the	“same”	eidetic	insights:	“one	science	turns	into	the	other	through	a	mere	change	in	focus,	such	that	the	‘same’	phenomena	and	eidetic	insights	occur	in	both	sciences.”54	Therefore,	it	is	claimed	that	“in	 a	 certain	 way	 purely	 psychological	 phenomenology	 coincides	 with	 transcendental	 phenomenology,	proposition	 for	proposition.”55	Yet,	 this	 is	 not	without	 an	 important	qualification.	The	 “change	 in	 focus”	has	 the	 effect	 of	 changing	 the	 meaning	 of	 their	 results	 fundamentally.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that,	 while	 the	psychologist	 and	 the	 transcendental	 phenomenologist	 share	 their	 eidetic	 insights	 into	 the	 intentional	
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structure	of	consciousness,	their	interpretations	of	these	insights	differ	substantially	such	that	they	end	up	with	completely	different	understandings	of	the	phenomenological	realm	that	is	uncovered:		[W]hat	their	respective	assertions	understand	by	the	phenomenologically	pure	<realm>	is,	in	the	one	case,	 the	psychic,	a	 stratum	of	being	within	 the	naturally	accepted	world,	 and,	 in	 the	 other	 case,	 the	
transcendental-subjective,	 where	 the	 sense	 and	 existential	 validity	 of	 the	 naturally	 accepted	 world	
originate.56			 Accordingly,	in	this	particular	sense,	the	eidetic	insights	are	essentially	different.	But	how	can	their	interpretations	 differ	 so	 radically?	What	 does	 this	 “change	 of	 focus”	 consist	 of?	 It	 is	 here	 that	 we	 are	introduced	to	the	transcendental	reduction:		The	 objectives	 of	 a	 transcendental	 philosophy	 require	 a	 broadened	 and	 fully	 universal	
phenomenological	reduction	(the	transcendental	reduction)	that	does	justice	to	the	universality	of	the	problem	and	practices	 an	 “epoché”	 regarding	 the	whole	world	 of	 experience	 and	 regarding	 all	 the	positive	 cognition	 and	 sciences	 that	 rest	 on	 it,	 transforming	 them	 all	 into	 phenomena	 –	transcendental	phenomena.57		What	 is	 interesting	here	 is	 that	 the	 transcendental	 reduction	 is	 introduced	as	 “the	broadened	and	 fully	universal	 phenomenological	 reduction,”	 thereby	 suggesting	 that	 the	 transcendental	 reduction	 is	 an	extension	of	the	phenomenological	reduction	and	not	something	radically	different.	Indeed,	this	is	why	the	pure	 psychologist	 can	 become	 a	 transcendental	 phenomenologist	 by	 executing,	 what	 Husserl	 calls,	 the	“unconditioned	epoché.”58	Or,	put	the	other	way	around,	the	transcendental	phenomenologist	can	become	a	 pure	 psychologist	 by	 abstaining	 from	 taking	 this	 “unconditioned	 epoché”	 and	 thereby	 remaining	transcendentally	 naive.	 But	 here,	 one	 may	 wonder:	 Have	 we	 not	 already	 bracketed,	 through	 the	phenomenological	 epoché,	 “the	whole	world	 of	 experience”	 and	 “all	 the	 positive	 cognition	 and	 sciences	that	rest	on	it”?	In	other	words:	what	more	is	there	to	bracket?		 Before	 answering	 this	 question,	 let	 us	 first	 look	 at	 the	 reasons	 Husserl	 gives	 for	 why	 pure	psychology	remains	transcendentally	naive.	In	the	first	draft,	Husserl	gives	us	the	following	explanation:	Even	pure	psychology	 in	 the	phenomenological	 sense,	 thematically	delimited	by	 the	psychological-phenomenological	reduction,	still	is	and	always	will	be	a	positive	science:	it	has	the	world	as	its	pre-given	 foundation.	 The	 pure	 psyches	 and	 communities	 of	 psyches	 <that	 it	 treats>	 are	 psyches	 that	
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belong	 to	 bodies	 in	 nature	 that	 are	 presupposed	 but	 simply	 left	 out	 of	 consideration.	 Like	 every	positive	science,	this	pure	psychology	is	itself	transcendentally	problematic.59		Simply	put,	pure	psychology	is	transcendentally	naive	due	to	its	status	as	a	positive	science.	Yet	it	is	not	entirely	 clear	 from	 this	 passage	 what	 “positive	 sciences”	 signify	 and	 consequently	 in	 what	 sense	 pure	psychology	counts	as	one	of	them.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	unclear	why	pure	psychology	“has	the	world	as	 its	pre-given	 foundation”	when	 this	was	 supposedly	bracketed	 through	 the	epoché.	Admittedly,	 the	 second	draft	is	much	clearer	on	these	points.	I	will	quote	at	length	since	it	is	an	important	passage:	Even	when	doing	pure	psychology	we	still	stand,	as	psychologists,	on	the	ground	of	positivity;	we	are	and	 remain	 explorers	 simply	 of	 the	 world	 or	 of	 a	 <particular>	 world,	 and	 thus	 all	 our	 research	remains	 transcendentally	 naive.	 Despite	 their	 purity,	 all	 pure	 psychic	 phenomena	 have	 the	ontological	sense	of	worldly	real	 facts,	even	when	they	are	treated	eidetically	as	possible	 facts	of	a	world	which	 is	 posited	 as	 general	 possibility	 but	which,	 for	 that	 very	 reason,	 is	 also	 unintelligible	from	a	transcendental	point	of	view.	For	the	psychologist,	who	as	psychologist	remains	in	positivity,	the	 systematic	 psychological-phenomenological	 reduction,	 with	 its	 epoché	 regarding	 the	 existing	world,	 is	merely	 a	means	 for	 reducing	 the	 human	 and	 animal	 psyche	 to	 its	 own	 pure	 and	 proper	essence,	 all	 of	 this	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 a	 world	 that,	 as	 far	 as	 the	 psychologist	 is	 concerned,	remains	 continually	 in	being	 and	 constantly	 valid.	 Precisely	 for	 that	 reason	 this	phenomenological	reduction,	 seen	 from	 the	 transcendental	 viewpoint,	 is	 characterized	 as	 inauthentic	 and	transcendentally	non-genuine.60	Here,	 we	 learn	 that	 “positive	 sciences”	 signify	 sciences	 that	 “remain	 in	 positivity.”	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	positive	 sciences	 are	 those	 that	 deal	 with	 beings	 whose	 existence	 is	 posited,	 i.e.	 presupposed.	 Pure	psychology	 is	 a	positive	 science	 in	 this	 sense	because,	whilst	bracketing	 the	 existence	of	 the	world,	 the	pure	psyche	itself	is	nonetheless	presupposed	as	existing	in	the	world.	And	since	the	positivity	of	the	pure	psyche	 implies	 belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 world,	 or	 so	 the	 argument	 goes,	 pure	 psychology	 has	presupposed	the	world	despite	the	appearance	to	the	contrary.	Thus,	in	this	regard,	“it	[pure	psychology]	has	the	world	as	its	pre-given	foundation.”	Through	the	“psychological-phenomenological	reduction,”	we	are	led	back	to	the	pure	psyche,	which	is	“pure”	in	the	sense	of	being	purified	from	the	non-psychic	and	particularities	but	not	pure	in	the	sense	of	being	freed	from	all	positivity	insofar	as	it	presupposes	its	own	positivity	(and,	as	a	corollary,	the	positivity	of	the	world).	Therefore,	as	Husserl	asserts,	the	psychological-phenomenological	reduction	is	“a	means	for	reducing	the	human	and	animal	psyche	to	its	own	pure	and	proper	essence”	but	only	 “against	 the	backdrop	of	a	world	 that,	as	 far	as	 the	psychologist	 is	 concerned,	remains	continually	in	being	and	constantly	valid.”	
																																								 																				
59	Ibid.,	pp.	248-249/96-97.	
60	Ibid.,	pp.	272-273/127-128.	
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	 Now,	 if	 the	 pure	psyche	 is	 posited	 as	 existing	within	 the	world,	 then	 this	 cannot	 be	 the	 ground	from	 which	 the	 sense	 and	 validity	 of	 the	 world	 and	 everything	 that	 exists	 in	 it	 originate,	 namely	transcendental	 subjectivity.	 This	 follows	 insofar	 as	 a	 region	 amongst	 other	 regions	 within	 the	 world	simply	cannot	be	the	originating	or	constituting	source	of	the	world.	Or	to	put	it	in	terms	of	‘positivity,’	all	regions	within	the	world,	insofar	as	they	are	posited	beings,	cannot	be	the	ground	of	such	positivity.	Thus,	all	sciences	that	deal	with	posited	beings,	namely	all	positive	sciences,	cannot	be	that	fundamental	science	that	provides	the	a	priori	foundation	for	all	sciences.	Accordingly,	pure	psychology	is	not	a	transcendental	science	 since	 it	 too,	 being	 an	 a	 priori	 regional	 science,	 is	 a	 positive	 science.	 If	 we	 want	 to	 rightly	understand	the	transcendental	problematics,	we	must	maintain	a	strict	distinction	between	the	positive	sciences	 and	 transcendental	 science	 and,	 accordingly,	 between	 phenomenological	 psychology	 and	transcendental	phenomenology.	Dan	Zahavi	captures	this	distinction	nicely:	Phenomenological	 psychology	 is	 a	 form	 of	 philosophical	 psychology	 which	 takes	 the	 first-person	perspective	 seriously,	 but	which	 –	 in	 contrast	 to	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 –	 remains	within	the	 natural	 attitude.	 The	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 is	 consequently	 that	 phenomenological	psychology	might	 be	 described	 as	 a	 regional-ontological	analysis	which	 investigates	 consciousness	for	 its	 own	 sake.	 In	 contrast,	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 is	 a	 much	 more	 ambitious	 global	enterprise.	 It	 is	 interested	 in	 the	constitutive	dimension	of	subjectivity,	 that	 is,	 it	 is	 interested	 in	 an	investigation	of	consciousness	in	so	far	as	consciousness	is	taken	to	be	a	condition	of	possibility	for	meaning,	truth,	validity,	and	appearance.61		 Let	 us	 now	 go	 back	 to	 our	 earlier	 question	 regarding	what	more	 there	 is	 to	 bracket.	 From	 the	above	discussion,	we	can	conclude	that	it	is	the	positivity	of	the	psyche	that	we	must	further	bracket	after	the	psychological-phenomenological	reduction.	Or	put	differently,	in	order	to	execute	the	“unconditioned	
epoché,”	we	must	bracket	the	positivity	of	the	psyche	insofar	as	that	is	the	last	vestige	of	positivity.	What	we	then	have	as	a	consequence	is	not	the	pure	psyche	posited	as	existing	in	the	world	but	a	consciousness	purified	from	all	positivity,	i.e.	transcendentally	pure	consciousness	(or	ego).	As	Husserl	says:	Thus,	as	a	transcendental	phenomenologist,	what	I	have	now	is	not	my	ego	as	a	psyche	–	for	the	very	meaning	 of	 the	 world	 ‘psyche’	 presupposes	 an	 actual	 or	 possible	 world.	 Rather,	 I	 have	 that	transcendentally	pure	ego	within	which	even	 this	psyche,	with	 its	 transcendent	 sense,	 is	 endowed,	from	out	of	the	hidden	functions	of	consciousness,	with	the	sense	and	validity	it	has	for	me.62	And	shortly	after:	
																																								 																				
61	Zahavi	2010,	p.	10	(my	italics).	
62	Hua	IX,	pp.	274-274/129.	
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It	is	the	transcendental	reduction’s	fundamental	and	proper	character	that,	from	the	very	beginning	and	with	one	blow	–	by	means	of	an	all-inclusive	theoretical	act	of	will	–	it	checks	this	transcendental	naivete	that	still	remains	as	a	residue	in	pure	psychology.63	It	is	in	this	sense,	then,	that	the	transcendental	reduction	is	taken	to	be	the	“broadened	and	fully	universal	phenomenological	 reduction.”64	Husserl	 also	 speaks	 of	 this	 universal	 character	 of	 the	 transcendental	reduction	 in	terms	of	 its	“all-inclusiveness”	(Universalität):	“The	 issue	of	all-inclusiveness	belongs	to	the	essential	sense	of	the	transcendental	problem.”65	And:	According	 to	 the	sense	of	 the	 transcendental	question	 I	as	a	 transcendental	phenomenologist	place	the	whole	world	entirely	and	absolutely	within	this	question.	With	equal	all-inclusiveness,	therefore,	I	stop	every	positive	question,	every	positive	judgment,	and	the	whole	of	natural	experience	qua	pre-accepted	valid	basis	for	possible	judgments.66		As	an	all-encompassing	procedure,	 the	transcendental	reduction	therefore	 leads	us	back	to	the	realm	of	subjectivity	that	is	rid	of	all	positivity.		
	
2.4 The	nature	of	transcendental	subjectivity		 At	this	point,	however,	a	further	question	arises	as	to	how	to	make	sense	of	such	a	non-positable	subjectivity.	Specifically,	how	can	we	proceed	to	thematize	and	describe	a	realm	if	it	is	non-positable?	In	fact,	Husserl	makes	some	conflicting	claims	on	this	matter.	Although	on	the	one	hand	he	pushes	for	the	all-inclusiveness	of	the	transcendental	reduction	and	emphasizes	that	all	positivity	must	be	left	behind,	he	at	the	same	time	claims	that	transcendental	subjectivity	is	“the	only	one	that	is	positable”:		In	fact	it	is	evident	that	the	ego	in	its	<now	transcendentally>	reduced	peculiarity	is	the	only	one	that	is	 positable	 [setzbar]	 with	 all	 its	 intentional	 correlates,	 and	 that	 it	 therefore	 offers	 me	 the	 most	fundamental	and	primordial	experiential	ground	for	transcendental	exploration.67			 But	 if	 Husserl	 really	wants	 to	maintain	 that	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 is	 “the	 only	 one	 that	 is	positable,”	then	it	must	be	clarified	how	the	positivity	of	transcendental	subjectivity	is	different	from	that	of	objects	in	the	world	in	such	a	way	that	justifies	its	positivity.	In	what	sense	could	it	be	said	that	there	is	
																																								 																				
63	Ibid.,	p.	274/130	(my	italics).	
64	Ibid.,	p.	249/97.	
65	Ibid.,	p.	271/124.	
66	Ibid.,	p.	273/128-129.	
67	Ibid.,	p.	275/131.	
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a	transcendental	subjectivity?	Here,	the	issue	concerns	the	being	of	transcendental	subjectivity,	and	it	has	been	pointed	out	by	some	commentators	 that	Husserl	 remains	ambiguous	on	 this	point.	David	Carr,	 for	example,	has	argued	that	Husserl	leaves	us	with	a	paradox	regarding	the	very	existence	of	transcendental	subjectivity:	On	 the	one	hand,	Husserl	wants	 to	 stress	 the	existence	 of	 the	 ego	 in	 transcendental	reflection:	 "ego	sum"	provides	us	with	an	"apodictically	existing	basis	to	stand	on."	[…]	On	the	other	hand,	this	ego	is	deprived	of	any	normal	sense	of	existing,	that	is,	being	an	entity	among	other	entities,	existing	for	an	ego	as	an	object	within	the	horizon	of	the	world.68		This	is	also	a	point	that	Heidegger	pushes	Husserl	on.	In	the	margins	of	the	above-quoted	passage	where	Husserl	states	that	“the	ego	in	its	reduced	peculiarity	is	the	only	one	that	is	positable,”	Heidegger	writes:			<So	it	is	a>	positum!	Something	positive!	Or	else	what	kind	of	positing	is	this?	In	what	sense	<can	one	say>	that	this	posited-something	is	–	if	it	is	supposed	to	be	not	nothing	<but>	rather	in	a	certain	way	everything?69		Indeed,	 this	 is	an	 important	point	of	dispute	between	Husserl	and	Heidegger	and	one	to	which	we	shall	return	in	Part	II.	But	for	now,	it	is	sufficient	to	merely	note	that	Husserl	remained	somewhat	ambiguous	on	this	point	and	that	Heidegger	did	not	fail	to	see	that.		There	 is,	 however,	 another	 path	 that	 one	 can	 take	 that	 incidentally	 saves	 us	 from	 falling	 into	 a	paradox.	 And	 it	 revolves	 around	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 ought	 to	 be	 posited	regardless	of	what	Husserl	himself	says	about	the	matter.	Above,	we	saw	how	transcendental	subjectivity	is	revealed	through	the	epoché	and	the	transcendental	reduction.	Seen	in	this	light,	it	is	a	kind	of	residue.	Accordingly,	up	to	this	point,	the	characterization	of	transcendental	subjectivity	has	been	rather	negative,	i.e.	as	the	realm	freed	from	all	positivity,	or	at	least	from	the	positivity	that	pertains	to	objects	in	the	world.	But	Husserl	 also	 gives	 a	more	 positive	 characterization,	 namely	 as	 that	wherein	 objects	 and	 the	world	appear,	 i.e.	 the	 locus	 of	 appearance.	 Or	 to	 use	 a	 term	 adopted	 by	many	 commentators	 (though	 not	 by	Husserl),	it	is	the	“dative	of	manifestation.”70	This	is	very	much	a	phenomenological	characterization	since	it	 is	 derived	 from	 the	 intentional	 structure	 of	 consciousness	 revealed	 through	 phenomenological	reflection.	 What	 phenomenological	 reflection	 clarified	 was	 that	 the	 world	 existing	 independently	 of	consciousness	makes	 no	 sense	 and	 that	 the	 only	 way	 to	 understand	 the	world	 is	 as	 it	 is	 intended.	 Put	
																																								 																				
68	Carr	1999,	pp.	93-94.	
69	Hua	IX,	p.	604/131.	
70	According	to	Overgaard,	the	phrase	“dative	of	manifestation”	was	first	coined	by	Thomas	Prufer.	Cf.	Overgaard	2004,	p.	
45;	Prufer	(1988,	p.	200).	
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bluntly,	 the	world	 is	 always	 a	world	 as	 it	 appears	 for	 consciousness.	 Here	 again,	 however,	 we	must	 be	careful	not	to	misidentify	this	“dative	of	manifestation”	as	the	pure	psyche.	For	while	the	pure	psyche	is	that	 consciousness	 for	 which	 objects	 and	 the	 world	 appear,	 it	 is	 also	 an	 object	 in	 the	 world.	Transcendental	subjectivity,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	never	an	object	 in	 the	world.	The	distinction	between	the	 two	 notions	 of	 subjectivity,	 and	more	 generally	 between	 empirical	 and	 transcendental	 subjectivity,	can	be	cashed	out	in	terms	of	their	relation	to	the	world.	And	indeed,	this	is	what	essentially	separates	one	from	the	other.	Carr	has	nicely	underlined	this	point:		The	 key	 to	 the	 difference	 between	 transcendental	 and	 empirical	 subjects	 is	 to	 be	 found	 not	 in	 the	internal	structures	of	consciousness	–	that	is,	in	its	relation	to	itself	–	but	rather	in	its	relation	to	the	world.71			 On	 the	one	hand,	we	have	 the	empirical	 subject	 that	 “relates	 in	both	 intentional	 and	 real-causal	ways	to	the	world,	but	in	any	case	[…]	as	part	to	whole.”72	In	other	words,	it	is	a	subject	for	the	world	but	also	an	object	in	the	world	amongst	other	objects	that	exist	independently	of	the	self.	On	the	other	hand,	we	have	the	 transcendental	subject	 that	 “relates	purely	and	exclusively	 intentionally	 to	 the	world,	not	as	part	to	whole	but	as	subject	to	object	–	or	rather,	as	subject	to	horizon	of	objects.”73	Here,	the	subject	 is	
exclusively	a	subject	for	the	world.	Carr	further	explains:		Rather	 than	 being	 an	 object	 it	 is	 the	 ‘condition	 of	 the	 possibility’	 of	 there	 being	 objects	 at	 all,	 and	indeed,	of	there	being	a	world.	That	is,	as	subject	of	its	own	intentionality,	this	subject	can	be	seen	as	the	source,	not,	of	course,	of	 the	existence	of	the	world	or	the	things	 in	 it,	but	of	 their	meaning,	and	indeed	their	status	as	objects	and	as	world	for	a	subject.74	But	if	we	characterize	transcendental	subjectivity	as	the	locus	of	manifestation	that	is	exclusively	a	subject	 for	 the	world,	 how	can	we	proceed	 to	 give	 further	positive	descriptions	of	 it?	 Since	 it	 is	 not	 an	object	to	which	various	properties	can	be	attributed,	in	a	certain	sense,	it	lacks	content,	i.e.	it	is	vacuous:		It	is	nothing	but	its	intentional	relation	to	the	world;	its	only	content	is	the	 intentional	content	of	its	objects.	But	 these	are	not	properties	or	determinations	of	 the	transcendental	subject;	whether	they	exist	or	not,	they	transcend	the	subject	and	its	intentions;	they	are	in	no	way	to	be	considered	‘really	inherent	parts’	of	it.75		
																																								 																				
71	Carr	1999,	p.	90.	
72	Ibid.,	p.	90.	
73	Ibid.,	pp.	90-91	(my	italics).	
74	Ibid.,	pp.	91-92.	
75	Ibid.,	p.	94.	
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Here,	however,	an	important	point	is	made.	Namely,	transcendental	subjectivity	does	not	altogether	lack	content,	but	 rather,	 “its	only	content	 is	 the	 intentional	 content	of	 its	objects.”	This	 is	 to	 say	 that	we	can	turn	to	the	world	to	give	us	descriptions	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	Overgaard	underscores	this	point	and	argues	that	we	are	able	to	have	access	to	transcendental	subjectivity	in	an	indirect	way	via	the	world.	Moreover,	not	only	is	this	indirect	path	one	possible	way	to	access	transcendental	subjectivity	but	it	is	the	
only	way	 to	do	 so.	And	as	a	 corollary,	he	argues	 that,	 contrary	 to	what	 some	of	Husserl’s	words	on	 the	matter	 indicate,	 the	 only	 positing	 that	Husserlian	phenomenology	needs	 is	 that	 of	 the	world.76	In	 other	words,	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 posit	 or	 presuppose	 the	 existence	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 in	 order	 to	thematize	it	phenomenologically	insofar	as	it	can	be	examined	indirectly	via	an	examination	of	the	world:	[T]he	world	cannot	constitute	itself	without	doing	so	for	someone,	and	this	someone	(the	one,	or	ones,	to	whom	 the	world	 appears)	we	 define	 as	 the	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 The	 question	 is	whether	Husserl	could,	or	should,	 “posit”	 this	subjectivity	as	a	sphere	of	being	to	be	directly	 investigated	by	phenomenology,	 and	 the	 answer	 is	 negative,	 since	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 as	 defined	 seems	 to	have	no	content	besides	 that	of	 the	experienced	world.	 Instead	we	need	to	 focus	once	again	on	 the	world	inside	its	brackets,	to	see	if	this	could	function	as	a	guiding	clue	to	an	indirect	investigation	of	the	 initially	 empty	 “dative	 of	manifestation.”	 This	 indirect	 approach	 to	 transcendental	 subjectivity,	this	going	back	from	the	world	and	mundane	entities	to	that	for	which	it	constitutes	itself,	we	call	the	transcendental	or	phenomenological	reduction.77		To	be	sure,	one	must	be	careful	not	to	misunderstand	his	claim	that	we	need	to	only	posit	the	world	and	“focus	 once	 again	 on	 the	 world	 inside	 its	 brackets”	 as	 signifying	 that	 he	 is	 somehow	 disregarding	 the	phenomenological	 epoché.	 Overgaard	 certainly	 takes	 pains	 to	 clarify	 that	 this	 is	 exactly	what	 he	 is	 not	claiming:		Husserl	posits	nothing	less	and	nothing	more	than	the	existing	world	and	all	entities	belonging	to	it,	but	 does	 so	 in	 a	 peculiar	 manner,	 viz.	 he	 posits	 the	 world	 as	 that	 whose	 constitution	 we	 must	
understand.	78		The	difference	from	the	positing	that	takes	place	in	the	natural	attitude	is	that	we	do	not	posit	the	world	and	 the	 objects	within	 it	 as	 existing	 independently	 of	 consciousness,	 ready	 to	 be	 examined	 in	 terms	 of	
																																								 																				
76	Overgaard	notes	that	he	is	interested	in	understanding	“what	is	actually	going	on	in	Husserlian	phenomenology”	and	
not	so	much	in	Husserl’s	own	interpretation	of	it.	He	emphasizes	the	importance	of	this	distinction	by	drawing	on	
Gadamer’s	claim	that	an	author	is	generally	not	the	authority	of	his	own	work	insofar	as	he	becomes	a	reader	of	it	(and	
accordingly	no	more	authoritative	than	other	readers).	This	distinction	is	all	the	more	emphasized	in	the	context	of	
working	with	Husserl	since,	according	to	Overgaard,	Husserl	was	not	the	best	interpreter	of	his	own	works.	Cf.	Overgaard	
2004,	p.	49.	
77	Overgaard	2004,	p.	54.	
78	Ibid.,	p.	51.	
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their	properties	 and	 relations	 that	pertain	between	 them.	Rather,	we	posit	 the	world	as	 the	 intentional	correlate	of	consciousness	and	as	something	that	needs	to	be	understood	 in	 its	constitution.	 It	 is	 in	 this	sense	 that	 the	 world	 and	 its	 objects	 are	 taken	 as	 “transcendental	 guiding	 clues”	 (Leitfäden)	 for	understanding	transcendental	subjectivity.79		 Hereto,	 we	 have	 seen	 two	 ways	 of	 understanding	 what	 the	 transcendental	 reduction	 reveals:		transcendental	subjectivity	as	“the	only	one	that	is	positable”	and	transcendental	subjectivity	freed	from	all	positivity	but	gains	 its	content	 from	the	world.	We	have	already	seen	how	the	former	understanding	leads	 to	 a	 paradox	 that	 calls	 for	 further	 articulation	 regarding	 the	 being	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	Does	the	 latter	understanding	fare	better?	Admittedly,	 it	does	avoid	the	paradox	since	we	are	no	 longer	dealing	with	 two	kinds	of	positivity.	This	may	be	good	news	 for	 the	Husserlian	who	 is	eager	 to	quickly	dismiss	 Heidegger’s	 objection	 to	 Husserl	 that	 he	 needs	 to	 clarify	 the	 sense	 in	 which	 transcendental	subjectivity	 ‘is.’	They	can	simply	say	 that	 the	question	does	not	arise	 in	Husserlian	phenomenology	and	hence	 is	 irrelevant	 since	 there	 is	 no	 need	 to	 posit	 the	 existence	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 But	Overgaard’s	 suggestion	 that	 we	 only	 have	 indirect	 access	 to	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 via	 the	examination	 of	 the	 world	 does	 not	 render	 the	 question	 of	 the	 being	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity	irrelevant.	On	the	contrary,	we	can	even	say	that	it	makes	the	question	all	the	more	relevant	in	the	sense	that	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 give	 a	 Husserlian	 response	 to	 Heidegger’s	 objection	 without	 necessarily	 getting	ourselves	 tangled	up	 in	 a	metaphysical	 discussion.	 For,	 in	 arguing	 that	 indirect	 access	 is	 necessary	and	
sufficient	 in	bringing	transcendental	subjectivity	 to	phenomenological	evidence,	Overgaard	 is	suggesting	that	the	way	of	being	of	transcendental	subjectivity	is	sufficiently	captured	by	recourse	to	its	relation	to	the	world	and	objects	in	the	world.	Therefore,	according	to	this	interpretation,	Husserlian	phenomenology	can	and	does	indeed	provide	an	account	of	the	being	of	transcendental	subjectivity.		 Another	advantage	that	this	interpretation	of	transcendental	subjectivity	has	over	the	other	is	that	it	highlights	the	essential	role	that	the	world	has	for	transcendental	subjectivity.	When	the	transcendental	reduction	is	understood	as	the	stripping	off	of	the	last	vestige	of	positivity	that	the	pure	psyche	has,	this	can	 give	 the	 impression	 that	what	we	have	 left	 is	 a	 transcendental	 ego	without	 a	world,	 not	 so	distant	from	the	Cartesian	cogito.	Indeed,	the	way	in	which	Husserl	introduces	transcendental	phenomenology	in	the	EB	article	that	we	have	hereto	been	looking	at,	namely	by	first	calling	for	the	need	of	pure	psychology	and	underlining	the	similarities	it	has	to	transcendental	phenomenology,	admittedly	assists	in	giving	the	wrong	 impression	 that	 the	 world	 is	 somehow	 excluded.	 But	 when	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 is	understood	as	the	dative	of	manifestation	where	its	only	content	is	the	world,	then	this	puts	us	in	a	better	
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position	to	see	how	the	world	is	an	inseparable	component	of	transcendental	subjectivity	and	accordingly,	of	 transcendental	 phenomenology.	 In	 fact,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 denying	 that,	 transcendental	 or	 not,	phenomenology	never	 leaves	 the	world	out	 of	 the	picture.	 Even	psychological	 phenomenology	 includes	the	 world	 insofar	 as	 the	 pure	 psyche	 has	 the	 world	 (or	 more	 precisely,	 the	 objects	 therein)	 as	 its	intentional	correlate.	Transcendental	phenomenology	is	no	different	 in	this	regard	–	 it	works	with	what	Husserl	 calls	 the	 “universal	 a	 priori	 correlation”	 (Korrelationsapriori)	 between	 the	 cogito	 and	 the	
cogitatum.80	Hence	on	the	side	of	the	cogitatum,	it	works	with	the	descriptions	of	the	intentional	object	as	it	is	intended,	and	these	are	called	the	noematic	descriptions.	On	the	other	side	of	the	cogito,	we	have	the	descriptions	 of	 the	mode	of	 consciousness,	 i.e.	 the	noetic	 descriptions.	 In	 this	way,	 the	epoché	 does	not	bracket	away	 the	world	but,	 rather,	 rediscovers	 it	 in	a	different	 light.81	As	Husserl	 says	 in	 the	Cartesian	
Meditations:		We	now	understand	that,	by	our	universal	epoché	with	respect	to	the	being	or	non-being	of	the	world,	we	have	not	simply	lost	the	world	for	phenomenology;	we	retain	it,	after	all,	qua	cogitatum.82		The	difference	between	transcendental	and	psychological	phenomenology	is	not	that	the	former	includes	the	world	while	the	latter	does	not,	but	rather	that,	in	the	former,	the	cogito-cogitatum	(noetic-noematic)	correlation	is	uncovered	in	its	constitution,	i.e.	as	manifest	for	transcendental	subjectivity.		 Let	 us	 now	 summarize	 Husserl’s	 view	 on	 transcendental	 reflection.	 Transcendental	 reflection	differs	 from	 what	 Husserl	 called	 natural	 reflection	 in	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 thematizes	 our	 experience.	Natural	reflection	is	a	bending	back	of	consciousness	onto	our	experience	in	the	natural	attitude.	This	is	to	
																																								 																				
80	Hua	VI,	§46.	
81	There	is	a	huge	debate	which	I	did	not	go	into	here	that	concerns	the	status	of	the	noema	and	which	is	sometimes	
referred	to	as	the	noema-discussion.	The	controversy	revolves	around	the	relation	between	the	noema	understood	as	the	
object-as-it-is-intended	and	the	object-that-is-intended.	According	to	what	is	called	the	West	Coast,	or	Fregean,	
interpretation,	most	famously	maintained	by	Føllesdal	and	Dreyfus,	the	noema	is	that	which	mediates	our	act	and	object.	
The	noema	is	here	understood	as	the	ideal	sense	by	virtue	of	which	we	intend	objects.	Under	this	interpretation,	the	
epoché	brackets	the	world	and	objects	therein	and,	accordingly,	phenomenology	leaves	the	world	out	of	the	picture.	
Contra		this	reading,	there	is	the	East	Coast	interpretation	propounded	by	Sokolowski,	Drummond,	Zahavi	and	others	
according	to	which	the	noema	just	is	the	object	considered	in	phenomenological	reflection.	According	to	this	reading,	the	
epoché	is	not	a	way	to	leave	the	world	and	objects	therein	out	of	the	picture	and	to	focus	instead	on	mental	
representations	but,	rather,	a	method	to	see	objects	and	the	world	in	a	different	way.	In	phenomenological	reflection,	
then,	the	relation	between	the	object-that-is-intended	and	the	object-as-it-is-intended	is	not	seen	as	an	ontic	distinction	
between	two	entities	but	rather	a	reflective	or	methodological	distinction	within	the	structure	of	the	noema.	Without	
attempting	a	full	justification,	I	will	only	note	what	I	take	to	be	the	most	detrimental	feature	of	the	former	reading,	namely	
that,	if	we	subscribe	to	the	former	view,	then	phenomenology	becomes	a	form	of	representationalism,	a	view	of	the	mind	
that	Husserl	clearly	distanced	himself	from.	For	a	discussion	regarding	this	debate,	see	e.g.	Zahavi	(2003b)	and	Drummond	
(1990).	
82	Hua	I,	p.	75/36.	
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say	that	 it	 thematizes	our	experience	as	psychic	experience	alongside	the	physical	world.	 It	does	not	alter	the	way	we	conceive	the	world	since	it	leaves	the	world	out	of	the	picture.	Transcendental	reflection,	on	the	 other	 hand,	 fundamentally	 changes	 the	 way	 we	 relate	 to	 the	 world	 since	 the	 world	 is	 no	 longer	conceived	as	existing	apart	 from	us	but	 is	now	the	world	only	 insofar	as	 it	manifests	 for	consciousness.	Moreover,	 we	 have	 seen	 that	 the	 transcendental	 phenomenologist	 differs	 from	 the	 psychological	phenomenologist	 in	 that,	 while	 they	 both	 employ	 phenomenological	 reflection	 on	 the	 intentional	structure	of	consciousness,	the	latter	remains	in	the	natural	attitude	insofar	as	he	takes	the	pure	psyche	to	be	 existing	 in	 the	 world.	 In	 order	 to	 move	 into	 the	 transcendental	 attitude,	 one	 must	 effect	 the	“unconditioned	epoché,”	which	brackets	all	positivity	and	‘bring	us	back	to’	(Latin:	reducere)	the	realm	of	pure	transcendental	subjectivity.	And	as	the	dative	of	manifestation,	this	realm	is	that	“place”	wherein	the	world	 appears	 in	 its	 constitution.	 The	 transcendental-phenomenological	 epoché	 and	 reduction	 are	 thus	the	 specific	 methods	 that	 together	 constitute	 transcendental	 reflection.	 Put	 differently,	 to	 employ	transcendental	reflection	is	simply	to	execute	the	transcendental-phenomenological	epoché	and	reduction.	Accordingly,	we	can	say	that,	for	Husserl,	transcendental	reflection	thematizes	the	intentional	structures	of	 our	 experience	as	 they	are	 constituted	 in	 consciousness.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 experience	 and	 this	 experience	alone	that	deserves	to	be	called	transcendental	experience.	It	is	radically	different	from	psychic	experience	insofar	 as	 the	 latter	 refers	 to	 our	 experience	 of	 the	 world	 distinguished	 from	 the	 world	 itself.	Transcendental	 experience,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 designates	 our	 experience	 of	 the	 world	 as	 such	 and	therefore,	it	makes	no	sense	to	speak	of	a	world	outside	of	this	experience.			
46	
	
Chapter	2:	The	essence	of	transcendental	philosophy	
Introduction		 In	 the	 previous	 chapter,	we	 examined	Kant	 and	Husserl’s	 respective	 versions	 of	 transcendental	philosophy	with	a	view	to	determining	the	essence	of	transcendental	philosophy.	But	the	focus	was	more	on	how	Kant	and	Husserl	understood	the	transcendental	in	the	context	of	the	specific	problematics	they	were	dealing	with	and	 less	on	how	 their	understandings	of	 the	 transcendental	 relate	 to	each	other.	We	saw	how	Husserl	understood	his	transcendental	phenomenology	to	be	a	development	of	Kant’s,	but	this	does	not	yet	give	us	a	clear	idea	as	to	what	makes	them	both	transcendental	philosophies.	Accordingly,	the	aim	of	this	chapter	is	to	articulate	the	essence	of	transcendental	philosophy	based	on	our	investigations	in	the	 previous	 chapter.	 The	 pressing	 question	 is:	 In	 virtue	 of	 what	 characteristics	 are	 they	 variations	 of	
transcendental	 philosophy?	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	 chapter,	 we	 will	 be	 equipped	 with	 three	 criteria	 of	transcendental	philosophy.		
1. Transcendental	reflection	and	conditions	of	possibility		 First	 and	 foremost,	 for	 both	 Kant	 and	 Husserl,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 a	 second-order	discipline.	This	entails	that	the	transcendental	must	be	clearly	distinguished	from	all	first-order	mode	of	inquiry.	 Steven	 Crowell	 calls	 this	 the	 “discontinuity	 thesis,”	 namely	 the	 thesis	 that	 there	 is	 a	 radical	
discontinuity	between	philosophy	and	all	 first-order	cognition,	whether	empirical	or	metaphysical.1	This	
																																								 																				
1	Crowell	2013,	p.	11.	Crowell	argues	that	this	discontinuity	thesis	is	maintained	by	all	transcendental	philosophers,	from	
Kant	and	the	neo-Kantians	to	Husserl	(and	early	Heidegger),	as	he	also	calls	it	the	“transcendental	discontinuity	thesis”	(p.	
18).	At	first	sight,	this	may	run	counter	to	his	earlier	claim	made	in	his	2001	book.	There,	he	argued	that	what	distinguishes	
the	neo-Kantians’	version	of	transcendental	philosophy	from	transcendental	phenomenology	is	that	the	former	maintains	
a	continuity	between	philosophy	and	the	positive	sciences	while	the	latter	claims	a	discontinuity	(2001,	p.	24).	While	neo-
Kantians	identified	philosophy’s	task	with	providing	a	theory	of	science	(and	hence	insisted	on	the	continuity	with	the	
positive	sciences),	phenomenologists	took	their	main	task	to	be	a	clarification	of	meaning	and	accordingly	insisted	on	the	
autonomy	of	philosophy	(and	hence	insisted	on	the	discontinuity	with	the	positive	sciences).	But	importantly,	Crowell	was	
not	thereby	claiming	that,	for	the	neo-Kantians,	philosophy	provides	first-order	knowledge	claims	as	the	positive	sciences	
do.	They	are	not	continuous	in	that	sense.	Thus,	I	believe	Crowell’s	view	is	consistent	throughout	insofar	as	he	always	
maintained	that	what	marks	transcendental	philosophy	is	its	second-order	status.	The	discontinuity	thesis	merely	follows	
from	this.	Namely,	it	is	the	thesis	that	philosophical	knowledge	is	a	second-order	knowledge	and	thus	distinguished	from	
knowledge	gained	in	the	positive	sciences,	and	indeed	from	all	first-order	knowledge.	
Another	point	to	note	in	this	context	is	the	debate	between	Crowell	and	Dan	Zahavi	concerning	the	relation	between	
philosophy	and	the	positive	sciences.	Against	Crowell’s	view	that	phenomenology	understands	this	relation	to	be	a	
discontinuous	one,	Zahavi	has	argued	that	Husserl’s	attitude	to	this	relation	is	more	“conciliatory”	(2003c	
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point	 is	also	nicely	captured	by	David	Carr	when,	 in	the	context	of	discussing	Kant	and	Husserl,	he	says	that	“both	thinkers	conceive	of	themselves	not	as	producing	knowledge	about	reality	or	the	world,	but	as	reflecting	 on	 such	 knowledge.”2	Now,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 secures	 this	 discontinuity	 with	 the	specific	 kind	 of	 reflection	 it	 employs,	 namely	 transcendental	 reflection.	 Kant	 had	 distinguished	transcendental	 reflection	 from	 empirical	 or	 psychological	 reflection.	 While	 the	 latter	 thematizes	 our	experience	with	a	view	to	determining	its	real	properties	(for	example,	it	thematizes	our	mind	to	seek	out	mental	 states	 or	 properties),	 transcendental	 reflection	 thematizes	 our	 experience	 with	 a	 view	 to	determining	 the	 a	 priori	 subjective	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 cognition	 of	 objects.	 Here,	transcendental	 reflection	 is	 a	 second-order	 consciousness	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 asks	 for	 the	 underlying	conditions	of	possibility	 for	our	experience	and	not	 the	 factual	make	up	of	our	experience.	Accordingly,	transcendental	reflection	abstracts	 from	our	experience	and	seeks	 the	underlying	principles	 that	enable	us	to	have	these	experiences	in	the	first	place.			 It	may	not	be	easy	to	see	how	Husserl’s	transcendental	reflection,	consisting	of	the	transcendental-phenomenological	epoché	and	reduction,	 is	a	second-order	reflection.	For	the	phenomenological	method	does	not	abstract	from	our	experience	as	it	never	leaves	the	sphere	of	experience.	Nonetheless,	it	is	also	not	 first-order	 reflection	 since	 it	 does	 not	 thematize	 our	 experience	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 its	 real	properties.	Husserl	called	this	natural	reflection,	i.e.	the	kind	of	reflection	employed	in	the	natural	attitude.	In	 the	 natural	 attitude,	 we	 take	 the	 existence	 of	 objects	 and	 the	 world	 for	 granted.	 And	 so	 in	 natural	reflection,	we	thematize	our	experience	as	pertaining	to	the	psychophysical	being	that	exists	in	the	world.	But	 once	 these	 assumptions	 in	 the	 natural	 attitude	 are	 bracketed,	 the	 intentional	 structures	 of	 our	experience	can	be	revealed	in	full,	i.e.	in	its	constitution,	as	the	very	ground	of	meaning.	It	is	then	in	this	sense	 that	we	can	say	 that	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 reflection	 is	 second-order,	namely,	not	 in	 the	sense	that	 it	abstracts	 from	our	experience	but	 in	 the	sense	 that	 it	abstracts	 from	the	natural	attitude	(or	our	experience	 interpreted	 in	 the	 natural	 attitude	 as	 mental	 or	 psychical).	 Therefore,	 employing	 Kantian	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
,	p.	333;	2004,	p.	341).	But	in	light	of	the	above	consideration,	it	is	important	to	understand	that	the	point	of	disagreement	
is	not	about	the	second-order	status	of	transcendental	knowledge	and,	accordingly,	the	discontinuity	thesis.	As	I	
understand	it,	Zahavi’s	main	motivation	for	arguing	in	favor	of	a	more	conciliatory	reading	of	the	relation	between	
philosophy	and	the	positive	sciences	(based	on	Husserl’s	as	well	as	Merleau-Ponty’s	views	on	the	matter)	is	not	to	reduce	
philosophy	to	a	first-order	science	but	rather	to	suggest	that	the	two	can	cooperate	with	each	other	and	mutually	profit	by	
doing	so.	Accordingly,	he	does	not	deny	the	autonomy	of	philosophy	and,	in	fact,	he	stresses	that	one	of	the	differences	
between	philosophy	and	the	empirical	sciences	(and	I	believe	this	can	be	extended	to	all	first-order	cognition)	is	that	
philosophy	is	a	critical	science	(2004,	p.	344-345).	Therefore,	although	Zahavi	challenges	the	traditional	boundary	between	
the	transcendental	and	the	empirical,	I	do	not	think	he	would	go	so	far	as	to	deny	the	discontinuity	thesis	which	secures	
the	specific	status	of	philosophical	knowledge.	
2	Carr	1999,	p.	101.	
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language,	we	can	say	that,	for	both	Kant	and	Husserl,	transcendental	reflection	is	a	second-order	reflection	that	thematizes	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	cognition	of	objects	or,	more	generally,	our	experience	of	the	world.				 At	this	point,	however,	it	is	also	worth	pointing	out	the	way	in	which	Husserl’s	phenomenological	rendering	widens	the	scope	of	transcendental	philosophy	as	 it	was	developed	by	Kant.	The	difference	is	evident	if	we	compare	the	basic	transcendental	questions	they	were	interested	in.	Kant	was	interested	in	the	 specific	 question:	How	 is	 synthetic	a	priori	 knowledge	possible?	 Husserl’s	 question,	 in	 contrast,	was:	
How	 does	 meaning	 manifest	 in	 consciousness?	 Husserl’s	 interest	 was	 not	 limited	 to	 synthetic	 a	 priori	knowledge	and	the	problem	of	cognition	but	was	more	generally	geared	towards	our	experience	of	objects	and	 the	 structures	of	 intentional	 consciousness.	And	 in	 this	way,	phenomenology	widened	 the	 scope	 to	encompass	our	experience	in	general.	As	Crowell	confirms:	[P]henomenology	 accomplishes	 a	 universal	 generalization	 of	 the	 transcendental	 turn:	 inquiry	 into	the	(normative)	conditions	for	the	possibility	of	knowledge	becomes	an	inquiry	into	intentionality	or	“mental	content”	as	such:	our	experience	of	something	as	something.3	In	 the	same	context,	Crowell	argues	 that	phenomenology	 is	 transcendental	 insofar	as	 it	makes	meaning	(what	he	 identifies	with	 the	as-structure	of	our	experience	of	objects)	 thematic.4	It	 is	 important	 to	note	that	by	“meaning”,	Crowell	does	not	have	in	mind	something	through	which	we	intend	objects,	e.g.	mental	content.	The	double	quotation	marks	around	mental	content	in	the	quotation	attest	to	his	taking	distance	from	any	kind	of	 representationalist	 understanding	of	 phenomenology.	 Put	 differently,	 he	 is	 not	 saying	that	phenomenology	thematizes	merely	meaning,	leaving	the	world	out	of	the	picture.	Rather:	“[m]eaning	
is	the	thing	as	it	presents	itself	to	phenomenological	reflection.”5			 Nonetheless,	 one	 may	 worry	 that	 making	 meaning	 thematic	 in	 the	 above	 proper	phenomenological	sense	still	does	not	sufficiently	capture	the	transcendental	character	of	phenomenology.	For	was	it	not	the	inquiry	into	the	ground	of	meaning	and	accordingly	into	the	constitutive	dimensions	of	consciousness	 that	marks	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 turn?	Put	differently,	 can	we	not	 thematize	meaning	without	 necessarily	 engaging	 in	 a	 transcendental	 problematic?	 I	 believe	 Crowell	would	 reply	 by	 saying	that	making	meaning	thematic	is	necessarily	to	delve	into	transcendental	problematics	since	questioning	the	meaning	of	 something	 is	 precisely	 to	question	how	 the	 thing	 appears	 to	me,	 i.e.	 how	consciousness	constitutes	the	thing	as	such.	I	would	agree	but,	to	highlight	this	point	more	explicitly,	I	would	stress	that	
																																								 																				
3	Crowell	2013,	p.	10.	
4	Ibid.,	ibid.	
5	Crowell	2001,	p.	89.	
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transcendental	 phenomenology	 is	 specifically	 interested	 in	 the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	 intentionality	and	meaning	(and	not	just	intentionality	or	meaning,	as	Crowell	says).	In	other	words,	I	want	to	stress	that	what	marks	Kant’s	and	Husserl’s	transcendental	inquiries	is	that	they	are	both	second-order	inquiries	into	the	conditions	of	possibility.	Indeed,	that	this	is	more	a	matter	of	emphasis	than	of	dispute	is	clear	as	in	the	quotation	below:	The	 transcendental	 reduction	 […]	 allows	 phenomenology	 to	 study	 the	 intentional	 constitution	 of	things	–	that	is,	the	conditions	that	make	possible	not	the	existence	of	entities	in	the	world	(the	issue	of	 existence	 has	 been	 bracketed),	 but	 their	meaning	 as	 existing,	 and	 indeed	 their	 being	 given	 as	anything	at	all.6		
2. Alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world		 Accordingly,	we	can	say	 that	 the	second-order	search	 for	“conditions	of	possibility”	 is	a	defining	marker	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 But	 this	 does	 not	 yet	 sufficiently	 capture	 the	 essence	 of	transcendental	philosophy	as	it	was	developed	by	Kant	and	Husserl.	For	what	is	crucial	in	transcendental	philosophy	is	that	its	search	for	conditions	of	possibility	is	coupled	by	the	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	
world.	 Put	 differently,	 transcendental	 inquiry	 has	 distinct	 metaphysical	 implications.	 In	 the	 context	 of	evaluating	the	epistemological	and	ontological	readings	of	the	transcendental	 in	Kant,	we	saw	that	the	a	priori	subjective	conditions	of	possibility	of	our	experience	are	not	merely	what	constitute	our	experience	but	also	 the	ontological	constitution	of	objects.	This	entails	 two	 things.	On	 the	one	hand,	 this	means	 that	transcendental	 inquiry	is	not	merely	epistemological	 in	the	sense	that	 it	has	no	bearing	on	ontology	but	has	 significant	 ontological	 implications.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 insofar	 as	 these	 conditions	 are	 subjective	conditions	of	the	mind,	it	implies	that	we,	as	transcendental	subjects,	are	responsible	for	what	objects	are,	at	 least	 partly.	 This	 is	 the	 core	 of	 Kant’s	 Copernican	 revolution.	 Our	 mind	 does	 not	 represent	 objects	independently	existing	 in	 themselves	but,	rather,	our	mind’s	activity	 is	essential	 to	what	objects	are,	 i.e.	they	constitute	objects	as	objects.	As	Kant	tells	us:		
The	 order	 and	 regularity	 in	 the	 appearances,	which	we	 entitle	 nature,	we	 ourselves	 introduce.	We	could	never	find	them	in	appearances,	had	not	we	ourselves,	or	the	nature	of	our	mind,	originally	set	them	there.	(A125)		
																																								 																				
6	Crowell	2013,	p.	47.	
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As	a	consequence,	our	relation	to	the	world	is	radically	altered	in	the	sense	that	we	are	no	longer	mirrors	of	the	world	(that	represent	objects	either	rightly	or	wrongly)	but	constituting	subjects	for	the	world.	Lee	Braver	has	identified	this	as	the	central	feature	of	Kant’s	revolution	and	has	called	it	the	“Active	Knower	thesis”:	 “[t]he	 center	 of	 Kant’s	 revolution	 is	 […the]	 Active	 Knower	 [thesis]	 –	 the	 thesis	 that	 the	 mind	actively	organizes	and	constitutes	experience;	it	is	more	like	a	factory	than	wax	or	a	mirror.”7		 As	we	have	 already	 seen,	Husserl	 understood	Kant’s	 revolution	 to	 consist	 in	 the	 turn	 “from	 the	naive	 positive	 stage	 of	 world-cognition	 to	 a	 world-cognition	 through	 ultimate	 self-consciousness	 of	cognition.”8	And	he	defined	transcendental	philosophy	as	“a	philosophy	which	[...]	goes	back	to	knowing	subjectivity	 as	 the	 primal	 locus	 of	 all	 objective	 formations	 of	 sense	 and	 ontic	 validities.”9	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology	no	doubt	 follows	this	Kantian	revolution	and	the	turn	to	 transcendental	subjectivity	 as	 the	 source	 of	 sense	 and	 validity.	 But	 not	 only	 does	 Husserl	 follow	 Kant,	 his	phenomenological	rendering	goes	further	than	Kant	in	that	it	clarifies	the	sense	in	which	our	relation	to	the	 world	 changes.	 This	 is	 evident	 in	 how	 elaborate	 Husserl’s	 version	 of	 transcendental	 reflection,	consisting	 of	 the	 transcendental-phenomenological	 epoché	 and	 reduction,	was	 in	 comparison	 to	 Kant’s.	These	methods	and	the	entire	matter	of	changing	of	“attitudes”	gives	us	the	concrete	tools	to	arrive	at	the	structures	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	And	importantly,	the	world	was	not	at	all	lost	in	this	process.	On	the	 contrary,	 the	 world	 was	 rediscovered	 as	 the	 horizon	 of	 intentional	 correlates,	 i.e.	 as	 meaningful.	Transcendental	phenomenology,	therefore,	follows	and	furthers	Kant’s	revolution	insofar	as	it	transforms	our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 from	 our	 experience	 of	 the	 world	 as	 existing	 independently	 of	 us	 to	 the	experience	of	 the	world	as	meaningfully	manifesting	 in	 and	 constituted	 through	 consciousness.	Husserl	says	in	the	Cartesian	Meditations:		The	objective	world,	 the	world	 that	 exists	 for	me,	 that	 always	has	 and	always	will	 exist	 for	me	 [...]	derives	its	whole	sense	and	its	existential	status,	which	it	has	for	me,	from	me	myself,	from	me	as	the	transcendental	ego.10		As	we	emphasized	in	the	previous	chapter,	transcendental	experience	leaves	nothing	out	in	the	sense	that	it	designates	our	experience	of	the	world	as	such.	In	this	way,	the	search	for	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	of	the	world	is,	at	once,	the	search	for	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	world.	
																																								 																				
7	Braver	2007,	p.	36.	
8	Hua	VII,	p.	286/55.	
9	Hua	VI,	p.102/99.	
10	Hua	I,	p.	65/26.	
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	 This	 brings	 us	 to	 reflect	 on	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 that	 I	 have	 not	expanded	 on,	 namely	 transcendental	 idealism.	 Both	 Kant	 and	 Husserl	 characterize	 their	 positions	 as	transcendental	 idealism,	and	 this	 is	probably	 the	most	misinterpreted	aspect	of	 their	 thought.	A	 typical	misunderstanding	comes	from	taking	this	as	just	another	metaphysical	position	juxtaposed	to	traditional	forms	 of	 idealism	 and	 realism.	 As	we	 have	 been	 emphasizing,	 however,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 a	second-order	 discipline	 and	 so,	 by	 its	 very	 nature,	 it	 cannot	 be	 identified	with	 any	 first-order	 position	including	 metaphysical	 positions	 that	 are	 concerned	 with	 objects	 in	 a	 straightforward	 manner	 (i.e.	whether	objects	exist	independently	of	us).	As	Crowell	claims:	What	Henry	Allison	 says	of	Kant’s	position	holds	equally	of	Husserl’s,	 namely,	 that	 “transcendental	idealism	 must	 be	 characterized	 primarily	 as	 a	 meta-philosophical	 or	 methodological	 ‘standpoint,’	rather	than	as	a	straightforwardly	metaphysical	doctrine	about	the	nature	or	ontological	status	of	the	objects	of	human	cognition.”11			David	Carr	makes	 the	 same	point	 that	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 not	 itself	metaphysics	 but	 rather	 a	
method,	 though,	 he	 says,	 metaphysics	 is	 certainly	 at	 issue.12	What	 he	 means	 by	 the	 latter	 is	 that	transcendental	philosophy	is	concerned	with	the	critique	of	metaphysics.	In	Kant’s	own	words,	the	kind	of	inquiry	 he	 was	 engaged	 in	 “should	 be	 entitled	 not	 a	 doctrine,	 but	 only	 a	 transcendental	 critique”	(A12/B26).	As	a	 critique,	 “their	 [Kant’s	and	Husserl’s]	 approach	 to	 it	 [metaphysics]	 is	not	 to	 contribute	further	to	it	but	to	reflect	critically	on	its	origins.”13	Therefore,	as	a	meta-philosophical	position	or	critique,	transcendental	idealism	cannot	be	identified	with	either	plain	idealism	or	realism	nor	can	it	be	thought	of	as	an	alternative	metaphysical	position.		 Carr’s	 suggestion	 to	 understand	 transcendental	 philosophy	 as	 a	 method	 also	 helps	 to	 clarify	 a	misunderstanding	about	what	transcendental	philosophy	is	concerned	with.	Neither	Kant	nor	Husserl	 is	suggesting	 that	 we	 replace	 the	 thing-in-itself	 or	 the	 object-that-is-intended	 with	 the	 subject-matter	 of	transcendental	philosophy,	namely	appearance	or	the	object-as-it-is-intended.	Such	a	reductionist	account	would	turn	transcendental	philosophy	into	some	kind	of	subjective	idealism.	But	one	might	be	tempted	to	say	 that	 this	 is	 just	 what	 Husserl	 is	 doing	 insofar	 as	 the	 noema	 is	 the	 object-that-is-intended	 in	phenomenological	 reflection.	 However,	 what	 is	 important	 here	 is	 the	 latter	 qualification,	 ‘in	
phenomenological	reflection.’	Namely,	this	is	a	claim	made	in	the	reflective	stance	of	the	phenomenological	attitude	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	 a	 first-order	 claim.	 Put	 differently,	 insofar	 as	
																																								 																				
11	Crowell	2001,	p.	236.	The	quotation	from	Henry	Allison	is	from	Kant’s	Transcendental	Idealism,	p.	25.	
12	Carr	1999,	p.	108-110.	
13	Ibid.,	p.	114.	
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transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 a	 method	 and	 not	 itself	 a	 metaphysical	 doctrine,	 the	 noema	 cannot	 be	understood	as	just	another	entity.		 Now,	insofar	as	transcendental	philosophy	is	a	reflective	method	that	does	not	concern	itself	with	the	existence	or	non-existence	of	objects,	Carr	goes	on	to	say	 that	 transcendental	philosophy	taken	as	a	method	is	metaphysically	neutral:	“[w]hat	we	are	attributing	to	Husserl	and	Kant,	as	the	genuine	sense	of	transcendental	philosophy,	 is	 the	 idea	of	a	philosophical	method	 that	 is	metaphysically	neutral.”14	Here,	however,	we	 should	be	 careful	not	 to	understand	Carr	as	 saying	 that	 transcendental	philosophy	has	no	metaphysical	 implications.	 It	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 say	 that	 the	 method	 is	 metaphysically	 neutral	 and	 quite	another	thing	to	claim	that	the	 implications	of	carrying	out	the	method	are	metaphysically	neutral.	This	point	 is	 underlined	 by	Dan	 Zahavi	with	 reference	 to	Husserl	when	he	 says,	 “although	Husserl's	 epoché	suspends	 unjustified	 metaphysical	 assumptions,	 his	 phenomenology	 does	 not	 lack	 metaphysical	implications	 altogether.”15	In	 other	 words,	 although	 the	 method	 of	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 is	metaphysically	 neutral	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 neither	 assumes	 a	 first-order	 metaphysical	 position	 nor	attempts	 to	 provide	 such	 a	 position,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 thereby	 compatible	 with	 any	 kind	 of	metaphysical	 position.	 For	 example,	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 certainly	 rules	 out	representationalist	views	that	would	reintroduce	a	two-world	theory	with	a	world	as	it	appears	to	us	and	a	world	independently	existing	apart	from	us.16			 Let	us	now	 tie	 this	discussion	back	 to	 the	point	 I	 emphasized	earlier,	 namely	 that	 it	 is	part	 and	parcel	of	transcendental	philosophy	that	 its	search	for	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	is	coupled	with	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world.	How	should	we	make	sense	of	this	in	light	of	what	we	said	about	transcendental	philosophy	being	a	method	and	transcendental	 idealism,	a	methodological	standpoint?	First	of	all,	we	have	to	stress	that	this	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	does	not	entail	a	metaphysical	position	in	itself	(insofar	as	this	is	understood	as	a	first-order	position)	since	transcendental	philosophy	is	a	second-order	discipline.	Rather,	we	can	understand	this	alteration	as	a	kind	of	reflective,	methodological	 stance.	 Secondly,	 this	 alteration	 of	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 highlights	 one	 of	 the	important	 metaphysical	 implications	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 namely	 anti-realism.	 By	 realism,	 I	mean	 naive	 realism,	 i.e.	 the	 naive	 view	 of	 the	 world	 as	 existing	 independently	 of	 us.	 Insofar	 as	 the	metaphysical	implications	of	transcendental	philosophy	undermine	this	view,	transcendental	idealism	can	
																																								 																				
14	Carr	1999,	p.	112.	
15	Zahavi	2003b,	p.	61.	
16	Cf.	Ibid.,	pp.	61-63.	
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be	 negatively	 characterized	 as	 an	 anti-(naive-)realist	 position.17	Yet	 it	 must	 be	 stressed	 that	 this	 anti-realism	does	not	entail	 idealism	since	it	 is	equally	anti-idealism.	The	only	reason	why	I	have	exclusively	focused	on	anti-realism	as	the	metaphysical	implication	of	transcendental	philosophy	is	because	realism,	or	naive	realism,	is	our	default	way	of	understanding	the	world	and	as	such,	it	underlies	our	everyday	way	of	relating	to	the	world.	Accordingly,	this	negative	characterization	is	important	insofar	as	it	prohibits	our	natural	 way	 of	 relating	 to	 the	 world.	 However,	 I	 believe	 that	 we	 can	 also	 provide	 a	 more	 positive	description	 of	 transcendental	 idealism,	 namely	 that	 it	 entails	 a	 specific	 priority	 of	 transcendental	subjectivity	over	objects	and	the	world.	And	this	brings	us	to	the	third	point,	namely	that	transcendental	philosophy	 alters	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 gives	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 a	privileged	role.	Accordingly,	we	come	to	see	the	world	through	transcendental	subjectivity.	We	will	return	to	this	point	towards	the	end	of	this	chapter.		
3. Transcendental	foundationalism		 Above,	 we	 pointed	 out	 that	 it	 is	 the	 search	 for	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 (coupled	 with	 its	employment	of	transcendental	reflection)	and	the	consequent	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	that	marks	transcendental	philosophy	as	developed	by	Kant	and	Husserl.	There	is,	however,	another	important	feature	 that	 I	 have	 left	 unattended	 to	 that	 is	 equally	 crucial	 for	 understanding	 the	 essence	 of	transcendental	philosophy,	namely,	its	foundationalist	character.	Though	closely	related	to	the	two	points	raised	above,	it	deserves	consideration	on	its	own	since	the	topic	of	foundationalism	raises	several	issues.		 In	 his	 1985	 book	 The	 Possibility	 of	 Transcendental	 Philosophy,	 J.	 N.	 Mohanty	 provides	 a	characterization	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 foundation.	 Indeed,	 the	common	motif	 of	 transcendental	 philosophies,	 according	 to	Mohanty,	 is	 the	 search	 for	 a	 foundation	 for	knowledge,	 thinking	 and	 experience.	 But	 since,	 he	 says,	 “not	 every	 foundationalism	 is	 transcendental	philosophy,”	he	settles	for	the	following	characterization:	[T]ranscendental	philosophy	 looks	 for	 the	 foundation	 in	 the	a	priori	 structures	of	 the	experiencing	subject,	leaving	aside	for	the	present	how	precisely	this	subject	is	to	be	understood.18	Immediately,	we	can	extract	two	important	points:	transcendental	philosophy	is	a	foundationalist	mode	of	discipline,	 and	 the	 foundation	 is	 sought	 in	 the	 a	 priori	 structures	 of	 subjectivity.	 Now,	 characterizing	
																																								 																				
17	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	72.	
18	Mohanty	1985,	p.	214.	
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transcendental	philosophy	as	foundationalist	comes	at	a	price	insofar	as	it	puts	it	into	a	category	together	with	many	other	strands	of	philosophy	that	it	must	not	be	identified	with.	This	also	makes	it	potentially	vulnerable	 to	 critiques	put	 forward	by	 supporters	of	 anti-foundationalism,	 specifically	 to	 those	of	post-modernists.	 Nonetheless,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 denying	 that	 foundationalism	 of	 a	 certain	 kind	 is	 a	 defining	character	of	transcendental	philosophy.	Therefore,	the	challenge	is	to	clarify	the	uniqueness	of	what	can	be	called	“transcendental	foundationalism”	(a	term	I	borrow	from	John	Drummond)	in	contradistinction	to	other	kinds	of	foundationalism	preceding	Kant.	 In	the	following,	I	will	take	up	this	challenge	with	the	prospect	that	this	will	further	help	us	understand	the	essence	of	transcendental	philosophy.		 Foundationalism	in	the	most	general	sense	can	be	understood	as	a	term	that	refers	to	philosophy’s	search	 for	a	 first	principle	 (or	 first	principles)	 that	 serves	as	 the	basis	 for	 reality	as	 such.	Taken	 in	 this	broadest	sense,	foundationalism	refers	not	so	much	to	a	specific	strand	within	philosophy	as	to	that	which	marks	 philosophy	 as	 a	 distinct	 discipline	 in	 contrast	 to	 other	 disciplines.	 Transcendental	 philosophy	shares	this	aspiration	for	a	first	principle	and	the	consequent	conviction	that	philosophy	is	a	foundational	science,	 i.e.	 that	 philosophical	 knowledge	has	 a	 special	 status	vis-à-vis	 knowledge	 acquired	 in	 the	 other	sciences	insofar	as	it	provides	the	foundation	for	other	knowledge.	Yet	transcendental	foundationalism	is	distinct	in	that	it	takes	a	unique	approach	to	seeking	this	foundation	and	this	in	turn	gives	rise	to	a	rather	different	 idea	of	 foundation	 from	how	 it	 is	understood	 in	other	 forms	of	philosophical	 foundationalism.	For	our	purposes,	let	us	contrast	it	with	two	other	kinds	of	foundationalism.	By	doing	so,	we	will	be	able	to	arrive	 at	 the	 unambiguous	 sense	 in	 which	 transcendental	 philosophy	 can	 be	 called	 a	 foundationalist	discipline.		 The	 first	kind	 seeks	 indubitable	basic	 truths	 that	 serve	as	 self-evident	 first	principles	or	axioms	from	 which	 all	 other	 knowledge	 can	 be	 derived.	 All	 other	 knowledge	 can	 thus	 be	 derived	 from	 and	reduced	 to	 these	 founding	 truths.	 We	 can	 call	 this	 epistemological	 foundationalism.	 Drummond	 has	distinguished	 empiricistic	 and	 rationalistic	 foundationalism	 as	 two	 kinds	 of	 epistemological	foundationalism.19	The	former	identifies	bedrock	truths	with	incorrigible	immediate	sensory	experiences	whereas	the	latter	takes	non-empirical	certain	truths	as	the	foundation	for	all	other	knowledge.	Cartesian	foundationalism	 is	 a	 typical	 case	 of	 the	 latter	 since	 cogito	 sum	 is	 a	 non-empirical	 truth	 gained	 by	 the	alleged	clear	and	distinct	perception	that	serves	as	the	basis	for	all	other	knowledge.			 The	second	kind	of	 foundationalism	seeks	not	so	much	the	 foundation	 for	our	knowledge	as	 the	metaphysical	ground	from	which	all	reality	can	be	derived.	We	can	call	this	metaphysical	foundationalism.	While	 epistemological	 foundationalism	may	 entail	metaphysical	 foundationalism	 insofar	 as	 self-evident	
																																								 																				
19	Cf.	Drummond	(1988	and	1991).	
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principles	may	 serve	 as	 basic	 building	blocks	not	 only	 of	 our	 knowledge	but	 of	 reality	 as	 such,	what	 is	specific	to	metaphysical	foundationalism	(and	not	all	epistemological	foundationalism	with	metaphysical	implications	 shares	 this	 feature)	 is	 that	 it	 seeks	 the	ground	 in	 some	kind	of	metaphysical	principle,	 e.g.	God,	 substance,	 Plato’s	 ideas.	 Accordingly,	 metaphysical	 foundationalism	 is	 interested	 in	 offering	 a	metaphysical	explanation	of	reality	and	the	metaphysical	principle	serves	as	the	ultimate	explanans.		 Frederick	 Beiser	 takes	 into	 account	what	we	 have	 identified	 here	 as	 Cartesian	 foundationalism	and	 argues	 that	Kant’s	 transcendental	 deduction	 and,	more	 generally,	 his	 transcendental	 project	 in	 the	
Critique	is	not	foundationalist	in	this	sense:	One	can	interpret	the	Transcendental	Deduction	of	the	first	Kritik	as	a	form	of	foundationalism,	since	it	appears	 to	 begin	with	 the	 self-evidence	 of	 the	 ‘I	 think’	 and	 then	 to	 derive	 the	 application	 of	 the	categories	 to	 experience.	 Yet	 this	 interpretation	 has	 been	 hotly	 contested;	 and	 even	 if	 it	 were	vindicated,	 it	 is	 false	 that	 the	 Transcendental	 Deduction	 is	 part	 of	 a	 general	 foundationalist	program.20	Beiser	 is	correct	 to	say	 that,	despite	certain	similarities	between	the	Cartesian	cogito	 and	 the	Kantian	 ‘I	think,’	Kant’s	transcendental	project	cannot	be	identified	with	Cartesian	foundationalism.	Doing	so	would	simply	undermine	Kant’s	contribution	insofar	as	the	significance	of	Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy	lies	in	 offering	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 the	 old	 problems	of	 philosophy.	Namely,	 Kant	was	 not	 interested	 in	finding	the	self-evident	basic	truth	or	metaphysical	ground	from	which	everything	else	can	be	derived.	But	while	 Beiser	 goes	 on	 to	 infer	 that	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 project	 is	 therefore	 non-foundational,	 this	conclusion	must	not	be	immediately	accepted.	For	although	Kant	may	not	be	a	Cartesian	foundationalist,	there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 claim	 that	 he	 is	 a	 foundationalist	 in	 a	 different	 sense,	 as	 I	 will	 argue	 in	 the	following.		 Kant’s	inquiry	into	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	can	be	understood	as	the	search	for	the	theoretical	grounds	or	 foundation	of	such	knowledge.	Even	Beiser,	I	suspect,	would	admit	to	just	this.	The	question	is:	If	this	entails	foundationalism,	and	we	both	acknowledge	that	it	must	be	distinguished	 from	various	 forms	of	 foundationalism	before	Kant,	 including	what	we	have	 identified	 as	epistemological	 and	metaphysical	 foundationalism,	 then	what	 is	 the	 form	of	 foundationalism	specific	 to	transcendental	 inquiry?	 In	 the	 following,	 let	us	 focus	on	the	relation	between	transcendental	conditions	
																																								 																				
20	Beiser	2002,	p.	7.	Beiser’s	criticism	of	the	foundationalist	interpretation	of	Kant’s	first	Critique	appears	in	his	general	
refutation	of	the	interpretation	of	German	idealism	as	a	revival	of	Cartesian	foundationalism.	As	long	as	we	keep	
“transcendental	foundationalism”	distinct	from	Cartesian	foundationalism	and	define	the	former	in	the	way	outlined	here,	
I	believe	our	claim	that	Kant	is	a	transcendental	foundationalist	can	be	aligned	with	Beiser’s	general	argument.	
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and	that	which	 is	conditioned	by	these	conditions	and	frame	the	question	 in	the	 following	way:	In	what	
way	could	it	be	said	that	transcendental	conditions	are	the	“foundations”	of	the	conditioned?			
3.1. Drummond	on	transcendental	foundationalism		 Let	 us	 begin	 with	 John	 Drummond’s	 distinction	 between	 what	 he	 calls	 transcendental	foundationalism	 and	 epistemological	 foundationalism.	 In	 his	 1991	 article,	 “Phenomenology	 and	 the	Foundationalism	Debate,”	he	states	 that,	according	to	 transcendental	 foundationalism,	“the	 foundational	beliefs	are	legitimating	beliefs	about	classes	of	experience	rather	than	beliefs	about	the	experienced	world	which	 function	as	premises	 in	 justificatory	 arguments.”21	Drummond	 is	here	working	with	 a	distinction	between	 “legitimation”	 and	 “justification”	 and,	 as	 a	 corollary,	 between	 legitimating	 and	 justificatory	foundationalism.	This	distinction,	however,	is	so	subtle	that	it	is	not	at	all	clear,	at	least	on	its	own,	where	the	difference	lies.	But	what	presumably	clarifies	matters	is	that	this	distinction	is	coupled	with	another	set	 of	 distinctions,	 namely	 between	 “classes	 of	 experience”	 and	 “experienced	 world.”	 Taking	 this	 into	consideration,	we	can	reformulate	Drummond’s	statement	in	the	following	way:	Whereas	epistemological	or	justificatory	foundationalism	is	concerned	with	providing	foundational	beliefs	that	serve	as	premises	in	“justifying”	 first-order	 knowledge	 claims	 about	 our	 experienced	 world,	 transcendental	 or	 legitimating	
foundationalism	is	interested	in	providing	foundational	beliefs	that	“legitimate”	experience	in	general.			 Admittedly,	 this	 formulation	 is	not	much	clearer	 than	 the	original,	but	 I	believe	 it	does	go	some	way	 in	 clarifying	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 that	 Drummond	 seems	 to	 be	highlighting,	namely	its	distance	from	all	first-order	inquiries.	For	what	he	seems	to	be	getting	at	is	that,	on	the	one	hand,	we	have	basic	self-evident	truths	from	which	the	truths	of	first-order	beliefs	are	derived.	On	the	other	hand,	we	have	transcendental	conditions	that	have	no	say	about	the	specific	content	of	first-order	 truth	 claims.	 Accordingly,	 transcendental	 foundationalism	 “views	 philosophy	 as	 a	 foundational	discipline	 not	 because	 non-philosophical	 truths	 are	 inferentially	 justified	 by	 appeal	 to	 philosophical	premises	 but	 because	 philosophical	 truths	 are	 about	 other	 kinds	 of	 experience	 or	 knowledge.”22	Put	differently,	 philosophical	 truths	 in	 transcendental	 discourse	 are	 not	 first-order	 but	 second-order	 truths	about	 our	 experience	 and	 knowledge.	 Drummond	 thus	 claims	 that	 this	 kind	 of	 foundationalism	 in	
																																								 																				
21	Drummond	1991,	p.	58.	
22	Ibid.,	p.	48.	
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transcendental	philosophy	is	a	“position	arising	out	of	metaphilosophical	concerns	regarding	the	relation	of	philosophy	to	non-philosophical	experience.”23		According	 to	 Drummond,	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 philosophy	 typifies	 transcendental	foundationalism	insofar	as	Kant	does	not	attempt	to	provide	foundational	beliefs	that	serve	as	premises	in	justificatory	arguments	for	particular	empirical	beliefs	but,	rather,	proceeds	by	taking	specific	content	of	our	experience	(provided	by	Newtonian	physics)	and	indirectly	arguing	for	the	transcendental	principles	that	underlie	that	content.	Therefore,	Drummond	claims	that	“[h]e	[Kant]	is	concerned	solely	to	legitimate	the	categories	operative	in	it	[truths	of	Newtonian	physics]	by	grounding	them	transcendentally.”24	Again,	Drummond	appeals	to	his	distinction	between	justification	and	legitimation	and	consequently	denies	that	Kant	is	interested	in	the	former.	This	is	confusing,	to	say	the	least,	insofar	as	Kant	himself	had	identified	his	concern	with	the	quid	juris,	 i.e.	 the	 justification	of	our	beliefs	about	 the	world,	and	not	quid	facti,	 i.e.	how	 the	world	 in	 fact	 is.	 Admittedly,	 Drummond	 is	 not	 denying	 that	 Kant	 is	 interested	 in	quid	 juris	 as	opposed	 to	quid	 facti	 but	 only	 denying	 that	 Kant’s	 interest	 lies	 in	 justifying	 first-order	beliefs	about	 the	
world.	 Nonetheless,	 considering	 the	 obvious	 misunderstandings	 they	 could	 elicit,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	understand	why	Drummond	needs	to	resort	to	these	terms.		 There	 is,	 however,	 a	 more	 serious	 worry	 about	 Drummond’s	 appeal	 to	 the	 justification-legitimation	 distinction	 which	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	 way	 Husserlian	 phenomenology	 fit	 into	 the	 picture.	According	 to	 Drummond,	 phenomenology	 is	 different	 from	 the	 Kantian	 approach	 in	 that,	 rather	 than	proceeding	 indirectly	 from	 the	 content	 of	 our	 experience	 to	 the	 transcendental	 conditions,	 it	 proceeds	
directly	by	identifying	and	describing	the	formal	structures	of	intentionality.	To	be	sure,	even	for	Husserl,	there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 he	 proceeds	 indirectly	 from	 our	 intentional	 experience	 to	 the	 conditions	 of	possibility	 for	 our	 experience.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 earlier,	 although	 Husserl	 does	 not	 abstract	 from	 our	experience,	 the	 transcendental-phenomenological	epoché	 and	reduction	were	a	way	of	abstracting	 from	the	natural	attitude.	Put	differently,	 insofar	as	transcendental	reflection	is	a	second-order	consciousness,	there	is	a	certain	“indirectness”	to	the	whole	approach.		Nonetheless,	 Drummond	 is	 right	 in	 pointing	 out	 that	 what	 is	 distinct	 in	 the	 phenomenological	method	is	that	the	transcendental	conditions	are	not	indirectly	inferred	by	transcendental	arguments	but	rather	directly	intuited.	This	is	not	to	say	that	phenomenology	does	not	employ	transcendental	arguments	at	all	but	only	that,	when	they	are	employed,	there	is	an	appeal	to	intuitive	givennness	at	every	step	of	the	argument:	 “the	 premises	 of	 such	 arguments	 are	 not	 formed	 in	 the	 abstract;	 they	 are	 formed	 in	 an	
																																								 																				
23	Ibid.,	p.	48.	
24	Ibid.,	p.	59.	
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intentional	 encounter	with	 the	world.”25	As	Husserl	had	 said,	 the	phenomenological	method	 is	different	from	the	Kantian	method	in	that,	whereas	the	latter	is	a	“constructively	inferring	[schliessende]	method,”	the	former	is	a	“thoroughly	intuitively	disclosing	[erschliessende]	method”	that	is	“intuitive	in	its	point	of	departure	 and	 in	 everything	 it	 discloses.”26	According	 to	 Drummond,	 it	 is	 this	 appeal	 to	 the	 intuitive	givenness	 of	 intentional	 experience	 and	 the	 specific	 kind	 of	 evidence	 it	 provides	 that	 makes	phenomenology	non-foundationalist.	Drummond	acknowledges	that	phenomenological	findings	gain	their	apodicticity	thanks	to	Husserl’s	method	of	 imaginative	variation,	which	guarantees	their	 indubitability,	a	criterion	 we	 seek	 for	 in	 a	 proper	 foundation.	 But,	 in	 phenomenology,	 indubitability	 does	 not	 entail	infallibility	 and	 incorrigibility.	 For	 not	 only	 are	 phenomenological	 findings	 always	 open	 to	 revision	 by	further	 investigation	 but,	 also,	 “our	 perceptions	 are	 themselves	 associationally	 informed	 by	 judgments	previously	made	both	by	ourselves	and	by	others	whose	 judgments	are	 in	various	educational	practices	handed	down	to	us	as	culture,	as	the	inherited	wisdom	of	the	ages,	as	common	knowledge,	and	so	forth.”27	Accordingly,	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 phenomenologists	 cannot	 identify	 any	 “ultimately	 foundational	experiences”:		There	are	no	ultimately	foundational	experiences	(say,	perceptions)	which	are	not	subject	to	further	clarification	and	emendation	by	those	very	experiences	(e.g.	judgments)	which	are	originally	founded	upon	 the	 candidates	 for	 ultimately	 founding	 experiences	 (the	 perception).	 Hence,	 foundations	present	 themselves	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 hermeneutic	 circle	 [...].	 Our	 experiences,	 in	 other	words,	 have	
founding	moments	reciprocally	related	to	one	another	but	no	foundational	moments.28	Therefore,	 since	 the	 transcendental	 conditions	 that	phenomenology	uncovers	are	 liable	 to	 revision,	and	hence	are	neither	 infallible	nor	 incorrigible,	 they	cannot	properly	be	said	to	 legitimate	our	beliefs	about	the	 world	 (since	 infallibility	 and	 incorrigibility	 are	 apparently	 necessary	 conditions	 for	 legitimating	beliefs).	For	this	reason,	despite	its	being	transcendental	and	achieving	apodictic	insight	into	experience,	phenomenology	is,	Drummond	concludes,	a	non-foundationalist	discipline.	Now,	granting	that	phenomenology	does	indeed	fail	to	provide	“legitimating	beliefs	about	classes	of	 experience,”	 does	 this	 immediately	make	 it	 non-foundationalist?	 I	 think	 not.	What	 is	 problematic	 in	Drummond’s	 argument	 is	 that	 he	 works	 with	 the	 questionable	 assumption	 that	 the	 only	 kind	 of	foundationalism	 involved	 in	 transcendental	philosophy	 is	of	 the	 legitimating	sort.	 So	 long	as	one	works	with	this	narrow	characterization	of	transcendental	foundationalism,	it	may	be	inevitable	to	conclude	that	
																																								 																				
25	Ibid.,	pp.	61-62.		
26	Hua	VI,	p.	118/115-116.	
27	Ibid.,	p.	62.	
28	Ibid.,	p.	62.	
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phenomenology	 is	 non-foundational.	 But	why	 should	 one	maintain	 that	 the	 foundationalism	 specific	 to	transcendental	philosophy	is	of	one	sort,	namely	the	legitimating	sort?		 Mohanty	 seems	 to	 allow	 for	 different	 kinds	 of	 foundationalism	 in	 transcendental	 philosophy	 by	attending	to	the	nature	of	Kantian	and	phenomenological	inquiries.	What	distinguishes	them,	according	to	Mohanty,	is	not	that	one	is	foundational	and	the	other	not	but	what	it	is	they	are	seeking	the	foundation	for.	Mohanty	cashes	out	the	difference	by	distinguishing	between	truth	and	meaning:		The	contrast	is	between	the	conditions	of	the	possibility	of	truths	(of	a	certain	sort)	about	the	world	and	 the	 conditions	 of	 the	 possibility	 of	 meanings,	 or,	 what	 amounts	 to	 the	 same,	 of	 modes	 of	interpretation.	The	first	is	the	Kantian,	the	second	the	phenomenological	enterprise.29	Put	this	way,	we	can	see	that	there	is	a	specific	sense	in	which	phenomenology	is	foundational:	It	seeks	the	foundation	for	meaning	and	not	truth,	or	at	least	not	directly.	The	latter	qualification	must	be	added	since,	in	 seeking	 the	 foundation	 for	meaning,	 phenomenology	 is	 also	 seeking	 the	 foundation	 for	 truth.	 For,	 as	Mohanty	 points	 out,	 the	 concept	 of	 truth	 is	 founded	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 meaning	 (and	 hence,	 the	phenomenological	enterprise	 is	more	fundamental	than	the	Kantian).30	This	distinction	further	points	to	the	essential	difference	between	the	Kantian	and	phenomenological	transcendental	philosophies.	On	the	one	hand,	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy	is	concerned	with	justifying	an	existing	body	of	truths	and,	therefore,	 seeks	a	priori	principles	 through	a	kind	of	argument.	Transcendental	phenomenology,	on	 the	other	hand,	is	interested	in	clarifying	the	structure	of	meaning	by	appealing	to	the	intuitive	givenness	of	our	experience,	i.e.	to	“evidence.”		Mohanty	accordingly	calls	the	former,	“prinzipien-theoretisch,”	and	the	latter,	“evidenz-theoretisch,”	transcendental	philosophy.31			 Now,	although	Mohanty’s	distinction	between	 the	prinzipien-	and	evidenz-theoretisch	 illuminates	the	difference	between	Kantian	and	phenomenological	transcendental	philosophy,	admittedly,	it	does	not	take	us	very	far	in	clarifying	the	specific	sense	in	which	transcendental	foundationalism	differs	from	other	kinds	 of	 foundationalist	 approaches.	 To	 be	 sure,	 Mohanty	 does	 note	 that	 “[f]oundationalism,	 as	 such,	
																																								 																				
29	Mohanty	1985,	p.	214.	
30	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	214.	We	can	understand	the	way	in	which,	from	a	phenomenological	perspective,	the	concept	of	truth	is	
founded	on	the	concept	of	meaning	by	looking	at	the	following	example.	Let	us	suppose	that	we	want	to	ask	whether	it	is	
true	that	the	cup	is	currently	on	the	table.	In	order	to	ask	this	question,	I	must	first	ask	what	it	means	for	there	to	be	a	cup	
on	the	table	at	that	moment.	This	may	entail	that	I	see	it	from	a	certain	angle	and	that	this	perception	entails	the	other	
side	of	the	cup,	which	my	subsequent	perception	can	confirm.	All	of	these	are	conditions	of	possibility	for	there	to	be	a	
cup	on	the	table	at	that	moment.	Accordingly,	only	upon	clarifying	the	meaning	of	this	proposition	can	I	then	ask	whether	
these	conditions	are	fulfilled	or	not,	namely	whether	it	is	true	or	not.	
31	Mohanty	1985,	pp.	214-215.	
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cannot	 constitute	 transcendental	 thinking”32	and	 briefly	 rules	 out	 the	 foundationalism	 of	 the	 logical	empiricists,	 which	 takes	 basic	 protocol	 sentences	 as	 the	 edifice	 of	 knowledge	 and	 other	 metaphysical	attempts.	He	then	quickly	goes	on	to	say	that	the	foundationalism	at	play	in	transcendental	philosophy	is	unique	insofar	as	it	seeks	for	a	priori	conditions	of	possibility.	Certainly,	it	is	clear	by	now	that	we	are	in	no	disagreement	 on	 this	 point.	 Nonetheless,	 in	 the	 current	 context,	 one	 could	 question	 the	 validity	 of	grouping	the	two	approaches	together	when	they	differ	so	much	in	what	they	are	seeking	to	provide	the	foundation	 for	 and	 the	 methods	 they	 accordingly	 employ.	 Indeed,	 much	 of	 Drummond’s	 rationale	 for	claiming	that	Husserlian	phenomenology	is	non-foundational	was	drawn	from	its	apparent	deviation	from	Kant.	 Accordingly,	 seen	 from	 Drummond’s	 perspective,	 Mohanty’s	 characterization	 of	 transcendental	foundationalism	 is	 too	broad	and	 it	does	not	do	 justice	 to	 the	way	 in	which	Husserlian	phenomenology	moves	 away	 from	 the	 Kantian	 approach.	 Yet,	 from	 Mohanty’s	 perspective,	 Drummond’s	 denial	 that	Husserlian	phenomenology	 is	 foundationalist	 simply	undermines	 the	 core	of	 transcendental	philosophy	and,	for	this	reason,	he	cannot	account	for	why	Husserlian	phenomenology	is	nonetheless	transcendental.	Giving	up	the	foundationalist	enterprise	is	tantamount	to	giving	up	the	ideal	of	transcendental	philosophy,	or	so	Mohanty	would	argue.			 The	 point	 of	 controversy,	 then,	 ultimately	 comes	 down	 to	 how	 we	 define	 transcendental	foundationalism	and	whether	we	want	to	include	foundationalism,	of	a	certain	kind,	as	a	necessary	aspect	of	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Putting	 aside	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 we	 should	 define	 transcendental	foundationalism,	 I	 agree	 with	 Mohanty	 that,	 as	 I	 have	 been	 suggesting,	 foundationalism	 is	 indeed	 a	defining	 feature	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Kant	 had	 identified	 philosophy’s	 task	 in	 providing	 the	foundation	 for	 the	other	sciences,	and	Husserl	was	certainly	 following	Kant	 in	 this	 respect.	And	 indeed,	Husserl’s	 designation	of	phenomenology	 as	 “first	philosophy”,	 not	 as	metaphysics	 in	Aristotle’s	 original	sense	or	as	epistemology	as	the	neo-Kantian	had	it,	but	as	“a	philosophy	of	beginnings	instituting	itself	in	the	 most	 radical	 philosophical	 self-consciousness”33	clearly	 indicates	 that	 he	 saw	 phenomenology	 as	 a	foundational	 science.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 denying	 that	 Husserl’s	phenomenological	approach	modified	many	aspects	of	Kantian	transcendental	philosophy.	In	this	regard,	then,	 the	 reasons	 that	 led	 Drummond	 to	 conclude	 that	 Husserlian	 phenomenology	 is	 non-foundational	also	cannot	be	ignored.		Zahavi	has	also	been	reluctant	to	call	Husserl	a	foundationlist	for	similar	reasons	to	Drummond’s.	For	one	thing,	phenomenological	findings	are	inconclusive	and,	for	Husserl,	“the	full	and	conclusive	truth	
																																								 																				
32	Ibid.,	p.	213.	
33	Hua	VII,	p.	6.	
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about	 the	 transcendental	 dimension	 is	 a	 regulative	 ideal.”34	Secondly,	 the	 phenomenological	method	 is	non-deductive:	 “Husserl	 explicitly	 distances	 himself	 from	 the	 axiomatic	 and	 deductive	 ideal	 of	method	that	 rationalistic	 foundationalism	 has	 normally	 been	 committed	 to.”35	Rephrasing	 this	 second	 point,	Zahavi	goes	on	to	say	that	“the	truths	that	transcendental	phenomenology	might	uncover	does	not	make	up	a	 foundation	 that	 the	contents	of	 the	positive	sciences	could	be	deduced	 from.”36	This	 last	point	was	also	 underlined	 by	Drummond	when	 he	 suggested	 that	 transcendental	 conditions	 differ	 from	 the	 basic	building	blocks	 in	 epistemological	 foundationalism	 insofar	 as	 the	 truths	 of	 first-order	 beliefs	 cannot	 be	derived	 from	 them.	 In	 other	 words,	 they	 have	 no	 say	 about	 the	 content	 of	 first-order	 truths.	Transcendental	 conditions,	 therefore,	 cannot	 determine	 the	 truth	 and	 falsity	 of	 particular	 first-order	truths.	But	granting	this,	what	positive	characterization	can	we	give	transcendental	conditions?	What	do	these	 transcendental	 conditions	 articulate?	 To	 phrase	 it	 differently,	 what	 is	 the	 aim	 of	 transcendental	inquiry	in	its	search	for	the	“conditions	of	possibility”	for	our	experience	and	knowledge	of	objects?	It	is	to	this	 question	 that	 we	 now	 turn	 in	 order	 to	 unravel	 the	 exact	 sense	 in	 which	 transcendental	foundationalism	 differs	 from	 other	 kinds	 of	 foundationalism.	What	 proves	 to	 be	 crucial	 is	 the	 kind	 of	reasoning	that	transcendental	inquiry	is	concerned	with.		
3.2. The	hermeneutical	nature	of	transcendental	inquiry		 At	 this	 point,	 it	 is	 helpful	 to	 turn	 to	 a	 distinction	 made	 by	 Jeff	 Malpas	 between	 two	 modes	 of	reasoning,	or	ways	of	grounding,	a	distinction	originally	made	by	Heidegger	in	the	Introduction	to	Being	
and	 Time.	 In	 Heidegger’s	 words,	 it	 is	 a	 distinction	 between	 “grounding	 something	 by	 derivation”	 and	“laying	 bare	 the	 grounds	 and	 exhibiting	 them.”37	The	 former	 is	 a	 mode	 of	 reasoning	 that	 attempts	 to	deliver	proofs	by	way	of	deriving	 truths	 from	axioms	or	basic	 truths.	The	 latter,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	a	kind	of	reasoning	that	does	not	aim	at	proving	as	such	but,	rather,	pursues	a	unified	understanding	of	the	whole	by	way	of	articulating	its	basic	structures.	Admittedly,	proving	that	something	is	the	case	can	also	contribute	to	understanding	the	unified	whole,	but	not	all	attempts	at	the	latter	take	the	form	of	proofs.	
																																								 																				
34	Zahavi	2003b,	p.	67.	
35	Ibid.,	p.	67.	
36	Ibid.,	p.	67.	I	should	note	that,	while	Zahavi	provides	similar	reasons	to	Drummond’s,	he	does	not	thereby	conclude	that	
phenomenology	is	non-foundational.	Rather,	his	claim	is	that	we	should	be	wary	of	calling	Husserl	a	foundationalist	due	to	
his	divergence	from	more	traditional	forms	of	foundationalism.	I	certainly	share	his	worry,	but	I	believe	that,	so	long	as	we	
clarify	misunderstandings	and	explain	the	positive	sense	in	which	transcendental	phenomenology	is	foundational,	we	can	
continue	to	call	Husserl	a	foundationalist.			
37	SZ,	p.	8/28.	
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What	 is	 decisive	 about	 the	 latter	mode	 of	 reasoning	 is	 that	 the	 articulation	 is	 achieved	by	 reference	 to	nothing	outside	of	and	independent	of	that	which	it	is	trying	to	articulate.	In	other	words,	the	articulation	is	brought	about	from	within	and	not	without.	 In	this	regard,	the	latter	mode	of	reasoning	operates	 in	a	kind	of	circularity.	Since	proofs	are	the	sort	of	things	that	can	only	be	achieved	by	reference	to	something	that	lies	outside	what	they	are	trying	to	prove	(which	is	why	circular	reasoning	is	the	enemy	of	proofs),	the	latter	kind	of	reasoning	cannot	be	said	to	deliver	proofs,	strictly	speaking.		Malpas	argues	that	transcendental	arguments,	and	more	generally	transcendental	inquiry,	belong	to	 this	 latter	mode	 of	 reasoning.	 And	 this	 is	 so	 because	 transcendental	 arguments	 are,	 by	 their	 nature,	circular.	 In	other	words,	 this	circularity	does	not	pose	a	problem	for	 transcendental	 inquiry	but,	 rather,	constitutes	the	essential	structure	of	transcendental	philosophy.38	Furthermore,	transcendental	inquiry	is	essentially	 circular	 because	 it	 exemplifies	 a	 general	 circularity	 involved	 in	 our	 understanding,	 i.e.	 the	hermeneutical	circle:	Transcendental	inquiry	operates	always	from	within	experience	and	by	appeal	to	experience.	It	does	not	and	cannot	move	to	ground	the	foundational	principles	or	structures	it	uncovers	independently	of	experience,	knowledge	or	being-in-the-world.	Neither	is	there	any	independent	or	presuppositionless	starting	 point	 for	 such	 inquiry.	 In	 this	 respect	 […]	 transcendental	 inquiry	 exhibits	 a	 ‘circularity’	identical	to	the	circularity	of	interpretation.39	This	way	of	understanding	the	nature	of	transcendental	inquiry	fits	well	with	our	earlier	observation	that	the	 truth	 and	 falsity	 of	 first-order	 beliefs	 cannot	 be	 derived	 from	 transcendental	 conditions.	What	 this	implies	 is	 that	 transcendental	 conditions	 cannot	 prove	 first-order	 beliefs.	 This	 is	 not	 a	 problem	 for	transcendental	 inquiry,	 however,	 because	 it	 is	 simply	 not	 interested	 in	 delivering	 proofs.	 It	 is	 rather	interested	 in	 articulating	 the	 basic	 structures	 of	 experience	 from	 within	 experience.	 Transcendental	
conditions,	therefore,	are	these	articulated	basic	structures	of	our	experience.		 But	one	may	immediately	question,	as	Malpas	himself	does,	whether	this	really	is	the	case	for	Kant.	How	 could	 we	 say	 that	 Kant	 was	 not	 interested	 in	 delivering	 proofs	 when	 Kant	 himself	 speaks	 of	transcendental	proofs	throughout	the	Critique?	First	of	all,	we	must	note	that,	in	order	to	prove	something,	one	must	acknowledge	that	such	proof	is	wanting	and	that	there	is	a	need	for	such	proof.	This	is	a	point	that	Heidegger	discusses	in	Being	and	Time	in	the	context	of	arguing	for	the	impossibility	of	proving	that	Dasein	is	being-in-the-world.	Attempts	to	prove	this	are	doomed	to	fail	because,	in	order	to	attempt	such	proof,	Dasein	must	 already	be	 in	 the	world.	 Equally	 untenable	 are	 attempts	 to	 disprove	 this	 since	 they	
																																								 																				
38	Cf.	Malpas	1997.	
39	Ibid.,	p.	16.	
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presuppose	the	opposite,	namely	that	Dasein	is	 in	the	world.	The	very	demand	for	such	attempts	comes	from	simply	misunderstanding	the	being	of	the	entity	that	is	said	to	be	doing	the	demanding.	Therefore,	Heidegger	says:	“[i]f	Dasein	is	understood	correctly,	it	defies	such	proofs,	because,	in	its	Being,	it	already	is	what	subsequent	proofs	deem	necessary	to	demonstrate	for	it.”40			Similarly,	Kant	was	not	 interested	 in	proving	 the	 existence	 of	 the	world	 since	 that	would	 entail	that	he	accepted	the	way	of	ideas	or	a	similar	view	of	the	way	we	relate	to	the	world.	In	this	sense,	Kant’s	transcendental	inquiry	is	not	an	attempt	to	prove	the	existence	of	the	world.	But	it	would	also	be	wrong,	strictly	 speaking,	 to	 say	 that	 Kant	 attempted	 to	 prove	 the	 objective	 validity	 of	 categories	 in	 the	Transcendental	Deduction.	This	is	not	because	he	did	not	see	the	need	for	such	proofs	(the	transcendental	deduction	 is	 set	 out	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 categories	 apply	 to	 objects)	 but	 because	 any	 such	 “proof”	would	 not	 qualify	 as	 a	 proof	 in	 any	 unconditional	 sense.	 For,	 although	 proofs	must	make	 reference	 to	something	outside	of	that	which	they	are	trying	to	prove,	Kant	proceeded	to	“prove”	the	objective	validity	of	the	categories	by	making	explicit	reference	to	the	experience	in	which	such	categories	are	employed.41	Accordingly,	Malpas	claims	that,	for	Kant,	“transcendental	reasoning	is	understood	as	operating	only	with	reference	to	experience	and	its	possibility	[…]	even	though	it	is	precisely	experience	that	is	in	question.”42	Therefore,	with	Kant	(and	Heidegger)	in	mind,	Malpas	goes	on	to	say:		The	 transcendental-ontological	 project	 is	 concerned	 with	 ‘laying	 out’	 a	 structure	 that	 is	 already	present	in	our	being	the	kinds	of	beings	we	are;	that	is	already	present	in	the	possibility	of	experience.	It	does	not,	and	cannot,	‘prove’	such	a	structure	in	any	unconditional	sense,	because	the	articulation	of	 that	 structure	 must	 itself	 make	 essential	 reference	 to	 being	 as	 already	 given,	 to	 experience	 as	already	presented.43	If,	however,	we	understand	transcendental	inquiry	as	a	specific	case	of	hermeneutical	inquiry	and,	accordingly,	 transcendental	 conditions	as	essentially	 caught	up	 in	 the	hermeneutical	 circle,	 then	are	we	thereby	 denying	 that	 transcendental	 inquiry	 is	 foundational?	 For	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 circularity	 does	 not	seem	to	fit	well	together	with	the	idea	of	foundation.	Indeed,	this	brings	us	back	to	Drummond’s	reason	for	 claiming	 that	 Husserlian	 phenomenology	 is	 non-foundational.	 It	 was	 Drummond’s	 thesis	 that	
																																								 																				
40	SZ,	p.	205/249.	
41	This	point	about	the	apparent	circularity	in	Kant’s	“proof”	of	the	principles	of	understanding	is	highlighted	by	Heidegger:	
“[t]he	proof	consists	in	showing	that	the	principles	of	pure	understanding	are	possible	through	that	which	they	themselves	
make	possible,	through	the	nature	of	experience.	This	is	an	obvious	circle,	and	indeed	a	necessary	one.	The	principles	are	
proved	by	recourse	to	that	whose	arising	they	make	possible,	because	these	propositions	are	to	bring	to	light	nothing	else	
than	this	circularity	itself;	for	this	constitutes	the	essence	of	experience”	(GA	41,	p.	244/241-242).	See	also	Malpas	2012,	p.	
81.	
42	Malpas	1997,	p.	12.	
43	Ibid.,	p.	12.	
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phenomenology	 cannot	 provide	 the	 legitimating	 foundation	 for	 truths	 since	 such	 foundation	 must	 be	infallible	and	incorrigible	and,	by	disclosing	the	hermeneutical	nature	of	our	experience,	phenomenology	cannot	 arrive	 at	 such	 foundation.	 As	Drummond	 claimed,	 “foundations	 [discovered	 in	 phenomenology]	present	 themselves	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	hermeneutic	 circle”	 and,	 therefore,	 our	 experiences	 “have	 founding	moments	 reciprocally	 related	 to	one	another	but	no	 foundational	moments.”44	Now,	as	we	have	already	seen,	 since	 phenomenology	 is	 not	 so	much	 interested	 in	 founding	 truth	 but	meaning,	 the	 question	we	must	 ask	 is	whether	 paying	 heed	 to	 the	 hermeneutical	 nature	 of	 our	 experience	 precludes	 finding	 the	foundation	 of	meaning.	When	phrased	 this	way,	we	 can	 see	 that	Drummond’s	 case	 is	 rather	weak.	 For	there	seems	to	be	no	good	reason	why	the	foundation	of	meaning	cannot	be	caught	in	the	hermeneutical	circle.	In	fact,	it	is	only	expected	that	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	meaning	are	dependent	on	historical,	cultural	and	social	practices	and	also	 liable	 to	 revision	 through	 future	 investigations.	Therefore,	against	Drummond,	we	can	maintain	that	paying	heed	to	the	hermeneutical	nature	of	our	experience	does	not,	at	least	by	itself,	make	phenomenology	non-foundational.			
3.3. The	priority	relation	between	transcendental	subjectivity	and	objects		 Nevertheless,	acknowledging	the	structural	necessity	of	such	circularity	does	challenge	the	idea	of	foundation	 in	 general	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 how	 it	 has	 been	 understood	 by	 epistemological	 and	metaphysical	 foundationalists.	 Distinguishing	 the	 two	 ways	 of	 grounding	 does	 shed	 light	 on	 the	hermeneutical	 nature	 of	 transcendental	 inquiry	 and	 how	 the	 circularity	 involved	 is	 still	 a	 way	 of	grounding,	but	Malpas	does	not	provide	further	explanation	on	how	transcendental	 inquiry	differs	 from	other	 hermeneutical	 inquiries.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 that	 characterizing	 transcendental	conditions	as	the	articulated	basic	structures	of	our	experience	does	not	sufficiently	capture	the	distinctly	transcendental	 character	 of	 these	 conditions.	 If	 we	 want	 to	 maintain	 that	 transcendental	 inquiry	 is	foundational	despite	its	being	a	species	of	hermeneutical	inquiry,	then	it	is	all	the	more	pressing	that	we	clarify	 the	 specific	 sense	 in	which	 it	 is	 foundational.	 Therefore,	we	must	 ask	 the	 following:	What	 is	 the	additional	trait	that	makes	certain	hermeneutical	inquiries	transcendental?		This,	I	propose,	is	a	specific	kind	of	priority	relation.	Priority	relations	in	general	are	asymmetrical	or	one-way	relations.	 If	x	 is	prior	 to	y,	 then	we	cannot	simultaneously	maintain	 that	y	 is	prior	 to	x.	Any	kind	 of	 foundationalism,	 I	 would	 submit,	 operates	 with	 a	 priority	 relation.	 In	 epistemological	
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foundationalism,	 the	basic	evident	beliefs	are	prior	to	 all	other	beliefs	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 truth	of	 the	latter	is	derived	from	the	truth	of	the	former.	In	metaphysical	foundationalism,	the	metaphysical	principle	is	prior	to	reality	in	the	sense	that	the	former	provides	the	metaphysical	explanation	for	the	latter.	Now,	for	reasons	 already	 given,	 the	 priority	 relation	 involved	 in	 transcendental	 foundationalism	 cannot	 be	identified	with	 either	 of	 the	 above,	 i.e.	 it	 cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 derivation	 or	metaphysical	explanation.	 But	 then,	 what	 is	 the	 specific	 kind	 of	 priority	 relation	 that	 pertains	 between	 the	transcendental	conditions	and	the	conditioned	or,	more	specifically,	between	transcendental	subjectivity	(as	that	which	is	prior	to	all)	and	objects	in	the	world?	Besides	the	two	ways	mentioned	above,	one	could	also	understand	priority	in	terms	of	epistemic	or	ontological	priority.	To	begin	with	the	former,	‘x	is	epistemically	prior	to	y’	means	that	the	knowledge	of	
x	 is	 prior	 to	 the	 knowledge	 of	 y.	 In	 our	 case,	 this	 would	 mean	 that	 knowledge	 of	 transcendental	subjectivity	is	prior	to	knowledge	of	objects.	It	is	evident	that	this	is	not	the	case	for	either	Kant	or	Husserl.	For	Kant,	so	 long	as	he	begins	with	the	truths	of	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	claims,	 it	 is	clear	that	our	knowledge	of	objects	is	prior	to	that	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	For	Husserl	too,	insofar	as	he	begins	with	the	natural	attitude,	even	if	it	is	only	to	bracket	the	general	belief	in	the	existence	of	the	world,	our	knowledge	of	objects	given	in	the	natural	attitude	is	prior	to	our	knowledge	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	Put	 differently,	 though	 it	 abstracts	 from	 it,	 transcendental	 reflection	 necessarily	 takes	 our	 first-order	cognition	of	objects	as	its	starting	point.		Could	we	then	think	of	transcendental	subjectivity	as	ontologically	prior	to	objects?	What	I	mean	by	ontological	priority	is	the	following:	x	is	ontologically	prior	to	y	if	and	only	if	the	existence	of	y	depends	on	 that	 of	 x.	 This	 looks	more	 promising.	 For,	 as	we	 have	 pointed	 out,	 one	 of	 the	 important	 features	 of	transcendental	inquiry	is	the	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world.	From	the	naive	view	that	objects	exist	independently	of	us,	we	come	to	see	through	transcendental	reflection	that	objects	exist	only	as	they	are	manifest	 in	consciousness.	Transcendental	subjectivity	as	meaning-bestowing	constitutes	what	 it	means	for	 something	 to	 exist.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 existence	 of	 objects	 depends	 on	 that	 of	 transcendental	subjectivity.	 However,	 the	 relation	 seems	 to	 be	 one	 of	 mutual	 dependence	 since	 the	 existence	 of	transcendental	 subjectivity	 can	 also	 be	 said	 to	 depend	 on	 that	 of	 objects.	 Moreover,	 if	 a	 mutual	dependence	 relation	 obtains,	 then	 either	 we	 have	 to	 give	 up	 the	 belief	 that	 transcendental	 inquiry	 is	foundational	(since	foundational	relations	are	asymmetrical	while	mutual	dependence	is	symmetrical)	or	we	must	argue,	as	I	will	do	below,	that	ontological	dependence	does	not	fully	capture	the	uniqueness	of	the	relation	in	question.		
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To	begin	with,	we	must	first	clarify	what	“existence	of	objects”	means.	If	we	understand	it	 in	the	naive	sense	of	objects	existing	independently	of	us	as	in	the	natural	attitude,	then	it	would	mean	that	it	is	required	 for	 carrying	 out	 the	 epoché	 and	 reduction.	 But	 since,	 in	 carrying	 out	 the	 epoché,	 we	 are	bracketing	 the	 belief	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 objects,	 the	 existence	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 does	 not	depend	on	that	of	objects.	In	other	words,	it	does	not	matter	whether	the	objects	really	exist	or	not.	But	if	we	mean	 “existence	 of	 objects”	 in	 the	 transcendental	 attitude,	 then	 “existence	 of	 objects”	 signifies	 the	
meaning	of	the	existence	of	objects.	Under	this	reading,	the	existence	of	transcendental	subjectivity	could	be	said	to	depend	on	that	of	objects	in	the	sense	that	the	latter	are	simply	part	of	the	noematic	correlate	of	the	noesis	in	the	intentional	structure	of	transcendental	subjectivity.		At	this	point,	then,	we	seem	to	have	a	case	of	mutual	ontological	dependence.	But	it	also	seems	to	be	 the	 case	 that	 we	 do	 not	 have	 a	 strictly	 symmetrical	 relation.	 For	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 objects	 are	ontologically	dependent	on	transcendental	subjectivity	in	the	sense	that	the	latter	constitutes	the	former’s	meaning,	 while	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 is	 ontologically	 dependent	 on	 objects	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	latter	are	part	of	the	noematic	correlate	of	the	noetic	structure	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	In	fact,	what	this	shows	is	that	there	is	indeed	an	asymmetry	in	the	dependence	relation.	Namely,	while	transcendental	subjectivity	is	dependent	on	objects,	this	is	so	only	in	the	sense	that	objects	are	understood	as	noemata,	i.e.	as	constituted	through	transcendental	subjectivity.	 In	other	words,	this	dependence	relation	only	makes	sense	insofar	as	transcendental	subjectivity	 is	meaning-constituting	and	hence	has	priority	over	objects.	Accordingly,	we	can	say	 that	despite	 the	peculiar	 co-dependence	 relation,	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 is	prior	 to	 objects	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 former	 constitutes	 the	 latter’s	 meaning.	 Put	 differently,	 we	 can	conclude	 that	 the	 priority	 relation	 specific	 to	 transcendental	 foundationalism	 is	 one	 of	 meaning-constitution.	In	order	to	set	this	apart	from	other	kinds	of	priority	relations,	I	will	call	this	transcendental	
priority.	Thus,	 from	 the	 above	 discussion,	 we	 can	 give	 the	 following	 definition	 of	 transcendental	foundationalism:	Transcendental	foundationalism	is	the	foundationalism	specific	to	transcendental	 inquiry	
insofar	 as	 the	 foundations	 are	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 transcendental	 priority,	 i.e.	 the	 priority	 of	
transcendental	 subjectivity	 over	 objects	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 former	 constitutes	 the	 latter’s	 meaning.	Furthermore,	 at	 this	 point,	 we	 can	 finally	 make	 sense	 of	 our	 claim	 made	 earlier	 in	 this	 chapter	 that	transcendental	 idealism	 entails	 a	 specific	 priority	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 over	 objects	 and	 the	world.	Indeed,	we	can	even	say	that	transcendental	priority	is	the	basic	tenet	of	transcendental	idealism.		
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4. Three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy		 We	 are	 finally	 at	 a	 point	 where	 we	 can	 lay	 out	 three	 criteria	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 as	developed	 by	 Kant	 and	Husserl.	 To	 begin	with,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 seeks	 the	 foundation	 of	 our	experience	and	knowledge.	It	is	therefore	engaged	in	a	foundational	project.	However,	as	I	have	argued	at	some	 length,	 the	 foundationalism	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 different	 from	 various	 sorts	 of	traditional	 foundationalism.	Namely,	 it	 does	 not	 seek	 a	 foundation	 from	which	 the	 truths	 of	 first-order	claims	 are	 derived	 (epistemological	 foundationalism),	 nor	 does	 it	 seek	 the	 metaphysical	 explanans	 for	reality	 (metaphysical	 foundationalism).	 Rather,	 transcendental	 foundationalism	 looks	 for	 transcendental	priority,	namely	the	priority	of	transcendental	subjectivity	over	objects	and	the	world	in	the	sense	that	it	constitutes	the	latters’	meaning.	I	will	thus	designate	this	as	the	first	criterion.	Transcendental	philosophy	seeks	 for	 the	 foundation	 of	 our	 experience	 and	 knowledge	whereby	 this	 foundation	 is	 understood	 as	 a	transcendental	priority.		 Secondly,	transcendental	philosophy	employs	a	specific	kind	of	reflection,	namely	transcendental	
reflection,	which	 serves	 as	 the	 appropriate	 method	 of	 seeking	 the	 foundation	 for	 our	 experience	 and	knowledge.	I	will	identify	this	as	the	second	criterion.	What	is	most	important	about	this	kind	of	reflection	is	that	it	is	a	second-order	reflection	that	does	not	thematize	objects	straightforwardly	to	determine	their	real	properties	but,	rather,	thematizes	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	of	objects.		 Thirdly,	 in	 carrying	 out	 the	 reflection	 into	 the	 foundation	 of	 our	 experience	 and	 knowledge,	transcendental	philosophy	elicits	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world.	Namely,	from	the	naive	realist	view	that	the	world	exists	independently	of	us,	transcendental	reflection	allows	us	to	see	that	the	world	persists	 only	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 constituted	 by	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 In	 this	 sense,	 transcendental	philosophy	alters	our	relation	to	the	world	in	that	it	awakens	us	to	the	privileged	role	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	Since	this	metaphysical	implication	is	an	important	aspect	of	what	constitutes	transcendental	philosophy,	I	will	identify	this	as	our	third	criterion	of	transcendental	philosophy.	Therefore,	to	set	out	the	three	 criteria	 more	 concisely:	 (1)	 transcendental	 philosophy	 is	 a	 search	 for	 the	 foundation	 of	 our	experience	and	knowledge	 (though	 in	a	 specific	 sense),	 (2)	employs	 transcendental	reflection,	 and	 (3)	 it	entails	 an	 alteration	 of	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world.	 We	 will	 be	 employing	 these	 three	 criteria	 to	 assess	Heidegger	 and	 Nishida’s	 critical	 engagement	 with	 the	 transcendental	 tradition	 (Chapters	 4	 and	 6	respectively).		
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Chapter	3:	Heidegger’s	project	in	Being	and	Time	
Introduction		 The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	prepare	the	grounds	for	the	following	chapter	where	we	will	be	examining	Heidegger’s	critical	engagement	with	transcendental	philosophy	in	Being	and	Time	(hereafter,	BT).	 Accordingly,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 articulate	 Heidegger’s	 project	 laid	 out	 in	 BT.	 BT	 is	Heidegger’s	magnum	opus	and	is	often	hailed	as	one	of	the	most	important	philosophical	texts	of	the	last	century.	Although	the	text	is	not	easy	to	understand,	especially	with	the	abundance	of	idiosyncratic	jargon,	what	certainly	make	the	work	more	accessible	are	the	phenomenological	descriptions	of	tools,	the	world,	our	 everyday	 engagement	 with	 others	 and	 so	 on	 that	 pervade	 the	 whole	 work.	 Indeed,	 the	 detailed	descriptions	are	so	 fascinating	that	 they	alone	can	be	taken	as	evidence	 for	 the	significance	of	 the	work	itself.	Having	said	 that,	however,	 it	would	be	a	misunderstanding	of	 the	work	as	a	whole	 if	one	were	 to	identify	 this	 as	 the	 main	 significance	 of	 BT.	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 BT	 was	 not	 merely	 to	 give	phenomenological	 descriptions	 of	 our	 everyday	 dealings	 but	 was	much	more	 grandiose:	 To	 clarify	 the	
meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general.	 The	 descriptions	 themselves	 must	 be	 understood	 accordingly	 within	 the	oeuvre	of	this	ontological	project.		 But	 what	 drove	 Heidegger	 to	 undertake	 such	 a	 project	 and	 what	 method(s)	 did	 he	 employ?	 The	systematic	 and	 lengthy	 Introduction	 to	 BT	 provides	 us	 with	 Heidegger’s	 own	 answer	 to	 this	 crucial	question	for	understanding	the	project	of	BT.	There,	Heidegger	articulates	the	problematics	of	the	work,	the	 motivations	 behind	 his	 proposed	 project	 and	 the	 methodology	 for	 undertaking	 such	 a	 project.	Admittedly,	the	fact	that	the	published	portion	of	BT	is	only	a	fragment	of	what	was	initially	planned	in	the	Introduction	creates	an	obvious	discrepancy	between	what	Heidegger	promised	to	do	and	what	he	in	fact	accomplished	in	BT.	As	such,	we	are	left	with	the	difficult	task	of	interpreting	the	nature	of	BT	in	light	of	its	 incompleteness.	 However,	 although	 such	 a	 task	 is	 important	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 understanding	 the	possible	problems	of	the	proposed	project	in	BT	and	the	trajectory	of	Heidegger’s	thought,	this	will	not	be	taken	 up	 in	 this	 chapter,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 rather	 to	 lay	 the	 basis	 for	 articulating	 the	transcendental	orientation	of	BT.	Accordingly,	the	aim	of	the	following	is	to	clarify	the	proposed	project	in	BT	as	it	was	initially	laid	out	by	Heidegger	and,	specifically,	with	regard	to	its	underlying	problematics	and	methodology.	 Accordingly,	 in	 the	 following,	 we	 will	 be	 focusing	 on	 Heidegger’s	 discussion	 in	 the	Introduction	to	BT	with	reference	to	some	of	the	Marburg	lecture	courses	that	address	the	same	issues.			
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1. Formulating	the	question	of	being		 BT	 begins	 with	 the	 statement	 that	 the	 question	 of	 being	 has	 been	 forgotten	 today.	 The	 very	question	that	baffled	Plato	and	Aristotle	had	been	neglected	by	the	whole	of	Western	thought,	 the	story	goes,	due	to	various	presuppositions	or	“dogmas”	regarding	what	‘being’	is.	Firstly,	it	has	been	maintained	that	 being	 is	 the	most	 universal	 concept	 that	 “transcends”	 the	 universality	 of	 a	 genus.1	In	 other	words,	being	 is	 a	 universal	 concept	 but	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 lies	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 system	 of	 categories.	 To	capture	 this	 feature,	 being	 was	 simply	 designated	 as	 ‘transcendens’	 in	 medieval	 ontology.	 From	 this	specific	universality,	the	second	“dogma”	is	derived,	namely	that	being	cannot	be	defined	by	reference	to	either	higher	or	lower	concepts,	i.e.	it	is	indefinable.2	But	if	the	universality	of	being	is	distinct	from	that	of	a	 genus	 and	 hence	 defies	 any	 definition,	 this	 opens	 up	 a	 whole	 range	 of	 questions.	 What	 is	 this	
transcendent	character	of	being?	If	it	is	indefinable,	how	can	we	approach	its	meaning?	Yet,	a	third	“dogma”	has	prevented	raising	these	questions,	namely	that	being	is	self-evident.3	If	we	already	know	what	being	means,	then	there	is	no	need	to	look	for	a	definition.	Indeed,	it	is	true	that	we	make	statements	all	the	time	using	 the	word	 for	 being,	 such	 as	 “Life	 is	 jolly”	 and	 “I	am	 happy,”	with	 full	 comprehension	 of	what	we	mean	by	these	statements.	In	this	sense,	we	have	a	pre-conceptual	understanding	of	being	but	one	which	supposedly	precludes	conceptual	articulation.	So	the	story	goes.	But	is	this	really	the	end	of	the	story?	Is	it	true	 that	 being	 forbids	 all	 conceptual	 articulation,	 making	 any	 philosophical	 inquiry	 into	 the	 subject-matter	 redundant?	 Or	 could	 it	 merely	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 kind	 of	 conceptual	 repertoire	 necessary	 to	articulate	being	has	been	lacking?	Heidegger	follows	the	latter	line	of	thinking.	In	fact,	Heidegger	tells	us	that	what	 has	 been	 said	 of	 being,	 namely	 that	 it	 is	 universal,	 indefinable	 and	 self-evident,	 are,	 taken	 in	themselves,	 genuine	 insights	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 being.	 It	 is	 only	 when	 they	 are	 taken	 as	 cues	 for	suspending	 further	 philosophical	 investigation	 that	 they	 become	 dogmas.	 At	 most,	 what	 these	 general	insights	tell	us	is	that	the	problem	of	being	is	a	genuine	problem.	The	distinct	character	of	being	demands	a	closer	look.			 The	task	that	Heidegger	sets	out	in	BT	is,	accordingly,	to	bring	to	light	the	long-forgotten	question	of	being.	Prima	facie,	this	may	sound	as	if	Heidegger	is	grieving	over	the	neglect	of	ontology	only	to	take	up	the	task	of	constructing	ontology	anew.	However,	his	aim	in	BT	was	different	and	importantly	so.	What,	in	a	certain	sense,	was	more	problematic	than	neglecting	the	question	of	being	was	that	the	question	itself	lacked	a	clear	orientation.	Before	any	attempt	can	be	made	to	answer	the	question	of	being,	the	question	
																																								 																				
1	SZ,	p.	3/22.	
2	SZ,	p.	4/23.	
3	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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itself	must	be	clarified	so	that	we	have	a	better	idea	of	what	we	are	asking	for	in	the	very	question.	For	this	reason,	 Heidegger	 spends	 some	 time	 spelling	 out	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 question	 itself.	 In	 fact,	 the	 whole	Introduction	 is	 devoted	 to	 formulating	 the	 question	 of	 being	 “explicitly	 and	 transparently,”	 in	 an	“adequate”	manner.4	His	strategy	is	to	first	 lay	out	the	formal	structure	of	questions	in	general	and	then	clarify	why	and	how	the	question	of	being	is	a	special	question.			 Heidegger	first	identifies	three	moments	in	the	structure	of	a	question	in	general.	Any	inquiry	has	that	which	is	asked	about	(Gefragtes),	that	which	is	interrogated	(Befragtes)	and	that	which	is	to	be	found	out	by	 the	 asking	 (Erfragte).5		 Put	differently,	we	 can	 say	 that	 that	which	 is	 asked	about	 is	 the	 subject-matter	or	the	topic,	that	which	is	interrogated	is	the	direct	object	of	the	investigation	and	that	which	is	to	be	found	out	is	the	aim	of	the	inquiry.	For	example,	a	botanist	may	ask	about	the	life	of	a	particular	plant	and	this	would	be	the	topic	of	the	investigation.	The	respective	research	would	consist	of	interrogating,	i.e.	taking	 as	 the	 direct	 object	 of	 the	 investigation,	 a	 sample	 of	 that	 plant	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 finding	 out	 the	general	characteristics	of	that	species.	Furthermore,	in	any	inquiry,	we	are	never	without	a	clue	to	begin	with.	As	Heidegger	says:	“[i]nquiry,	as	a	kind	of	seeking,	must	be	guided	beforehand	by	what	is	sought.”6	In	other	words,	in	asking	about	something,	we	already	have	some	familiarity	with	the	topic.	This	need	not	be,	 and	 for	 the	 most	 part	 is	 not,	 a	 conceptually	 articulated	 understanding.	 It	 may	 even	 be	 a	 biased	understanding	based	on	traditional	beliefs.	Nonetheless,	there	is	always	a	certain	familiarity	with	the	topic	that	allows	us	 to	address	 the	question	 in	 the	 first	place.	Therefore,	when	we	ask	 the	question,	 “What	 is	‘being’?”,	we	are	already	working	with	an	understanding	of	being.	Heidegger	designates	this	as	the	“vague	average	 understanding	 of	 being.”7	It	 is	 based	 on	 this	 vague	 average	 understanding	 that	we	 are	 able	 to	formulate	the	question	of	being	with	regard	to	the	three	moments	of	questions	in	general.	To	begin	with,	our	vague	average	understanding	of	being	tells	us	that	being	is	not	some	free	floating	thing	detached	from	all	entities	but,	rather,	that	being	is	the	being	of	entities.	In	other	words,	being	is	“that	which	determines	entities	as	entities,	 that	on	 the	basis	of	which	entities	are	already	understood,	however	we	may	discuss	them	 in	 detail.”8	Accordingly,	 in	 the	 question	 of	 being,	we	 are	 asking	 about	being	 and	 interrogating,	 or	taking	as	the	direct	object	of	the	investigation,	entities:	“[i]n	so	far	as	being	constitutes	what	is	asked	about,	and	‘being’	means	the	being	of	entities,	then	entities	themselves	turn	out	to	be	what	is	interrogated.”9	
																																								 																				
4	SZ,	p.	7/27.	
5	SZ,	p.	5/24.	
6	SZ,	p.	5/25.	
7	Ibid.,	ibid.	
8	SZ,	p.	6/25-26.	
9	SZ,	p.	6/26.	
72	
	
	 But	our	vague	average	understanding	also	tells	us	that,	while	it	is	that	which	determines	entities	as	entities,	being	is	not	itself	an	entity.	To	use	a	term	that	Heidegger	employs	in	his	other	works	(but	not	in	 BT),	 there	 is	 an	 “ontological	 difference”	 between	 entities	 and	 their	 being.10	This	 distinction	 follows	directly	 from	 the	 supreme	universality	 of	 being.	 For,	 if	 being	 is	 not	 a	 universal	 concept	 in	 the	 sense	 of	genera,	then	being	cannot	be	articulated	in	terms	of	genus	and	species.	And	since	entities	are	the	only	sort	of	thing	that	can	be	articulated	in	this	way,	being	is	not	itself	an	entity.	While	this	is	a	negative	conclusion,	it	 is	 nonetheless	 an	 important	 one	 that	 tends	 to	 be,	 and	 historically	 has	 been,	 all	 too	 easily	 neglected,	according	to	Heidegger.	As	Heidegger	stresses,	it	is	a	distinction	that	must	be	held	first	and	foremost	if	the	problem	of	being	is	to	become	a	genuine	philosophical	problem:	
The	being	of	 entities	 ‘is’	 not	 itself	 an	 entity.	 If	we	are	 to	understand	 the	problem	of	being,	 our	 first	philosophical	step	consists	in	not	μῦθὀν	τινα	διηγεῖσθαι,	 in	not	 ‘telling	a	story’	–	that	is	to	say,	 in	not	defining	entities	as	entities	by	tracing	them	back	in	their	origin	to	some	other	entities,	as	if	being	had	the	character	of	some	possible	entity.	Hence	being,	as	that	which	is	asked	about,	must	be	exhibited	in	a	way	of	its	own,	essentially	different	from	the	way	in	which	entities	are	discovered.11	The	reason	why	there	are	quotation	marks	around	“is”	is	because,	strictly	speaking,	“is”	does	not	apply	to	the	 being	 of	 entities.	 As	 he	 explains	 in	 a	 lecture	 course	 held	much	 later	 titled	The	Principles	of	Reason:	“[w]hen	 we	 say	 something	 ‘is’	 and	 ‘is	 such	 and	 so,’	 then	 that	 something	 is,	 in	 such	 an	 utterance,	represented	as	a	being.	Only	a	being	‘is’;	the	‘is’	itself	–	being	–	‘is’	not.”12	 		 The	 same	 point	 is	 made	 in	 his	 summer	 lecture	 course	 of	 1927,	 The	 Basic	 Problems	 of	
Phenomenology.	Here,	the	term	“ontological	difference”	makes	its	first	appearance:		We	 must	 be	 able	 to	 bring	 out	 clearly	 the	 difference	 between	 being	 and	 beings	 in	 order	 to	 make	something	 like	 being	 the	 theme	 of	 inquiry.	 This	 distinction	 is	 not	 arbitrary;	 rather,	 it	 is	 the	 one	 by	which	 the	 theme	 of	 ontology	 and	 thus	 of	 philosophy	 itself	 is	 first	 of	 all	 attained.	 It	 is	 a	 distinction	which	 is	 first	 and	 foremost	 constitutive	 for	 ontology.	 We	 call	 it	 the	 ontological	 difference	 –	 the	differentiation	 between	 being	 and	 beings.	 Only	 by	making	 this	 distinction	 –	 krinein	 in	 Greek	 –	 not	between	 one	 being	 and	 another	 being	 but	 between	 being	 and	 beings	 do	we	 first	 enter	 the	 field	 of	philosophical	research.13	Indeed,	this	distinction	proves	to	be	of	utmost	importance	in	understanding	the	question	of	being.	While	we	are	 interrogating	entities,	we	must	always	bear	 in	mind	 that,	 in	doing	so,	we	are	asking	about	 their	
																																								 																				
10	GA	24,	p.	22/17.	
11	SZ,	p.	6/26.	
12	GA	10,	p.77/51.	
13	GA	24,	pp.	22-23/17.	
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being.	 As	 Heidegger	 says,	 “[t]hese	 [entities	 themselves]	 are,	 so	 to	 speak,	 questioned	 as	 regards	 their	being.”14	This	also	means	that	our	interrogation	of	entities,	whatever	it	may	turn	out	to	be,	must	look	quite	different	 from	 inquiries	 that	ask	about	entities	as	regards	their	qualities.	An	example	of	 the	 latter	 is	 the	botanist’s	 investigation	 of	 the	 life	 of	 a	 plant	 insofar	 as	 that	 is	 taken	 to	 be	 a	mere	 quality	 of,	 or	 at	 least	nothing	above	and	beyond	the	general	characteristics	of,	 the	plant.	When	we	ask	about	 the	being	of	 the	plant,	 in	 contrast,	we	 are	 asking	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 question	 altogether.	 As	Heidegger	 says	 in	 his	 1928	lecture	 course:	 “[b]ecause	 being	 ‘is’	 not,	 and	 thus	 is	 never	 along	with	 other	 beings,	 there	 is	 no	 proper	sense	at	all	or	legitimacy	in	asking	what	being	is	with	respect	to	beings	in	themselves.”15	In	other	words,	
What	 ‘is’	 being?,	 if	 we	 were	 to	 phrase	 it	 that	 way,	 requires	 those	 quotation	marks	 since	 that	 question	primarily	aims	at	beings.		 Having	articulated	the	topic	and	the	direct	object	of	investigation	of	the	question	of	being	as	being	and	entities	respectively,	Heidegger	deems	the	aim	of	the	investigation,	or	what	is	to	be	found	out	in	the	question	of	being,	the	meaning	of	being.	Here,	one	may	wonder	what	the	difference	between	being	and	the	
meaning	of	being	amounts	 to.	 In	 general,	 there	 is	 a	 close	 relation	 between	 the	 topic	 and	 the	 aim	 of	 an	investigation.	 In	 our	 earlier	 example,	 the	 botanist	 attempts	 to	 reveal	 the	 life	 of	 the	 particular	 plant	 by	studying	the	general	characteristics	of	that	plant.	The	topic	(the	life	of	the	particular	plant)	gains	clarity	by	carrying	out	an	investigation	with	a	specific	aim	(to	find	out	the	general	characteristics	of	that	plant).	But	there	can	be	different	aims,	and	accordingly	different	 investigations,	 that	target	the	same	topic.	Another	botanist	may	study	the	effects	of	environmental	pollution	on	the	plant	at	issue,	and	the	aim	of	this	study	would	be	different	 from	 the	 former.	Nevertheless,	both	will	be	 targeting	 the	 same	 topic:	 the	 life	of	 that	particular	plant.	Likewise,	the	aim	of	the	inquiry	into	being	may	vary,	and	the	nature	of	the	investigations	would	 vary	 accordingly.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 investigation	 of	 being,	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 inquiry	 that	seeks	the	meaning	of	being	 is	not	 the	only	possible	 inquiry	that	targets	being.	However,	as	we	will	 later	see	in	detail,	at	the	time	BT	was	written,	Heidegger	believed	that	inquiry	into	the	meaning	of	being	is	not	just	 one	 possible	 inquiry	 amongst	 many	 others	 but	 the	most	 fundamental	 one	 and	 hence	 a	 necessary	inquiry.				 In	this	way,	Heidegger	highlights	the	three	moments	of	the	question	of	being:	being	(that	which	is	asked	 about,	 the	 topic),	 entities	 (that	 which	 is	 interrogated,	 the	 direct	 object	 of	 investigation)	 and	 the	
meaning	of	being	 (that	which	 is	 to	be	 found	out,	 the	aim).	At	 this	point,	 the	question	arises	as	 to	which	entity	or	entities	we	should	take	as	the	direct	object	of	our	investigation	since	there	are	many	things	we	
																																								 																				
14	SZ,	p.	6/26.	
15	GA	26,	p.	195/153.	
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designate	entities,	e.g.	plants,	animals,	human	beings,	numbers,	etc.	In	order	to	formulate	the	question	of	being	“adequately,”	Heidegger	claims	that	“it	requires	us	to	prepare	the	way	for	choosing	the	right	entity	for	 our	 example,	 and	 to	 work	 out	 the	 genuine	 way	 of	 access	 to	 it.”16	It	 is	 here	 that	 Heidegger	 first	introduces	 “Dasein”	 in	 BT.	 “Dasein”	 is	Heidegger’s	 technical	 term	 for	 the	 kind	 of	 entity	 that	we	 human	beings	 are.	 Along	 with	 the	 three	 moments,	 being,	 entities	 and	 the	 meaning	 of	 being,	 Dasein	 plays	 an	important	role	in	addressing	the	question	of	being.	Indeed,	as	will	become	apparent,	Dasein	plays	the	most	important	role	in	the	way	the	question	is	addressed	in	BT.	The	subsequent	sections	of	the	Introduction	are,	largely,	an	attempt	to	show	why	Dasein	proves	to	be	the	“right	entity”	in	the	question	of	being	and	what	the	“genuine	way	of	access”	to	this	entity	consists	of.				
2. The	demand	for	a	fundamental	ontology		 In	formulating	the	question	of	being,	we	have	found	out	that	the	aim	of	the	investigation	in	BT	is	to	articulate	the	meaning	of	being	and,	although	the	reason	is	yet	to	be	given,	this	is	to	proceed	by	examining	the	entity	Dasein.	But	is	the	question	of	being	merely	one	question	that	arises	amongst	others?	Or	does	the	question	have	some	kind	of	priority	over	other	questions	that	make	it	“special”?	And	if	it	is	special,	in	what	way	is	 it	special?	It	 is	to	these	questions	that	Heidegger	now	turns,	and	his	aim	will	be	to	show	that	the	question	 of	 being	 is	 the	 “most	 basic	 and	 the	 most	 concrete”	 question.17	His	 argument	 for	 this	 claim	proceeds	by	first	showing	that	the	question	of	being	demands	a	“fundamental	ontology”	if	 it	 is	to	be	the	most	fundamental	of	all	questions,	and	then	showing	that	such	a	fundamental	ontology	“must	be	sought	in	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.”18	Let	us	begin	with	the	first	part	of	his	claim.		 The	aim	of	§3,	titled	“The	Ontological	Priority	of	the	Question	of	Being,”	is	precisely	to	show	that	the	question	of	being	demands	a	“fundamental	ontology.”	The	basic	distinctions	made	here	are	between	the	“ontic	sciences”	and	ontology,	on	the	one	hand,	and	regional	ontology	and	“fundamental	ontology”	on	the	 other.	Heidegger	 begins	 by	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 positive	 sciences	 or,	 in	 his	 preferred	 terminology,	“ontic	 sciences”	 (sciences	 that	 deal	with	 entities	 in	 a	 broad	 sense	 including	 not	 only	 concrete	 but	 also	abstract	entities,	e.g.	mathematical	entities),	accomplish	a	“rough	and	naive”	demarcation	of	their	subject-matter	in	undertaking	their	research.	Moreover,	what	guide	this	initial	demarcation	are	the	basic	concepts	(e.g.	‘plant’,	‘nature,’	‘human	beings,’	‘history,’	‘numbers,’	‘life’)	that	are	experienced	and	interpreted	by	us	
																																								 																				
16	SZ,	p.	7/26.	
17	SZ,	p.	9/29.	
18	SZ,	p.	13/34.	
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before	 any	 science	 of	 them	 even	 exists.19	For	 example,	 before	 a	 botanist	 starts	 examining	 the	 life	 of	 a	particular	plant	as	a	botanist,	he/she	has	an	understanding	(however	rough	and	naive	it	may	be)	of	what	‘plants’	are	to	begin	with	that	allows	him/her	to	distinguish	the	area	of	his/her	field	from	other	fields,	say,	zoology.	Based	on	these	pre-scientific	 interpretations	of	basic	concepts,	 the	positive	sciences	proceed	to	make	progress	by	working	within	that	predelineated	domain.	But	this	is	to	say	that,	if	these	basic	concepts	are	 ill-founded,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 their	 interpretation	 lacks	 clarity	 or	 is	 questionable,	 then	 the	 positive	sciences	are	 faced	with	some	sort	of	crisis	at	 their	 foundation.	Such	a	crisis	was	 in	 fact	occurring	at	 the	time	Heidegger	was	writing	 BT	 in	 the	 various	 sciences	 including	mathematics,	 physics	 and	 biology.	 As	Heidegger	 himself	 mentions,	 the	 debate	 between	 the	 formalists	 and	 the	 intuitionists	 in	 mathematics	regarding	 the	 primary	way	 of	 access	 to	mathematical	 entities	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 crisis	 at	 the	 foundation	 of	mathematics.	And	 in	physics,	 relativity	 theory	 and	quantum	 theory	had	 sparked	a	discussion	 regarding	the	very	nature	of	physical	matter.20	Such	crises	call	for	an	investigation	into	the	basic	building	blocks	of	their	sciences,	i.e.	a	reexamination	of	their	basic	concepts.	Moreover,	this	shows	that	preliminary	research	into	the	basic	concepts	is	demanded	by	the	positive	sciences	themselves	in	order	to	secure	their	status	as	well-founded	 science.	 Such	 preliminary	 research	 is	 what	 Husserl	 called	 regional	 ontology	 (though	Heidegger	 does	 not	 use	 this	 terminology	 in	 BT).	 Therefore,	 in	 terms	 of	 foundation,	 regional	 ontology	founds	the	positive	sciences	and	hence	has	priority	over	the	latter.	This	is	what	Heidegger	means	when	he	says,	“[o]ntological	 inquiry	 is	 indeed	more	primordial,	as	over	against	the	ontical	 inquiry	of	 the	positive	sciences.”21	Put	 differently,	 inquiries	 into	 the	 different	 regions	 of	 being	 are	 more	 basic	 compared	 to	inquiries	into	entities.	However,	the	“ontological	priority”	of	the	question	of	being	Heidegger	is	speaking	of	 in	 this	 section	does	not	merely	 refer	 to	 the	priority	of	 regional	ontology	over	 the	ontic	 sciences.	 For	“ontological	 inquiry”	 itself,	 namely	 regional	 ontology,	 demands	 further	 clarification.	 As	 he	 continues:	“[b]ut	it	[ontological	inquiry]	remains	itself	naive	and	opaque	if	in	its	researches	into	the	being	of	entities	it	fails	to	discuss	the	meaning	of	being	in	general.”22	Therefore,	regional	ontology	itself	is	said	to	demand	what	he	calls	“fundamental	ontology,”	that	which	studies	the	meaning	of	being	in	general.			 At	 this	 point,	 however,	 one	 may	 wonder	 why	 this	 should	 be	 the	 case,	 namely	 that	 ontological	inquiry	 into	 the	 various	 regions	 of	 being	 remains	 “naive	 and	 opaque”	without	 further	 inquiry	 into	 the	“meaning	of	being	in	general.”	Why	can	we	not	be	content	with	having	a	plurality	of	meanings	of	being?	This	point	has	been	raised	by	Herman	Philipse	as	the	problem	of	the	“pole	of	unity”:	
																																								 																				
19	SZ,	p.	9/29.	
20	SZ,	pp.	9-10/29-30.	
21	SZ,	p.	11/31.	
22	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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What,	 we	 may	 wonder	 […]	 justifies	 Heidegger’s	 assumption	 that	 there	 must	 be	 one	 fundamental	meaning	of	“to	be”?	Why	does	his	question	of	being	have	a	pole	of	unity?23		As	Malpas	rightly	notes,	Philipse’s	question	is	not	entirely	clearly	phrased	since	it	could	be	understood	as	asking	either	why	 the	various	meanings	must	be	unified	under	a	 single	meaning	of	being	or	why	 there	must	be	any	unity	at	all.24	Since	 the	 latter	question	 is	clearly	more	basic,	Malpas	reformulates	Philipse’s	question	as	“asking	after	the	reason	for	the	association	of	the	question	of	being	with	the	idea	of	unity.”25	So	then,	why	did	Heidegger	seek	the	unity	of	the	various	meanings	of	being	in	BT?	The	question	of	unity	is	not	 explicitly	 raised	 by	Heidegger,	 and	 for	 that	 reason,	 it	 seems	 as	 though	 he	merely	 assumes	 that	 the	need	for	a	search	for	this	unity	is	self-evident.	In	fact,	it	is	interesting	that	he	later	writes	that	the	“quest	for	the	unity	in	the	multiplicity	of	Being,	then	only	obscurely,	unsteadily,	and	helplessly	stirring	within	me,	remained,	through	many	upsets,	wanderings,	and	perplexities,	the	ceaseless	impetus	for	the	treatise	Being	
and	Time	which	appeared	two	decades	later.”26	But	the	question	is	where	such	impetus	came	from.	Both	Malpas	and	Philipse	suggest	that	the	main	rationale	for	the	demand	for	unity	is	traceable	to	Heidegger’s	indebtedness	 to	Aristotle’s	 formulation	of	 the	question	of	being.27	Aristotle	 argued	 for	 the	 irreducibility	and	unity	of	the	various	meanings	of	being	by	identifying	the	primary	sense	of	being,	namely	ousia.28	For	Aristotle,	 this	 singling	out	of	a	primary	sense	was	necessitated	by	his	pursuit	of	 first	philosophy,	which	studies	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 being.	 Although	 Heidegger	 saw	 problems	 with	 Aristotle’s	identification	of	the	unity	of	being	with	ousia,	the	formulation	of	the	question	of	being	in	BT,	as	specifically	formulated	in	terms	of	unity,	provides	evidence	that	he	was	nonetheless	following	Aristotle’s	formulation	of	 it	and,	by	 implication,	 the	 idea	of	 first	philosophy	as	a	search	 for	 the	unity	of	being,	or	 the	ground	of	being,	as	Malpas	puts	it.29	Accordingly,	one	could	say	that	Heidegger’s	demand	for	a	fundamental	ontology	was	guided	by	the	Aristotelian	ideal	of	philosophy	as	a	foundational	science.30	
																																								 																				
23	Philipse	1998,	p.	102.	
24	Malpas	2003,	p.	92.	
25	Ibid.,	p.	93.	
26	The	quotation	is	from	the	inaugural	address	given	at	the	Heidelberg	Academy	of	Sciences	and	first	published	in	1957	
(Seigfried	1970,	p.	4.).	
27	Malpas	2003,	pp.	79,	93;	Philipse	1998,	p.	88.	Compare	also	Heidegger’s	famous	statement	that	it	was	Brentano’s	
dissertation,	On	the	Several	Senses	of	Being	in	Aristotle,	that	led	him	to	the	question	of	being	(GA	14,	p.	93).	
28	Cf.	Metaphysics,	Book	7	(Barnes	1984).	
29	Cf.	Malpas	2003,	pp.	79-80.	Charlotta	Weigelt	has	also	pointed	out	that	Heidegger’s	idea	of	philosophy	in	the	early	
1920s	(that	presumably	extends	to	the	late	1920s)	is	comparable	to	Aristotle’s	idea	of	first	philosophy	(prote	philosophia)	
in	that,	for	both,	philosophy	is	primary	in	relation	not	only	to	other	philosophical	disciplines	but	also	to	positive	sciences	
(2002,	pp.	37-44).	
30	This	is	not	to	say	that	this	was	Heidegger’s	only	rationale	for	demanding	a	fundamental	ontology.	Indeed,	both	Malpas	
and	Philipse	also	relate	this	problem	of	unity	to	the	transcendental	problematic	they	argue	is	operative	in	BT	(Malpas	2003,	
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	 Thus,	 so	 long	 as	 Heidegger	 sought	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general	 that	 provides	 unity	 to	 the	various	meanings	of	being,	ontology	that	provides	the	foundation	for	the	ontic	sciences	itself	was	broken	down	into	two	levels	of	inquiry,	regional	ontology	and	fundamental	ontology,	with	the	latter	providing	the	foundation	 for	 the	 former.	 In	 this	sense,	 fundamental	ontology	has	priority	over	both	 the	ontic	sciences	and	 regional	 ontology.	 Therefore,	 the	 question	 of	 being,	 understood	 as	 the	 question	 of	 the	meaning	 of	being	 in	general,	has	“ontological	priority”	over	the	question	of	entities	and	 the	question	of	 the	being	of	particular	domains.			
3. Towards	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein		 In	 the	 subsequent	 section,	 §4,	 titled	 “The	 Ontical	 Priority	 of	 the	 Question	 of	 Being,”	 we	 find	Heidegger’s	 crucial	 and	 baffling	 statement	 that	 “fundamental	 ontology,	 from	 which	 alone	 all	 other	ontologies	 can	 take	 their	 rise,	must	 be	 sought	 in	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein.”31	The	whole	 of	 §4,	indeed,	 is	devoted	 to	 showing	 that	 this	 is	 the	 case.	Here,	we	can	distinguish	 two	parts	of	his	 argument.	Firstly,	 he	 begins	 by	 arguing	 that	 there	 is	 an	 entity,	 Dasein,	 which	 is	 distinct	 from	 other	 entities	 in	 a	peculiar	 way.	 This	 entity	 is	 unique	 in	 that	 it	 has	 a	 specific	 relation	 to	 the	 question	 of	 being	 or,	 more	specifically,	 to	what	 is	asked	about	 in	 the	question	of	being,	namely,	being.	As	Heidegger	says	 in	an	oft-quoted	passage:	“it	[Dasein]	is	ontically	distinguished	by	the	fact	that,	in	its	very	Being,	that	very	Being	is	an	 issue	 for	 it.”32	And	 shortly	 after:	 “Dasein	 is	 ontically	 distinctive	 in	 that	 it	 is	 ontological.”33	What	Heidegger	is	here	claiming	is	that,	unlike	other	entities,	Dasein	has	a	pre-ontological	(i.e.	pre-theoretical)	understanding	 of	 being.	 Or	 put	 differently,	 a	 pre-ontological	 understanding	 of	 being	 is	 constitutive	 of	Dasein’s	being.	Furthermore,	not	only	does	Dasein	have	an	understanding	of	its	own	being,	but	it	has	an	understanding	 of	 the	 being	 of	 all	 entities	 other	 than	 itself.	 And	 Dasein	 is	 unique	 in	 having	 such	 an	understanding.	But,	if	this	is	the	case,	then,	in	order	to	understand	the	being	of	this	or	that	entity,	we	must	first	understand	the	being	of	a	particular	entity,	Dasein.	In	order	to	work	out	the	meaning	of	the	being	of	‘nature’,	for	example,	we	must	first	inquire	into	the	being	of	Dasein.	Likewise,	all	inquiries	into	the	being	of	entities	must	 lead	back	 to	an	 inquiry	 into	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being.	This	 is	 to	 say	 that	a	 specific	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
p.	88;	Philipse	1998,	section	9).	In	fact,	the	transcendental	motive	is	especially	important	in	understanding	the	subsequent	
demand	for	fundamental	ontology	to	be	sought	in	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.	I	will	be	addressing	these	points	in	the	
following	chapter.	
31	SZ,	p.	18/34.	
32	SZ,	p.	16/32.	
33	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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region,	namely	Dasein,	 takes	precedence	over	other	regions.	Moreover,	since	 it	was	earlier	claimed	that	regional	 ontology	 is	 founded	 on	 fundamental	 ontology,	 it	 follows	 that	 fundamental	 ontology	 must	 be	sought	in	the	ontology	of	Dasein.	Put	differently,	the	meaning	of	being	in	general	is	to	be	found	in	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being.	This,	I	believe,	is	the	first	part	of	Heidegger’s	argument.34	But,	then,	what	does	an	inquiry	into	Dasein’s	being,	i.e.	the	ontology	of	Dasein,	look	like?	How	will	it	 differ	 from	 inquiries	 into	 the	 being	 of	 other	 entities?	 The	 second	 part	 of	 Heidegger’s	 argument	establishes	 that	 the	ontology	of	Dasein	will	 take	 the	 shape	of	 an	 “existential	 analytic”	 and	 that	 this	will	provide	us	with	a	direction	to	find	an	answer	to	the	above	question.	We	have	already	seen	that	Dasein	is	distinct	in	that	it	has	an	understanding	of	being,	not	only	of	itself	but	of	all	other	entities	other	than	itself.	Here,	Heidegger	goes	on	to	further	explicate	Dasein’s	unique	being	as	“existence”	(Existenz).	As	Heidegger	later	clarifies	 (§9),	Dasein	 ‘exists’	 in	a	way	essentially	different	 from	the	way	entities	other	 than	Dasein	‘exist.’	Other	entities	 ‘exist’	 for	us	as	 things	that	are	useful	or	useless,	meaningful	or	meaningless:	chairs	are	there	for	us	to	sit	on,	fruits	are	there	for	us	to	eat,	flowers	are	there	for	us	to	admire,	etc.	We	ourselves,	on	the	other	hand,	‘exist’	in	a	radically	different	way	insofar	as	we	are	the	very	source	of	these	meanings.	Of	course,	the	exact	sense	in	which	our	existence	differs	from	that	of	other	entities	cannot	be	expected	to	be	 found	in	the	Introduction	since,	 to	a	certain	degree,	 the	purpose	of	BT	(at	 least	 that	of	 the	published	parts)	is	to	spell	out	just	that.	It	is	nevertheless	clear	that	Heidegger	had	no	doubt	that	the	being	of	Dasein	is	radically	different	 from	that	of	all	other	entities	and	that	such	a	conviction	 is	what	guides	 the	project	undertaken	 in	BT.	Heidegger	 thus	distinguishes	 the	 term	“existentia,”	which	he	explains	as	ontologically	signifying	 “being-present-at-hand”	 (Vorhandensein),	 from	 “existence”	 (Existenz)	 and	 reserves	 the	 latter	term	exclusively	for	the	being	of	Dasein.	Consequently,	Heidegger	says	that	Dasein	has	an	understanding	of	being	as	existence:	“Dasein	always	understands	itself	in	terms	of	its	existence	[Existenz]	–	in	terms	of	a	possibility	of	itself:	to	be	itself	or	not	itself.”35	A	note	should	be	made	here	that	Heidegger’s	claims	such	as	“Dasein	 understands	 itself”	 and	 “Dasein	 understands	 its	 own	 existence”	 are	 not	 to	 be	 understood	 as	somehow	excluding	the	understanding	of	other	entities	and	their	being.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	constitutive	of	Dasein’s	existence	 that	 it	has	an	understanding	of	 its	own	being	and	 the	being	of	other	entities	other	than	itself.	Now,	there	are	two	ways	in	which	Dasein	can	understand	its	existence.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
																																								 																				
34	As	Heidegger	himself	notes,	there	is	a	kind	of	circularity	involved	in	this	argument.	For,	in	clarifying	the	meaning	of	being	
on	the	basis	of	clarifying	Dasein’s	being,	we	are	already	presupposing	the	meaning	of	being	in	our	starting	point.	But	he	
goes	on	to	say	that	this	does	not	pose	a	problem	to	the	question	of	being	insofar	as	there	is	actually	no	circular	reasoning	
involved	here.	Rather,	the	kind	of	circularity	involved	here	is	a	necessary	component	of	our	understanding	and,	
accordingly,	of	the	hermeneutic	method	(SZ,	pp.	7-8/27-28).	I	will	be	addressing	this	point	in	more	detail	in	the	next	
chapter.	
35	SZ,	p.	17/33.	
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particular	Dasein	is	said	to	always	have	an	understanding	of	its	own	existence	by	simply	living	out	its	own	existence:	“Dasein	always	understands	itself	in	terms	of	its	existence	–	in	terms	of	a	possibility	of	itself:	to	be	 itself	or	not	 itself.”36	In	 this	sense,	Heidegger	says	 that	 “[t]he	question	of	existence	 is	one	of	Dasein’s	ontical	 ‘affairs’.”37	Such	 an	 understanding,	 however,	 which	 he	 designates	 as	 “existentiell”	 (existenziell),	need	not	be	theoretically	transparent	to	oneself.	On	the	other	hand,	Dasein	can	theoretically	understand	its	own	existence	by	undertaking	an	analysis	of	the	ontological	structures	of	existence.	Contrasting	it	with	the	“existentiell”	manner	of	understanding,	Heidegger	calls	 this	understanding	“existential”	(existenzial).	As	 such,	 the	ontological	 analysis	of	Dasein’s	existence	 is	 called	 “the	existential	 analytic	of	Dasein.”	With	this,	it	is	argued	that	fundamental	ontology	must	be	sought	in	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	through	a	two-step	argument.			 But	here,	we	must	ask:	How	does	this	conclusion	relate	to	the	heading	of	§4,	“The	Ontical	Priority	of	 the	 Question	 of	 Being?”	 What	 does	 “ontical	 priority”	 designate	 here?	 In	 §3,	 we	 examined	 the	“ontological	 priority	 of	 the	 question	 of	 being.”	 The	 meaning	 of	 “ontological	 priority”	 was	 relatively	straightforward.	There,	Heidegger	argued	that	fundamental	ontology	has	priority	over	regional	ontology	and	that	regional	ontology	in	turn	has	priority	over	the	positive	sciences	insofar	as	fundamental	ontology	founds	 both	 regional	 ontology	 and	 the	 positive	 sciences.	 And,	 since	 fundamental	 ontology	 and	 regional	ontology	 are	 both	 ontological	 inquiries,	 it	 was	 claimed	 that	 ontological	 inquiry	 has	 priority	 over	 the	inquiries	 of	 the	 positive	 sciences.	 Consequently,	 we	 can	 understand	 “ontological	 priority”	 to	 signify	priority	 in	 the	order	of	 the	sciences:	a	particular	science	has	ontological	priority	over	another,	or	other,	science(s),	when	the	former	provides	the	foundation	for	the	latter.	In	contrast,	the	meaning	of	the	“ontical	priority	of	the	question	of	being”	is	not	very	clear.	In	§4,	Heidegger	focuses	exclusively	on	arguing	for	the	priority	of	Dasein	over	all	other	entities	in	order	to	establish	the	claim	that	fundamental	ontology	must	be	sought	 in	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 section	 argues	 for	 the	 ontical	 priority	 of	
Dasein.	But	to	say	that	Dasein	has	ontical	priority	with	regard	to	the	question	of	being	(i.e.	that	the	entity	Dasein	has	priority	over	all	other	entities	with	regard	to	the	question	of	being)	is	not	the	same	as	claiming	that	the	question	itself	has	ontical	priority.	Heidegger	does	not	provide	us	with	a	clear	explanation	of	how	the	priority	of	Dasein	translates	into	the	ontical	priority	of	the	question	of	being.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	it	is	not	even	clear	what	the	ontical	priority	of	the	question	of	being	could	possibly	mean.	Nonetheless,	he	does	provide	us	with	a	hint	as	to	what	this	could	mean	and	why	it	could	be	maintained.	The	hint	is	given	when	
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he	claims	that	“the	roots	of	the	existential	analytic,	on	its	part,	are	ultimately	existentiell,	that	is,	ontical.”38	He	 explains	 that	 only	 when	 the	 existential	 analytic	 is	 seized	 upon	 as	 the	 possibility	 of	 Dasein’s	 own	individual	being	does	it	become	an	“adequately	founded	ontological	problematic.”39	And	upon	noting	this,	he	 continues:	 “[b]ut	 with	 this,	 the	 ontical	 priority	 of	 the	 question	 of	 being	 has	 also	 become	 plain.”40	Although	 it	 is	not	easy	to	see	how	the	ontical	priority	has	become	plain	with	such	 little	explanation,	we	can	conjecture	that	the	question	of	being	is	“ontically	prior”	in	the	sense	that	the	question	itself	belongs	to	the	very	possibility	of	Dasein’s	existence	without	which	the	existential	analytic	could	not	unfold.	In	other	words,	 without	 the	 self-questioning	 of	 one’s	 own	 existence,	 it	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 disclose	 the	existential	 structures.	 This	 is	 in	 fact	 an	 important	 point	 that	 suggests	 the	 prescriptive	 character	 of	 the	ontological	analytic	to	which	we	will	return	in	the	next	chapter.		 Let	us	now	summarize	the	foregoing.	Heidegger	has	first	shown	that	the	question	of	being	involves	three	moments:	being	(that	which	is	asked	about,	the	topic),	entities	(that	which	is	interrogated,	the	direct	object	 of	 investigation)	 and	 the	meaning	of	being	 (that	which	 is	 to	 be	 found	out,	 the	 aim).	 Then,	 it	was	shown	 that	 the	 “right	 entity”	 to	 be	 interrogated	 in	 its	 being	 is	Dasein.	 Accordingly,	 the	 question	 of	 the	meaning	of	being	is	to	take	its	departure	in	the	being	of	Dasein.	Finally,	it	was	further	established	that	the	question	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 being,	 i.e.	 the	 question	 of	 fundamental	 ontology,	 was	 to	 be	 sought	 in	 the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	(which	is	ultimately	ontically	grounded).		 		
4. The	phenomenological	method	Now,	after	having	shown	that	 the	 inquiry	 into	Dasein’s	being	will	 take	the	 form	of	an	existential	analytic,	 Heidegger	 goes	 on	 to	 clarify	 the	 specific	 method	 to	 be	 employed.	 From	 the	 very	 beginning,	Heidegger	makes	it	clear	that	he	is	opposed	to	any	kind	of	dogmatic	construction,	be	it	based	on	tradition,	system	or	philosophical	school.	Instead	of	blindly	adopting	some	standpoint,	the	correct	way	to	proceed	is	to	go	back	to	the	things	themselves.	Hence	Heidegger	says:		With	 the	 question	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 being,	 our	 investigation	 comes	 up	 against	 the	 fundamental	question	of	philosophy.	This	is	one	that	must	be	treated	phenomenologically.41		
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After	having	said	that,	the	first	point	he	underscores	is	that	phenomenology	is	primarily	a	methodological	concept.	 It	signifies	neither	a	philosophical	school	nor	a	particular	science	with	 its	own	specific	subject-matter.	 Phenomenology	 rather	 expresses	 the	 how	 of	 the	 research.	 In	 this	 regard,	 “To	 the	 things	themselves!”	–	as	Husserl	rightly	put	it	–	expresses	the	maxim	of	phenomenology.	But	Heidegger	does	not	merely	take	Husserl	at	his	words	and	apply	it	to	his	own	work.	For	that	would	reduce	phenomenology	to	another	dogmatic	tradition.	While	Heidegger	expresses	his	 indebtedness	to	Husserl	 for	having	prepared	the	ground	for	doing	concrete	phenomenological	work,	he	goes	on	to	say	that:	[W]hat	is	essential	in	it	[phenomenology]	does	not	lie	in	its	actuality	as	a	philosophical	 ‘movement.’	Higher	than	actuality	stands	possibility.	We	can	understand	phenomenology	only	by	seizing	upon	it	as	a	possibility.42		While	there	is	no	denying	that	Husserl	 inaugurated	a	new	movement	that	 is	seen	as	a	tradition	in	 itself,	phenomenology	proper	does	not	amount	 to	 such	a	 tradition	 if	by	 that	we	mean	what	has	actually	been	accomplished	 by	 Husserl.	 Rather,	 insofar	 as	 phenomenology	 primarily	 signifies	 the	 method	 of	 doing	research,	the	essence	of	phenomenology	lies	in	its	possibilities.	Although	this	is	not	at	all	to	deny	Husserl’s	achievements,	 Heidegger’s	 emphasis	 here	 on	 the	 possibilities	 of	 phenomenology	 over	 its	 actuality	nevertheless	intimates	his	reluctance	to	fully	accept	Husserl’s	idea	of	phenomenology,	whatever	that	may	be.	We	can	also	sense	this	critical	tone	when	Heidegger	suggests	that	the	very	maxim	of	phenomenology	demands	a	closer	look.	He	explains	that	‘To	the	things	themselves!’	is	an	expression	of	a	principle	not	only	for	phenomenologists	but	for	all	scientists	who	want	to	abstain	from	mere	speculation.	In	this	sense,	it	is	a	‘self-evident’	principle.	But	if	this	is	the	case,	then	the	following	question	arises:	“[w]hy	should	anything	so	self-evident	be	taken	up	explicitly	in	giving	a	title	to	a	branch	of	research?”43	He	then	goes	on	to	say:	“[i]n	point	of	fact,	the	issue	here	is	a	kind	of	‘self-evidence’	which	we	should	like	to	bring	closer	to	us,	so	far	as	it	is	important	to	do	so	in	casting	light	upon	the	procedure	of	our	treatise.”44	Indeed,	only	by	articulating	the	apparent	 self-evidence	 of	 this	 principle	 will	 the	 “genuine	 way	 of	 access”	 to	 Dasein	 become	 evident.	Heidegger	thus	goes	on	to	explicate	this	“self-evident”	principle	in	phenomenology	by	way	of	expounding	the	conception	of	phenomenology.		
4.1. The	meaning	of	phenomenon	
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Heidegger	begins	by	breaking	the	concept	into	its	two	components,	‘phenomenon’	and	‘logos.’	The	meaning	 of	 the	 compound	 is	 to	 be	 found	 out	 after	 inquiring	 into	 the	 two	 individually.	 We	 are	 first	introduced	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 Greek	 verb,	 φαίνεισθαι	 (phaineisthai),	 from	 which	 the	 word	 for	phenomenon,	φαινόμενoν	 (phainomenon),	 is	derived:	 to	show	itself.	Accordingly,	 ‘phenomenon’	 signifies	“that	which	 shows	 itself	 in	 itself.”45	A	 thing,	however,	may	 show	 itself	 in	 itself	 in	different	ways.	 It	may	show	itself	 in	itself	as	that	which	shows	itself	in	itself,	or	it	may	show	itself	 in	itself	as	something	which	in	
itself	it	is	not.	Heidegger	calls	the	former	“the	positive	and	primordial	signification	of	φαινόμενoν”	and	the	latter	 founded	 sense	 of	 phenomenon,	 “‘phenomenon’	 as	 semblance.”46	Let	 us	 think	 of	 Henri	 Fantin-Latour’s	painting	of	 three	peaches.	Looking	at	 the	painting,	one	may	say	 that	 the	peaches	 seem	like	 real	peaches.	In	this	way,	the	painting	shows	itself	as	something	which	in	itself	it	is	not.	However,	it	is	because	the	 painting	 makes	 a	 pretension	 of	 showing	 itself	 as	 that	 which	 shows	 itself	 in	 itself,	 namely	 as	 real	peaches,	that	the	painted	peaches	can	seem	like	real	peaches	at	all.	Therefore,	Heidegger	says:		Only	when	the	meaning	of	something	is	such	that	it	makes	a	pretension	of	showing	itself	–	that	is,	of	being	a	phenomenon	–	can	 it	show	itself	as	something	which	 it	 is	not;	only	then	can	 it	 ‘merely	 look	like	so-and-so’.47		It	is	in	this	sense,	then,	that	the	primordial	sense	of	phenomenon	is	“already	included	as	that	upon	which	the	second	signification	is	founded.”48	These	 two	meanings	of	phenomenon,	phenomenon	 in	 the	primordial	 sense	and	phenomenon	as	semblance,	are	both	cases	where	things	show	themselves	in	themselves.	There	is,	however,	another	way	that	 things	 can	 show	 up,	 namely	 as	 not	 showing	 themselves.	 Heidegger	 designates	 the	 latter	 as	“appearances”	 (Ersheinungen)	 and	distinguishes	 them	altogether	 from	 the	 class	of	phenomena.	He	does	this	by	distinguishing	“showing	itself”	(sich	zeigen)	from	“announcing	itself”	(sich	melden).	Let	us	refer	to	an	example	Heidegger	himself	gives.	When	one	speaks	of	symptoms	of	an	 illness,	one	has	 in	mind	some	kind	 of	 occurrences	 in	 the	 body	 that	 indicate	 the	 illness.	 In	 having	 a	 fever,	 for	 example,	we	 say	 that	 it	
appears	 that	 you	 have	 some	 sort	 of	 illness.	 The	 illness	 itself,	 however,	 does	 not	 show	 itself.	 Rather,	 it	“announces	itself”	through	or	in	something	that	does	show	itself.	Hence	the	illness,	which	does	not	show	itself,	announces	 itself	 through	that	which	shows	 itself,	namely	 the	 fever:	 “[a]ppearing	 is	a	not-showing-
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itself	(Sich-nicht-zeigen).”49	However,	as	is	clear	in	the	example,	“appearances”	presuppose	“phenomena.”	For	 although	 appearances	 are	 precisely	 defined	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 do	 not	 show	 themselves	 in	themselves,	 they	 necessarily	 become	 manifest	 through	 that	 which	 does	 in	 fact	 show	 itself	 in	 itself.	Therefore,	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 “phenomena	 are	 never	 appearances,	 though	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 every	appearance	 is	 dependent	 on	 phenomena.”50	There	 is	 also	 a	 sense	 in	 which	 one	 can	 speak	 of	 “mere	appearances.”	This	 is	 a	 case	 in	which	 that	which	 shows	 itself	 is	 taken	 to	 “emanate”	 (ausstrahlten)	 from	that	which	never	manifests	 and,	hence,	 “as	 an	emanation	of	what	 it	 announces,	 it	 keeps	 this	 very	 thing	constantly	veiled	in	itself.”51	Heidegger	tells	us	that	Kant	used	the	term	“appearance”	in	a	twofold	way	to	signify	 both	 “phenomenon”	 in	 the	 primordial	 sense	 of	 showing	 itself	 in	 itself	 and	 “mere	 appearance.”	Namely,	 insofar	 as	 appearance	 denotes	 the	 objects	 of	 empirical	 intuition,	 it	 signifies	 that	which	 shows	itself	 in	 itself.	Yet	 insofar	as	these	objects	of	empirical	 intuition	are	thought	to	emanate	from	something	which	hides	itself,	namely	from	the	thing-in-itself,	they	are	also	“mere	appearances.”52		From	 the	 above	 discussion,	 Heidegger	 clarified	 the	 following	 point:	 The	 multiplicity	 of	 the	meanings	 of	 the	 word	 “phenomenon”	 all	 presuppose	 a	 single	meaning	 of	 the	 term,	 namely	 that	which	
shows	itself	in	itself.	With	this,	then,	we	have	arrived	at	the	primordial	conception	of	phenomenon.	At	this	point,	 Heidegger	 distinguishes	 the	 “formal”	 conception	 of	 phenomenon	 from	 its	 “ordinary”	 conception.	When	we	leave	open	the	content	of	what	we	take	as	that	which	shows	itself	in	itself,	we	have	the	formal	conception	 of	 phenomenon.	 The	 ordinary	 conception,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 takes	 this	 to	 designate	 things	accessible	through	our	empirical	intuition	or,	more	simply,	through	our	senses.	Heidegger	further	informs	us	 that	 “this	 ordinary	 conception	 is	 not	 the	 phenomenological	 conception.”53	So	 then,	 what	 is	 the	“phenomenological	conception”	of	phenomenon?	Before	this	can	be	clarified,	however,	we	must	first	turn	to	the	latter	half	of	“phenomenology,”	namely	“logos.”	
4.2. The	meaning	of	logos	Just	as	‘phenomenon’	had	a	primordial	signification	amongst	the	multiplicity	of	meanings	attached	to	 the	 word,	 Heidegger	 brings	 our	 focus	 to	 the	 basic	 meaning	 of	 the	 word	 λόγος	 (logos),	 which	 he	designates	as	“discourse”	(Rede).	The	 function	of	discourse,	he	says,	 lies	 in	δηλοΰν	(deloun)	which	 is	“to	
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make	manifest	what	 one	 is	 ‘talking	 about’	 in	 one’s	 discourse.”54	Heidegger	 further	 expounds	 Aristotle’s	rendering	of	this	function	of	discourse	as	άποφαίνεσθαι	(apophainesthai),	which	means	to	let	something	be	seen	from	(άπό-)	the	very	thing	which	the	discourse	is	about.	This	is	to	say	that	what	is	being	said	in	discourse	does	not	come	from	elsewhere	but	from	the	very	thing	that	is	being	said.	Accordingly,	discourse	is	a	letting	something	be	seen	by	way	of	pointing	it	out	(aufweisenden	Sehenlassen):		In	discourse	(άπόφανσις),	so	far	as	it	is	genuine,	what	is	said	is	drawn	from	what	the	talk	is	about,	so	that	 discursive	 communication,	 in	 what	 it	 says,	 makes	manifest	 what	 it	 is	 talking	 about,	 and	 thus	makes	this	accessible	to	the	other	party.	This	is	the	structure	of	the	λόγος	as	άπόφανσις.55		Moreover,	this	way	of	putting	it	marks	the	particular	way	that	discourse	in	the	“genuine”	sense	lets	things	be	seen.	For	example,	 requesting	(das	Bitten,	 εύχή:	euche),	which	 is	another	 form	of	discourse,	does	not	count	as	a	genuine	sense	of	discourse	by	this	definition	since	in	requesting,	according	to	Heidegger,	one	does	not	draw	what	 is	being	said	 from	the	very	thing	that	 is	being	said.	 In	addition,	 this	pointing	out	of	that	which	 is	 being	 said	 is	 not	 a	 pointing	out	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	mere	pointing	 to	 something	 and	 saying,	“This.”	Rather,	in	discourse,	one	lets	something	be	seen	as	something,	in	its	togetherness	with	something.	In	other	words,	 logos	as	άπόφανσις	has	 the	 structural	 form	of	 synthesis	(σύνθεσις).56	Therefore,	we	can	say	that	logos	as	apophansis	is	a	letting	something	be	seen	from	the	very	thing	itself	as	something.		
4.3. The	meaning	of	phenomenology	From	the	above	discussion,	we	have	reached	the	 fundamental	signification	of	 ‘phenomenon’	and	‘logos’	respectively.	In	the	primordial	sense,	‘phenomenon’	is	‘that	which	shows	itself	in	itself’	and	‘logos’	is	‘letting	something	be	seen	from	the	very	thing	itself	as	something.’	When	put	this	way,	we	immediately	realize	that	the	two	meanings	appear	to	fit	well	 together.	As	Heidegger	says,	“we	are	struck	by	an	inner	relationship	 between	 the	 things	 meant	 by	 the	 terms.” 57 	Hence	 when	 they	 are	 put	 together,	‘phenomenology’	 or	 “λέγειν	 τά	φαινόμενα”	 translates	 into	 “άποφαίνεσθαι	 τά	φαινόμενα,”	which	means	“to	 let	 that	which	shows	 itself	be	seen	 from	 itself	 in	 the	very	way	 in	which	 it	 shows	 itself	 from	 itself.”58	Immediately	 after	 formulating	 this	 definition	 of	 phenomenology,	 Heidegger	 adds:	 “[b]ut	 here	 we	 are	
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expressing	nothing	else	than	the	maxim	formulated	above:	‘To	the	things	themselves!’”59	At	this	point,	we	are	brought	back	to	the	initial	question	that	inspired	the	exploration	into	the	meaning	of	phenomenology.	Namely,	in	what	sense	is	the	maxim,	“To	the	things	themselves!,”	self-evident,	and	why	does	it	have	to	be	specifically	set	out	as	the	maxim	of	phenomenology?	To	begin	with,	 the	above	discussion	has	shown	that,	despite	the	apparent	 isomorphism	between	phenomenology	and	other	sciences	 in	 the	sense	that	 they	share	the	 form	of	a	Greek	term	followed	by	 ‘-logy,’	 phenomenology	 is	unlike	 the	others.	To	give	a	 few	examples,	 theology	 is	 the	 ‘logos’	 or	 science	of,	Θεός	 (theos)	 or	 God,	 geology	 is	 the	 science	 of	 γῆ	 (ge)	 or	 earth,	 and	 anthropology	 is	 the	 science	 of	ἄνθρωπος	 (anthropos)	 or	man.	Phenomenology,	 however,	 is	 not	 the	 science	of	 phenomena	 in	 the	 same	manner.	For	unlike	the	other	sciences,	which	are	defined	by	their	delimitation	of	their	field	of	research	to	a	particular	subject-matter,	phenomenology,	by	definition,	has	no	such	specification.	This	is	precisely	the	reason	why	phenomenology	is	a	methodological	concept.	It	expresses	the	how	and	not	the	what:		
The	word	[phenomenology]	merely	informs	us	of	the	“how”	with	which	what	 is	to	be	treated	in	this	science	gets	exhibited	and	handled.	To	have	a	science	 ‘of’	phenomena	means	 to	grasp	 its	objects	 in	
such	a	way	 that	 everything	 about	 them	which	 is	 up	 for	 discussion	must	 be	 treated	by	 exhibiting	 it	directly	and	demonstrating	it	directly.60		Phenomenology,	therefore,	purely	designates	the	way	of	access	to	whatever	it	is	that	it	lets	be	seen.		This	 way	 of	 characterizing	 phenomenology	 fits	 well	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 we	 have	 no	 problem	formulating	 and	 imagining	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 various	 branches	 of	 research	 under	 the	 rubric,	‘phenomenology	of.’	Indeed,	much	work	has	been	done	on	the	phenomenology	of	emotion,	embodiment,	perception,	etc.	This	is	just	to	say	that	anything	that	can	be	called	a	phenomenon,	i.e.	anything	that	allows	itself	to	show	itself	in	itself,	has	the	possibility	of	being	taken	up	phenomenologically.	Yet	when	Heidegger	proceeds	with	his	 analysis	 in	BT,	he	 is	not	 just	 randomly	 taking	a	 phenomenon	 that	 interested	him	 for	whatever	 reason.	 In	 other	words,	 his	 particular	 focus	 on	 being	 is	 not	 just	 an	 outcome	 of	 the	 arbitrary	choice.	This	 is	where	 the	 “phenomenological	 conception”	of	phenomenon	becomes	 relevant.	As	we	 saw	earlier	in	the	discussion	of	the	meaning	of	phenomenon,	Heidegger	distinguished	the	“formal”	conception	of	phenomenon	(when	the	subject-matter	is	left	open)	from	its	“ordinary”	conception	(when	phenomenon	is	 identified	with	 the	object	of	empirical	 intuition).	The	 “phenomenological”	 conception	 is	distinguished	from	 both	 of	 the	 above.	 Let	 us	 quote	 Heidegger	 at	 length	 since	 what	 he	 says	 here	 about	 the	phenomenological	conception	of	phenomenon	is	telling:	
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What	 is	 it	 that	phenomenology	 is	 to	 ‘let	us	see’?	What	 is	 it	 that	must	be	called	a	 ‘phenomenon’	 in	a	distinctive	 sense?	What	 is	 it	 that	 by	 its	 very	 essence	 is	necessarily	 the	 theme	whenever	we	 exhibit	something	explicitly?	Manifestly,	it	is	something	that	proximally	and	for	the	most	part	does	not	show	itself	at	all:	it	is	something	that	lies	hidden,	in	contrast	to	that	which	proximally	and	for	the	most	part	does	show	itself;	but	at	 the	same	time	it	 is	something	that	belongs	to	what	thus	shows	itself,	and	 it	belongs	to	it	so	essentially	as	to	constitute	its	meaning	and	its	ground.	Yet	that	which	remains	hidden	in	 an	 egregious	 sense,	 or	which	 relapses	 and	 gets	 covered	up	 again,	 or	which	 shows	 itself	 only	 ‘in	
disguise’,	 is	not	just	this	entity	or	that,	but	rather	the	Being	of	entities,	as	our	previous	observations	have	shown.	61	Here,	we	are	informed	that	the	phenomenological	conception	of	phenomenon	is	that	which	is	“proximally	and	 for	 the	most	part”	hidden	and	hence	does	not	 show	 itself.	 This	 contrasts	 sharply	with	 the	ordinary	conception,	 for,	 according	 to	 it,	phenomenon	 is	 that	which	proximally	and	 for	 the	most	part	does	 show	itself.	In	everyday	life,	we	are	in	touch	with	objects	through	our	sensory	perception	and	usually,	we	take	these	objects	as	phenomena.	But	that	which	remains	hidden	from	us	is	said	to	pertain	to	an	object	“as	to	constitute	 its	 meaning	 and	 its	 ground.”	 From	 these	 two	 characterizations,	 namely	 hiddenness	 and	 the	essential	relation	to	objects,	Heidegger	concludes	that	the	phenomenological	conception	of	phenomenon	amounts	to	nothing	less	than	the	being	of	objects	or	entities.	This	is	not	a	surprising	conclusion	when	we	recall	 his	 emphatic	 discussion	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 Introduction	 of	 the	 negligence	 of	 being	 and	 its	essential	 relation	 to	 entities	 (i.e.	 that	 being	 is	 always	 the	 being	 of	 entities).	 However,	 it	 is	 somewhat	surprising	 that	 Heidegger	 appeals	 here	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 hiddenness.	 For	 did	 we	 not	 concede	 that	“phenomenon”	means	 “that	 which	 shows	 itself	 in	 itself”	 and	 not	 “that	 which	 does	 not	 show	 itself,”	 i.e.	“appearance”?	Is	Heidegger	committed	to	the	idiosyncratic	claim	that	the	phenomenological	conception	of	phenomenon	is	appearance?			 The	answer	is	negative	if	we	are	mindful	of	what	“hiddenness”	means	in	this	particular	case.	As	we	recall,	 appearance	 was	 something	 which	 never	 showed	 itself	 but	 rather	 announced	 itself	 through	something	else	which	showed	itself	 in	 itself.	Hence	appearances	are	 forever	hidden	from	us	in	the	sense	that	they	are,	by	definition,	not	phenomena	in	the	primordial	sense	of	showing	themselves	in	themselves.	Illness,	for	example,	can	never	become	a	phenomenon	because	illness	is	something	that	announces	itself	through	 that	 which	 shows	 itself	 in	 itself.	 When	 speaking	 of	 the	 phenomenological	 conception	 of	phenomenon,	however,	Heidegger	 is	careful	 to	say	 that	being	 is	hidden	 from	us	“proximally	and	 for	 the	most	part.”	In	other	words,	 ‘being’	 is	not	 in	principle	hidden	from	us	as	appearances	are	but,	rather,	 it	 is	hidden	from	us	in	the	sense	that	it	is	“covered	up.”	Indeed,	phenomena	get	covered	up	for	various	reasons:	
																																								 																				
61	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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they	may	be	merely	undiscovered	and	hence	neither	known	nor	unknown,	buried	in	the	sense	that	they	have	deteriorated,	or	disguised	and	passed	off	as	something	else.	But	does	not	this	very	possibility	of	the	covered-up-ness	 of	 phenomena	 precisely	 imply	 the	 opposite,	 namely	 the	 possibility	 of	 becoming	uncovered?	Indeed,	Heidegger	says:	“[a]nd	just	because	the	phenomena	are	proximally	and	for	the	most	part	 not	 given,	 there	 is	 need	 for	 phenomenology.	 Covered-up-ness	 is	 the	 counter	 concept	 to	
‘phenomenon.’”62	Accordingly,	one	must	take	pains	to	uncover	the	phenomena,	and	this	is	precisely	the	job	of	phenomenology.	As	Heidegger	says,	the	“way	in	which	Being	and	its	structures	are	encountered	in	the	mode	of	phenomenon	is	one	which	must	first	of	all	be	wrested	[abgewonnen	werden]	from	the	objects	of	phenomenology.”63			 From	 the	 above,	 we	 can	 claim	 that	 “To	 the	 things	 themselves!”	 is	 specifically	 designated	 as	 a	maxim	of	 phenomenology	 not	 only	 because,	 as	Heidegger	 himself	 says,	 that	 is	 just	what	 the	 composite	word	 ‘phenomenology’	 signifies	 (i.e.	 phenomenology	 just	means	 letting	 that	which	 shows	 itself	 be	 seen	from	itself),	but	more	specifically	because	the	“things	themselves”	in	this	maxim	has	a	particular	meaning	in	phenomenology.	To	speak	in	terms	of	the	“self-evident”	character	of	this	maxim,	we	must	attend	to	the	particular	sense	of	self-evidence	in	phenomenology	as	opposed	to	the	sense	it	has	for	the	other	sciences.	Namely,	 all	 sciences	 advocate	 this	 maxim	 (in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 constitutes	 the	 ideal	 of	 a	 good	 science)	insofar	 as	 it	 means	 that	 they	 are	 opposed	 to	 “all	 free-floating	 constructions	 and	 accidental	 findings”,	“taking	over	any	conceptions	which	only	seem	to	have	been	demonstrated”	and	“those	pseudo-questions	which	parade	themselves	as	 ‘problems’,	often	for	generations	at	a	time.”64	Having	freed	themselves	from	such	dogmatic	presuppositions	and	the	like,	the	sciences	claim	to	be	going	back	to	the	things	themselves.	Yet,	the	sense	in	which	this	maxim	is	a	“self-evident”	principle	for	phenomenology	is	rather	different	and	much	more	specific.	For	one	thing,	the	principle	 is	self-evident	for	phenomenology	precisely	because,	as	we	just	said,	 it	expresses	what	phenomenology	signifies.	But	more	specifically,	“going	back	to	the	things	themselves”	 in	phenomenology	 translates	 to	uncovering	 that	which	 is	proximally	and	 for	 the	most	part	covered-up	and	hidden	from	us.	This	uncovering	of	their	covered-up-ness	is	what	going	back	to	the	things	themselves	signifies	in	phenomenology.	Moreover,	this	maxim	is	expressive	of	a	normative	ideal	insofar	as	that	 which	 is	 proximally	 and	 for	 the	 most	 part	 hidden,	 namely	 being,	 must	 be	 “wrested”	 from	 its	hiddenness.	
																																								 																				
62	SZ,	p.	36/60	(my	emphasis).	
63	SZ,	p.	36/61.	
64	SZ,	p.	28/50.	
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	 Now,	 having	 identified	 the	phenomenological	conception	 of	 phenomenon	 as	 being,	we	 are	 led	 to	qualify	 what	 was	 previously	 said	 about	 phenomenology,	 namely	 that	 phenomenology,	 unlike	 other	sciences,	 does	 not	 delimit	 its	 subject-matter.	 For	 whilst	 it	 is	 still	 true	 that	 phenomenology	 primarily	designates	 the	 how	 and	 not	 the	 what,	 insofar	 as	 being	 is	 that	 which	 comprises	 the	 phenomenological	conception	 of	 phenomenon,	 phenomenology	 does	 have	 its	 specific	 subject-matter.	 As	 Heidegger	 says,	“[w]ith	regard	to	 its	subject-matter,	phenomenology	 is	 the	science	of	 the	Being	of	entities	–	ontology.”65	Put	 differently,	 while	 phenomenology	 is	 a	 methodological	 concept	 and	 hence	 necessarily	 a	phenomenology	of	something,	there	is	a	distinct	kind	of	phenomenon	that	takes	precedence	over	others,	namely	being.	The	phenomenology	of	being	is	therefore	phenomenology	par	excellence.	This	indeed	leads	us	to	the	following	conclusion	regarding	the	relation	between	phenomenology	and	ontology:	“[o]ntology	and	phenomenology	are	not	two	distinct	philosophical	disciplines	among	others.	These	terms	characterize	philosophy	itself	with	regard	to	its	object	and	its	way	of	treating	that	object.”66	Or,	as	it	is	claimed	shortly	before:	“[o]nly	as	phenomenology,	is	ontology	possible.”67		 Hitherto,	we	have	seen	how	Heidegger	 identified	phenomenology,	articulated	in	his	own	distinct	sense,	 as	 the	 method	 of	 ontology.	 Now,	 insofar	 as	 fundamental	 ontology	 is	 sought	 in	 the	 existential	analytic	 of	 Dasein,	 what	 we	must	 immediately	 seek	 is	 the	 method	 of	 this	 existential	 analytic.	Without	further	justification,	Heidegger	goes	on	to	say	that	such	an	analytic	will	be	phenomenological	and	that	“the	meaning	of	phenomenological	description	as	a	method	lies	in	interpretation	[Auslegung].”68	The	first	part	of	 the	claim	 is	not	surprising	since	 the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	 is,	after	all,	an	ontological	 (and	not	ontic)	mode	of	 inquiry.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 latter	part,	 however,	 it	 comes	 as	 somewhat	of	 a	 surprise,	 at	least	given	the	course	of	what	has	been	said	up	to	now.	Immediately	after,	he	continues:	The	λόγος	of	the	phenomenology	of	Dasein	has	the	character	of	a	ἑρμηνεύειν	[hermeneuein],	through	which	 the	 authentic	meaning	of	Being,	 and	also	 those	basic	 structures	of	Being	which	Dasein	 itself	possesses,	are	made	known	to	Dasein's	understanding	of	Being.69	It	 is	here	 that	we	 find	Heidegger’s	 important	claim	that	 the	phenomenology	of	Dasein	 takes	 the	 form	of	
hermeneutics.	This	 is	an	important	methodological	point	that,	 together	with	phenomenology,	constitutes	the	method	 of	 the	 analytic	 in	 BT.	 Despite	 its	 importance,	 however,	 Heidegger	 does	 not	 expand	 on	 the	meaning	 of	 hermeneutics	 as	 he	 does	 for	 phenomenology.	 In	 the	 lengthy	 Introduction,	 only	 a	 single	
																																								 																				
65	SZ,	p.	37/61.	
66	SZ,	p.	38/62.	
67	SZ,	p.	35/60.	
68	SZ,	p.	37/61.	
69	SZ,	p.	37/61-62.	
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paragraph	 is	devoted	to	hermeneutics.	And	 in	 fact,	among	the	 few	places	 in	BT	where	Heidegger	makes	explicit	mention	of	hermeneutics,	this	is	basically	the	only	place	where	he	offers	some	kind	of	articulation	of	its	meaning.70	In	this	short	passage,	he	raises	three	senses	of	the	word	“hermeneutic.”	According	to	the	first	and	“primordial	signification	of	the	word,”	the	phenomenology	of	Dasein	is	hermeneutic	in	the	sense	that	 it	 is	 in	 the	business	 of	 interpreting	 the	meaning	of	Dasein’s	 being	 and	 that	 of	 the	being	 of	 entities	other	 than	 itself.	 Namely,	 in	 and	 through	 such	 interpreting,	 “the	 authentic	 meaning	 of	 Being,	 and	 also	those	basic	structures	of	Being	which	Dasein	itself	possesses,	are	made	known	to	Dasein’s	understanding	of	 Being.”71	This	 “making	 known”	 to	 one’s	 understanding,	 the	 laying-out	 (Aus-legung)	 of	 meaning	 by	making	 it	 explicit,	 is	what	 hermeneutics	means	 in	 this	 first	 sense.	 The	 second	 sense	 has	 a	much	more	specific	meaning.	Heidegger	says:	But	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 by	 uncovering	 the	 meaning	 of	 Being	 and	 the	 basic	 structures	 of	 Dasein	 in	general	we	may	exhibit	 the	horizon	for	any	further	ontological	study	of	 those	entities	which	do	not	have	the	character	of	Dasein,	this	hermeneutic	also	becomes	a	‘hermeneutic’	in	the	sense	of	working	out	the	conditions	on	which	the	possibility	of	any	ontological	investigation	depends.72		While	 this	 usage	 of	 hermeneutic	 seems	 rather	 unusual,	 at	 this	 point	Heidegger	merely	 asserts	 that	 the	phenomenology	of	Dasein	is	hermeneutic	insofar	as	the	basic	structures	of	being	that	it	reveals	serve	as	the	ground	for	further	ontological	study.	In	short,	it	is	hermeneutic	in	the	specific	sense	that	it	contributes	to	 fundamental	 ontology.	 The	 third	 sense	 in	 which	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 Dasein	 is	 hermeneutic	 is,	according	to	Heidegger,	in	the	sense	that	it	is	an	analytic	of	the	existentiality	of	existence.	Put	differently,	insofar	as	it	is	a	making	explicit	of	the	existential	structures	of	Dasein,	the	phenomenology	of	Dasein	is	a	
hermeneutic	of	Dasein.	 And	 this,	 he	 tells	 us	without	 further	 ado,	 is	 the	 “philosophically	primary”	 sense.	Thus,	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	is	to	take	the	shape	of	a	hermeneutic	phenomenology.	Near	the	end	of	§7,	Heidegger	gives	a	concise	characterization	of	the	project	to	be	undertaken	in	the	rest	of	the	work:		
Philosophy	is	universal	phenomenological	ontology,	and	takes	its	departure	from	the	hermeneutic	of	Dasein,	 which,	 as	 an	 analytic	 of	 existence	 [Existenz],	 has	 made	 fast	 the	 guiding-line	 for	 all	philosophical	inquiry	at	the	point	where	it	arises	and	to	which	it	returns.73		
																																								 																				
70	Heidegger’s	most	lengthy	discussion	of	hermeneutics	can	be	found	in	his	1923	lecture,	“Ontology:	The	Hermeneutics	of	
Facticity”	(GA	63).	
71	SZ,	p.	37/62.	
72	Ibid.,	ibid.	
73	SZ,	p.	38/62.	
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5. The	incompleteness	of	the	project	in	BT		 Let	me	now	close	this	chapter	with	a	note	on	the	incomplete	nature	of	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT,	which	we	 touched	on	at	 the	opening	of	 this	 chapter.	As	 I	 stated	 there,	 the	 aim	of	 this	 chapter	 is	not	 to	interpret	the	nature	of	the	project	in	light	of	its	incompleteness.	Accordingly,	I	do	not	wish	to	elaborate	on	this	problem	 in	 any	detail	 here.	Yet,	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 an	 important	point	 for	understanding	 the	nature	of	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT,	I	will	give	a	brief	exposition	of	what	this	incompleteness	consists	of.			 The	 project	 in	 BT	 is	 incomplete	 in	 at	 least	 two	 senses,	 one	 which	 is	 not	 so	 important	 but	nonetheless	relevant	and	another	which	is	very	important	and	relevant	for	interpreting	the	philosophical	success	of	the	project.	The	first	sense	in	which	BT	is	incomplete	is	that	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	does	not	provide	a	“complete	ontology	of	Dasein”:	When	taken	in	this	way,	the	analytic	of	Dasein	remains	wholly	oriented	towards	the	guiding	task	of	working	 out	 the	 question	 of	 Being.	 Its	 limits	 are	 thus	 determined.	 It	 cannot	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	complete	ontology	of	Dasein,	which	assuredly	must	be	constructed	 if	anything	 like	a	 ‘philosophical’	anthropology	is	to	have	a	philosophically	adequate	basis.74		By	“philosophical	anthropology,”	we	can	understand	it	to	be	a	specific	discipline	that	deals	with	the	nature	of	human	beings	and	the	human	condition.	But	if	such	a	discipline	is	to	have	a	“philosophically	adequate	basis,”	 it	 must	 be	 grounded	 in	 a	 “complete	 ontology	 of	 Dasein”	 that	 would	 supposedly	 consist	 of	 a	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	ontological	structures	of	Dasein.	Yet,	as	the	ultimate	aim	of	BT	consists	not	in	 constructing	 a	 philosophical	 anthropology	 but	 rather	 in	 preparing	 the	 grounds	 for	 questioning	 the	meaning	of	being	in	general,	i.e.	preparing	for	a	fundamental	ontology,	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	in	BT	will	be	undertaken	only	to	the	extent	that	it	serves	this	purpose.	In	this	sense,	it	necessarily	remains	incomplete	as	a	complete	ontology	of	Dasein.			 Yet,	insofar	as	that	is	not	Heidegger’s	concern	in	BT,	such	incompleteness	is	rather	insignificant.	It	is	 nonetheless	 relevant	 since	 it	 sheds	 light	 on	 the	 provisional	 character	 of	 the	 existential	 analytic	with	regard	to	the	main	concern	in	BT,	namely	fundamental	ontology.	For	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	was	intended	 as	 a	 propaedeutic	 for	 questioning	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general.	 This	 point	 must	 be	emphasized	 since	we	must	 not	mistakenly	 identify	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein	with	 fundamental	ontology	per	se.	Moreover,	this	point	leads	us	to	the	second	sense	in	which	the	project	in	BT	is	incomplete,	namely	that	it	is	unfinished.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	the	incomplete	nature	of	the	project	in	BT	is	important	for	assessing	 the	success	of	 the	project.	As	 is	widely	known,	 the	published	sections	of	BT	comprise	 less	
																																								 																				
74	SZ,	p.	17/38.	
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than	half	of	what	Heidegger	had	 initially	planned	out.	 Indeed,	only	the	 first	 two	divisions	of	Part	 I	were	published	(out	of	two	parts).	75	What	is	particularly	important	is	the	absence	of	the	third	division	of	Part	I,	to	be	titled	“Time	and	Being.”	For	it	is	in	this	division	that	Heidegger	was	planning	to	address	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	being.	Therefore,	without	the	third	division,	the	provisional	character	of	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	had	to	remain	provisional.	This	has	led	some	commentators	to	speak	of	the	“failure”	of	the	 overall	 project	 of	 BT,	 and	 Heidegger’s	 own	 later	 self-interpretations	 also	 provide	 support	 for	 this	interpretation.76	What	is	all	the	more	interesting	is	that	this	alleged	failure	has	often	been	associated	with	the	 transcendental	 orientation	 of	 Heidegger’s	 thought	 at	 the	 time	 of	 writing	 BT.77	While	 this	 certainly	makes	 this	 issue	more	 relevant	 to	 our	 project,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 addressed	 in	 any	 detail	 in	 the	 remaining	chapters,	 for	 the	 problem	of	 “failure”	mainly	 concerns	 the	 trajectory	 of	Heidegger’s	 thought,	which	 lies	outside	of	the	concerns	of	this	work.		
Conclusion		 Let	us	now	briefly	summarize	Heidegger’s	proposed	project	in	BT.	Heidegger’s	main	project	is	to	clarify	 the	meaning	of	being	 in	general	 as	 this	has	been	covered-up	by	 the	metaphysical	 tradition	 since	Plato	 and	 Aristotle.	 Such	 a	 task	 is	 subsequently	 given	 the	 title	 fundamental	 ontology,	 which	 founds	 or	gives	unity	not	only	to	the	ontic	sciences	but	also	to	regional	ontology.	But	before	fundamental	ontology	can	 be	 carried	 out,	 Dasein’s	 being	must	 be	 clarified	with	 regard	 to	 its	 existential	 structures	 due	 to	 the	specific	priority	of	Dasein’s	being	in	relation	to	the	question	of	being.	Finally,	insofar	as	phenomenology	is	the	uncovering	of	that	which	is	proximally	and	for	the	most	part	hidden	(i.e.	being),	and	this	uncovering	
																																								 																				
75	Yet,	this	is	not	to	say	that	Heidegger	left	the	unpublished	parts	untouched.	In	a	lecture	course,	The	Basic	Problems	of	
Phenomenology,	held	the	summer	in	1927	shortly	after	the	publication	of	BT,	he	writes	that	the	course	is	set	out	as	a	“new	
elaboration	of	division	3	of	part	1	of	Being	and	Time,”	namely	what	he	had	presented	in	BT	as	“the	explication	of	time	as	
the	transcendental	horizon	for	the	question	of	Being”	(GA	24,	p.	1/1).	But	in	fact,	the	course	covers	much	more	than	this.	
The	first	part	of	the	published	lecture	course	is	devoted	to	the	historical	destruction	of	traditional	ontology,	starting	with	
Kant,	medieval	ontology	derived	from	Aristotle	and	modern	ontology	heavily	indebted	to	Descartes.	Accordingly,	the	
lecture	course	also	provides	an	extensive	discussion	of	what	Heidegger	had	supposedly	planned	to	do	in	Part	Two	of	BT.	
Furthermore,	the	first	division	of	Part	Two	on	“Kant’s	doctrine	of	schematism	and	time,	as	a	preliminary	stage	in	a	
problematic	of	Temporality”	was	given	separate	treatment	in	the	so-called	“Kantbuch,”Kant	and	the	Problem	of	
Metaphysics,	published	in	1929.	
76	Cf.	Kisiel	(1993);	Blattner	(1999);	Guignon	(1983).	See	also	the	recent	publication	of	the	collections	of	essays	that	
address	the	very	issue	of	the	third	division	of	BT:	Braver	2015.	For	Heidegger’s	self-interpretation	of	the	project’s	failure,	
see:	“Letter	on	Humanism”	(GA	9)	and	Contributions	to	Philosophy:	From	Enowning	(GA	65).	
77	Heidegger	himself	suggests	this	in	Contributions.	Cf.	Contributions	to	Philosophy	(From	Enowing),	§§132-134	(GA65,	pp.	
250-254).	
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takes	its	departure	in	making	explicit	the	existential	structures	of	Dasein	(i.e.	the	hermeneutic	of	Dasein),	the	genuine	way	of	access	to	Dasein’s	being	is	established	as	hermeneutic	phenomenology.	Therefore,	the	project	 of	 BT	 is	 to	 clarify	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general	 by	 way	 of	 first	 undertaking	 a	 hermeneutic	phenomenology	of	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.	Or	at	least	that	was	the	promised	project.	In	actuality,	the	 realized	 project	 of	 BT	 was	 constrained	 to	 what	 was	 supposed	 to	 be	 merely	 propaedeutic	 to	fundamental	ontology,	namely	the	hermeneutic	phenomenology	of	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.	
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Chapter	4:	Heidegger’s	critical	engagement	with	the	transcendental	in	Being	and	Time	
Introduction		 The	 general	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 clarify	 Heidegger’s	 engagement	 with	 transcendental	philosophy	 during	 the	 period	 of	 BT.	1	More	 specifically,	 I	 attempt	 to	 articulate	 the	 transcendental	orientation	of	BT	and	 its	hermeneutic	 transformations.	But	before	we	begin,	a	 few	preliminary	remarks	are	in	order.	In	saying	that	I	will	be	articulating	the	transcendental	orientation	of	BT,	I	have	presupposed	that	such	a	transcendental	orientation	can	be	discerned	and	that	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	BT	is,	to	a	great	extent,	 a	 work	 within	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Thus,	 the	 following	 attempts	 not	 so	 much	 a	transcendental	 interpretation	 of	 BT	 (which	 may	 suggest	 that	 the	 interpretation	 is	 externally	 brought	about)	as	an	uncovering	of	the	transcendental	motif	that	is	inherent	in	BT.	But	it	must	be	noted	that	such	a	presupposition	 is	 not	 uncontroversial.	 There	 are	many	 considerations	 that	must	 be	 taken	on	board.	To	begin	 with,	 nowhere	 in	 BT	 does	 Heidegger	 explicitly	 state	 that	 it	 is	 a	 work	 within	 transcendental	philosophy.	Although	we	find	no	denial	of	it	either,	he	presumably	had	more	reason	to	claim	that	BT	is	a	work	 against	 it	 than	 within	 it.	 After	 all,	 BT	 was	 set	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	 being	 that	 had	 been	forgotten	 by	 his	 predecessors,	 and	 the	 transcendental	 tradition	 was	 no	 exception	 in	 this	 regard.	 It	 is	certainly	easier	 to	 find	critical	comments	about	Kant	and	Husserl	 than	evidence	of	acclaim	in	the	whole	work.		 Nonetheless,	there	is	an	undeniable	sense	in	which	BT	is	a	work	within	transcendental	philosophy.	Perhaps	this	is	most	evident	in	Heidegger’s	own	assessment	when	he	later	explicitly	disavows	the	idea	of	the	transcendental	which	included	his	earlier	position	in	BT.2	This	suggests	that,	despite	his	intention	to	work	against	the	tradition,	he	was	in	fact	still	working	within	a	transcendental	framework	at	the	time.	The	task	then	would	be	to	unravel	the	unintended	transcendental	orientation	of	the	work.	However,	there	is	room	to	doubt	that	Heidegger	had	in	fact	intended	a	wholesale	rejection	of	the	transcendental	even	at	the	time	 of	writing	 BT.	 For	 example,	while	 throughout	 the	work	we	 scarcely	 find	 him	 employing	 the	 term	transcendental,	 in	 the	 few	passages	where	he	does,	 it	 is	employed	not	 in	a	critical	manner	but	 in	a	way	that	 positively	 captures	 the	 content	 of	 his	 project.	 As	 we	 read	 in	 an	 important	 passage	 from	 the	Introduction:	“Being	is	the	transcendens	pure	and	simple.	[...]	Every	disclosure	of	Being	as	the	transcendens	is	 transcendental	 knowledge.	 Phenomenological	 truth	 (the	 disclosedness	 of	 Being)	 is	 veritas	
																																								 																				
1	This	chapter	is	a	substantially	revised	version	of	my	article,	“The	transcendental	orientation	of	Sein	und	Zeit”	(2015a).		
2		Cf.	Contributions	to	Philosophy	(From	Enowing),	§§132-134	(GA65,	pp.	250-254).	
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transcendentalis.”3	We	also	find	many	instances	in	the	work	where	he	uses	the	Kantian	phrase	“conditions	of	possibility”	and	reasons	in	a	transcendental	manner.	For	example,	in	the	context	of	analyzing	how	tools	are	encountered	in	our	everyday	dealings,	he	concludes	from	his	analysis	that	our	involvement	with	tools	presupposes	Dasein’s	previously	 letting	 the	 tool	be	discovered	 in	 its	 readiness-to-hand:	 “[t]his	 ‘a	priori’	letting-something-be-involved	 is	 the	 condition	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 encountering	 anything	 ready-to-hand.”4	In	the	lecture	course	of	1927,	The	Basic	Problems	of	Phenomenology,	he	even	says	that	ontology	is	a	“transcendental	science	of	being.”5	These	cases	seem	to	suggest	that	Heidegger	was	not	so	much	rejecting	as	reinterpreting	the	transcendental	 from	within	his	own	project.	 If	 this	 is	the	case,	 then	there	are	good	reasons	 to	 claim	 that	 BT	 is,	 in	 a	 certain	 sense	 and	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 a	work	within	 a	 transcendental	framework.		 In	fact,	when	we	take	a	good	look	at	the	literature,	we	find	more	arguing	in	favor	of	this	reading	of	BT	than	against	it.6	But	interestingly,	we	also	find	that	these	publications	are	relatively	recent,	within	the	past	three	decades	or	so.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	the	whole	discussion	concerning	Heidegger’s	relationship	to	transcendental	philosophy	only	started	gaining	attention	from	around	then.	What	was	responsible	for	this	turn	of	events	was	the	publication	of	Heidegger’s	Marburg	lectures	(1923-28)	in	the	1970s.	Prior	to	this,	the	two	major	texts	for	evaluating	Heidegger’s	stance	towards	transcendental	thought	in	the	1920s	were	BT	and	the	so-called	Kantbook.	While	these	texts	provided	the	framework	for	understanding	his	general	stance,	which	was	basically	critical,	the	Marburg	lectures	revealed	Heidegger’s	more	nuanced	relation	to	Kant	 and	 Husserl’s	 thought.	 A	 seminal	 work	 that	 highlights	 Heidegger’s	 relation	 to	 Husserl’s	phenomenology	 in	 light	of	 these	 lectures	 is	 John	Caputo’s	essay	 from	1977,	 “The	Question	of	Being	and	Transcendental	 Phenomenology.”	 Noting	 that	 in	 BT	 Heidegger	 says	 virtually	 nothing	 about	 the	phenomenological	 epoché	 and	 the	 reduction,	 nor	 other	 matters	 pertaining	 to	 the	 core	 of	 Husserlian	phenomenology	such	as	intentionality	and	transcendental	constitution,	he	goes	on	to	say:	
The	incontestable	virtue	of	the	publication	of	the	Marburg	lectures	will	be,	I	think,	to	illuminate	these	dark	corners	of	Heidegger	interpretation.	As	a	contribution	to	this	direction,	I	would	like	to	address	
																																								 																				
3	SZ,	p.	38/62.	
4	SZ,	p.	86/117.	Philipse	also	contends	that	“there	can	be	no	doubt	that	there	are	transcendental	arguments	in	Sein	und	
Zeit”	(1998,	pp.	122-123).		
5	GA	24,	p.	23/17.	
6	Examples	of	this	favorable	reading	include:	Caputo	(1977),	Dahlstrom	(1991),	Philipse	(1998),	Carr	(1999),	Crowell	(2001),	
Moran	(2007),	Malpas	(2007),	Okrent	(2003).		
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the	knotted	problem	of	Heidegger’s	 relationship	 to	 transcendental	phenomenology,	 i.e.	 to	Husserl’s	view	that	the	objects	of	knowledge	are	constituted	in	and	through	transcendental	consciousness.7	Caputo’s	work	certainly	makes	a	significant	contribution	to	clarifying	what	he	calls	 the	“dark	corners	of	Heidegger	 interpretation.”	Making	good	use	of	 the	Marburg	 lectures,	he	gives	an	 illuminating	account	of	Heidegger’s	 stance	 on	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 constitution	 and	 convincingly	argues	 that	BT	 is	a	work	within	transcendental	phenomenology.	Nearly	 forty	years	after	 its	publication,	this	 essay	 still	 remains	 one	 of	 the	 most	 illuminating	 works	 that	 deal	 with	 Heidegger’s	 relationship	 to	Husserlian	 transcendental	 phenomenology.	 The	 work	 is	 also	 important	 more	 generally	 since	 it	successfully	shows	that	the	transcendental	is	a	key	motif	for	Heidegger	in	the	1920s.		 But	 Caputo’s	 work	 did	 not	 so	 much	 spark	 the	 interest	 in	 Heidegger	 scholarship	 to	 further	investigate	 the	 close	 relation	 between	 Heidegger’s	 thought	 and	 the	 transcendental.	 To	 be	 sure,	 some	attempts	were	made	by	prominent	scholars	such	as	Steven	Crowell	and	Daniel	Dahlstrom	that	contributed	greatly	to	this	 issue.	But	a	systematic	treatment	of	 the	topic	was	wanting	 in	establishing	the	unmovable	place	of	 the	 transcendental	 in	Heidegger	 scholarship.	With	 such	an	aim	clearly	 in	mind,	 Steven	Crowell	and	Jeff	Malpas,	both	of	whom	were	working	extensively	on	this	issue,	co-edited	a	collection	of	essays	in	2007	 titled	Transcendental	Heidegger.8	In	 the	 Introduction,	upon	noting	 that	 the	 transcendental	 is	a	key	notion	throughout	Heidegger’s	thought,	they	say:	
It	is	perhaps	surprising,	then,	that	more	attention	has	not	been	paid	so	far	to	what	may	be	thought	of	as	the	“transcendental	Heidegger”	–	to	the	role	of	the	transcendental	in	Heidegger’s	thinking	as	well	as	Heidegger’s	stance	toward	the	tradition	of	transcendental	thought	as	such.	This	collection	aims	to	go	some	way	toward	remedying	this	apparent	neglect,	and	to	argue	for	the	continuing	significance	of	the	transcendental	for	understanding	Heidegger’s	thinking,	both	early	and	late.9	Owing	much	 to	 their	 success,	 the	 “transcendental	 Heidegger”	 has	 gained	 acknowledgment	 both	within	Heidegger	scholarship	and	without,	from	those	interested	more	generally	in	transcendental	problematics.	Furthermore,	 the	 range	 of	 the	 collection	 of	 essays	 in	 the	 volume	 showcases	 that	 the	 transcendental	 is	relevant	 to	 not	 only	 early	 Heidegger	 but	 also	 later,	 when	 he	 explicitly	 disavows	 the	 idea	 of	 the	transcendental.			 As	 Crowell	 and	 Malpas	 concede,	 however,	 the	 volume	 does	 not	 claim	 to	 provide	 a	 definitive	account	of	the	“transcendental	Heidegger.”	Some	take	the	term	to	refer	to	a	specific	period	of	Heidegger’s	
																																								 																				
7	Caputo	1977,	p.	85.	
8	The	collective	effort	to	bring	attention	to	the	topic	goes	back	to	the	conference,	“Heidegger	and	Transcendental	
Philosophy”,	held	at	Rice	University	in	2003.	Earlier	versions	of	the	essays	in	the	volume	were	delivered	at	this	conference.	
9	Crowell	and	Malpas	2007,	p.	1.	
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thought	to	contrast	 it	with	an	anti-	or	post-transcendental	Heidegger.	Others	understand	the	term	more	extensively,	 arguing	 that	 transcendental	 thinking	 occupied	 Heidegger’s	 thought	 even	 after	 his	 explicit	disavowal	of	it.	The	authors	of	the	essays	in	the	volume	accordingly	operate	with	different	notions	of	the	transcendental,	 and	 this	 itself	 is	 left	 up	 for	 discussion.	 For	 my	 particular	 purpose	 of	 articulating	Heidegger’s	 engagement	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 in	 BT,	 I	 will	 work	 with	 the	 three	 criteria	 of	transcendental	philosophy	worked	out	in	Chapter	2:	(1)	it	is	a	search	for	the	foundation	of	our	experience	and	 knowledge	 (in	 the	 sense	 that	 there	 is	 a	 transcendental	 priority),	 (2)	 it	 employs	 transcendental	
reflection,	and	(3)	it	entails	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world.		But	 what	 is	 the	 rationale	 for	 employing	 these	 criteria	 in	 articulating	 BT’s	 relation	 to	 the	transcendental?	 How	 are	 we	 justified	 in	 employing	 criteria	 that	 are	 based	 on	 Kant	 and	 Husserl’s	conceptions	of	 transcendental	philosophy?	Wasn’t	Heidegger	working	with	a	different	conception	of	 the	transcendental?	This	is	an	important	point	in	need	of	clarification.	As	I	have	been	intimating,	and	will	be	arguing	in	what	follows,	Heidegger	did	not	so	much	reject	as	reinterpret	the	transcendental	in	BT.	This	is	to	 say	 that	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 he	was	 still	 following	 the	 transcendental	 tradition	 since	Kant	 and	Husserl.	Yet	insofar	as	he	reinterprets	or	transforms	some	of	the	core	ideas	in	the	transcendental	tradition,	there	is	also	a	sense	in	which	he	was	going	beyond	a	traditional	transcendental	framework.	This	calls	for	an	evaluation	of	Heidegger’s	project	 in	BT	 in	 light	of	some	set	of	criteria	of	a	 traditional	 transcendental	framework.	 Therefore,	 the	 three	 criteria	 above	 are	 a	 heuristic	 device	 to	 determine	 the	 extent	 to	which	Heidegger	works	within	a	traditional	transcendental	framework	and	to	see	the	way	in	which	he	attempts	to	go	beyond	it.		 	The	aim	of	this	chapter	is	thus	twofold:	to	articulate	the	extent	to	which	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT	is	transcendental	in	light	of	the	three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy	worked	out	in	Chapter	2	and	to	clarify	 the	ways	 in	which	Heidegger	attempts	 to	go	beyond	 this	 framework.	The	 two	aims	will	 be	dealt	with	together	in	going	through	the	three	criteria.	At	the	end	of	the	chapter,	I	will	summarize	these	points	in	light	of	what	I	will	call	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy.		
1. The	transcendental	orientation	of	BT		 Before	 we	 start	 assessing	 the	 transcendental	 orientation	 of	 BT	 vis-à-vis	 the	 three	 criteria	 of	transcendental	 philosophy,	 let	 us	 first	make	 note	 of	 some	 of	 the	 issues	 that	 are	 at	 stake	 in	 addressing	Heidegger’s	relationship	to	transcendental	thought	in	the	1920s.	We	can	begin	by	noting	two	related	but	different	aspects	of	 the	relationship.	The	 first	 concerns	his	 relation	 to	Kant’s	 transcendental	philosophy	
97	
	
and	the	second	his	relation	to	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology.	Heidegger’s	relation	to	Kant	is	a	huge	 topic	 in	 itself,	 the	 understanding	 of	 which	would	 require	 us	 to	 engage	with	 his	 interpretation	 of	Kant’s	Critique	 and	 a	 thorough	 reading	 of	 the	 so-called	Kantbook,	Kant	and	the	Problem	of	Metaphysics,	published	in	1929.10	But	insofar	as	our	interest	is	to	discern	the	transcendental	orientation	of	BT,	we	will	only	be	concerned	with	this	relation	to	the	extent	that	it	has	relevance	to	the	project	laid	out	in	BT.	In	fact,	given	our	specific	interest,	Heidegger’s	relation	to	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology	proves	to	be	more	relevant	since	Heidegger	explicitly	formulates	his	project	in	BT	as	phenomenological.	But	this	is	not	without	 complications	 since	 he	 was	 not	 uncritically	 employing	 Husserl’s	 understanding	 of	phenomenology	to	tackle	the	question	of	being.	Heidegger’s	stance	toward	his	mentor	was,	at	least	on	the	face	of	 it,	more	critical	and	distanced	 than	approving.	 In	 fact,	and	 this	 is	 the	most	 relevant	point	 for	us,	Heidegger	 explicitly	 rejects	Husserl’s	 phenomenological	 reduction	 in	 the	 1925	 lecture	 on	History	of	 the	
Concept	of	Time.	This	has	led	commentators	to	claim	that	Heidegger	rejects	Husserl’s	transcendental	turn	altogether.	 Some	 of	 the	 most	 famous	 of	 them	 are	 Walter	 Biemel	 and	 Timothy	 Stapleton.	 Stapleton	accordingly	 juxtaposes	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 phenomenology	with	Heidegger’s	 (non-transcendental)	hermeneutic	 phenomenology.11	But	 there	 are	many	 others	who	 have	 claimed	 otherwise	 including	 John	Caputo,	 Steven	 Crowell,	 David	 Carr,	 Dermot	 Moran	 and	 Jeff	 Malpas.	While	 these	 authors	 acknowledge	Heidegger’s	 distance	 from	 Husserl,	 they	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 not	 Heidegger’s	 rejection	 of	 transcendental	phenomenology	 that	separates	 the	 two.	Thus,	 in	 the	course	of	going	 through	the	 three	criteria	below,	 it	will	be	 important	 that	we	examine	and	evaluate	Heidegger’s	apparent	 rejection	of	 the	 reduction.	And	 if	this	did	not	mean	a	simple	rejection	of	transcendental	phenomenology,	we	will	still	have	to	clarify	where	Heidegger	parts	ways	with	Husserl.	In	relation	to	this	point,	we	will	see	how	Heidegger	takes	issue	with	other	relevant	transcendental	themes,	specifically	subjectivity	and	the	idea	of	constitution.			
1.1. Transcendental	foundationalism		 The	first	set	of	questions	we	need	to	address	is	whether	Heidegger	was	engaging	in	a	foundational	project	 and,	 if	 so,	 whether	 we	 can	 say	 that	 he	 was	 committed	 to	 transcendental	 foundationalism.	 Put	differently,	could	we	say	that	Heidegger’s	question	of	being	in	BT	is	a	search	for	some	kind	of	foundation?	And	if	this	is	the	case,	could	we	then	say	that	this	foundation	is	understood	in	terms	of	what	I	have	called	
transcendental	 priority,	 i.e.	 the	 specific	 priority	 relation	 between	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 and	 the	
																																								 																				
10	For	Heidegger’s	relation	to	Kant,	see	for	example:	Dahlstrom	(1991),	Han-Pile	(2005),	Carr	(2007).	
11	Cf.	Stapleton	1983.	
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world,	the	former	constituting	the	latter’s	meaning?	What	proves	to	be	important	in	answering	these	sets	of	 questions	 is	 Heidegger’s	 call	 for	 a	 fundamental	 ontology	 and	 his	 statement	 in	 the	 Introduction	 that	fundamental	ontology	must	be	sought	in	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.		 Heidegger’s	 call	 for	 fundamental	 ontology	 was	 nothing	 less	 than	 a	 demand	 for	 a	 foundational	
science.	As	we	saw	in	the	last	chapter,	fundamental	ontology	was	demanded	by	the	necessity	of	founding	both	what	he	called	ontic	sciences,	i.e.	positive	sciences,	and	regional	ontology.	Ontic	sciences	demanded	a	clarification	 of	 their	 basic	 concepts,	 which	 serve	 to	 delineate	 the	 particular	 domain	 of	 being.	 Such	ontological	inquiry	into	the	basic	concepts	lays	the	foundation	for	the	ontic	sciences	since	it	discloses	the	understanding	 of	 those	 entities	 with	 regard	 to	 their	 being,	 something	 that	 the	 ontic	 sciences	 merely	presuppose.	But	 such	 regional	ontology	 itself	was	 said	 to	be	naive	and	opaque	without	questioning	 the	meaning	of	being	in	general	that	unites	the	multitude	of	meanings	of	being.	As	such,	fundamental	ontology,	i.e.	 the	 science	 that	 investigates	 the	meaning	of	being	 in	general,	 is	 the	 foundational	science	 of	 all	 other	sciences,	both	ontic	and	ontological.			 But	 that	 Heidegger	 was	 engaged	 in	 a	 kind	 of	 foundational	 thinking	 is	 also	 clear	 from	 his	formulation	of	the	question	of	being	in	BT	as	a	search	for	the	unity	of	the	various	meanings	of	being.	As	we	noted	 in	Chapter	3,	Heidegger	 seems	 to	have	been	 following	Aristotle	here	 in	explicitly	 formulating	 the	question	of	being	in	terms	of	the	problem	of	unity.	Thus,	just	as	Aristotle	understood	first	philosophy	as	the	foundational	science	that	 inquires	 into	the	unity	of	being,	Heidegger	too	understood	ontology	as	the	foundational	 science	 that	 studies	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 various	 meanings	 of	 being.	 In	 fact,	 one	 could	 even	identify	this	quest	for	unity	as	a	common	feature	of	all	foundational	thinking	in	philosophy.	Whether	it	is	providing	 the	 ultimate	metaphysical	 explanans	 (metaphysical	 foundationalism)	 or	 deriving	 truths	 from	basic	 self-evident	 beliefs	 (epistemological	 foundationalism),	 these	 are	 attempts	 to	 unify	 reality	 or	 our	body	 of	 knowledge.	 Transcendental	 thinking	 also	 attempts	 to	 unify	 our	 experience	 and	 knowledge	 by	revealing	the	priority	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	12		 This	brings	us	to	the	second	part	of	the	question,	namely	whether	Heidegger	is	committed	to	the	specific	 kind	 of	 foundationalism	 in	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 revealing	 that	 Heidegger	expressly	describes	his	fundamental	ontology	in	terms	of	a	priori	conditions	of	possibility:	The	 question	 of	 Being	 aims	 therefore	 at	 ascertaining	 the	 a	 priori	 conditions	 not	 only	 for	 the	possibility	of	the	sciences	which	examine	entities	as	entities	of	such	and	such	a	type,	and,	in	so	doing,	
																																								 																				
12	In	fact,	both	Malpas	and	Philipse	have	argued	that,	in	BT,	Heidegger	reinterprets	the	problem	of	unity	to	integrate	both	
the	Aristotelian	motif	of	seeking	the	unity	of	the	various	meanings	of	being	and	the	Kantian	motif	of	seeking	the	
transcendental	grounds	of	our	experience.	Cf.	Malpas	2003,	p.	88;	Philipse	1998,	section	9.	
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already	 operate	 with	 an	 understanding	 of	 Being,	 but	 also	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	 those	 ontologies	themselves	which	are	prior	to	the	ontical	sciences	and	which	provide	their	foundations.13		This	way	of	formulating	the	question	of	being	seems	to	suggest	that	Heidegger’s	search	for	foundations	is	a	 search	 for	 transcendental	 foundations.	But	we	must	 still	 examine	whether	 this	 commits	Heidegger	 to	transcendental	 foundationalism,	 whereby	 the	 foundational	 relation	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	
transcendental	priority.	It	is	at	this	point	that	Heidegger’s	claim	that	fundamental	ontology	must	be	sought	in	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein	 becomes	 relevant.	 For	 this	 allows	 us	 to	 see	 how	 there	 is	 a	 specific	methodological	priority	of	Dasein	that,	as	we	will	see,	subsequently	unfolds	into	a	transcendental	priority.			 As	we	saw	in	the	previous	chapter,	Heidegger	argues	in	§4	that	Dasein	has	priority	over	all	other	entities	due	to	the	special	relation	it	has	to	the	question	of	being.	Namely,	Dasein	is	unique	in	that	its	very	being	is	an	issue	for	itself	or,	put	differently,	Dasein	has	an	understanding	of	being.	It	is	at	this	point	that	the	methodological	priority	of	Dasein’s	being	announces	itself.	With	this	priority	of	Dasein’s	being,	then,	the	 inquiry	 into	 the	meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general	 is	 said	 to	 take	 its	 departure	 from	 the	 hermeneutic	 of	Dasein,	i.e.	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein.	But	before	proceeding	any	further,	let	us	take	a	closer	look	at	the	exact	nature	of	this	methodological	priority.	How	does	Heidegger	establish	this	priority?		 The	priority	of	Dasein’s	being	in	the	question	of	being	follows	directly	from	the	presuppositional	nature	of	understanding,	namely	the	idea	that	“[a]ny	interpretation	which	is	to	contribute	understanding,	must	already	have	understood	what	is	to	be	interpreted.”14	Although	this	idea	of	the	hermeneutic	circle	of	understanding	 is	 not	 articulated	 until	 §32,	 the	 circularity	 involved	 in	 the	 question	 of	 being	 is	 already	thematized	 in	 §2,	 right	 after	 Heidegger	 announces	 that	 we	 must	 first	 explicate	 an	 entity	 Dasein	 with	regard	to	its	being:	
Is	there	not,	however,	a	manifest	circularity	in	such	an	undertaking?	If	we	must	first	define	an	entity	
in	its	Being,	and	if	we	want	to	formulate	the	question	of	Being	only	on	this	basis,	what	is	this	but	going	in	a	circle?	In	working	out	our	question,	have	we	not	‘presupposed’	something	which	only	the	answer	can	bring?15	If	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	being	is	concerned	with	arriving	at	a	definition	of	being,	surely	we	cannot	presuppose	such	a	definition	at	 its	 starting	point.	To	do	so	would	be	 to	commit	 the	 fallacy	of	a	 circular	argument.	However,	Heidegger	tells	us	that	there	can	be	no	circular	reasoning	in	formulating	the	question	of	being	since	it	is	not	at	all	concerned	with	“laying	down	an	axiom	from	which	a	sequence	of	propositions	
																																								 																				
13	SZ,	p.	11/31.	
14	SZ,	p.	152/194.	
15	SZ,	p.	10/27.	
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is	deductively	derived.”16	It	is	not	as	if	we	are	seeking	a	definition	of	being	from	which	we	can	then	deduce	specific	claims	about	being.			 It	 is	 at	 this	point	 that	Heidegger	makes	 the	distinction	between	 two	ways	of	 grounding	 that	we	employed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 namely	 grounding	 something	 by	 derivation	 and	 grounding	 by	 laying	 bare	 and	exhibiting	its	own	grounds:	
It	 is	quite	 impossible	 for	 there	 to	be	any	 ‘circular	 argument’	 in	 formulating	 the	question	about	 the	meaning	of	Being;	for	in	answering	this	question,	the	issue	is	not	one	of	grounding	something	by	such	a	derivation	[from	an	axiom];	it	is	rather	one	of	laying	bare	the	grounds	for	it	and	exhibiting	them.17	Since	the	inquiry	into	the	meaning	of	being	is	not	interested	in	the	kind	of	grounding	that	aims	to	deliver	proofs	in	the	strict	sense,	the	presupposition	of	Dasein’s	being	poses	no	threat	to	the	inquiry.	As	a	matter	of	 fact,	 the	kind	of	presupposing	 that	 is	 involved	here	does	not	 amount	 to	presupposing	a	definition	of	being	at	all.	Rather,	the	“presupposing”	of	being	has	the	character	of	“taking	a	look	at	it	beforehand,	so	that	in	light	of	it	the	entities	presented	to	us	get	provisionally	articulated	in	their	Being.”18	Indeed,	it	is	to	have	a	pre-ontological	understanding	of	being.	Taken	in	this	way,	far	from	posing	a	problem,	such	presupposing	is	 deemed	 necessary	 for	 inquiring	 into	 the	 meaning	 of	 being.	 For	 this	 expresses	 nothing	 less	 than	 the	presuppositional	 nature	 of	 understanding,	 or	 the	 hermeneutic	 circle	 of	 understanding.	 Therefore,	 the	question	of	the	meaning	of	being	must	take	its	departure	from	Dasein’s	pre-ontological	understanding	of	being.	This	is	why,	towards	the	end	of	the	Introduction,	Heidegger	claims	that	the	question	of	being	takes	its	departure	from	the	hermeneutic	of	Dasein:	Philosophy	is	universal	phenomenological	ontology,	and	takes	its	departure	from	the	hermeneutic	of	Dasein,	 which,	 as	 an	 analytic	 of	 existence	 [Existenz],	 has	 made	 fast	 the	 guiding-line	 for	 all	philosophical	inquiry	at	the	point	where	it	arises	and	to	which	it	returns.19		At	this	point,	then,	it	is	clear	that	the	priority	of	Dasein’s	being	in	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	being	is	established	on	 the	grounds	of	 the	hermeneutic	 circle	of	understanding:	 since	any	kind	of	 interpretation	presupposes	 our	 prior	 understanding,	 articulating	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 presupposes	 Dasein’s	 pre-ontological	 understanding	 of	 being.	 As	 such,	 the	 question	 of	 being	 must	 begin	 with	 an	 articulation	 of	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being.	Let	us	call	this	methodological	priority	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein.	
																																								 																				
16	SZ,	p.	11/28.	
17	Ibid.,	ibid.	
18	SZ,	p.	8/27.	
19	SZ,	p.	38/62.	
101	
	
	 But	now,	how	is	this	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	related	to	transcendental	priority,	namely	the	idea	 that	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 has	 priority	 over	 the	 world	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 constitutes	 its	meaning?	The	rest	of	this	section	is	an	attempt	to	argue	that	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	is	in	fact	a	transcendental	priority.	This	of	course	raises	several	questions:	in	what	sense	could	we	say	that	Dasein	is	a	transcendental	subjectivity?	And	what	warrants	us	to	assert	that	Dasein	constitutes	the	world?	Is	this	not	just	 flat-out	wrong	 inasmuch	 as	 Dasein	 is	 being-in-the-world,	 i.e.	 the	 “world”	 is	 one	 of	 the	 constitutive	structures	of	Dasein’s	being?	Let	us	begin	by	clarifying	 this	 last	point	 regarding	Dasein’s	 relation	 to	 the	world.		
1.1.1. Dasein’s	relation	to	the	“world”		 Dasein	is	being-in-the-world	but,	at	the	same	time,	the	world	depends	on	Dasein	in	an	important	way.	In	order	to	see	how	this	could	be	the	case,	it	is	first	essential	that	we	do	not	misunderstand	Dasein’s	being-in-the-world	as	an	entity	being	located	in	another	entity.	“Being-in”	is	a	state	of	Dasein’s	being,	that	is,	an	
existentiale	and,	as	such,	it	must	be	kept	apart	from	the	category	of	“insideness”	that	pertains	to	the	state	of	entities	 that	are	present-at-hand.20	The	way	 in	which	Dasein	dwells	 in	 the	world	 is	radically	different	from	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 chair	 is	 located	 in	 the	 room,	 or	 even	 the	way	 in	which	 the	 human	body,	 as	present-at-hand,	is	“in”	the	“world.”	This	last	point	leads	us	to	the	distinction	between	the	“world”	that	we	live	in,	“that	‘wherein’	a	factical	Dasein	as	such	can	be	said	to	‘live,’”21	and	the	“world”	taken	as	the	totality	of	entities	that	are	present-at-hand,	i.e.	“Nature.”	Heidegger	calls	the	former	the	“ontic-existentiell”	concept	of	the	world	and	the	latter	the	“ontico-natural”concept	of	the	world.22	The	“world”	of	being-in-the-world	is	then	the	world	in	an	ontico-existentiell	sense.	Yet,	Heidegger	is	not	concerned	with	describing	the	world	and	our	relation	to	it	ontically	but,	rather,	ontologically.	Accordingly,	Heidegger	further	distinguishes	the	being	of	the	world	that	we	live	in,	namely	the	“ontologico-existential”	sense	of	the	world,	and	calls	this	the	“worldhood	 of	 the	world.”23	With	 these	 distinctions	 at	 hand,	Heidegger	 then	 goes	 on	 to	 clarify	 how	 the	
worldhood	 of	 the	 world	 depends	 on	 Dasein’s	 being.	 And	 he	 attempts	 to	 demonstrate	 this	 through	 an	analysis	of	our	everyday	concernful	dealings	with	tools	(Zeuge).		
																																								 																				
20	SZ,	p.	56/82.	
21	SZ,	p.	87/93.	
22	GA	26,	pp.	231-232/180.	
23	SZ,	p.	65/93,	§14	.	
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	 Tools,	 to	begin	with,	never	appear	 in	 isolation	but	 always	belong	 to	a	 “totality	of	 involvements”	(Bewandtnisganzheit)	 that	has	a	complex	“in-order-to”	 (Um-zu)	structure.24	This	pertains	 to	 the	being	of	tools,	which	Heidegger	calls	readiness-to-hand	(Zuhandenheit).25	The	pen	is	for	taking	notes,	the	laptop	is	for	writing,	books	are	for	studying,	etc.,	and	these	are	all	involved	in	an	intricate	way	in	order	for	me	to	do	research.	 The	worldhood	 of	 the	world	 is,	 in	 short,	 the	 totality	 of	 such	 references	 (Verweisungen).	 This	referential	 structure,	 moreover,	 is	 said	 to	 ultimately	 point	 back	 to	 the	 “for-the-sake-of-which”	(Worumwillen)	that	pertains	to	Dasein’s	being:	
But	 the	 totality	 of	 involvements	 itself	 goes	 back	 ultimately	 to	 a	 “towards-which”	 [Wozu]	 in	 which	there	 is	 no	 further	 involvement:	 this	 “towards-which”	 is	 not	 an	 entity	 with	 the	 kind	 of	 Being	 that	belongs	 to	 what	 is	 ready-to-hand	 within	 a	 world;	 it	 is	 rather	 an	 entity	 whose	 Being	 is	 defined	 as	Being-in-the-world,	and	to	whose	state	of	Being,	worldhood	itself	belongs.	[…]	This	primary	‘towards-which’	is	a	“for-the-sake-of-which”.	But	the	‘for-the-sake-of’	always	pertains	to	the	Being	of	Dasein,	for	which,	in	its	Being,	that	very	Being	is	essentially	an	issue.	We	have	thus	indicated	the	interconnection	by	which	the	structure	of	an	involvement	leads	to	Dasein’s	very	Being	as	the	sole	authentic	“for-the-sake-of-which.”26	In	 short,	 the	worldhood	of	 the	world	 taken	as	 the	 totality	of	 references	ultimately	depends	on	Dasein’s	projection	of	the	for-the-sake-of.	I	use	my	pen	for	taking	notes,	laptop	for	writing,	books	for	studying,	etc.	all	for	the	sake	of	carrying	out	my	research	and,	if	it	weren’t	for	this	particular	project,	these	tools	would	not	 have	 the	 specific	 involvement	 they	 have.	 Or	 put	 differently,	 these	 specific	 involvements	would	 not	pertain	if	I	did	not	care	about	carrying	out	research.	Since	Heidegger	designates	care	(Sorge)	as	the	basic	structure	of	Dasein’s	being27,	we	can	say	that	the	worldhood	of	the	world	depends	on	care.28			 But	what	 is	 also	 important	 here	 is	 that	Dasein’s	 projection	 of	 understanding	 is	what	Heidegger	calls	 “thrown	 projection”	 (geworfenen	 Entwurf).	 In	 projecting	 ourselves	 into	 possibilities,	 we	simultaneously	 find	 ourselves	 thrown	 into	 some	 situation.	 This	 idea	 of	 “thrownness”	 (Geworfenheit)	captures	the	“facticity”	of	Dasein	(the	factuality	of	the	fact	of	Dasein’s	way	of	being,	which	is	different	from	
																																								 																				
24	SZ,	p.	68/97,	83-86/114-118.	
25	SZ,	p.	69/98.	
26	SZ,	pp.	112-113/116-117.	
27	Cf.	SZ	§41.	
28	In	Division	II	of	BT,	Heidegger	goes	on	to	interpret	the	meaning	and	unity	of	care	as	temporality	(Zeitlichkeit)	and	
accordingly,	the	“horizonal	unity	of	ecstatical	temporality”	as	the	ground	of	the	world:	the	“world	is	neither	present-at-
hand	nor	ready-to-hand,	but	temporalizes	itself	in	temporality”	(SZ	p.	365/417).	I	have	left	temporality	out	of	the	
discussion	not	because	I	think	it	is	irrelevant	but	only	because	I	believe	my	point	can	be	made	without	going	into	this	
discussion.	This	discussion	of	temporality	gains	more	relevance,	however,	if	we	engage	with	Heidegger’s	relation	to	Kant.	
See	for	example:	Dahlstrom	(1991).			
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the	factuality	of	the	fact	of	entities’	way	of	being29)	and	the	historically,	situationally	contingent	nature	of	our	projective	understanding.	My	project	of	conducting	research	 is	contingent	on	being	thrown	into	the	world,	where	these	things	can	matter.	Namely,	 in	choosing	this	project,	 I	have	already	found	myself	 in	a	meaningful	context	from	which	the	possibility	to	take	up	this	project	arises	in	the	first	place.	Thus,	thrown	
projection	is	said	to	be	constitutive	of	the	structure	of	care.30		 The	brief	overview	of	Heidegger’s	analysis	of	the	worldhood	of	the	world	above	clearly	indicates	that	Heidegger	is	engaged	in	a	kind	of	transcendental	thinking	that	looks	for	the	conditions	of	possibility.	For	he	has	basically	attempted	to	show	that	the	structure	of	care	that	is	constitutive	of	Dasein’s	being	is	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	being	of	ready-to-hand	entities	and	the	world	we	live	in.	In	fact,	in	his	lecture	course,	The	Metaphysical	Foundations	of	Logic,	we	find	him	expressly	stating	that	the	for-the-sake-of-which	 provides	 the	 transcendental	 organization	 of	 the	 world:	 “the	 basic	 characteristic	 of	 world	whereby	 wholeness	 attains	 its	 specifically	 transcendental	 form	 of	 organization	 is	 the	 for-the-sake-of-which.”31	But	 at	 this	 point	 a	 further	 point	 remains	 to	 be	 clarified.	 Namely,	 while	 Heidegger	 may	 have	shown	that	the	being	of	the	world	we	live	in	depends	on	Dasein’s	being,	he	has	yet	to	provide	an	account	of	how	the	being	of	the	world	as	it	is	in	itself	does	so.	Indeed,	if	Dasein	is	to	have	transcendental	priority	over	the	 world,	 it	 is	 necessary	 that	 the	 latter	 is	 also	 established	 (for	 transcendental	 priority	 entails	 that	transcendental	subjectivity	constitutes	the	meaning	of	the	world	as	it	is	in	itself).	In	Heidegger’s	terms,	it	must	 also	be	 shown	 that	 “Nature”	 taken	 as	 the	 totality	 of	 present-at-hand	 entities	depends	on	Dasein’s	being.		 As	we	have	seen,	Heidegger	does	not	begin	with	a	phenomenological	description	of	“Nature”	as	a	way	of	articulating	the	phenomenon	of	the	“world”	but,	rather,	he	begins	with	the	worldhood	of	the	world	we	human	beings	dwell	in.	In	fact,	he	tells	us	that	such	an	ontological	investigation	of	Nature	“will	never	reach	 the	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 the	 ‘world.’”32	But	why	 not?	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	 this	 is	 because	 the	ontological	sense	of	Nature	is	a	derivative	sense	of	the	world	that	is	founded	on	the	primary	sense	of	the	world	we	live	in,	namely	the	worldhood	of	the	world.	And	it	is	derivative	in	the	specific	sense	that	Nature	is	a	deprived	mode	of	the	worldhood	of	the	world.	But	in	order	to	ontologically	understand	Nature	in	this	mode	of	deprivation,	one	must	first	understand	what	the	world	is	like	prior	to	its	deprived	state,	namely	the	worldhood	of	 the	world.	So	 then,	 in	what	sense	 is	Nature	a	deprived	mode	of	 the	worldhood	of	 the	world?	Ontologically,	Nature	 is	 the	world	 as	 a	 totality	 of	 entities	 that	 are	present-at-hand.	 Presence-at-
																																								 																				
29	Cf.	SZ,	pp.	55-56/82,	135/174	.	
30	SZ,	p.	223/265.	
31	GA	26,	p.	238/185.	
32	SZ,	p.	63/92.	
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hand,	 however,	 only	 announces	 itself	 in	 readiness-to-hand	when	 something	 goes	wrong	with	 our	 tools	and	 they	 become	 conspicuous,	 or	 when	 they	 become	 obtrusive	 or	 obstinate.33	Thus,	 pure	 presence-at-hand,	 that	 is,	 entities	 existing	 “in	 themselves,”	 is	 lit	 up	 for	 the	 first	 time	 when	 readiness-to-hand	 is	deprived	 of	 its	 worldhood.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that,	 when	 one	 exclusively	 begins	 with	 the	 present-at-hand	entities,	 the	 “in	 itself”	 of	 entities	 does	 not	 get	 ontologically	 clarified.34	As	 Heidegger	 says:	 “only	 on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 the	 world	 can	 the	 Being-in-itself	 of	 entities	 within-the-world	 be	 grasped	ontologically.”35	Accordingly,	 since	 the	 ontological	 sense	 of	 entities	 “in	 themselves”	 and	 “Nature”	 is	derived	 from	 the	worldhood	 of	 the	world	 and	 the	worldhood	 of	 the	world	 depends	 on	Dasein’s	 being,	presence-at-hand	and	Nature	depend	on	Dasein’s	being.	Thus,	according	to	Heidegger,	not	only	does	the	being	of	the	world	we	live	in	depend	on	Dasein’s	being,	but	the	being	of	the	world	as	it	is	in	itself	does	so	too.		 But	then,	if	this	is	the	case,	hasn’t	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	announced	itself	as	a	kind	of	transcendental	priority?	For	can	we	not	say	that	Dasein	has	priority	over	the	world	in	the	sense	that	the	former’s	being	“constitutes”	the	latter’s?	At	this	point,	we	cannot	draw	any	definite	conclusions	since	the	way	in	which	the	being	of	the	world	presupposes	Dasein’s	being	or	the	way	in	which	the	former	depends	on	the	latter	remains	to	be	clarified.	But	so	long	as	Dasein’s	being	has	priority	over	that	of	the	world	in	the	sense	that	the	latter	presupposes	the	former	as	its	condition	of	possibility,	we	seem	to	have	a	good	case	of	transcendental	priority.		 Hereto,	 I	 have	 attempted	 to	 show	how	we	 can	understand	 the	 relation	between	Dasein	 and	 the	world	in	terms	of	a	transcendental	priority.	In	doing	so,	I	have	also	attempted	to	show	how	we	can	discern	the	transcendental	way	of	thinking	operative	in	BT.	But	at	this	point,	one	may	perhaps	wonder	how	much	of	this	is	really	comparable	to	Kant’s	and	Husserl’s	transcendental	inquiries.	In	other	words,	while	we	may	formulate	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 terms	 of	 transcendental	 language,	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 this	 genuinely	reflect	 Heidegger’s	 problematic	 in	 BT?	 In	 what	 sense	 is	 the	 question	 of	 being	 really	 a	 transcendental	
problem?	To	clarify	this	point,	let	us	now	turn	to	two	particular	passages	from	his	Marburg	lecture	courses	where	Heidegger	explicitly	formulates	his	problem	in	terms	of	the	transcendental	problematic	developed	by	 Kant	 and	 Husserl.	 The	 first	 concerns	 the	 problem	 of	 transcendence	 and	 the	 second	 the	 problem	 of	
constitution.	 These	 passages	will	 reveal	 the	way	 in	which	 Heidegger	 is	 still	 working	within	 Kant’s	 and	
																																								 																				
33	SZ,	§16.	
34	SZ,	p.	75/106.	
35	SZ,	p.	76/106.	
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Husserl’s	transcendental	inquiries.	This	would	then	put	us	in	a	better	position	to	see	that	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	is	indeed	transcendental	priority.	
	
1.1.2. The	problem	of	transcendence		 The	 first	 passage	 to	which	 I	want	 to	 call	 attention	 is	 a	 passage	 from	 the	 1928	 summer	 lecture	course,	 The	 Metaphysical	 Foundations	 of	 Logic	 where	 he	 discusses	 “the	 problem	 of	 transcendence.”	According	to	Heidegger,	 this	problem	is	commonly	understood	as	the	problem	of	“ontic	transcendence,”	whereby	 an	 entity,	 Dasein,	 crosses	 over	 to	 another	 entity	 such	 that	 in	 this	 transcending,	 that	which	 is	transcended	 is	disclosed	 to	Dasein	 for	 the	 first	 time.	Heidegger	 identifies	 this	ontic	 transcendence	with	intentionality:	 “[i]ntentionality	 is	 indeed	 related	 to	 the	beings	 themselves	 and,	 in	 this	 sense,	 is	 an	ontic	transcending	comportment.”36	But	Heidegger	claims	that	this	common	understanding	of	the	problem	does	not	wholly	capture	the	problem	of	transcendence:	
The	 problem	of	 transcendence	 as	 such	 is	 not	 at	 all	 identical	with	 the	 problem	of	 intentionality.	 As	ontic	 transcendence,	 the	 latter	 is	 itself	 only	 possible	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 original	 transcendence,	 on	 the	basis	 of	 being-in-the-world.	 This	 primal	 transcendence	 [Urtranscendenz]	 makes	 possible	 every	intentional	relation	to	beings.37	Heidegger’s	claim	here,	namely	that	ontic	transcendence	is	only	possible	on	the	basis	of	original	or	primal	transcendence,	 or	 what	 he	 also	 calls	 the	 “transcendence	 of	 Dasein,”38	was	 intended	 as	 a	 criticism	 of	Husserl.	According	to	Heidegger,	Husserl	had	failed	to	fully	grasp	the	problem	of	transcendence	since	he	had	mistakenly	identified	this	with	the	problem	of	intentionality.	For	Heidegger,	intentionality	is	an	ontic	comportment	in	which	the	subject	transcends	towards	beings.	In	order	for	such	a	relation	to	be	possible,	however,	 beings	 must	 have	 already	 been	 understood	 with	 regard	 to	 their	 being.	 Since	 such	 an	understanding	 of	 being	 pertains	 to	 Dasein’s	 pre-ontological	 understanding	 of	 being,	 Dasein’s	understanding	 of	 being	 is	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	 every	 intentional	 relation	 to	 beings.39	Here,	Heidegger	identifies	this	understanding	of	being	with	primal	transcendence.	As	he	says:	
																																								 																				
36	GA	26,	p.	168/134.	
37	GA	26,	p.	170/135.		
38	GA	26,	§11.	
39	Heidegger’s	argument	for	this	claim	in	this	lecture	is	rather	brief.	But	we	can	find	a	more	elaborate	argument	that	goes	
some	way	towards	establishing	this	claim	in	The	Basic	Problems	of	Phenomenology.	There,	Heidegger	argues	that	the	
intentionality	of	perception	presupposes	the	understanding	of	the	being	of	the	perceived	entity.	Upon	first	portraying	
perception	as	the	uncovering	of	entities,	he	asks:	how	is	perception	able	to	uncover	entities	from	their	covered-up-ness?	
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If	then	primordial	transcendence	(being-in-the-world)	makes	possible	the	intentional	relation	and	if	the	 latter	 is,	 however,	 an	 ontic	 relation,	 and	 the	 relation	 to	 the	 ontic	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	understanding-of-being,	 then	 there	 must	 be	 an	 intrinsic	 relationship	 between	 primordial	transcendence	and	the	understanding-of-being.	They	must	in	the	end	be	one	and	the	same.40			 Now,	 what	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 about	 this	 discussion	 is	 that	 Heidegger	 is	 expressly	formulating	the	question	of	being	vis-à-vis	the	traditional	problem	of	how	a	subject	can	transcend	towards	objects.	Of	course	he	is	not	claiming	that	the	problem	of	being	is	the	problem	of	transcendence	understood	in	that	way.	Rather,	he	is	reorienting	the	problem	of	transcendence	in	a	way	that	directly	connects	to	the	problem	of	being:	This	phenomenon	of	 transcendence	 is	not	 identical	with	 the	problem	of	 the	subject-object	 relation,	but	is	more	primordial	in	dimension	and	kind	as	a	problem;	it	is	directly	connected	with	the	problem	of	being	as	such.41	Heidegger	is	thus	taking	up	the	problem	of	transcendence	understood	in	the	traditional	sense	and	delving	deeper	 into	 the	 problem.	 And	 he	 does	 this	 by	 basically	 arguing	 that	 the	 subject-object	 relation	presupposed	in	the	traditional	conception	of	the	problem	is	founded	on	a	more	primordial	understanding	of	being	 that	 is	not	 itself	 another	 “subject”	 transcending	 towards	 “objects.”	 In	 fact,	 in	 the	 same	context,	Heidegger	directs	a	criticism	to	Kant	that	is	quite	similar	to	the	one	he	had	posed	to	Husserl.	According	to	Heidegger,	Kant	had	asked	about	the	grounds	of	the	possibility	of	the	relation	of	consciousness	to	objects	without	clarifying	this	relation	 itself.	Namely,	he	did	not	question	the	subject-object	relation	but	merely	presupposed	it.	In	doing	so,	the	relation	itself	remained	vague,	and	so	did	the	being	of	the	relata.42	In	this	way,	 then,	both	Kant	and	Husserl	merely	presupposed	 the	subject-object	 relation	without	 clarifying	 the	grounds	of	this	relation.			 But	 in	 what	 sense	 did	 they	 really	 not	 clarify	 the	 grounds	 of	 this	 relation?	 To	 begin	 with,	 it	 is	certainly	not	true	that	Kant	and	Husserl	did	not	question	the	grounds	of	the	subject-object	relation.	The	transcendental	inquiry	into	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	of	objects	is	none	other	than	a	questioning	of	 the	grounds	of	 the	 subject-object	 relation.	Heidegger’s	point,	 then,	must	be	 that,	 in	 their	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
How	is	it	that	I	can	perceive	a	cup,	for	example,	but	not	a	number?	According	to	Heidegger,	I	can	perceive	a	cup	and	not	a	
number	because	I	have	already	understood	the	former,	but	not	the	latter,	as	something	that	is	perceivable,	namely	as	
present-at-hand.	Thus,	in	perceiving	a	cup,	I	must	have	already	understood	something	like	presence-at-hand	beforehand.	
Contrasting	the	“uncoveredness”	(Entdecktheit)	of	entities	with	the	“disclosedness”	(Erschlossenheit)	of	the	being	of	those	
entities,	he	says	that	the	disclosedness	of	the	presence-at-hand	that	belongs	to	Dasein’s	being	is	the	“condition	of	the	
possibility	of	the	uncoverability	of	present-at-hand	entities”	(GA	24,	pp.	98-101/69-71).	
40	GA	26,	p.	170/135-136.	
41	GA	26,	p.	170/135.	
42	GA	26,	p.	163/130.	
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questioning	of	the	grounds	of	transcendence,	they	nonetheless	presupposed	the	subject-object	relation	in	their	 conception	 of	 transcendental	 subjectivity.	 In	 other	 words,	 if	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 is	 just	another	“subject”	that	transcends	towards	“objects,”	then	one	has	not	yet	fully	clarified	the	grounds	of	the	subject-object	relation.	Therefore,	in	questioning	the	grounds	of	transcendence,	one	cannot	stop	short	of	questioning	the	being	of	the	“subject,”	what	Heidegger	calls	“the	subjectivity	of	the	subject.”	Thus	we	find	him	saying:	 “for	 transcendence,	as	 for	 the	problem	of	being,	 it	 is	 the	subjectivity	of	 the	subject	which	 is	itself	 the	 central	question.”43		Heidegger	accordingly	 reorients	 the	problem	of	 transcendence	 to	address	this	very	point,	namely	the	being	of	the	“subject”	that	is	the	ground	of	this	subject-object	relation.	Only	by	clarifying	this	point	will	the	being	of	“objects”	become	evident	as	well.	Thus,	understood	in	this	way,	the	problem	of	transcendence	is	none	other	than	the	problem	of	being.		 But	 it	may	come	as	somewhat	of	a	surprise	 that	he	 tells	us	 that	 the	subjectivity	of	 the	subject	 is	“the	 central	question”	 for	 the	problem	of	being,	 for,	 as	we	know,	Heidegger	 intentionally	 avoided	using	terms	like	‘I’	and	‘subject’	in	BT.	As	he	says	in	BT:	
Ontologically,	every	idea	of	a	‘subject’	–	unless	refined	by	a	previous	ontological	determination	of	its	basic	character	–	still	posits	the	subjectum	(ὑποκείμενον)	along	with	it,	no	matter	how	vigorous	one's	ontical	protestations	against	the	‘soul	substance’	or	the	‘reification	of	consciousness’.44			But	the	reason	why	he	avoided	characterizing	Dasein	as	a	“subject”	was	not	because	he	simply	wanted	to	avoid	 the	whole	 problem	 of	 subject	 and	 subjectivity,	 but	 only	 because	 these	 terms	 often	 carry	 specific	ontological	 meanings	 that	 are	 misleading.	 This	 is	 why	 he	 also	 claims	 in	 BT	 that	 the	 relation	 between	Dasein	and	the	world	does	not	coincide	with	that	between	subject	and	object.45	For	Dasein	is	not	primarily	related	to	the	world	as	the	subject	of	our	intentional	acts	but,	rather,	Dasein	is	primarily	characterized	by	its	disclosedness	 to	 the	world.	Accordingly,	 the	 “world”	 is	also	not	primarily	an	object	of	our	 intentional	acts	but	 “that	 ‘wherein’	 a	 factical	Dasein	as	 such	 can	be	 said	 to	 ‘live.’”46	It	 is	not	 as	 if	 there	 is	 an	entity,	Dasein,	which	discloses	 itself	 for	 the	 first	 time	 to	 the	world	 in	 its	encounter	with	other	entities.	Rather,	“Dasein	 is	 its	disclosedness	 [Erschlossenheit].”47	And,	 as	 such,	 it	 is	being-in-the-world.	This	 is	 evidently	a	way	of	conceiving	the	subjectivity	of	the	subject,	namely	the	way	in	which	we	relate	to	the	world,	but	one	that	underscores	its	essential	openness	to	the	world.	Accordingly,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	infer	from	his	refusal	to	identify	Dasein	as	“subject”	that	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	has	no	bearing	on	the	problem	
																																								 																				
43	GA	26,	p.	194/153.	
44	SZ,	p.	46/72.	
45	SZ,	p.	60/87.	
46	SZ,	p.	65/93.	
47	SZ,	p.	133/171.	
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of	subject.	Quite	the	contrary,	it	is	precisely	an	ontological	investigation	of	transcendental	subjectivity,	i.e.	an	inquiry	into	the	being	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	This	is	why	Caputo	is	able	to	claim	that:	“[t]here	can	 be	 no	 doubt	 that	 Heidegger	 saw	 his	 fundamental	 ontology	 of	 Dasein,	 his	 return	 of	 the	 problem	 of	Being	to	the	being	which	raises	the	question	of	Being,	in	terms	of	Husserl’s	return	to	subjectivity.”48	Just	as	Husserl	turned	to	transcendental	consciousness,	Heidegger	turned	to	Dasein’s	being.		 Therefore,	we	 can	now	claim	 the	 following:	 to	 the	 extent	 that	Heidegger	was	 engaging	with	 the	problem	 of	 transcendence	 and	 his	 interpretation	 of	 Dasein’s	 being	 as	 disclosedness	 was	 an	 effort	 to	understand	the	subjectivity	of	the	subject,	his	analysis	of	Dasein’s	being	is	a	clear	extension	of	Kant’s	and	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 inquiries.49 	At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 in	 interpreting	 Dasein’s	 being	 as	disclosedness,	 Heidegger	 was	 seeking	 a	 way	 to	 understand	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 as	 that	 which	serves	 as	 the	 ground	 for	 the	 subject-object	 relation	 but	 is	 not	 itself	 primarily	 a	 subject	 transcending	towards	objects.	Rather	than	a	“subject,”	Dasein	 is	primarily	 the	disclosedness	to	the	world.	This	 is	also	why	the	world	is	one	of	the	constitutive	structures	of	Dasein’s	being.	Thus,	Dasein	is	not	a	“subject”	that	transcends	towards	the	object,	“world,”	but,	rather,	Dasein	is	being-in-the-world.	
	
1.1.3. The	problem	of	constitution		 The	 second	 text	 I	want	 to	bring	 to	 light	 is	Heidegger’s	 letter	 to	Husserl	dated	October	22,	1927	regarding	 the	 drafts	 of	 their	 attempted	 collaboration	 on	 the	 Encyclopaedia	 Britannica	 article.50	In	 the	letter	and	the	appendices	attached	to	it,	he	summarizes	the	main	questions	that	he	thought	were	still	 in	need	 of	 clarification	 and	 attempts	 to	 clarify	 his	 disagreements	 by	 characterizing	 how	 his	 project	 in	 BT	tackles	 the	 transcendental	 problem.	 As	 he	 says	 in	 the	 letter:	 “[t]his	 also	 gives	 me	 an	 occasion	 to	characterize	 the	 fundamental	 orientation	of	Being	and	Time	within	 the	 transcendental	 problem.”51	Thus	this	 short	 text	 in	 fact	 reveals	 Heidegger’s	 own	 account	 of	 the	 transcendental	 orientation	 of	 BT.	 In	 the	appendix,	he	begins	by	stating	what	he	sees	as	their	point	of	agreement:		
																																								 																				
48	Caputo	1977,	p.	95.	
49	Jeff	Malpas	has	also	claimed	that	Heidegger’s	focus	on	the	problem	of	transcendence	during	this	period	“indicates	the	
indebtedness	of	that	work	[Being	and	Time]	to	Husserl	and	Kant,	and	[...]	the	extent	to	which	that	work	operates	within	a	
transcendental	and	phenomenological	framework”	(2007,	p.	127).	
50	For	a	historical	account	of	the	redaction	of	the	article,	see	Sheehan’s	introduction	to	the	English	translation	of	the	article	
(1997,	pp.	35-68).	
51	Hua	IX,	p.	600/136.	
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We	are	in	agreement	on	the	fact	that	entities	in	the	sense	of	what	you	call	“world”	cannot	be	explained	in	their	transcendental	constitution	by	returning	to	an	entity	of	the	same	mode	of	being.52	Heidegger	seems	to	understand	Husserl’s	conception	of	the	“world”	as	a	totality	of	entities,	i.e.	the	world	as	posited.	This	is	not	necessarily	true	to	Husserl	since	he	also	developed	a	conception	of	the	world	as	the	“nonobjective	“horizon”	of	all	positing”	as	Crowell	puts	it53,	or,	later,	the	life-world,	which	puts	it	closer	to	Heidegger’s	 understanding	 of	 world	 as	 that	 wherein	 Dasein	 lives.54	But	 putting	 aside	 this	 point,	 for	Husserl,	 the	 constitution	 of	 the	 posited	 world	 can	 only	 be	 understood	 by	 recourse	 to	 transcendental	consciousness,	 which	 is	 not	 another	 entity	 in	 the	 world	 but	 rather	 the	 condition	 of	 possibility	 for	 the	world	to	manifest	to	consciousness.	Heidegger	is	in	agreement	insofar	as	the	being	of	a	totality	of	entities	(whether	ready-to-hand	or	present-at-hand)	can	only	be	understood	by	recourse	to	Dasein’s	being,	which	does	not	have	the	same	mode	of	being	as	ready-to-hand	or	present-at-hand	entities.	This	again	shows	that	Heidegger	understood	Dasein’s	being	as	 taking	up	the	role	of	Husserl’s	 transcendental	consciousness	as	the	transcendental	ground	of	the	world.		 After	voicing	his	agreement,	however,	Heidegger	goes	on	to	articulate	their	point	of	divergence:	But	 that	 does	not	mean	 that	what	makes	up	 the	place	 of	 the	 transcendental	 is	 not	 an	 entity	 at	 all;	rather,	precisely	at	this	juncture	there	arises	the	problem:	What	is	the	mode	of	being	of	the	entity	in	which	 “world”	 is	 constituted?	 That	 is	 Being	 and	 Time’s	 central	 problem	 –	 namely,	 a	 fundamental	ontology	 of	Dasein.	 It	 has	 to	 be	 shown	 that	 the	mode	of	 being	 of	 human	Dasein	 is	 totally	 different	from	 all	 other	 entities	 and	 that,	 as	 the	 mode	 of	 being	 that	 it	 is,	 it	 harbors	 right	 within	 itself	 the	possibility	of	transcendental	constitution.55			What	is	revealing	about	this	passage	is	that	Heidegger	formulates	BT’s	“central	problem”	as	the	problem	of	
constitution.	 The	 fundamental	 ontology	 of	 Dasein	 is	 said	 to	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 Dasein’s	 being	“harbors	 the	possibility	 of	 [the]	 transcendental	 constitution”	 of	 the	world.	Walter	Biemel	 observes	 that	Heidegger	 is	 here	using	 the	 expression	 “transcendental	 constitution”	 as	 a	 favor	 to	Husserl	 and	 that	 the	notion	 of	 constitution	 is	 avoided	 in	 BT	 because	 he	 looks	 at	 it	 as	 an	 idealistic	 residue	 that	 must	 be	
																																								 																				
52	Hua	IX,	p.	601/138.	
53	Crowell	2001,	p.	177.		
54	On	the	ambiguity	of	Husserl’s	sense	of	the	world,	see:	Crowell	2001,	p.	177.	
55	Hua	IX,	p.	601/138.	This	passage	corresponds	to	Heidegger’s	marginal	notes	to	the	second	draft	where	Husserl	writes:	
“[i]n	fact	it	is	evident	that	the	ego	in	its	<now	transcendentally>	reduced	peculiarity	is	the	only	that	is	positable	[setzbar]	
with	all	its	intentional	correlates.”	Heidegger	underlines	“setzbar”	and	writes	in	the	margins:	“<So	it	is	a>	positum!	
Something	positive!	Or	else	what	kind	of	positing	is	this?	In	what	sense	<can	one	say>	that	this	posited-something	is	–	if	it	
is	supposed	to	be	not	nothing	<but>	rather	in	a	certain	way	everything”	(Hua	IX,	p.	604/131).	
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overcome.56	Endorsing	Biemel’s	point,	Caputo	adds	that	 the	passage	 is	nonetheless	 important	because	 it	shows	 that	Heidegger	could	 formulate	his	problem	 in	 the	 language	of	 constitution	 since	 “[f]undamental	Ontology	 is,	 in	 its	own	way,	 transcendental	 constitutive	phenomenology.”57	I	 fully	agree	with	Caputo	on	this	point.	The	true	significance	of	this	passage	lies	in	the	fact	that	Heidegger	could	formulate	his	problem	in	BT	in	the	 language	of	constitution	because	the	existential	analysis	of	Dasein	 is	an	 investigation	of	 the	constitutive	dimensions	of	transcendental	subjectivity.			 However,	in	response	to	Biemel,	Caputo	also	writes	that	Heidegger	is	able	to	speak	of	constitution	because	he	 is	working	here	with	a	 “non-idealistic	notion	of	 constitution”	whereby	 “constitution”	means	uncovering,	letting	be	seen	but	an	uncovering	and	letting	be	seen	based	on	Dasein’s	projection58:	
“Letting	be	seen	in”	Heidegger	is	no	mere	passive	opening	of	our	eyes	so	that	things	may	just	pour	in	upon	us.	 It	 is	a	matter	of	actively	projecting	the	being	 in	 its	proper	mode	of	Being,	so	as	 to	make	 it	accessible	 to	 us.	 It	 is	 letting	 be	 in	 the	 active	 sense	 of	 freeing	 the	 thing	 to	 show	 itself	 as	what	 it	 is.	Dasein	constitutes	the	world	by	releasing	it.59	Caputo	 is	 certainly	 right	 in	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 uncovering	 of	 entities	 through	 Dasein’s	 projective	understanding	is	not	a	mere	passive	seeing	but	an	active	projection	on	Dasein’s	part.	And	he	is	also	right	that	it	is	a	way	of	freeing	and	releasing	the	thing	to	show	itself	as	it	is	in	itself.	Neither	is	it	merely	passive	nor	is	it	“idealistic”	in	the	strong	sense	of	creating	or	producing	the	thing.	As	Heidegger	says	in	the	lecture	course,	History	of	the	Concept	of	Time:	 “‘[c]onstituting’	 does	not	mean	producing	 in	 the	 sense	of	making	and	fabricating;	it	means	letting	the	entity	be	seen	in	its	objectivity.”60	But	it	is	not	clear	how	such	a	notion	of	“constitution”	as	uncovering	and	letting	be	seen	is	supposed	to	differ	from	Husserl’s	notion	of	meaning-constitution,	as	Caputo	seems	to	be	suggesting.	In	fact,	they	seem	to	be	quite	similar.	For	Husserl’s	notion	of	constitution	does	not	mean	producing	or	creating	either,	although	he	occasionally	seems	to	suggest	so.	Rather,	 it	 is	 merely	 a	 way	 of	 disclosing	 the	 structure	 of	 meaning	 as	 it	 manifests	 to	 consciousness.	 As	Zahavi	 puts	 it,	 constitution	must	 be	 understood	 as	 “a	 process	 that	 permits	 that	which	 is	 constituted	 to	appear,	 unfold,	 articulate,	 and	 show	 itself	 as	 what	 it	 is.”61	Thus,	 if	 Husserl’s	 idea	 of	 constitution	 is	“idealistic,”	 it	 is	 only	 because	 of	 its	metaphysical	 implications	 and	 not	 because	 it	 somehow	 entails	 the	
																																								 																				
56	Biemel	1977,	p.	303.	
57	Caputo	1977,	pp.	98-99.	
58	Ibid.,	p.	99.	
59	Ibid.,	p.	100.	
60	GA	20,	p.	97/71.	
61	Zahavi	2003b,	p.	73.	Also	compare	with	Søren	Overgaard’s	concise	description	of	Husserl’s	notion	of	constitution:	
“constitution	is	the	process	of	manifestation	that	brings	entities	and	world	into	‘being’	for	us	–	the	process	without	which	
none	of	this	would	‘be	there’	for	us”	(2004,	p.	67).	
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metaphysical	 idealist	 idea	 that	 everything	 is	 created	 by	 consciousness.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 2,	transcendental	 idealism	 is	not	equivalent	 to	metaphysical	 idealism,	which	says	 that	everything	exists	 in	consciousness.	 Thus,	 Heidegger’s	 difference	 from	 Husserl	 does	 not	 lie	 in	 his	 “non-idealistic	 notion	 of	constitution”	as	Caputo	suggests.	Rather,	I	believe	the	point	of	divergence	should	be	identified	in	making	transcendental	constitution	a	possibility	of	the	human	being,	Dasein.62	This	is	in	sharp	contrast	to	Husserl,	for	whom	transcendental	constitution	belongs	to	the	province	of	transcendental	consciousness,	which	has	been	stripped	of	all	positivity	attached	to	the	human	being.	For	Heidegger,	however,	Dasein	is	not	“posited”	as	just	another	entity	in	the	world	but	it	has	a	radically	unique	mode	of	being	that	“harbors	right	within	itself	 the	possibility	of	transcendental	constitution.”	As	Thomas	Sheehan	puts	 it,	 “Dasein	 is	at	once	ontic	(although	not	present-at-hand)	and	ontologico-transcendental.”63	Or	as	Dermot	Moran	says,	Dasein	“both	manifests	being	and	is	also	a	being.”64	For	Heidegger,	 then,	the	problem	of	constitution	can	only	be	fully	grasped	by	understanding	the	radical	distinction	between	Dasein’s	being	and	that	of	other	entities.	 Let	 us	now	summarize	our	discussion	 in	 this	 section	and	draw	out	 the	 conclusion	 to	our	pressing	question	of	whether	 Heidegger	 was	 committed	 to	 transcendental	 foundationalism.	 We	 first	 suggested	 that	 the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	 is	a	kind	of	 transcendental	priority	so	 long	as	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	can	be	understood	as	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	being	of	the	world.	In	order	to	substantiate	this	claim,	we	then	examined	two	passages	in	which	Heidegger	expressly	formulates	his	problem	in	terms	of	 Kant’s	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 problematics:	 (a)	 in	 his	 reorientation	 of	 the	 problem	 of	transcendence,	 we	 found	 how	 Heidegger	 is	 still	 working	 within	 Kant’s	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	inquiries	while	advancing	a	notion	of	transcendental	subjectivity	that	serves	as	the	ground	for	the	subject-object	 relation	while	 not	 itself	 primarily	 being	 a	 subject	 transcending	 towards	 objects.	 (b)	 Then,	 in	 his	letter	to	Husserl,	where	he	formulates	the	question	of	being	 in	terms	of	 the	problem	of	constitution,	we	
																																								 																				
62	In	fact,	Caputo’s	account	of	the	Husserl-Heidegger	divide	in	his	later	article	of	1984,	“Husserl,	Heidegger	and	the	
question	of	a	‘hermeneutic’	phenomenology,”	is	more	in	line	with	my	suggestion	here.	There,	he	says:	“I	do	not	see	that	
there	is	any	serious	difference	between	Heidegger	and	Husserl	on	the	question	of	the	projectiveness	of	intentional	life,	of	
its	dependence	upon	anticipatory	structures	in	order	to	make	its	way	around	the	world.	The	real	issue	arises	on	the	level	
of	whether	or	not	this	phenomenological	account	harbors	within	it	an	ontological	view.	And	of	course	Husserl	contends	
that	it	need	not	and	does	not.	But	Heidegger	questions	whether	in	fact	Husserl	succeeds	in	this,	or	whether	the	
commitment	to	ontological	presuppositionlessness	does	not	itself	conceal	within	it	a	certain	ontology”	(1984,	p.	176).	
63	Sheehan	1997,	p.	52.	
64	Moran	2007,	p.	148.	Moran	sheds	further	light	on	their	divergence	in	light	of	their	ways	of	dealing	with	the	paradox	of	
subjectivity,	or	what	he	calls	“the	fundamental	transcendental	question”:	“[h]ow	can	that	which	constitutes	the	whole	be	
itself	a	constituted	part	of	that	very	whole”	(Ibid.,	ibid.)?	Husserl	resolves	the	paradox	by	making	a	distinction	between	
two	attitudes,	the	natural	and	the	transcendental.	Heidegger,	on	the	other	hand,	finds	a	way	to	solve	the	problem	by	
raising	the	being-question	and	“making	historically	existent	Dasein	both	a	transcendental	condition	for	world	and	at	the	
same	time	mediating	the	meaning	of	being”	(Ibid.,	p.	150).	
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saw	that	Heidegger	was	furthering	Husserl’s	transcendental	constitutive	phenomenology	with	his	analysis	of	 Dasein’s	 being.	 These	 two	 passages	 show	 how	 Heidegger	 was	 clearly	 engaging	 with	 Kant’s	 and	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 problematics	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 delving	 deeper	 by	 placing	 these	problematics	in	the	purview	of	the	question	of	being.	So	then,	we	can	now	conclude	that	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	is	indeed	a	transcendental	priority	insofar	as	Dasein’s	being	discloses	the	being	of	the	world,	 much	 like	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 constitutes	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 world.	 Heidegger	 was	therefore	committed	to	transcendental	foundationalism.			 Yet,	we	also	cannot	ignore	the	fact	that	our	investigation	has	indicated	how	Heidegger	attempts	to	transform	 Husserl’s	 notions	 of	 transcendental	 consciousness	 and	 constitution	 through	 Dasein’s	disclosedness.	But	at	 this	point,	 it	 remains	an	 indication.	The	nature	of	 this	 transformation	will	become	clearer	 as	 we	 examine	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 method	 and	 its	 transformations	 of	 transcendental	philosophy.	
	
1.2. Transcendental	reflection	
	 The	second	question	we	need	to	address	is	whether	it	can	be	claimed	that	Heidegger	employed	a	second-order	 reflection	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 experience,	 namely	 transcendental	reflection.	 To	 a	 certain	 degree,	 this	 question	 has	 already	 been	 answered	 in	 the	 above.	 For	 in	 following	Kant’s	and	Husserl’s	question	concerning	the	possibility	of	 transcendence,	Heidegger	was	also	 following	the	 way	 in	 which	 this	 must	 be	 carried	 out,	 namely,	 not	 by	 undertaking	 a	 first-order	 inquiry	 that	thematizes	 objects	with	 the	 a	 view	 to	determining	 their	 properties	 but,	 rather,	 through	 a	 second-order	reflection	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 transcendence.	 Thus,	 insofar	 as	 Heidegger	 sought	 the	conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 transcendence	 in	Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 good	reason	to	claim	that	Heidegger	employed	transcendental	reflection.			 There	are,	however,	two	points	that	remain	to	be	settled.	The	first	regards	Heidegger’s	apparent	
rejection	of	the	(transcendental-)phenomenological	reduction	that,	if	not	implicit	in	his	analysis	of	Dasein	in	BT,	is	then	explicitly	stated	in	his	lecture	course	of	1925.	Does	this	not	imply	that	he	was	rejecting	one	of	the	main	pillars	that	constitute	transcendental	reflection	for	Husserl?	Indeed,	as	I	have	already	indicated,	many	have	taken	this	as	evidence	of	Heidegger’s	rejection	of	the	transcendental	turn	altogether.	Therefore,	if	we	are	to	maintain	that	Heidegger	employed	transcendental	reflection,	we	must	be	able	to	account	for	this	apparent	incongruity.	The	second	point	concerns	the	problem	of	reflection.	For	it	has	been	argued	that	
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Heidegger’s	hermeneutical	method	stands	in	contrast	to	Husserl’s	reflective	phenomenology	in	that	it	is	a-
reflective.	We	will	examine	the	validity	of	such	an	interpretation	and	see	whether	this	puts	any	pressure	on	the	thesis	that	Heidegger	employed	transcendental	reflection.			
1.2.1. The	problem	of	reduction		 In	 the	 1925	 lecture	 course,	 History	 of	 the	 Concept	 of	 Time,	 Heidegger	 raises	 the	 topic	 of	 the	phenomenological	 reduction	 in	 the	 context	 of	 addressing	 the	 “two	 fundamental	 neglects”	 in	phenomenology,	 namely	 the	question	of	 the	being	of	 the	 intentional	 and	 the	question	of	 being	 as	 such.	Heidegger	 explicates	 the	 phenomenological	 reduction	 as	 the	 disregarding	 of	 reality	 and	 what	 is	 really	posited:	 “[i]n	 the	 reduction	 we	 disregard	 precisely	 the	 reality	 of	 consciousness	 given	 in	 the	 natural	attitude	in	the	factual	human	being.”65	However,	since	disregarding	reality	supposedly	entails	making	the	question	of	being	irrelevant,	Heidegger	contends	that	in	carrying	out	the	reduction,	we	are	“giving	up	the	ground	upon	which	 alone	 the	 question	 of	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional	 could	 be	 based.”66	Therefore,	 the	reduction	 is	 rejected	 as	 being	 “in	 principle	 inappropriate	 for	 determining	 the	 being	 of	 consciousness	positively.”67	But	one	may	reply	that	this	does	not	do	justice	to	Husserl’s	understanding	of	the	reduction	since	 for	 Husserl,	 the	 bracketing	 of	 the	 belief	 in	 reality	 is	 conducted	 to	 elucidate	 reality	 from	 the	transcendental	 attitude.	 Indeed,	 Heidegger	 anticipates	 that	 Husserl	 would	 reply	 that	 the	 “sense	 of	 the	reduction	is	at	first	precisely	to	disregard	reality	in	order	then	to	be	able	to	consider	it	precisely	as	reality	as	this	manifests	itself	in	pure	consciousness.”68	So	then,	if	the	phenomenological	reduction	is	not	so	much	a	 total	dismissal	of	 reality	as	a	 reconsideration	of	 it,	 as	Heidegger	admits	 it	 is,	 in	what	way	 is	 it	 still	 “in	principle	 inappropriate	 for	 determining	 the	 being	 of	 consciousness	 positively”?	What	were	Heidegger’s	reasons	for	rejecting	the	reduction?		 According	to	Heidegger,	the	reduction	or,	to	be	more	precise,	the	reductions	(since	he	rejects	both	Husserl’s	transcendental	and	eidetic	reductions,		at	least	to	a	certain	extent)	are	inappropriate	insofar	as	they	fail	to	sufficiently	answer	the	question	of	the	being	of	the	intentional	and	of	being	as	such.	Heidegger	provides	several	grounds	to	support	this	claim.	Firstly,	Heidegger	takes	issue	with	the	starting	point	of	the	transcendental	 reduction,	 namely	with	Husserl’s	 notion	 of	 the	 natural	 attitude.	He	 thus	 states	 his	 “first	critical	 question”:	 “[t]o	 what	 extent	 is	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional	 experienced	 and	 determined	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
65	GA	20,	p.	150/109.	
66	Ibid.,	ibid.	
67	Ibid.,	ibid.	
68	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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starting	 position	 –	 in	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 exemplary	 ground	 of	 the	 reductions?”69	According	 to	Heidegger,	Husserl	takes	us	to	be	experiencing	ourselves	in	the	natural	attitude	as	zoological	living	beings,	as	objects	that	occur	amongst	other	objects	in	the	world.	But	this	is	already	a	specifically	theoretical	way	of	 conceiving	 ourselves.	 Heidegger	 thus	 argues	 that	 Husserl’s	 natural	 attitude	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 theoretical	position-taking	that	identifies	our	being	with	‘being	an	object,’	which	is	capable	of	taking	up	attributes	just	like	 any	 other	 thing	 in	 the	 world.	 Accordingly,	 instead	 of	 raising	 the	 question	 of	 the	 being	 of	 the	intentional,	Husserl	simply	assumes	a	specific	and	problematic	ontology	of	human	beings	at	his	starting	point	in	the	natural	attitude.		 Moreover,	by	assuming	this	way	of	being,	Husserl	is	able	to	effect	the	eidetic	reduction	universally,	i.e.	 to	bracket	all	questions	of	existence	 including	 that	of	our	 existence.	 Just	as	we	would	determine	 the	
essentia	of	colors	by	disregarding	their	particular	individuation	in	our	experience,	i.e.	their	existentia,	we	seek	to	determine	the	essence	of	pure	consciousness	by	disregarding	its	existence.	At	this	point,	Heidegger	raises	 his	 subsequent	 critical	 question:	 “[b]ut	 if	 there	were	 an	 entity	whose	what	 is	 precisely	 to	be	and	
nothing	 but	 to	 be,	 then	 this	 ideative	 regard	 of	 such	 an	 entity	 would	 be	 the	 most	 fundamental	 of	misunderstandings.”70	Heidegger	is	here	questioning	the	validity	of	carrying	out	the	eidetic	reduction	with	regard	to	human	being	since,	unlike	other	entities,	it	belongs	to	the	essence	of	human	being	to	exist	(not	as	an	“object”	but	in	its	unique	way	of	being).	In	other	words,	disregarding	the	existence	of	human	being	would	entail	disregarding	its	essence.	And	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	way	in	which	human	beings	“exist”	is	radically	different	 from	the	way	 in	which	other	entities	“exist.”	 Indeed,	 this	was	precisely	the	starting	point	 of	 the	 analysis	 in	 BT,	 namely	 that	 Dasein’s	mode	 of	 being	 is	 radically	 distinct	 from	 that	 of	 other	entities.	Heidegger	thus	criticizes	Husserl	for	working	with	an	undifferentiated	meaning	of	existence	and	thereby	inappropriately	effecting	the	eidetic	reduction	for	human	beings.		 Now,	 upon	 pointing	 out	 the	 unnaturalness	 of	 the	 natural	 attitude,	 Heidegger	 calls	 for	 a	reevaluation	 of	 the	 natural	 attitude	 in	 light	 of	 our	 more	 natural	 manner	 of	 experience	 prior	 to	 any	position-taking.	 But	 at	 this	 point,	 we	 may	 ask:	 how	 is	 this	 reevaluation	 of	 the	 natural	 attitude	 at	 all	relevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional?	 Is	 Heidegger	 suggesting	 that	 so	 long	 as	 we	understand	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional	 in	 a	 supposedly	 more	 natural	 way,	 we	 can	 remain	 in	 this	understanding,	making	the	reduction	redundant?	If	so,	 then	 isn’t	Heidegger	rejecting	the	transcendental	turn	after	all?	
																																								 																				
69	GA	20,	p.	152/111.	
70	GA	20,	p.	152/110.	
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	 In	fact,	Heidegger	does	seem	to	be	suggesting	the	above.	But	this	does	not	immediately	entail	that	he	 rejected	 the	 transcendental	 turn	 (I	 will	 turn	 to	 this	 point	 later).	 Rather,	 what	 it	 does	 entail	 is	 that	Heidegger	is	here	highlighting	the	primacy	of	the	hermeneutic	method	in	the	question	of	being.	We	can	see	this	in	the	passage	where	Heidegger	provides	his	reason	for	the	reevaluation	of	the	starting	position:	
If	 the	 intentional	 is	 to	 be	 interrogated	 regarding	 its	 manner	 of	 being,	 then	 the	 entity	 which	 is	intentional	must	be	originally	experienced	in	its	manner	of	being.	The	original	relationship	of	being	to	the	 entity	which	 is	 intentional	must	 be	 attained.	 But	 does	 this	 original	 relationship	 of	 being	 to	 the	intentional	not	 lie	 in	 the	starting	position	of	 the	reduction?	 [...]	 In	 the	end,	 this	 is	at	 least	where	 the	sense	 of	 the	 intentional,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 explicitly	 brought	 to	 the	 fore,	 must	 nevertheless	 be	experienced.71	Heidegger	 is	 claiming	 that,	 in	order	 to	question	 the	being	of	 the	 intentional,	 the	manner	of	being	of	 the	entity	that	is	intentional	must	be	originally	given	in	our	experience	prior	to	the	questioning.	This	is	to	say	that	Dasein	must	already	have	a	pre-ontological	understanding	of	its	own	being	prior	to	questioning	the	being	 of	 Dasein.	 Thus	 the	 clarification	 of	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional	 takes	 the	 form	 of	 a	 hermeneutic	interpretation,	namely	making	explicit	and	laying	out	our	pre-ontological	understanding	of	being.	What	is	problematic	about	Husserl’s	reduction,	however,	is	that,	at	the	very	starting	point	in	the	natural	attitude,	this	 pre-ontological	 understanding	 is	 covered	 up	 by	 the	 theoretically	 constructed	 ontology	 of	 human	beings.	What	we	must	then	instead	do	is	uncover	the	“original	relationship	of	being	to	the	entity	which	is	intentional.”		 Heidegger	gives	another	reason	 in	support	of	his	claim	that	Husserl’s	reduction	 is	 insufficient	 in	answering	 the	 question	 of	 the	 being	 of	 the	 intentional	 that	 follows	 directly	 from	 the	 basic	 ontological	distinction	 that	 Husserl	 himself	 draws.	 For	 Husserl,	 the	 transcendental-phenomenological	 reduction	articulates	what	he	calls	“the	most	radical	of	all	distinctions”	between	transcendental	pure	consciousness	and	objects	or	reality	as	it	manifests	itself	in	consciousness:	
The	 theory	 of	 categories	must	 start	 entirely	 from	 this	most	 radical	 of	 all	 ontological	 distinctions	 –	being	 as	 consciousness	 and	 being	 as	 something	 which	 becomes	 “manifested”	 in	 consciousness,	“transcendent”	 being	 –	which,	 as	we	 see,	 can	 be	 attained	 in	 its	 purity	 and	 appreciated	 only	 by	 the	method	of	the	phenomenological	reduction.	72	But	 if	 the	 reduction	 draws	 out	 this	 distinction	 and	Husserl	 concedes	 that	 this	 is	 the	most	 fundamental	
ontological	distinction,	the	question	of	being	becomes	an	all	the	more	urgent	question	for	phenomenology.	
																																								 																				
71	Ibid.,	ibid.	
72	Hua	III,	p.	159/171.	
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Yet,	according	to	Heidegger,	Husserl	questioned	the	being	of	neither	objects	nor	consciousness,	and	even	less	 the	meaning	of	being	that	makes	this	distinction	possible.	 In	 this	sense,	 then,	Husserl’s	reduction	 is	insufficient	 as	 it	 leaves	 unquestioned	 “the	 most	 urgent	 question	 inherent	 in	 the	 very	 sense	 of	phenomenology	itself.”	73			 Let	 us	 sum	 up.	 For	 Husserl,	 the	 reduction	 was	 a	 way	 to	 go	 back	 to	 transcendental	 pure	consciousness	 freed	 from	all	positivity	given	 in	the	natural	attitude.	According	to	Heidegger,	 in	carrying	out	 the	 reduction,	 Husserl,	 however,	 presupposed	 a	 specific	 ontology	 of	 human	 being	 that	 failed	 to	 do	justice	 to	 its	 unique	 manner	 of	 existence.	 In	 other	 words,	 he	 was	 working	 with	 an	 undifferentiated	meaning	of	existence	or	being	as	‘being	an	object’	and,	accordingly,	mistakenly	understood	human	beings	in	this	way.	For	this	reason,	he	was	able	to	effect	the	eidetic	reduction	for	human	beings	but	at	the	expense	of	 covering	 up	 the	 original	 relationship	 between	 being	 and	 the	 entity	which	 is	 intentional.	 In	 this	way,	both	 the	 transcendental	 and	 eidetic	 reductions	 leave	 the	 question	 of	 being	 undiscussed	 at	 its	 starting	point	 in	 the	 natural	 attitude.	 Moreover,	 the	 reductions	 also	 leave	 the	 question	 unaddressed	 after	 they	have	been	effected.	For,	although	the	reductions	illuminate	the	basic	ontological	distinction	between	pure	consciousness	and	objects	or	reality	manifesting	in	consciousness,	Husserl	nonetheless	failed	to	address	the	question	of	being.	Thus,	it	left	unquestioned	the	most	urgent	question	demanded	by	phenomenology.	Accordingly,	the	reductions	were	rejected	as	“in	principle	inappropriate”	on	the	grounds	that	they	merely	leave	 the	 question	 of	 being	 unquestioned	 both	 before	 the	 reduction	 at	 its	 starting	 point	 in	 the	 natural	attitude	and	after	the	reduction	to	pure	consciousness.			 But	 where	 does	 this	 leave	 us	 regarding	 Heidegger’s	 relationship	 to	 transcendental	 philosophy?	Walter	Biemel	concludes	from	the	fact	that	“the	reduction	is	totally	missing”	in	Heidegger	that	he	rejects	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 turn.74	From	what	we	 have	 seen	 above,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 claim	 is	 not	without	justification.	 However,	 Heidegger’s	 rejection	 of	 Husserl’s	 reductions	 does	 not	 immediately	 imply	 his	rejection	of	the	transcendental	turn.	Moreover,	if	Dasein’s	being	is	a	kind	of	transcendental	subjectivity	as	I	have	been	suggesting,	then	there	is	a	good	reason	to	think	that	there	is	something	equivalent	to	Husserl’s	transcendental	reduction	operative	in	Heidegger’s	question	of	being.		 As	a	matter	of	 fact,	Heidegger	himself	provides	a	positive	account	of	the	reduction	in	the	 lecture	course	 of	 summer	 1927,	 The	 Basic	 Problems	 of	 Phenomenology.	 There,	 Heidegger	 presents	 the	phenomenological	reduction	as	one	of	 the	 three	components	of	 the	phenomenological	method,	 together	with	phenomenological	construction	and	destruction.	But	he	makes	it	clear	that	his	understanding	of	the	
																																								 																				
73	GA	20,	p.	158/114-115.	
74	Biemel	1977,	p.	301.	
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phenomenological	 reduction	 is	 different	 from	 Husserl’s.	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	 Husserl’s	phenomenological	reduction	is	the	leading	of	the	phenomenological	vision	from	the	natural	attitude	of	the	human	being	to	the	transcendental	life	of	consciousness.	In	contrast	to	this,	he	says:	
For	 us	 phenomenological	 reduction	 means	 leading	 phenomenological	 vision	 back	 from	 the	apprehension	of	a	being,	whatever	may	be	the	character	of	that	apprehension,	to	the	understanding	of	the	being	of	this	being	(projecting	upon	the	way	it	is	unconcealed).75	In	rejecting	the	transcendental-phenomenological	reduction	in	Husserl’s	sense	of	the	term,	Heidegger	is	in	agreement	 with	 what	 he	 said	 in	 his	 1925	 lecture.	 Heidegger	 is	 thus	 not	 subscribing	 to	 the	phenomenological	 reduction	 that	 takes	 one	 from	 the	 natural	 attitude	 of	 the	 human	 being	 to	transcendental	consciousness.	Yet,	what	is	decisive	here	is	his	rendering	the	reduction	to	positively	signify	the	 regress	 from	 beings	 (entities)	 to	 the	 understanding	 of	 their	 being.	 Now,	 one	 might	 think	 that	 this	rendering	is	so	far	removed	from	Husserl’s	reduction	that	the	original	meaning	is	completely	lost.	Even	if	it	could	be	called	a	reduction	of	some	sort,	it	is	not	the	transcendental-phenomenological	reduction.	Thus	we	find,	for	example,	von	Herrmann	saying	that,	although	both	Husserl	and	Heidegger	speak	of	reductions,	they	do	so	with	completely	different	meanings.	76	However,	I	believe	this	does	not	do	justice	to	Heidegger’s	rendering	of	the	reduction.	If	we	pay	heed	to	the	two	kinds	of	regress	involved	in	the	move	from	beings	to	the	 understanding	 of	 being,	 we	 can	 see	 that	 Heidegger	 is	 only	 reorienting	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	reduction	within	the	framework	of	the	question	of	being.		 In	fact,	Caputo	has	aptly	identified	the	two	regresses	as	two	reductions	that	are	intermingled	here:	the	“ontological	reduction”	and	the	“transcendental	phenomenological	reduction.”77	Caputo	designates	the	“ontological	 reduction”	 as	 the	 regress	 from	 beings	 to	 their	 being	 and	 the	 “transcendental	phenomenological	 reduction”	 as	 the	 regress	 from	 being	 to	Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being.	 He	 further	observes	 that	 at	 the	 time	of	BT,	 the	 “regress	 to	Being	 (the	ontological	 reduction)	 is	made	possible	by	a	regress	 to	 Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 Being	 (the	 transcendental	 phenomenological	 reduction)”78	and	consequently,	the	two	reductions	end	up	being	“one	and	the	same.”79Accordingly,	while	Heidegger	rejects	Husserl’s	move	to	pure	transcendental	consciousness,	he	does	not	thereby	reject	the	transcendental	turn	but	only	couples	it	with	an	ontological	turn.		
																																								 																				
75	GA	24,	p.	29/21.	
76	von	Herrmann	2000,	p.	150/132.	(I	provide	the	pagination	from	the	original	German	first	followed	by	slash	and	
pagination	from	English	translation.)	
77	Caputo	1977,	pp.	84-105;	p.	100.	
78	Ibid.,	p.	101.	
79	Ibid.,	p.	103.	
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	 Caputo’s	observation	of	the	two	reductions	sheds	light	on	the	intermingling	of	the	two	questions	of	being	I	have	been	emphasizing	up	to	now,	namely,	the	question	of	the	meaning	of	being	in	general	(the	question	 of	 fundamental	 ontology)	 and	 the	 question	 of	 Dasein’s	 being	 (the	 question	 of	 the	 existential	analytic	of	Dasein).	Let	us	recast	the	intermingling	of	these	two	questions	in	terms	of	the	regresses	that	are	involved.	Fundamental	ontology	was	based	on	the	ontological	distinction	between	“beings”	and	“being.”	But	 insofar	as	 fundamental	ontology	seeks	the	meaning	of	being	 in	general,	which	provides	unity	to	the	various	meanings	of	being,	 there	 is	a	 further	distinction	between	the	various	meanings	of	being	and	the	meaning	of	being	 in	general.	Accordingly,	we	can	say	that	 fundamental	ontology	 is	based	on	the	regress	from	beings	 to	 the	meaning	of	being	 in	general.	 But	 insofar	 as	 fundamental	 ontology	was	 sought	 in	 the	existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 (to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	 undertaken	with	 the	 purpose	 of	serving	 as	 the	 preliminary	 study	 of	 fundamental	 ontology)	 the	 latter	 is	 based	 on	 the	 regress	 from	 the	
meaning	of	 being	 in	 general	 to	Dasein’s	 understanding	of	 being.	 Now,	 insofar	 as	 the	 priority	 of	 Dasein’s	being	in	the	question	of	being	is	not	merely	a	hermeneutic	priority	but	also	a	transcendental	priority	as	we	 have	 seen,	 this	 regress	 to	Dasein’s	 being	 is	 evidently	 a	 transcendental	 regress.	 Accordingly,	we	 can	agree	with	Caputo	that	the	two	regresses	involved	in	BT	are	ontological	and	transcendental,	respectively.	Heidegger’s	 “phenomenological	 reduction”	 is	 thus	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 “ontological	 reduction”	 and	 the	“transcendental-phenomenological	reduction.”			 Therefore,	 it	 is	 now	 clear	 that	 while	 Heidegger	 rejected	 Husserl’s	 reduction	 to	 transcendental	consciousness,	he	does	not	thereby	reject	the	transcendental	turn.	Rather,	for	Heidegger,	the	ontological	turn	 was	 “made	 possible	 by”	 the	 transcendental	 turn	 insofar	 as	 Dasein’s	 being	 is	 the	 condition	 of	possibility	 for	 the	 being	 of	 entities	 and	 the	 world.	 Accordingly,	 Heidegger’s	 difference	 from	 Husserl	 is	marked,	not	by	a	rejection	of	the	transcendental	turn	but	rather,	by	making	the	question	of	being	a	central	question	for	transcendental	inquiry.80			
1.2.2. The	problem	of	reflection		 Insofar	 as	Heidegger	 not	 so	much	 rejects	 as	 supplements	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 reduction,	 it	seems	 that	 we	 can	 now	 say	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	 being	 in	 general	 was	 sought	 through	 transcendental	
																																								 																				
80		Crowell	has	advanced	this	kind	of	reading	in	arguing	that	the	Husserl-Heidegger	dispute	should	not	be	understood	as	
Heidegger’s	wholesale	rejection	of	Husserl’s	transcendental	project	but	rather	as	a	result	of	the	immanent	criticism	of	it.	
Therefore,	according	to	Crowell,	the	fundamental	point	of	dispute	is	not	whether	phenomenology	should	be	
transcendental	or	ontological	but,	rather,	whether	transcendental	phenomenology	should	be	epistemological	or	
ontological	(2001,	chapter	9).	
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reflection.	But	here,	we	must	address	another	problem	that	centers	on	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method.	In	 his	 book	 titled	 Hermeneutik	 und	 Reflexion	 (2000),	 Friedrich-Wilhelm	 von	 Herrmann	 argues	 that	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	is	the	key	to	distinguishing	Heidegger’s	phenomenology	from	Husserl’s.	And	 he	 argues	 that	 this	 is	 specifically	 due	 to	 the	 a-reflective	 nature	 of	 the	 hermeneutic	 method.81	Accordingly,	 the	 whole	 book	 operates	 with	 the	 basic	 distinction	 between	 Heidegger’s	 a-reflective	hermeneutic	phenomenology	and	Husserl’s	reflective	phenomenology.	But	if	this	is	a	correct	description	of	 the	Husserl-Heidegger	divide,	 then	Heidegger	could	not	have	operated	with	 transcendental	reflection	for	 the	 very	 simple	 reason	 that	 he	 rejects	 the	 reflective	 method.	 Accordingly,	 we	 must	 ask:	 does	
Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	put	pressure	on	our	claim	that	he	employs	transcendental	reflection	in	BT?			 Since	Heidegger	does	not	expound	on	 the	hermeneutic	method	 in	BT,	 let	us	 look	at	 the	 lectures	from	 the	 war	 emergency	 semester	 of	 1919,	 “The	 Idea	 of	 Philosophy	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Worldview,”	where	he	first	develops	his	idea	of	hermeneutic	phenomenology.	There,	he	outlines	the	idea	of	philosophy,	or	 the	 future	of	philosophy	as	he	 sees	 it,	 as	 a	pre-theoretical	primordial	 science.	Heidegger	accordingly	goes	 on	 to	 articulate	 the	 phenomenological	 method	 by	 which	 we	 gain	 access	 to	 this	 pre-theoretical	domain	 of	 lived	 experience.	 At	 this	 point,	 Heidegger	 raises	 Natorp’s	 objection	 to	 phenomenology	 that,	despite	 its	 claim	 to	 describe	 lived	 experience,	 insofar	 as	 its	 method	 is	 reflective,	 phenomenology	necessarily	objectifies	experience	and,	accordingly,	distorts	the	original	lived	experience.	Furthermore,	its	descriptive	character	is	also	problematic	for	the	same	reason,	namely	that,	insofar	as	description	resorts	to	language,	it	involves	generalization	and	is	necessarily	objecifying.82	Heidegger	takes	Natorp’s	criticisms	seriously	 and	 underscores	 the	 reflective	 character	 of	 Husserl’s	 phenomenology	 by	 citing	 some	 key	passages	from	Ideas	I:	“[b]y	the	reflectional	experiencing	acts	alone	we	know	something	of	the	stream	of	mental	 processes,”83	and,	 “the	phenomenological	method	operates	 exclusively	 in	 acts	 of	 reflection.”84	So	then,	 if	 the	 phenomenological	 method	 is	 reflective	 in	 nature,	 the	 crucial	 question	 becomes:	 “[i]s	 this	method	of	descriptive	reflection	(or	reflective	description)	capable	of	 investigating	 the	domain	of	 lived-experience	and	disclosing	it	scientifically?”85		 On	the	one	hand,	Heidegger	does	not	deny	that	reflective	description	can	disclose	the	domain	of	lived	experience	 theoretically.	 Yet	on	 the	other	hand,	he	denies	 that	 it	 can	disclose	 the	domain	of	 lived	
																																								 																				
81	For	a	similar	reading,	see	also:	Hopkins	1993,	chapter	9	(“The	Phenomenological	Method:	Reflective	or	
Hermeneutical?”).	
82	GA	56/57,	pp.	99-101/83-85.	Cf.	Natorp	1912.	
83	Hua	III,	p.	168/180.	
84	Hua	III,	p.	162/174.	
85	GA	56/57,	p.	100/84.	
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experience	in	its	pre-theoretical	nature.	Accordingly,	Heidegger	agrees	with	Natorp’s	criticism	of	Husserl’s	phenomenology	 insofar	 as	 its	 reflective	method	 is	 necessarily	 objectifying	 and	 accordingly,	 prevents	 it	from	 accessing	 pre-theoretical	 lived	 experience.	 But	 rather	 than	 following	 Natorp’s	 anti-phenomenological	 alternative,	 which	 has	 “grown	 out	 of	 the	 Marburg	 school’s	 fundamental	 position,”86	Heidegger	seeks	an	alternative	method	within	phenomenology.	And	it	 is	at	this	point	that	he	 introduces	“hermeneutic	 intuition,”	a	kind	of	 intuition	 that	stays	in	 and	goes	along	with	 lived	experience.	 It	has	 the	“character	 of	 an	 appropriating	 event”	 (Ereignischarakter)	 that	 is	 non-objectifying	 as	 it	 simply	appropriates	lived	experience	by	going	along	with	it	and	making	it	explicit.			 Now,	 von	 Herrmann	 infers	 from	 Heidegger’s	 rejection	 of	 Husserl’s	 reflective	 phenomenological	method	 that	 the	 hermeneutic	 intuition	 he	 accordingly	 introduces	 is	 non-reflective:	 “[h]ermeneutic	intuition	 is	 not	 reflection	 on	 living,	 but	 ‘the	 understanding	 of	 living.’”87	Furthermore,	 he	 takes	 this	discovery	of	the	pre-theoretical	domain	of	lived	experience	and	the	accompanying	establishment	of	non-reflective	 hermeneutic	 phenomenology	 as	 the	 decisive	 beginning	 of	 Heidegger’s	 method,	 further	developed	in	the	early	Freiberg	and	Marburg	lectures	and	culminating	in	BT.88	Accordingly,	von	Herrmann	compares	and	contrasts	what	he	takes	to	be	two	very	different	conceptions	of	phenomenology:	on	the	one	hand,	 there	 is	 Husserl’s	 reflective	 phenomenology,	which	 necessarily	 involves	 stepping	 out	 of	 the	 lived	experience	so	that	it	can	turn	its	reflective	gaze	back	onto	the	latter	as	the	intentional	object	of	reflection.	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	phenomenology,	on	the	other	hand,	is	essentially	“a-reflective”	and	“a-theoretical”	in	that	it	interprets	lived	experience	by	staying	in	and	going	along	with	it	without	objectifying	it.89		 In	an	article	where	he	discusses	 the	problem	of	 reflection	presented	by	Natorp	and	Heidegger’s	response	to	it,	Zahavi	has	challenged	von	Herrmann’s	interpretation	of	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	as	 a-reflective.	 Zahavi	 argues	 that,	 although	 Heidegger	 by	 and	 large	 agrees	 with	 Natorp’s	 criticisms	 of	Husserl’s	reflective	phenomenology,	this	does	not	prove	that	his	alternative	method	is	a-reflective.	Rather,	he	 suggests	 that	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 method	 is	 the	 explication	 of	 a	 non-objectifying	 type	 of	
reflection.90	Zahavi	 is	here	operating	with	a	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	reflection,	objectifying	and	non-objectifying,	which,	according	to	him,	is	a	distinction	made	by	many	phenomenologists.	For	example,	Sartre	 distinguished	 between	 “impure	 reflection,”	 which	 transcends	 the	 original	 experience	 and	objectifies	it	as	the	reflected	upon,	and	“pure	reflection,”	which	thematizes	the	reflected	without	making	it	
																																								 																				
86	GA	56/57,	p.	102/86.	
87	von	Herrmann	2000,	p.	96/88.	
88	Ibid.,	p.	97/89.	
89	Ibid.,	p.	11/11.	
90	Zahavi	2003a,	pp.	168-169.		
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an	 object	 lying	 outside	 the	 reflecting	 consciousness.91	Zahavi	 also	 refers	 to	 Husserl’s	 conception	 of	reflection	as	an	accentuation	of	primary	experience	or	as	a	way	of	disclosing	and	articulating	the	implicit	structures	of	lived	experience.92	Accordingly,	while	reflection	can	certainly	be	reifying,	it	can	also	be	a	kind	of	 accentuation	without	 reification.	 In	 this	 sense,	 Zahavi	 argues	 that	 reflection	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	“higher	form	of	wakefulness”	and	a	special	form	of	attention	that	articulates	the	implicit	structures	of	our	original	 experience	 without	 making	 it	 an	 intentional	 object	 of	 reflection.93 	Furthermore,	 once	 we	understand	these	two	different	notions	of	reflection,	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	can	be	understood	as	the	non-objectifying	kind:	Thus,	 contrary	 to	what	 von	Herrmann	 is	 claiming,	Heidegger’s	 real	 contribution	might	 be	 taken	 to	consist	 in	an	analysis	of	 this	special	 type	of	non-objectifying	reflection;	a	 type	of	reflection	that	can	exactly	provide	us	with	an	access	to	lived	subjectivity	that	is	not	vulnerable	to	the	objections	posed	by	Natorp.94		 As	 Zahavi	 mentions, 95 	Crowell	 has	 also	 made	 the	 same	 point	 in	 the	 context	 of	 clarifying	Heidegger’s	conception	of	philosophy	and	philosophical	method	in	the	early	Freiberg	lectures.	Namely,	he	argues	 that	 hermeneutic	 intuition	 is	 “a	 reappropriation,	 rather	 than	 a	 rejection,	 of	 the	 genuinely	phenomenological	 concept	 of	 reflection.” 96 	And,	 more	 specifically,	 Crowell	 argues	 that	 Heidegger	reinterprets	 reflection	 as	 a	 “specifically	 philosophical	 species	 of	 self-question.”97	Since	 going	 through	Crowell’s	argument	in	full	requires	much	space	and	it	is	not	our	aim	to	unravel	Heidegger’s	conception	of	philosophy	 in	 these	 years,	 let	 us	 limit	 our	 discussion	 to	 some	 specific	 points	 that	 are	 relevant	 for	 our	purposes	 here.	 According	 to	 Crowell,	 after	 Heidegger	 makes	 his	 first	 preliminary	 formulation	 of	 the	hermeneutic	 method	 that	 secures	 access	 to	 pre-theoretical	 lived	 experience	 in	 his	 1919	 lecture,	 he	subsequently	develops	this	method	in	terms	of	Evidenz	and	formal	indication	in	his	lectures	from	1921	to	1923.98	Now,	the	aim	of	hermeneutic	phenomenology	is	to	gain	access	to	the	“original	evidence	situation”	that	must	be	uncovered	and	made	explicit.	Moreover,	insofar	as	this	evidence	situation	is	“my	own,”	in	the	sense	 that	 it	 is	not	posited	as	 something	over	and	against	me	but	 I	 am	 implicated	 in	 it,	 this	uncovering	
																																								 																				
91	Cf.	Sartre	1948.	
92	Zahavi	2003a,	p.	170.	
93	Ibid.,	p.	169.	
94	Ibid.,	p.	170.	
95	Cf.	Zahavi	2003a,	p.	174	(note	17).	
96	Crowell	2001,	p.	137.	
97	Ibid.,	p.	151.	
98	On	the	importance	of	formal	indication	in	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method,	see:	Crowell	(2001,	chapter	7),	Dahlstrom	
(1994),	Kisiel	(1993).		
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must	take	the	form	of	an	uncovering	of	Dasein’s	facticity.	But	then,	this	is	just	to	say	that	this	uncovering	must	be	reflective,	at	least	in	the	basic	sense	of	turning	the	gaze	back	upon	itself.99	The	difference	between	merely	 living	 in	our	factical	situation	and	coming	to	an	understanding	through	the	hermeneutic	method	must	 be	 that	 the	 latter	 involves	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 reflection.	 Accordingly,	 Crowell	 tells	 us	 that	 the	 “full	definition	 of	 philosophy	 implicates	 a	 moment	 of	 reflection,	 since	 the	 being	 who	 philosophizes	 must	concern	itself	with	its	own	being	as	being.”100			 At	 this	 point,	 then,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 hermeneutic	 reflection,	 if	 we	 can	 call	 it	 that,	 does	 not	 step	outside	Dasein’s	facticity	or	factic	life	and	make	it	an	intentional	object	of	reflection.	Rather,	it	is	a	kind	of	reflection	 whereby	 reflecting	 consciousness	 goes	 along	 with	 factic	 life	 in	 order	 to	 disclose	 its	 own	situation.	Jeff	Malpas	also	seems	to	be	underlining	this	specifically	reflective	character	of	the	hermeneutic	method	(though	he	himself	does	not	speak	 in	 terms	of	reflection)	when	he	says	 that	hermeneutics	 is	 “a	kind	 of	 ‘wakefulness’	 to	 Dasein’s	 factical	 situation”	 and	 suggests	 that	 “one	 should	 understand	 the	hermeneutical	as	itself	essentially	concerned	with	a	fundamental	mode	of	awareness	and	orientation	–	as	essentially	 a	 matter	 of	 finding	 oneself	 in	 one’s	 situatedness,	 of	 finding	 oneself	 in	 place.” 101 	Thus,	hermeneutic	reflection,	in	short,	is	the	disclosing	of	and	awakening	to	one’s	own	factical	situation.		 Now,	in	what	sense	could	we	say	that	hermeneutic	reflection	is	employed	in	BT?	In	other	words,	
how	is	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	a	disclosing	of	and	awakening	to	one’s	own	factical	situation?102	To	begin	 with,	 insofar	 as	 the	 existential	 analytic	 is	 the	 making	 explicit	 and	 laying	 bare	 of	 Dasein’s	 pre-ontological	understanding	of	being,	it	certainly	discloses	one’s	factical	situation.	But	in	what	sense	is	the	existential	analytic	a	kind	of	awakening	 to	one’s	own	situation?	In	 fact,	we	can	find	an	answer	to	this	 in	§63	of	BT	where	Heidegger	addresses	the	“methodological	character”	of	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	in	light	of	what	he	calls	the	“hermeneutic	situation.”	Here,	Heidegger	tells	us	that	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	is	that	which	must	be	“wrested”	from	Dasein	by	a	kind	of	counter-movement	to	its	own	tendency	to	cover	up	its	authentic	being.103	Since	everyday	Dasein	tends	to	interpret	itself	in	light	of	das	Man,	which	
																																								 																				
99	Crowell	also	points	out	that	formal	indication	is	a	kind	of	reflective	method:	the	“method	of	formal	indication	does	
‘repeat’	the	self-interpretation	of	life,	but	it	differs	from	a	mere	going-along-with	lived	life	because	it	is	an	explicitly	
cognitive-illuminative	self-recollection	(reflection)	and	is	oriented	toward	evident	(intuitive)	self-having”	(2001,	p.	127).	
100	Crowell	2001,	p.	143.	
101	Malpas	(forthcoming),	p.	14.	
102	For	my	purposes	here,	I	did	not	concern	myself	with	the	details	of	how	the	hermeneutic	method	develops	from	the	
early	Freiberg	years	to	the	Marburg	period.	For	a	concise	discussion	of	this	development,	see:	Farin	2015.	There	Farin	
distinguishes	three	distinct	phases	of	this	development:	(1)	the	initial	breakthrough	to	the	hermeneutics	of	facticity	in	the	
early	Freiberg	years,	(2)	the	hermeneutic	ontology	of	BT,	and	(3)	hermeneutics	after	the	“turn”	in	the	1930s	centering	on	
the	idea	that	language	and	poets	are	the	original	interpreters.	
103	SZ,	p.	311/359.	
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is	nothing	but	the	fallen	state	of	Dasein,	the	existential	analytic	is	said	to	constantly	have	the	character	of	
doing	 violence	 to	 everyday	 interpretation.104	This	 is	 also	why	Heidegger	 claims	 that	 “Dasein	 is	 ontically	‘closest’	 to	 itself	 and	 ontologically	 farthest.”105	But	 then,	 this	 is	 to	 say	 that	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	depends	on	Dasein’s	ontic	possibility	to	counter	one’s	own	fallenness	from	authentic	 self-understanding,	 i.e.	 the	 understanding	 of	 oneself	 in	 one’s	 ontological	 constitution.	 In	 this	sense,	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein’s	being	is	an	existentiell	possibility	of	Dasein	to	come	to	a	proper	or	authentic	self-understanding.	This	is	why	Heidegger	can	claim	in	the	Introduction	that	the	roots	of	the	existential	analytic	are	ultimately	existentiell:	
But	the	roots	of	the	existential	analytic,	on	its	part,	are	ultimately	existentiell,	 that	 is,	ontical.	Only	if	the	inquiry	of	philosophical	research	is	itself	seized	upon	in	an	existentiell	manner	as	a	possibility	of	the	 Being	 of	 each	 existing	 Dasein,	 does	 it	 become	 at	 all	 possible	 to	 disclose	 the	 existentiality	 of	existence	and	to	undertake	an	adequately	founded	ontological	problematic.106	Thus,	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	is	an	awakening	to	one’s	factical	situation	as	fallenness	(from	which	the	 ontological	 understanding	must	 be	wrested)	 that	 also	 presumably	motivates	 one	 towards	authentic	
self-understanding	(in	seizing	upon	it	as	one’s	own	existentiell	possibility).	In	this	way,	we	can	say	that	the	roots	 of	 the	 existential	 analytic	 are	 existentiell	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 one	 must	 understand	 one’s	 own	ontological	constitution	in	one’s	ontic	existence	in	order	to	have	a	“proper”	understanding	of	the	analytic.		 Finally,	 let	us	 return	 to	our	 initial	question	of	 this	 section:	does	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	
put	pressure	on	our	claim	that	he	employs	transcendental	reflection	in	BT?	 	 Firstly,	 insofar	as	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	is	not	so	much	a	rejection	as	a	reformation	of	phenomenological	reflection,	we	can	set	aside	von	Herrmann’s	claim	that	hermeneutic	phenomenology	is	a-reflective.	But	if	we	understand	the	hermeneutic	 method	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 reflection,	 then	 this	 demands	 a	 clarification	 of	 its	 relation	 to	transcendental	 reflection.	 So	 then,	 in	 what	 way	 does	 hermeneutic	 reflection	 transform	 transcendental	reflection?	To	begin	with,	 far	from	posing	a	problem	for	transcendental	reflection,	the	circular	nature	of	hermeneutic	 reflection	 merely	 underscores	 the	 hermeneutical	 nature	 of	 transcendental	 inquiry	 we	highlighted	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Transcendental	 inquiry	 was	 essentially	 circular	 because	 it	 exemplifies	 the	hermeneutic	circle	of	understanding.	As	Malpas	stated:	
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105	SZ,	p.	16/37.	
106	SZ,	pp.	13-14/34.	
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Transcendental	inquiry	operates	always	from	within	experience	and	by	appeal	to	experience.	It	does	not	and	cannot	move	to	ground	the	foundational	principles	or	structures	it	uncovers	independently	of	experience,	knowledge	or	being-in-the-world.107	Thus	Heidegger’s	transcendental-hermeneutic	reflection	discloses	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	as	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	the	being	of	entities	and	the	world	in	Dasein’s	pre-ontological	understanding	of	being,	where	being	is	always	already	understood.	But	 insofar	as	this	pre-ontological	understanding	is	essentially	embedded	in	Dasein’s	facticity,	transcendental	reflection	in	Heidegger’s	hands	is	rendered	into	the	 disclosing	 of	 one’s	 contingent	 factical	 situation	 through	 and	 through.	 This	 entails	 that	 the	transcendental-hermeneutic	conditions	it	uncovers	cannot	enjoy	the	status	of	universal	validity	entailed	in	the	 Kantian	 a	 priori.	 As	 Cristina	 Lafont	 has	 argued	 at	 length,	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 notion	 of	 the	“perfect	tense	a	priori,”	i.e.	the	“always	already,”	transforms	the	Kantian	notion	of	a	priority	by	eliminating	the	 implication	of	universal	validity.	For,	 in	Heidegger,	 “factual	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	 is	 itself	‘essentially	 factical’	 and	 changes	 historically	 by	 virtue	 of	 our	 contingent	 projections.”108	Lastly,	 since	hermeneutical	reflection	awakens	us	 to	our	own	factical	situation,	 transcendental	reflection	acquires	an	existentialist	tone	of	becoming	wakeful	to	our	own	situation.	Thus,	reflecting	on	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	as	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	being	of	entities	and	the	world	becomes	a	matter	of	wresting	our	authentic	self-understanding	from	our	fallen	state	and	seizing	upon	this	possibility	of	understanding	in	our	own	factic	lives.			 Therefore,	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 method	 puts	 pressure	 on	 our	 claim	 that	 transcendental	reflection	 is	 operative	 in	 BT	 not	 because	 it	 is	 a-reflective	 but	 only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 specifically	
reflective	nature	of	the	hermeneutic	method	(1)	makes	transcendental	reflection	a	matter	of	disclosing	the	contingent	 nature	 of	 one’s	 facticity	 and	 (2)	 ascribes	 transcendental	 reflection	 an	 existentialist	 role	 of	becoming	wakeful	to	our	own	factical	situation.			
1.3. Alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	
	 We	have	finally	arrived	at	our	third	and	final	question	regarding	the	metaphysical	implications	of	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT:	does	it	entail	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world?	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	2,	
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108	Lafont	2007,	p.	107.	Cf.	SZ,	p.	85/117-118.	Lafont	further	argues	that	Heidegger’s	notion	of	the	a	priori	as	“always	
already”	means,	at	most,	that	it	is	unquestionable	from	within	by	those	who	share	the	historically	contingent	projection.	
See	also,	Lafont	(2005).	
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it	 is	part	and	parcel	of	transcendental	philosophy	that	 its	search	for	the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	our	experience	 is	 coupled	 with	 an	 alteration	 of	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world.	 In	 other	 words,	 transcendental	philosophy	entails	transcendental	idealism.	But	transcendental	idealism	is	not	a	metaphysical	position	in	itself.	 For,	 transcendental	 inquiry	 is	 a	 second-order	 inquiry	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	experience	of	objects	and,	thus,	does	not	make	any	first-order	claims	about	objects.	Thus	the	alteration	of	our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 that	 transcendental	 philosophy	 demands,	 namely	 transcendental	 idealism,	 is	neither	 that	of	 realism	 (if	 this	 is	 to	 entail	 any	 sort	of	 alteration)	nor	 idealism	since	both	are	 first-order	metaphysical	 positions	 that	 attempt	 to	 explain	 objects	 in	 a	 straightforward	manner.	 Rather,	 it	must	 be	understood	as	a	kind	of	reflective	stance	or	a	methodological	standpoint.	Now,	this	methodological	stance	entailed	two	 important	metaphysical	 implications:	anti-(naive-)realism	and	the	priority	of	transcendental	
subjectivity.	Our	discussion	of	the	latter	in	the	first	section	on	transcendental	foundationalism	has	already	indicated	that	Heidegger’s	position	in	BT	entails	transcendental	idealism.	In	the	following,	I	will	attempt	to	work	out	the	full	metaphysical	implications	of	BT	by	addressing	the	following	two	questions:	(1)	can	we	say	that	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT	entails	a	methodological	standpoint	rather	than	metaphysical	position?	(2)	Does	it	entail	anti-(naive-)realism?		
	 Let	 us	 begin	 with	 our	 first	 question.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 Heidegger	 distanced	 himself	 from	traditional	metaphysics,	which	attempted	to	explain	being	in	terms	of	beings,	 it	 is	clear	that	Heidegger’s	own	 position	 in	 BT	 is	 not	 itself	 a	 metaphysical	 position	 in	 that	 sense.	 Indeed,	 as	 I	 noted	 above,	 our	discussion	of	the	transcendental	priority	of	Dasein	has	already	suggested	that	Heidegger’s	position	in	BT	is	 close	 to	Kant’s	 and	Husserl’s	 transcendental	 idealism	as	 I	delineated	 in	Chapter	2,	 specifically,	 in	not	entailing	a	metaphysical	position.	Since	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	is	the	condition	of	possibility	for	the	being	of	entities	and	the	world,	this	seems	to	entail	transcendental	idealism.	Indeed,	Heidegger	seems	to	be	affirming	this	when	he	says:	If	what	the	term	“idealism”	says,	amounts	to	the	understanding	that	Being	can	never	be	explained	by	entities	but	 is	already	 that	which	 is	 ‘transcendental’	 for	every	entity,	 then	 idealism	affords	 the	only	correct	possibility	for	a	philosophical	problematic.109			 Nonetheless,	 there	 are	 certain	 passages	 in	 BT	 that	 challenge	 the	 idea	 that	 Heidegger	 is	 a	transcendental	 idealist.	 For	 he	 sometimes	 says	 that	 the	 being	 of	 entities	 depends	 on	 Dasein’s	understanding	 of	 being	 while	 entities	 themselves	 do	 not:	 “Being	 (not	 entities)	 is	 dependent	 upon	 the	
																																								 																				
109	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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understanding	 of	 Being;	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 Reality	 (not	 the	 Real)	 is	 dependent	 upon	 care.”110	Taking	 such	claims	as	directly	 indicative	of	Heidegger’s	rejection	of	transcendental	 idealism,	Herman	Philipse	argues	that	 Heidegger	 is	 a	 transcendental	 realist	 (or	 what	 he	 also	 calls	 “weak	 transcendentalist”)111.	 William	Blattner	 and	 Cristina	 Lafont,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 have	 argued	 that	 these	 claims	 do	 not	 deter	Heidegger	from	being	committed	 to	some	version	of	 transcendental	 idealism.112	None	of	 them	are	 in	disagreement	that	Heidegger	attempts	 to	show	that	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	 is	 the	condition	of	possibility	 for	entities	 to	 show	 up	 as	 entities,	 i.e.	 for	 the	 being	 of	 entities.	 The	 point	 of	 disagreement	 is	 whether	Heidegger	 can	 still	 be	a	 transcendental	 idealist	whilst	 expressly	denying	 that	 entities	 are	dependent	on	Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being.	 Blattner	 offers	 an	 interesting	 solution	 to	 this	 problem.	 According	 to	Blattner,	Heidegger’s	 claim	 that	 entities	 are	not	dependent	on	Dasein’s	 being	 is	 an	 empirical	 claim	 that	expresses	 the	 ontological	 sense	 of	 entities	 as	 being	 independent	 of	 Dasein.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 claim	indicates	 that	 Heidegger	 is	 an	 empirical	 realist.	 Furthermore,	 this	 claim	 has	 no	 relevance	 at	 the	transcendental	level	since	the	very	question	of	whether	or	not	entities	depend	on	Dasein	simply	does	not	make	 sense	 on	 the	 transcendental	 level.	 Thus,	 Blattner	 concludes	 that	 Heidegger	 is	 a	 transcendental	idealist	regarding	being	but	not	entities.113	As	he	says:	He	 [Heidegger]	 is	 a	 transcendental	 idealist	 about	being,	but	not	 about	entities.	This	 is	not	because,	from	 the	 transcendental	 standpoint,	 entities	 are	 independent	 of	 Dasein;	 it	 is	 not	 because	 he	 is	 a	transcendental	realist	about	entities.	Rather,	it	is	because	one	can	be	neither	a	transcendental	idealist	nor	a	transcendental	realist	about	entities,	if	one	is	a	transcendental	idealist	about	being.114			 Philipse	raises	 two	powerful	objections	 to	 this	 interpretation.	Firstly,	he	argues	 that	Heidegger’s	claim	 that	 entities	 are	 not	 dependent	 on	 Dasein’s	 being	 cannot	 be	merely	 an	 empirical	 claim	 because	Heidegger	puts	forward	the	claim	not	only	as	“a	thesis	within	the	framework	of	occurrentness	or	‘reality’	[…]	but	 also	 as	 a	 general	 thesis	 about	 the	 relation	 among	Dasein,	 entities,	 and	 sein.”115	Secondly,	 if	 it	 is	nonsensical	to	raise	transcendental	questions	about	the	relation	between	the	understanding	of	being	and	entities	as	they	are	in	themselves,	apart	from	our	understanding	of	being,	then	Heidegger’s	transcendental	
																																								 																				
110	SZ,	p.	212/255.	Compare	also:	“[e]ntities	are,	quite	independently	of	the	experience	by	which	they	are	disclosed,	the	
acquaintance	in	which	they	are	discovered,	and	the	grasping	in	which	their	nature	is	ascertained.	But	Being	‘is’	only	in	the	
understanding	of	those	entities	to	whose	Being	something	like	an	understanding	of	Being	belongs”	(SZ,	p.	183/228).	
111	Philipse	1999,	§9,	especially	pp.	143-144;	pp.	432-433	(note	258).	
112	Cf.	Blattner	1999,	especially	pp.	251-254;	Lafont	2007.	Blattner	argues	for	“temporal	idealism”	and	Lafont	argues	for	
“hermeneutic	idealism.”	
113	Cf.	Blattner	1999,	pp.	244-254.	
114	Blattner	1999,	p.	253.	
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position	deflates	into	some	form	of	subjective	idealism	that	cannot	provide	any	justification	for	how	such	an	 understanding	 of	 being	 is	 really	 about	 the	 world.	 As	 Philipse	 says,	 then,	 “one	 must	 conclude	 that	Heidegger’s	notion	of	a	transcendental	framework	is	nonsensical.”116	I	agree	with	Philipse	that	Blattner’s	interpretation	of	Heidegger’s	position	does	not	“save”	Heidegger,	although	as	Philipse	himself	admits,	his	alternative	reading	of	him	as	a	transcendental	realist	does	not	do	so	either.	 If	Heidegger	can	be	“saved,”	that	is,	 if	he	is	to	be	a	full-blown,	consistent	transcendental	idealist,	Heidegger	must	be	a	transcendental	idealist	about	entities	and	not	just	their	being.	But	how	then	are	we	to	make	sense	of	his	claim	that	entities	do	not	depend	on	Dasein?			 I	believe	we	can	make	sense	of	this	claim	by	understanding	it	as	a	first-order	claim	about	entities.	Thus	I	am	in	agreement	with	Blattner	that	this	claim	expresses	the	being	of	entities	understood	from	an	empirical	 standpoint.	 Namely,	 from	 an	 empirical	 standpoint,	 entities	 exist	 independently	 of	 Dasein.	However,	I	disagree	with	Blattner	that	this	claim	loses	relevance	at	the	transcendental	 level,	 i.e.	that	the	question	 of	 whether	 entities	 depend	 on	 Dasein	 makes	 no	 sense	 on	 the	 transcendental	 level.	 On	 the	contrary,	 from	the	 transcendental	 standpoint,	 the	only	way	 to	make	sense	of	 the	question,	and	 the	only	way	 in	 which	 it	must	 make	 sense,	 is	 by	 understanding	 this	 as	 a	 second-order	 question	 regarding	 the	ontological	status	of	entities.	Thus,	the	transcendental	question	asks	whether	the	being	of	entities	depends	on	 Dasein’s	 being.	 Accordingly,	 from	 the	 transcendental	 standpoint,	 not	 only	 being	 but	 also	 “entities”	depend	on	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	because	 the	 transcendental	question	 is	 simply	asking	about	the	being	of	entities.	Moreover,	this	does	not	deny	that	we	are	asking	about	the	relation	between	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	and	“entities	as	they	are	in	themselves.”	For,	just	as	the	noema	is	the	object-that-is-intended	in	phenomenological	reflection	for	Husserl,	 the	being	of	entities	 is	 the	entities	as	they	are	 in	themselves	in	the	transcendental-reflective	attitude.	In	this	way,	Heidegger	is	a	transcendental	idealist	not	only	about	being	but	also	about	entities.117	
																																								 																				
116	Ibid.,	ibid.	
117	Lafont	offers	an	alternative	reading	by	suggesting	that	we	distinguish	between	being	in	the	sense	of	“essence”	and	
being	in	the	sense	of	“existence.”	This	distinction	allows	us	to	maintain	the	intransitive	depending-on	relation	on	the	
transcendental	level:	“the	essence	of	entities	depends	on	Dasein,	whereas	their	existence	does	not”	(2007,	p.	251,	note	
11).	According	to	Lafont,	this	does	not	commit	Heidegger	to	transcendental	realism	since	“the	claim	that	entities	exist	
independently	of	Dasein	entails	only	a	commitment	to	the	(ontologically	very	weak)	claim	that	something	or	other	exists,	
but	it	cannot	entail	what	transcendental	realism	requires:	a	commitment	to	the	existence	of	specific	entities	with	specific	
essences”	(2007,	p.	252,	note	11).	The	suggestion	is	supported	by	Heidegger’s	following	remarks	in	BT:	“[w]ith	Dasein’s	
factical	existence,	entities	within-the-world	are	already	encountered	too.	The	fact	that	such	entities	are	discovered	along	
with	Dasein’s	own	‘there’	of	existence,	is	not	left	to	Dasein’s	discretion.	Only	what	it	discovers	and	discloses	on	occasion,	
in	what	direction	it	does	so,	how	and	how	far	it	does	so	–	only	these	are	matters	for	Dasein’s	freedom,	even	if	always	
within	the	limitations	of	its	thrownness”	(SZ,	p.	266/417).		
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	 Now,	 insofar	 as	 transcendental	 idealism,	when	 understood	 properly,	 entails	 not	 a	metaphysical	position	 but	 a	methodological	 standpoint,	 Heidegger’s	 transcendental	 idealism	 should	 entail	 the	 latter.	Our	 investigation	 in	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein	 is	 certainly	 a	methodological	standpoint	 in	the	sense	that	 it	discloses	the	way	to	understand	our	relation	to	the	world	ontologically.	 Now,	 the	 pertinent	 question	 is:	 what	 kind	 of	 “understanding”	 is	 this?	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 our	discussion	 of	 hermeneutic	 reflection,	 reflecting	 on	 Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being	 as	 the	 condition	 of	possibility	 for	 the	 being	 of	 entities	 and	 the	 world	 was	 not	 a	 theoretically	 detached	 method.	 For	 the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	is	a	matter	of	disclosing	one’s	own	factical	situation	by	staying	in	and	going	
along	with	 one’s	 factical	 life.	Moreover,	 since	 the	 ontological	 understanding	must	 be	wrested	 from	our	everyday	 interpretation	 and	 seized	 upon	 as	 our	 own	 existentiell	 possibility	 of	 authentic	 self-understanding,	the	existential	analytic	is	essentially	a	matter	of	awakening	to	one’s	factic	situation.	In	this	way,	then,	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	is	a	reflective	methodological	method	that	takes	its	departure	from	Dasein’s	factical	life	and	stays	within	it	in	order	to	disclose	and	awaken	to	one’s	factical	situation.			 Let	 us	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 question	 of	 anti-(naive-)realism.	 As	 we	 emphasized	 in	 Chapter	 2,	transcendental	idealism	can	be	negatively	characterized	as	anti-realism	or	anti-naive-realism	since	this	is	one	 of	 its	 important	 metaphysical	 implications.	 Such	 nomenclature	 underscores	 how	 transcendental	idealism	 prohibits	 our	 natural	 way	 of	 relating	 to	 the	 world.	 That	 this	 is	 a	 necessary	 counterpart	 to	Heidegger’s	transcendental	 idealism	should	already	be	clear	from	our	discussion	so	far.	But	we	can	also	see	 evidence	of	Heidegger’s	 anti-realism	 in	 §43	of	BT,	where	he	discusses	 the	problems	of	 realism	and	idealism.	 Realism,	 according	 to	 Heidegger,	 is	 the	 thesis	 that	 “the	 external	 world	 is	 Really	 present-at-hand.”118	Now,	 insofar	as	Dasein’s	being,	as	being-in-the-world,	can	disclose	entities	within	 the	world	as	present-at-hand,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 existential	 analytic	 of	 Dasein	 do	 not	 contradict	 the	 realism	 thesis.	However,	 the	 problem	 with	 the	 realist	 position	 is	 that	 it	 does	 not	 understand	 the	 external	 world	 as	
present-at-hand.	 As	 Heidegger	 says,	 “in	 realism	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 ontological	 understanding.” 119	Accordingly,	 instead	of	 trying	 to	 articulate	 the	ontological	meaning	of	 the	 real,	 “realism	 tries	 to	 explain	Reality	ontically	by	Real	connections	of	 interaction	between	things	that	are	Real.”120	In	this	way,	realism	does	not	understand	the	ontological	difference	and	therein	lies	the	fatal	sin	of	realism.			 On	the	other	hand,	idealism	is	said	to	have	an	advantage	in	principle,	that	is,	so	long	as	it	has	not	“misunderstood”	itself	as	psychological	idealism.	Psychological	idealism	fares	no	better	than	realism	since	
																																								 																				
118	SZ,	p.	207/251.	
119	SZ,	p.	207/251.	
120	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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it	 attempts	 to	 explain	 reality	 through	 an	 entity,	 namely	 the	 mind.	 But,	 according	 to	 Heidegger,	 when	idealism	maintains	that	reality	is	only	“in	the	consciousness,”	this	is	expressive	of	the	understanding	that	reality	 cannot	 be	 explained	 through	 entities.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 distancing	 itself	 from	 any	 first-order	attempt	to	explain	reality.	Therefore,	so	long	as	idealism	is	attentive	to	the	ontological	difference	between	entities	and	 their	being,	 it	 is	 said	 to	be	 in	a	better	position	 than	 realism.	 Indeed,	 as	we	already	saw,	he	even	 goes	 on	 to	 say	 that	 transcendental	 idealism	 is	 the	 “only	 correct	 possibility	 for	 a	 philosophical	problematic.”121	Nonetheless,	 so	 long	 as	 idealism,	 transcendental	 or	 not,	 stops	 short	 of	 clarifying	 the	meaning	of	the	being	of	“subject”	or	“consciousness”	such	that	 it	 is,	at	best,	described	negatively	as	“un-thing-like,”	it	is	said	to	be	“no	less	naive	in	its	method	than	the	most	grossly	militant	realism.”122	This	can	be	 understood	 as	 an	 implicit	 criticism	 of	 Kant’s	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 idealism,	 which	 has	supposedly	 failed	to	clarify	 the	ontological	sense	of	“subject”	and	“consciousness.”	Thus	Heidegger	says:	“[i]f	 the	 idealist	 thesis	 is	 to	 be	 followed	 consistently,	 the	 ontological	 analysis	 of	 consciousness	 itself	 is	prescribed	as	an	 inevitable	prior	 task.”123	Therefore,	we	can	say	 that	Heidegger’s	anti-realism	alters	our	relation	 to	 the	world	 not	 by	 adopting	 an	 idealist	 position	 that	 stops	 short	 of	 clarifying	 the	 ontological	sense	of	“subject”	and	“consciousness”	but	by	undertaking	an	ontological	analysis	of	Dasein.	In	the	course	of	 the	 analytic,	 we	 come	 to	 see	 the	 world	 through	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 (Dasein),	 one	 whose	ontological	 constitution,	 however,	 is	 articulated	 as	 disclosedness	 to	 the	 world,	 factical,	 and	 is	 always	already	projecting	 its	possibilities	upon	 the	world.	 In	 short,	we	come	 to	 see	 the	world	 through	Dasein’s	
being-in-the-world.		
2. Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	in	BT		 In	this	chapter,	we	have	been	examining	Heidegger’s	engagement	with	transcendental	philosophy	in	light	of	the	three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy.	In	the	course	of	the	investigation,	it	has	become	clear	 that	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 BT	 is	 transcendental	 insofar	 as	 it	 fulfills	 the	 three	 criteria:	 it	 is	
foundational	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 Dasein	 has	 transcendental	 priority	 over	 the	 world,	 it	 employs	
transcendental	reflection	to	disclose	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	and	it	brings	about	an	
alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	from	our	naive	belief	in	the	independent	existence	of	objects	and	the	world	to	an	understanding	that	world-disclosure	depends	on	Dasein’s	being.	At	the	same	time,	however,	
																																								 																				
121	SZ,	p.	208/251.	
122	SZ,	p.	208/252.	
123	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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we	have	also	seen	that	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	method	transforms	transcendental	philosophy	in	certain	respects.	 By	 way	 of	 conclusion,	 then,	 let	 us	 draw	 out	 the	 essence	 of	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	based	on	our	above	discussion.		 I	 believe	we	 can	 identify	 the	 core	 of	Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	philosophy	 in	 the	 radicalness	 of	 hermeneutic	 reflection.	 As	 we	 saw,	 hermeneutic	 reflection	 was	 the	disclosing	 of	 and	 awakening	 to	 one’s	 own	 factical	 situation.	 This	 specifically	 reflective	 character	 of	 the	hermeneutic	method	 transformed	 traditional	 forms	 of	 transcendental	 reflection	 in	 two	 essential	 ways.	
Firstly,	as	the	disclosing	of	one’s	factical	situation,	transcendental	reflection	could	no	longer	articulate	the	transcendental	 conditions	 in	 their	universal	 validity,	 something	 that	was	 essential	 to	Kant’s	notion	of	 a	priori.	 To	 a	 certain	 extent,	 Husserl’s	 phenomenology	 had	 already	 made	 this	 transformation	 since	phenomenological	 reflection	 discloses	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 meaning,	 which	 already	 entails	paying	 heed	 to	 the	 contingencies	 inherent	 in	 our	 embodied	 and	 embedded	 aspects	 of	 subjectivity.124	Furthermore,	since	the	phenomenological	method	is	a	“thoroughly	intuitively	disclosing	method,”	that	is,	“intuitive	 in	 its	 point	 of	 departure	 and	 in	 everything	 it	 discloses,”	 phenomenological	 findings	 are	 not	incorrigible	and	infallible,	as	Drummond	has	pointed	out.125	Rather,	they	are	essentially	 inconclusive	and	always	liable	to	revision.	In	contrast	to	Kant’s	“constructively	inferring	[schliessende]	method,”	as	Husserl	put	it,	phenomenology’s	“thoroughly	intuitively	disclosing	[erschliessende]	method”	can	be	said	to	be	more	attentive	 to	 the	 circular	 nature	 of	 transcendental	 reflection,	 i.e.	 that	 “transcendental	 inquiry	 operates	always	 from	within	 experience	 and	 by	 appeal	 to	 experience.”126	In	 this	way,	 phenomenology	 undercuts	Kant’s	appeal	to	the	a	priori	structures	of	subjectivity	as	unchanging	and	universally	valid.			 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	 phenomenology,	 however,	 radicalizes	 Husserl’s	 phenomenological	method	 by	 underlining	 the	 circular	 nature	 of	 transcendental-hermeneutic	 reflection	as	 the	disclosing	of	
one’s	own	factical	situation.127	In	other	words,	hermeneutic	 reflection	does	not	 attempt	 to	 abstract	 from	our	everyday	way	of	being	in	the	world	in	order	to	disclose	the	transcendental	dimensions	but,	rather,	it	
discloses	itself	in	its	transcendental	constitution.	Thus,	since	there	is	no	regress	from	the	natural	attitude	of	
																																								 																				
124	For	the	transcendental	dimensions	of	embodiment	and	intersubjectivity	in	Husserl,	see	for	example:	Zahavi	(1996),	
Heinämaa	(2007),	Taipale	(2014).		
125	Drummond	1991.	Cf.	Hua	VI,	p.	118/115-116.	
126	Malpas	1997,	p.	16.	
127	Recently,	Simo	Pulkkinen	has	argued	that,	for	Husserl,	transcendental	subjectivity	and	its	constitutive	functioning	are	
determined	from	the	ground	up	by	a	radical	historicity	and	facticity.	More	specifically,	he	attempts	to	show	that	the	
interplay	of	the	two	basic	modes	of	consciousness,	activity	and	passivity,	“disclose[s]	transcendental	subjectivity	as	a	
fundamentally	developing	being	–	as	a	being	that	is	in	its	constitutive	functioning	dynamically	grounded	upon	its	own	past	
experiential	life	and,	correlatively,	situated	in	the	world	that	it	has	already,	at	any	given	moment,	learned	to	know	by	this	
past	experience”	(2014,	p.	121).	
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the	 human	 being	 to	 the	 transcendentally	 pure	 consciousness,	 the	 problem	of	 how	we	 can	 at	 once	 be	 a	subject	 for	 the	 world	 and	 an	 object	 in	 the	 world	 does	 not	 arise.	 For	 it	 belongs	 to	 the	 ontological	constitution	of	Dasein	that	it	is	at	once	thrown	into	the	world	and	that	which	allows	entities	and	the	world	to	be	 there	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Furthermore,	 since,	 for	Heidegger,	 the	 transcendental	 turn	 is	 essentially	 a	turn	within	the	factical	situation	of	Dasein,	the	problem	of	“including”	the	concrete	dimensions	of	human	life	such	as	embodiment	and	 intersubjectivity	again	do	not	arise	since	Dasein	 is	essentially	concrete.	As	Malpas	has	put	it,	hermeneutics	is	“essentially	a	matter	of	finding	oneself	in	one’s	situatedness”128	and	so,	transcendental-hermeneutic	 reflection	 is	 essentially	 a	 matter	 of	 disclosing	 one’s	 transcendental	constitution	 in	 one’s	 situatedness.	 Transcendental	 conditions	 and	 the	 constituting	 transcendental	subjectivity	are,	accordingly,	historically	and	factically	contingent	through	and	through.		 Secondly,	as	an	awakening	to	one’s	factical	situation,	transcendental	reflection	is	transformed	from	a	 theoretically	 detached	 method	 into	 an	 existentialist	 appropriating	 method,	 one	 that	 calls	 for	 an	awakening	 to	 one’s	 own	 factic	 life.	 The	 second-order	 reflection	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	experience	 becomes	 a	 matter	 of	 countering	 the	 momentum	 of	 everyday	 fallenness	 and	 coming	 to	 an	understanding	of	one’s	being	as	essentially	related	to	the	world	as	both	thrown	and	projecting,	being-in-the-world	 and	 world-disclosing.	 Accordingly,	 engaging	 in	 transcendental	 thinking	 does	 not	 amount	 to	engaging	 in	 a	 second-order	 reflection	 that	 can	 somehow	 be	 detached	 from	 our	 first-order	 engagement	with	 the	 world.	 While	 transcendental-hermeneutic	 thinking	 is	 a	 second-order	 reflection,	 it	 does	 not	detach	 from	 our	 everyday	 engagement	 with	 the	 world	 but,	 rather,	 takes	 hold	 of	 such	 engagement	 to	exhibit	 it	 anew	 in	 its	 transcendental-ontological	 structure.	 Therefore,	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	is	nothing	less	than	a	result	of	the	acknowledgment	that,	on	the	 one	 hand,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 cannot	 escape	 the	 bounds	 of	 our	 factical	 situation	 and	 on	 the	other	hand,	it	belongs	to	our	very	facticity	that	we	can	alter	our	everyday	relation	to	the	world	and	come	to	see	the	world	through	Dasein’s	being-in-the-world.		 		 	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
128	Malpas	(forthcoming),	p.	14.	
132	
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Chapter	5:	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	in	the	late	1920s	
Introduction			 The	purpose	of	this	chapter	is	to	prepare	the	grounds	for	the	following	chapter	where	we	will	be	examining	 Nishida’s	 critical	 engagement	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy	 in	 his	 early	 theory	 of	 basho.	Nishida’s	“theory	of	basho”	(bashoron1)	was	first	presented	in	an	article	published	in	1926	titled	“Basho.”	After	writing	this	article,	Nishida	wrote	to	his	student	that	he	felt	he	had	reached	his	“final	standpoint.”2	In	a	certain	sense,	this	was	not	entirely	correct	since,	in	the	1930s	and	‘40s,	he	came	to	rework	some	aspects	of	the	theory	in	light	of	his	growing	interest	in	the	social	and	historical	world.	Nonetheless,	his	impression	was	right	in	that	the	idea	of	basho	remained	central	for	the	rest	of	his	philosophical	career.			 For	the	purpose	of	 the	present	work,	 I	will	not	be	concerned	with	the	 later	developments	of	 the	theory	of	basho	 in	 the	1930s	and	 ‘40s.	There	are	two	reasons	 for	this	delimitation.	First	of	all,	Nishida’s	engagement	with	transcendental	thinking	is	more	evident	in	the	earlier	stage	when	Nishida’s	focus	was	on	epistemological	problematics.	Second,	 the	question	of	whether	or	not	the	 later	developments	also	entail	the	reworking	of	the	transcendental	is	secondary	to	the	question	of	whether	the	earlier	theory	of	basho	is	transcendental	or	not.	Accordingly,	I	have	delimited	the	scope	of	my	investigation	not	because	I	think	the	
																																								 																				
1	My	rendering	of	“bashoron”	(場所論)	as	“theory	of	basho”	may	be	misleading	in	the	sense	that	“theory”	in	English	has	a	
more	specific	meaning	than	“ron”	(論)	in	Japanese.	In	fact,	“theory”	would	more	commonly	be	a	translation	of	“riron”	
(literally,	rational	view).	Thus,	for	a	Japanese	speaker,	“theory	of	basho”	may	sound	more	like	a	rendering	of	“basho	no	
riron.”	Nishida	never	used	this	phrase	and	probably	rightly	so	insofar	as	“riron”	connotes	more	of	a	scientific	theory	than	a	
philosophical	theory	(e.g.	sōtaisei	riron,	theory	of	relativity;	keizai	riron,	economic	theory,	etc.).	The	“ron”	in	“bashoron”	
literally	means	opinion	or	view	(as	in	jiron	meaning	one’s	own	opinion	and	yoron	public	opinion)	as	well	as	discussion	and	
reasoning	(as	in	giron	meaning	discussion	and	seiron	a	fair	or	sound	argument).	When	one	combines	this	character	“ron”	
with	“ri,”	meaning	reason	or	principle,	one	can	get	two	words	with	different	meanings:	riron	(theory)	and	ronri	(logic).	
Interestingly,	although	Nishida	never	used	“riron”	to	characterize	his	philosophy	of	basho,	he	does	speak	of	“basho	no	
ronri”	or	“bashoteki	ronri”	(logic	of	basho)	to	refer	to	his	systematic	attempt	to	articulate	the	structure	of	reality	based	on	
the	concept	of	basho.	The	difference	between	“bashoron”	and	“basho	no	ronri”	is	subtle,	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	
Nishida	himself	clearly	distinguished	between	the	two	phrases.	However,	one	could	argue	that	Nishida	employed	the	
latter	when	he	wanted	to	emphasize	that	his	philosophy	of	basho	is	a	kind	of	“logic.”	One	should	not,	however,	
understand	this	emphasis	on	logic	as	entailing	that	Nishida	was	primarily	interested	in	the	structure	of	arguments,	as	
formal	and	modern	logic	are.	Nishida’s	“basho	no	ronri”	is	rather	interested	in	the	logic	of	reality	or	the	structures	of	
reality.	Nishida	was	emphatic,	especially	in	the	later	period,	that	his	“basho	no	ronri”	is	a	“predicate-based	logic”	
(jyutsugoteki	ronri)	that	stands	in	opposition	to	the	“subject-based	logic”	(shugoteki	ronri)	or	“object-logic”	(taishō	ronri)	
that	he	saw	as	typical	in	Aristotle	and	that,	according	to	Nishida,	has	pervaded	the	history	of	Western	philosophy.	For	my	
purposes	in	this	work,	I	have	opted	to	refer	to	Nishida’s	systematic	philosophy	of	basho	as	“bashoron”	since	I	believe	the	
connotation	is	slightly	more	comprehensive	than	“basho	no	ronri.”	Furthermore,	I	want	to	emphasize	that	my	rendering	of	
bashoron	as	“theory	of	basho”	should	accordingly	be	understood	in	the	broad	sense	of	the	word,	theory.	In	fact,	
“bashoron”	can	also	be	rendered	as	something	like	“basho-logy”	since	when	used	as	a	suffix,	“ron”	is	often	rendered	as	“-
logy”	(for	example,	hōhōron	means	methodology).	But	I	have	avoided	such	neologism	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.	
2	Cf.	Nishida’s	letter	(dated	June	8,	1926)	to	his	student	Mutai	Risaku	studying	in	Heidelberg	at	the	time	written	soon	after	
the	initial	publication	of	the	essay,	“Basho”:	NKZ	18,	pp.	303-304.	
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later	 developments	 are	 irrelevant	 for	my	 purposes	 but	 only	 because	 the	 earlier	 stage	 is	more	 directly	relevant	and	primary	for	determining	the	transcendental	orientation	of	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho.		 Therefore,	 the	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 to	 articulate	Nishida’s	 theory	 of	basho	 in	 its	 early	 stage	 of	development	in	the	late	1920s.	I	will	begin	by	briefly	outlining	the	trajectory	of	Nishida’s	thought	up	until	the	mid-1920s,	namely	 from	 the	earliest	 stage	of	 “pure	experience”	 to	 the	 subsequent	 stage	of	 “jikaku.”	While	Nishida	 soon	dismisses	 these	positions	as	 inadequate,	 since	his	efforts	 culminate	 in	his	 theory	of	
basho,	 it	 is	nonetheless	essential	that	we	understand	the	underlying	problematics	and	issues.	Therefore,	although	 I	will	 not	 go	 into	 the	details,	 I	will	 focus	on	 the	main	points,	 problematics	 and	 issues	of	 these	earlier	positions.	Then,	I	will	present	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	in	two	parts.	First,	we	will	look	at	its	initial	presentation	 in	 the	 latter	half	 of	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing	 (1927).	Then,	we	will	 look	at	how	Nishida	further	articulated	this	theory	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals	(1930).3			
1. Towards	the	theory	of	basho		 Nishida	Kitarō4	(1870-1945),	 the	most	 influential	 Japanese	philosopher	of	 the	twentieth	century,	instigated	the	philosophical	movement	known	as	the	Kyoto	School.	He	belongs	to	the	first	generation	of	thinkers	of	the	Meiji	period	(1868-1912)	who	contributed	to	importing	Western	ideas	to	Japan,	including	philosophy	 as	 an	 academic	 discipline,	 after	 over	 two	 centuries	 of	 national	 isolation.	 What	 marks	 the	difference	from	other	Meiji	thinkers,	however,	is	that	he	did	not	stop	at	mere	importation.	Rather,	Nishida	embarked	 on	 the	 task	 of	 constructing	 an	 original	 philosophical	 system	 that	 critically	 engages	 with	Western	philosophy	in	light	of	the	Eastern	intellectual	heritage,	particularly	that	of	Mahayana	Buddhism.5	It	is	in	this	sense	that	Nishida	deserves	to	be	called	the	first	modern	Japanese	philosopher.6	
																																								 																				
3	Though	this	book	was	published	in	1930,	it	is	a	collection	of	essays	published	between	1928	and	1929.	
4	Japanese	names	are	written	in	the	Japanese	order	of	family	name,	followed	by	given	name.	
5	In	this	way,	Nishida	can	be	said	to	have	developed	his	philosophy	between	the	East	and	the	West	and,	thus,	deserves	to	
be	called	an	“intercultural	philosopher.”	Bret	Davis	has	argued	that	Nishida,	as	well	as	other	Kyoto	school	thinkers,	are	
“philosophers	of	interculturality”	in	both	senses	of	the	genitive	in	this	phrase:	“[t]hey	thought	from	out	of	their	experience	
of	the	meeting	of	Eastern	and	Western	cultures	in	modern	Japan;	and	they	thought	about	what	a	cross-cultural	encounter	
does	and	should	entail”	(2011,	p.	46).	See	also	his	essay	“Opening	up	the	West:	Toward	Dialogue	with	Japanese	Philosophy”	
where	he	articulates	the	“inherently	cross-cultural	nature	of	Japanese	philosophy”	in	contrast	to	the	“lingering	Ameri-
Eurocentrism	of	Western	philosophy”	(2013,	p.	57).	For	more	on	Nishida	as	an	intercultural	philosopher,	see:	Elberfeld	
(1999).	
6	This	point	raises	the	long-discussed	question	in	Japan	of	whether	or	not	there	was	“philosophy”	in	pre-modern	Japan.	
Already	in	the	Meiji	period,	Nakae	Chōmin	(1847-1901)	famously	claimed	that	“there	is	no	such	thing	as	philosophy	in	
Japan,	neither	in	the	past	nor	in	the	present”	(Cf.	Chōmin	1983,	p.	155,	my	translation).	For	discussions	of	this,	see:	
Maraldo	&	Nakajima	(2011)	and	Maraldo	(1995).		
135	
	
1.1. Stages	in	Nishida’s	thought		 Let	 us	 first	 make	 note	 of	 the	 period	 I	 am	 focusing	 on	 in	 the	 trajectory	 of	 Nishida’s	 thought.	Nishida’s	 philosophy	 has	 often	 been	 divided	 into	 several	 stages	 or	 periods	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	development	of	his	ideas.	Commentators	diverge	in	the	way	they	divide	the	stages,	from	two	or	three	to	as	many	as	five	or	six	stages,	depending	on	their	specific	interests	and	interpretations.	While	it	is	common	to	distinguish	 the	 early,	 mid	 and	 later	 periods	 of	 Nishida’s	 thought,	 there	 is	 disagreement	 about	 where	exactly	 the	 distinctions	 are	 to	 be	 drawn.	 Nishida	 himself	 distinguished	 several	 stages	 in	 the	 preface	written	for	the	reprint	of	the	Inquiry	a	quarter	century	after	its	first	publication:	In	 Intuition	 and	 Reflection	 in	 Self-awareness	 through	 the	 mediation	 of	 Fichte's	 Tathandlung,	 the	standpoint	of	pure	experience	developed	into	the	standpoint	of	absolute	will.	Then,	in	the	second	half	of	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing,	through	the	mediation	of	Greek	philosophy,	it	took	a	turn	to	the	idea	of	“basho”.	There,	I	 found	the	clue	to	 lay	the	logical	base	for	my	ideas.	Then	the	idea	of	“basho”	was	concretized	as	the	“dialectical	universal”	and	that	standpoint	was	given	a	direct	expression,	“acting-intuition.”	7	Depending	on	how	one	interprets	the	last	sentence,	one	can	extract	four	or	five	stages	that	correspond	to	four	or	five	main	concepts:	(1)	pure	experience,	(2)	absolute	will,	(3)	basho,	(4)	dialectical	universal,	(5)	acting-intuition.	 John	Krummel	 follows	Nishida’s	general	outline	and	sticks	 to	a	 fourfold	division,	 taking	the	 last	 two	concepts	to	constitute	one	period.	Krummel	accordingly	takes	the	 first	 four	concepts	above	and	distinguishes	the	stages	of	Nishida’s	lifework	in	the	following	way:	(1)	the	psychologistic	period	(pure	experience),	(2)	the	voluntaristic	period	(absolute	will	and	jikaku),	(3)	the	epistemological	period	(basho),	and	(4)	 the	dialectical	period	(dialectical	universal,	historical	world,	acting-intuition).	8	According	to	this	division,	the	first	two	periods	would	supposedly	comprise	the	early	period,	the	third	would	be	called	the	mid	period	and	the	fourth,	the	later	period	of	Nishida’s	thought.		 Ueda	Shizuteru,	a	prominent	scholar	of	Nishida	and	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	last	Kyoto	School	philosopher,	has	 followed	a	more	simple	 threefold	division	 in	his	presentation	of	Nishida’s	 thought:	 (1)	pure	 experience,	 (2)	 jikaku,	 and	 (3)	basho.	 Ueda	 emphasizes	 that	while	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 set	 these	 three	stages	out	 as	distinct	phases,	 they	 are	not	 to	be	 taken	as	 isolated	 stages	but	must	be	understood	more	continuously,	 as	one	phase	unfolding	 into	 the	other	phases.	More	specifically,	Nishida’s	philosophy	as	a	whole,	according	to	Ueda,	is	the	articulation	of	the	idea	of	pure	experience.	As	he	says:	“[a]lready	in	pure	
																																								 																				
7	NKZ	1,	pp.	6-7/xxxii-xxxiii.	
8	Krummel	2015,	pp.	7-8.	
136	
	
experience,	the	movement	towards	jikaku	and	from	jikaku	to	basho	was	already	at	play.”9	Therefore,	Ueda	understands	Nishida’s	philosophy	as	the	dynamic	development	of	the	fundamental	understanding	already	implicit	in	the	idea	of	pure	experience.	As	he	says:	“[w]hen	one	considers	Nishida’s	philosophy,	one	must	look	at	the	whole	dynamic	development	that	at	least	contains	the	turn	from	pure	experience	to	jikaku	and	then	to	basho.”10		 The	difference	between	Krummel’s	and	Ueda’s	 interpretations	basically	comes	down	to	how	one	interprets	the	nature	of	the	later	development	of	the	theory	of	basho	in	the	1930s	and	‘40s.	According	to	Krummel,	 the	 later	 development	 reflects	 a	 significant	 change	 from	his	 early	 theory	 of	basho	 in	 the	 late	1920s.		For	Ueda,	however,	the	basic	structure	of	the	theory	of	basho	remains	throughout.	For	the	purpose	of	this	work,	however,	it	will	not	be	necessary	to	determine	whether	Nishida’s	development	in	the	1930s	is	a	significant	change	in	his	thought	or	not.	For	my	sole	focus	in	this	work	is	his	early	theory	of	basho	in	the	 late	 1920s.	 Accordingly,	 it	will	 be	 sufficient	 to	 acknowledge	 that,	 from	 the	 1930s,	 Nishida	 reworks	some	aspects	of	the	theory	of	basho	without	determining	what	implications	these	reworkings	may	have	on	his	early	theory	of	basho.	We	will	thus	work	with	a	distinction	between	the	early	and	later	theory	of	basho	while	leaving	open	the	question	of	whether	or	not	this	indicates	a	fourth	stage	in	Nishida’s	thought.			
1.2. Pure	experience		 Nishida’s	 first	attempt	 to	systematically	construct	his	philosophy	was	made	 in	his	maiden	work,	
An	 Inquiry	 into	 the	 Good,	 of	 1911	 (hereafter,	 Inquiry).	 In	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 opening	 passage,	Nishida	explains	his	idea	of	“pure	experience”	(junsui	keiken):	To	experience	means	to	know	facts	just	as	they	are,	to	know	in	accordance	with	facts	by	completely	relinquishing	one's	own	fabrications.	What	we	usually	refer	to	as	experience	is	adulterated	with	some	sort	 of	 thought,	 so	 by	 pure	 I	 am	 referring	 to	 the	 state	 of	 experience	 just	 as	 it	 is	without	 the	 least	addition	of	deliberative	discrimination.	The	moment	of	seeing	a	color	or	hearing	a	sound,	for	example,	is	prior	not	only	to	the	thought	that	the	color	or	sound	is	the	activity	of	an	external	object	or	that	one	is	 sensing	 it,	 but	 also	 to	 the	 judgment	 of	 what	 the	 color	 or	 sound	 might	 be.	 In	 this	 regard,	 pure	experience	 is	 identical	 with	 direct	 experience.	 When	 one	 directly	 experiences	 one's	 own	 state	 of	consciousness,	there	is	not	yet	subject	or	object,	and	knowing	and	its	object	are	completely	unified.11	
																																								 																				
9	Ueda	1991,	p.	361.	All	quotations	taken	from	works	in	Japanese	are	my	own	translations	unless	otherwise	specified.	
10	Ibid.,	p.	303.	
11	NKZ	1,	p.	9/3-4.	
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As	he	states	here,	pure	experience	is	our	direct	experience	of	reality	prior	to	the	subject-object	distinction.	For	example,	 it	 is	 that	experience	 in	which	one	simply	enjoys	a	piece	of	music	as	 it	unfolds	without	any	thought	about	what	kind	of	music	 it	 is	or	 that	 I	am	currently	 listening	 to	 the	music.	Prior	 to	conceptual	understanding	or	any	act	of	reflection,	the	reality	of	the	music	is	experienced	just	as	it	manifests	itself	to	consciousness.12 	To	 give	 another	 example,	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 reading	 an	 exciting	 novel,	 there	 is	 no	conjecturing	 thought	 about	 the	 author’s	 intentions	 or	 concerning	 idea	 that	 I	 should	be	 reading	Husserl	instead.	As	soon	as	these	thoughts	arise,	I	am	taken	out	of	the	state	of	pure	experience.	Now,	the	aim	of	the	
Inquiry	was	to	show	that	this	kind	of	direct,	undifferentiated	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	duality	is	the	“sole	reality”	from	which	the	rest	of	reality	and	experience	is	derived.	As	he	says	in	the	preface:	“I	would	like	to	explain	everything	on	the	basis	of	pure	experience	as	the	sole	reality.”13			 But,	 when	 put	 this	 way,	 a	 methodological	 tension	 inevitably	 arises.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 pure	experience	 is	 said	 to	be	pre-conceptual	 and	pre-reflective.	 It	 is	 prior	 to	 all	 differentiations	 that	 arise	 in	reflection	and	conceptual	articulation.	Such	pure	experience	is	said	to	be	the	sole	reality.	Yet,	on	the	other	hand,	Nishida	is	attempting	to	“explain,”	that	is,	conceptually	articulate	that	such	pure	experience	lies	at	the	 ground	 of	 all	 reality.	 This	 means	 that	 pure	 experience	 cannot	 merely	 be	 prior	 to	 conceptual	understanding	and	reflection	but	must	also	contain	the	possibility	of	philosophical	articulation.	For	how	else	can	we	talk	about	pure	experience	being	the	ground	of	reality?	So	then,	without	clarifying	the	ground	of	 the	 possibility	 of	 philosophical	 reflection,	 the	 philosophical	 standpoint	 of	 pure	 experience	 remains	unsatisfactory.	Indeed,	as	has	been	pointed	out	by	some	commentators,	one	of	the	main	problems	with	the	
Inquiry	 is	 that	 this	problem	was	 left	undiscussed.14	As	 such,	when	reading	 the	 Inquiry,	 the	 reader	 is	 left	with	a	 sense	 that	 the	work	 is	highly	 speculative	as	Nishida	does	not	 clarify	how	 he	 could	 say	 that	pure	experience	is	the	“sole	reality.”		 This	 methodological	 problem	 is	 coupled	 with	 a	 more	 general	 concern	 regarding	 Nishida’s	explanation	 of	 knowledge.	 In	 the	 Inquiry,	 Nishida	 argued	 that	 pure	 experience	 is	 the	 undifferentiated	ground	 that	 provides	 unity	 to	 the	 various	 differentiations	 in	more	 derivative	 forms	 of	 our	 experience,	including	judgments.	As	such,	pure	experience	is	said	to	be	the	“unifying	act”	(tōitsu	sayō)	or	“that	which	unifies	reality”	(tōitsuteki	arumono).	Thus	Nishida	says:	“[a]t	the	base	of	thinking	there	is	always	a	certain	
																																								 																				
12	Compare	Nishida’s	following	depiction	of	pure	experience:	“[j]ust	like	when	we	become	enraptured	by	exquisite	music,	
forget	ourselves	and	everything	around	us,	and	experience	the	universe	as	one	melodious	sound,	true	reality	presents	
itself	in	the	moment	of	direct	experience.	Should	the	thought	arise	that	the	music	is	the	vibration	of	air	or	that	one	is	
listening	to	music,	at	that	point	one	has	already	separated	oneself	from	true	reality	because	that	thought	derives	from	
reflection	and	thinking	divorced	from	the	true	state	of	the	reality	of	the	music”	(NKZ	1,	pp.	59-60/48).	
13	NKZ	1,	p.	4/1990,	p.	xxx.		
14	Cf.	Ueda	1991,	pp.	166-169,	pp.279-280;	Nitta	1998,	pp.	5-10.		
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unifying	reality	 [tōitsuteki	arumono]	 that	we	can	know	only	 through	 intuition.	 Judgment	arises	 from	the	analysis	 of	 this	 intuition.”15	But	 if	 this	 “unifying	 reality”	 is	 a	 kind	of	 intuitive	 experience,	 how	could	 the	objective	 validity	 or	 knowledge	be	 grounded	 in	 such	 experiential	 fact?	 Is	Nishida	here	 trying	 to	 reduce	cognition	 to	 psychological	 processes?	 If	 so,	 is	 he	 not	 falling	 into	 psychologism,	 namely	 misidentifying	logical	laws	with	psychological	laws?16			 To	begin	with,	pure	experience	clearly	cannot	be	identified	with	a	psychological	state	since	to	do	so	would	 already	 be	 to	 presuppose	 the	 subject-object	 duality.	 Nevertheless,	 Nishida	 almost	 exclusively	employs	psychological	language	in	his	explanations	of	pure	experience	such	that	it	is	difficult	to	see	what	else	 it	 could	 be	 but	 a	 psychological	 state.	 For	 example,	Nishida	 claims	 that	 the	 unifying	 act	 or	 unifying	reality	 is	normally	“subconscious”	and	can	only	be	“intuited”	 in	specific	 forms	of	our	experience	such	as	the	know-how	of	 skillful	 coping	or	 the	artist’s	 creation	of	a	work	without	 the	 least	bit	of	deliberation.17	Accordingly,	unifying	acts	are	explained	as	a	kind	of	subconscious	state	 that	can	only	be	brought	 to	our	awareness	 in	 specific	 kinds	 of	 experience.18	But	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 why	 such	subconscious	 or	 special	 experience	 should	 be	 the	necessary	 ground	 of	 reality	 and	 knowledge.	Nishida’s	problem,	 then,	 was	 that	 his	 psychologistic	 explanations	 were	 not	 capable	 of	 demonstrating	 how	 pure	experience	is	the	necessary	ground	of	the	unity	of	reality	and	our	knowledge.19			 Nishida’s	main	problem	in	the	Inquiry,	then,	was	that	it	was	not	clear	how	pre-conceptual	and	pre-reflective	 pure	 experience	 could	 be	 said	 to	 ground	 conceptual	 knowledge.	 In	 order	 to	 provide	 a	philosophically	 grounded	 account	 of	 how	 “pure	 experience	 is	 the	 sole	 reality,”	 Nishida	 needed	 to	
																																								 																				
15	NKZ	1,	p.	51/41.	
16	Nishida’s	understanding	of	psychologism	was	mainly	based	on	the	neo-Kantian	Heinrich	Rickert’s	critique	of	
psychologistic	approaches	to	epistemology.	A	few	months	after	the	publication	of	Inquiry,	Nishida	published	an	essay	
titled	“On	the	Claims	of	the	Pure	Logicists	in	Epistemology”	(1911).	There,	he	presents	Rickert’s	arguments	in	Der	
Gegenstand	der	Erkenntnis,	2nd	edition	(1904)	and	“Zwei	Wege	der	Erkenntnistheorie.	Transcendentalpsychologie	und	
Transcendentallogik”	(1909).	In	the	essay,	he	also	mentions	Husserl	as	another	“pure	logicist”	but	does	not	refer	to	his	
critique	of	psychologism.	In	fact,	Nishida’s	knowledge	of	Husserl	seems	to	have	been	limited	at	the	time.	As	he	says,	“[a]s	
far	as	I	can	tell,	Rickert	and	Husserl	broadly	belong	to	the	same	camp.”	He	also	notes	his	impression	that	Rickert,	coming	
from	Kant,	better	articulates	epistemological	problems	(NKZ	1,	p.	222).	
17	Cf.	NKZ	1,	p.	43/32.	Here,	Nishida	speaks	of	this	ideal	intuition	as	a	form	of	“intellectual	intuition”:	“[j]ust	as	ordinary	
perception	is	considered	merely	passive,	so	is	intellectual	intuition	considered	a	state	of	passive	contemplation;	however,	
a	true	intellectual	intuition	is	the	unifying	activity	in	pure	experience.	It	is	a	grasp	of	life,	like	having	the	knack	of	an	art	or,	
more	profoundly,	the	aesthetic	spirit.	For	example,	when	inspiration	arises	in	a	painter	and	the	brush	moves	
spontaneously,	a	unifying	reality	is	operating	behind	this	complex	activity.”	
18	Cf.	Nitta	1998,	p.	9.	
19	Nishida	later	admits	that	the	standpoint	of	pure	experience	was	in	some	sense	psychologistic.	In	the	preface	to	the	new	
edition	of	the	Inquiry	in	1936,	he	writes:	“[l]ooking	at	it	from	today,	the	standpoint	in	this	work	may	be	called	the	
standpoint	of	consciousness.	It	may	also	be	called	psychologistic.	Such	criticisms	are	inevitable.	Nonetheless,	even	then,	
what	lay	deep	down	in	my	thoughts	were	not	merely	psychological”	(NKZ	1,	p.	6/xxxi-xxxii).	
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understand	this	ground	of	reality	not	merely	as	pre-conceptual	and	pre-reflective	but	also	as	including	the	possibility	of	grounding	knowledge.	Together	with	this,	he	also	needed	to	develop	a	philosophical	method	that	clears	him	of	psychologistic	tendencies.	In	fact,	all	of	Nishida’s	subsequent	works	can	be	understood	as	efforts	to	resolve	these	very	issues	that	sprung	from	the	Inquiry.			 The	 two	 pressing	 questions	 that	 would	 occupy	 Nishida	 after	 the	 Inquiry	 were:	 how	 could	
knowledge	 be	 grounded	 in	 the	 experience	 prior	 to	 the	 subject-object	 split?	 And	 what	 is	 the	 nature	 of	
philosophical	 reflection	 that	articulates	 this	grounding	 relation?	 Nishida	 eventually	 stops	 using	 the	 term	“pure	 experience”	 and,	 instead,	 attempts	 to	 resolve	 these	 issues	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 jikaku	(self-awareness).	This,	however,	will	also	end	in	failure.	The	resolution	of	this	problem	had	to	wait	until	his	theory	of	basho.	But,	before	we	turn	to	basho,	let	us	briefly	run	through	his	idea	of	jikaku,	from	which	his	idea	of	basho	emerged.			
1.3. Jikaku	
	 Soon	 after	 the	 Inquiry,	Nishida	 came	 to	 formulate	his	 problem	 in	 terms	of	 the	 relation	between	“intuition”	and	“reflection.”	By	“intuition,”	Nishida	means	the	experience	of	the	unity	between	knower	and	known.	“Reflection,”	on	the	other	hand,	is	a	kind	of	experience	that	disrupts	this	unity	and	brings	out	the	differentiation	between	knower	and	known.	Thus,	Nishida	says	at	the	beginning	of	Intuition	and	Reflection	
in	Self-awareness	(1917):	
Intuition	is	a	consciousness	of	unbroken	progression,	of	reality	just	as	it	is,	wherein	subject	and	object	are	 not	 as	 yet	 divided	 and	 that	 which	 knows	 and	 that	 which	 is	 known	 are	 one.	 Reflection	 is	 a	consciousness	which,	standing	outside	of	this	progression,	turns	around	and	views	it.	[…]	But	how	is	such	reflection	possible	since	we	can	never	leave	the	actuality	of	intuition?	How	is	reflection	related	to	intuition?20		According	to	Nishida,	even	when	reflection	brings	about	this	differentiation	between	knower	and	known,	one	does	not	thereby	leave	the	“actuality	of	intuition,”	that	is,	the	experience	of	their	unity.	But	then,	the	questions	arise:	how	is	reflection	possible?	And	what	is	its	relation	to	intuition?		 Right	after	the	above	quotation,	Nishida	states	that	this	relation	can	be	clarified	by	examining	the	structure	 of	 “jikaku”	 or	 “self-awareness.”	 By	 “jikaku,”	 Nishida	 has	 in	 mind	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 self-awareness	whereby	I	am	not	merely	pre-reflectively	self-aware	but,	rather,	I	am	aware	of	myself	through	
																																								 																				
20	NKZ	2,	p.	15/3.	
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reflection.	This	kind	of	self-awareness	is	taken	as	the	clue	to	understanding	the	relation	between	intuition	and	 reflection	 since,	 in	 jikaku,	 I	 reflect	 on	 myself	 while,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 I	 am	 intuitively	 aware	 that	knower	and	known	are	one,	i.e.	“I”	am	“myself.”	In	this	way,	intuition	and	reflection	are	two	moments	in	the	 structure	of	 jikaku.	But	given	 that	 intuition	and	 reflection	are	 somehow	 internally	 related	 in	 jikaku,	how	does	this	structure	of	self-awareness	articulate	the	relation	between	them	in	general?			 As	Nishida	expressly	states	 in	the	preface	to	 Intuition	and	Reflection	in	Self-awareness	 (hereafter,	
Intuition	and	Reflection),	his	aim	in	these	essays	was	to	rethink	reality	in	light	of	the	“structure	of	the	self-aware	 system”	 (jikakuteki	 taikei	 no	 keishiki).	 In	 other	 words,	 instead	 of	 starting	 with	 pure	 experience,	Nishida	now	starts	with	the	idea	of	jikaku	and	seeks	to	ground	reality	and	knowledge	based	on	this	idea.		The	work	is	a	collection	of	essays	published	between	1913	and	1917	and	is	a	result	of	his	arduous	efforts	in	this	attempt.	In	doing	so,	he	engages	with	a	wide	range	of	thinkers	from	Bergson	to	Cohen,	Husserl	and	also	Fichte,	which	also	contributes	to	the	difficulty	of	the	text.	After	these	years	of	continuous	thinking	and	rethinking,	Nishida	was	 to	confess	 that,	at	 the	end	of	 the	 journey,	he	had	not	succeeded	 in	what	he	had	attempted	 to	 do.21	Yet,	 the	 idea	 of	 jikaku	 was	 to	 remain	 pivotal	 for	 Nishida	 even	 after	 he	 gives	 up	 his	position	in	Intuition	and	Reflection.	This	is	evident	in	the	fact	that	the	term	“jikaku”	remained	a	key	term	for	 Nishida	 throughout	 his	 subsequent	 works,	 unlike	 “pure	 experience,”	 which	 he	 eventually	 stopped	using	after	the	Inquiry.	For	our	purposes,	it	will	not	be	necessary	to	go	into	the	details	of	the	work.	Instead,	let	us	clarify	the	following	two	points	which	are	important	for	understanding	the	transition	to	the	theory	of	basho:	(1)	the	meaning	of	the	Japanese	word	“jikaku”	has	unique	connotations	that	are	not	present	in	its	English	 translations,	 “self-awareness”	or	 “self-consciousness”	and	(2)	 through	 the	work	of	 Josiah	Royce,	Nishida	came	to	understand	jikaku	as	a	“self-representative	system.”			
																																								 																				
21	In	the	preface	to	Intuition	and	Reflection,	he	says:	“[t]his	work	is	a	document	of	a	hard-fought	battle	of	thought.	I	must	
admit	that	after	many	tortuous	turns	I	have	finally	been	unable	to	arrive	at	any	new	ideas	or	solutions”	(NKZ	2,	p.	11/xxiii).	
In	the	preface	to	the	revised	edition	written	in	1941,	he	repeats	this	point	and	writes	that	the	significance	of	the	work	lies	
only	in	the	fact	that	it	comprises	a	phase	in	the	development	of	his	thought:	“[t]oday,	probably	the	only	significance	of	this	
work	is	that	it	represents	one	stage	in	my	intellectual	development.	Though	I	reread	this	work	in	preparation	for	the	
revised	edition,	it	is	so	distant	from	my	present	philosophical	position	as	to	make	it	impossible	for	me	to	add	anything.	As	I	
look	back	over	this	document	of	thirty	years	ago	representing	my	hard-fought	battle	over	several	years,	I	cannot	but	have	
the	feeling	of	exertion	expressed	by	the	famous	phrase,	‘I	have	had	fierce	struggles,	Descending	into	the	dragon's	cave	for	
you’”	(NKZ	2,	13/xxvi).	
141	
	
1.3.1. The	meaning	of	“jikaku”		 Japanese	uses	“jikaku”	in	ordinary	speech.	It	is	comprised	of	two	sinographs,	ji	(自,	self)	and	kaku	(覚,	 enlightenment	 or	 awakening).	 As	 the	 meanings	 of	 these	 sinographs	 already	 indicate,	 the	 word	 is	originally	 a	 Buddhist	 term	 that	 means	 “self-awakening”	 or	 “self-realization.”22	Although	 this	 religious	meaning	is	lost	in	everyday	speech,	the	word	still	carries	the	sense	of	coming	to	a	realization	and	is	often	used	with	a	normative	 connotation.	For	example,	when	politicians	are	exposed	 for	 their	 engagement	 in	some	corrupt	practice,	the	media	bashes	them	for	their	lack	of	jikaku	as	government	officials.	Or,	when	one	becomes	a	parent,	one	might	say	to	oneself	that	I	must	now	take	up	jikaku	as	a	mother	or	father,	meaning	that	one	should	raise	one’s	awareness	of	one’s	new	role	and	social	norms.	In	English,	we	can	also	speak	of	raising	 or	 lacking	 awareness	 about	 something,	 as	 in	 raising	 people’s	 awareness	 of	 gender	 equality.	Nonetheless,	 the	English	word	 “self-awareness”	does	not	necessarily	have	 this	 connotation.	 In	 contrast,	we	can	say	that	this	connotation	is	essential	to	the	word	“jikaku.”	Namely,	“to	take	up	jikaku	as	a	mother”	is	to	raise	awareness	of	the	social	norms	that	are	involved	in	being	a	mother	and,	accordingly,	to	adapt	to	the	new	manner	of	being.	Accordingly,	“jikaku	suru”	(to	become	self-aware)	or	“jikaku	shiteiru”	(to	be	self-aware)	 means	 that	 one	 is	 or	 becomes	 aware	 of	 one’s	 manner	 of	 being	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 this	 self-understanding	 is	 appropriated	 in	 one’s	 manner	 of	 being.	 Therefore,	 as	 Andrew	 Feenberg	 points	 out,	whereas	 the	 word	 “self-consciousness”	 (and,	 I	 would	 add,	 self-awareness)	 is	 employed	 in	 English	 and	German	 to	 refer	 to	 “the	 purely	 contemplative	 self-directed	 awareness,”	 the	 word	 “jikaku”	 in	 Japanese	denotes	 “the	 achievement	 of	 a	 deep	 realization	 or	 understanding	 of	 a	matter,	with	 the	 implication	 that	such	 understanding	 affects	 and	 alters	 the	 self.”23	Feenberg’s	 description	 highlights	 another	 important	point,	namely	that	jikaku	implies	one’s	openness	to	the	world.	In	order	to	be	able	to	raise	or	lack	awareness	about	something,	one	cannot	be	self-contained	and	closed	from	the	surrounding	world	but	must	be	open	to	 it.	 Moreover,	 one	 must	 be	 open	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 one	 comes	 to	 self-understanding	 through	 the	understanding	of	the	social	world.	This	is	to	say	that	the	kind	of	understanding	that	is	at	issue	here	cannot	be	detached	from	one’s	self-understanding	but,	rather,	must	necessarily	have	some	bearing	on	it.	 In	this	way,	 as	 Feenberg	 says,	 in	 jikaku,	 “a	 deep	 realization	 or	 understanding	 of	 a	 matter”	 implies	 that	 “such	understanding	affects	and	alters	the	self.”	
																																								 																				
22	See	Uehara	Mayuko’s	article,	“The	Conceptualization	and	Translation	of	Jikaku	and	Jiko	in	Nishida	Kitarō,”	where	she	
notes	on	the	structural	similarities	between	Nishida’s	jikaku	and	the	Buddhist	idea	of	enlightenment.	The	essay	sheds	light	
on	Nishida’s	notion	of	jikaku,	as	well	as	its	correlative	term	“jiko”	(self),	specifically	from	the	perspective	of	translation.	See	
also	Marldo’s	article,	“Translating	Nishida,”	which	highlights	some	important	issues	pertaining	to	translating	Nishida’s	
works.		
23	Feenberg	1999,	p.	34.	
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1.3.2. Jikaku	as	a	“self-representative	system”		 In	the	preface	to	Intuition	and	Reflection,	Nishida	claims	that	the	kind	of	 jikaku	he	has	in	mind	is	not	the	kind	of	self-consciousness	that	psychologists	speak	of	but,	rather,	the	“jikaku	of	a	transcendental	ego,	 similar	 to	Fichte’s	Tathandlung.”24	He	 then	 says	 that	he	 found	 inspiration	 for	 this	understanding	of	
jikaku	 in	 the	work	 of	 Josiah	 Royce.	More	 specifically,	 it	 was	 Royce’s	 way	 of	 understanding	 the	 infinite	activity	of	reflection	through	what	he	called	a	“self-representative	system”	that	gave	Nishida	the	 idea	of	articulating	the	structure	of	jikaku.		Let	us	look	at	Nishida’s	reference	to	Royce	at	the	beginning	of	Intuition	
and	Reflection:	The	self's	reflection	on	the	self,	its	reflecting	(in	the	sense	of	mirroring)	itself,	cannot	be	brought	to	a	halt	at	this	point,	for	self-reflection	consists	in	an	unending	process	of	unification,	and,	as	Royce	saw,	a	single	project	of	reflecting	the	self	inevitably	generates	an	unlimited	series,	just	as,	if	one	wished	to	make	 a	 complete	 map	 of	 England	 from	 within	 England,	 each	 realization	 of	 this	 plan	 would	immediately	generate	the	project	of	another	map	including	the	previous	one	within	itself	in	a	never-ending	 process;	 or	 just	 as	 an	 object	 placed	 between	 two	 bright	 mirrors	 must	 project	 its	 image	infinitely.25		In	The	World	and	the	Individual	(1899),	Royce	employs	the	example	of	the	“perfect	map”	to	illustrate	what	he	calls	a	self-representative	system,	i.e.	“a	system	that	can	be	exactly	represented	or	imaged,	element	for	element,	by	one	of	its	own	constituent	parts.”26	Royce	defines	a	perfect	map	as	a	map	where	there	is	a	one-to-one	correspondence	between	each	and	every	part	of	the	surface	that	is	mapped	and	the	representation.	Drawing	a	map	from	outside	the	mapped	region	would	not	be	self-representative	since	the	map	itself	 is	not	part	of	the	represented	region.	But,	he	asks,	what	if	one	were	to	draw	a	perfect	map	from	within	and	
on	the	surface	of	the	region	that	is	to	be	mapped?	What	if	one	were	to	draw	a	perfect	map	of	England	from	within	England?	 In	order	 for	 the	map	to	be	“perfect,”	 it	would	have	 to	contain	a	representation	of	 itself	within	the	map.	Yet	the	representation	itself	would	have	to	contain	a	further	representation	of	itself	and	so	on	ad	infinitum.	Accordingly,	such	an	infinite	project	of	making	a	perfect	map	from	within	the	mapped	region	exemplifies	a	self-representative	system.	27	
																																								 																				
24	NKZ	2,	p.	3/xix.	
25	Ibid.,	p.	16/4.	
26	Royce	1899,	p.	512.	Royce	appropriated	Dedekind	and	Cantor’s	idea	of	an	infinite	series.	For	a	closer	reading	of	this	
appropriation,	specifically	in	relation	to	Nishida,	see:	Ōhashi	(1995,	pp.	61-68);	Maraldo	(2006).		
27	Royce	1899,	pp.	503-504.	
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	 Taking	 this	 idea	 from	Royce,	 Nishida	 understood	 jikaku	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 self-representative	 system	that	reflects	itself	within	itself	infinitely.28	Furthermore,	it	is	not	merely	an	infinite	series	of	reflection	but	the	reflection	is	self-producing,	i.e.	the	infinite	activity	of	reflection	produces	the	self.	It	is	not	as	if	there	is	a	“self”	that	then	produces	itself	but,	rather,	the	self	is	created	through	the	infinite	series	of	reflection.	In	this	way,	 jikaku	 comes	 close	 to	Fichte’s	notion	of	Tathandlung	 (fact/act),	whereby	 self-consciousness	 is	understood	 as	 both	 the	 “act”	 of	 self-positing	 and	 the	 “fact”	 or	 product	 of	 the	 act	 itself.	 In	 other	words,	through	the	self-positing	act,	one	becomes	aware	of	and	produces	oneself.29			 According	 to	 Nishida’s	 self-assessment,	 his	 efforts	 to	 ground	 reality	 in	 the	 idea	 of	 jikaku	 were	unsuccessful.	In	1935,	looking	back	at	the	course	of	his	thinking,	he	writes:	“[n]either	pure	experience	nor	
Tathandlung,	at	bottom,	could	escape	subjectivism.	I	finally	found	the	logically	grounded	starting	point	via	Aristotle’s	hypokeimenon.”30	Although	Nishida	here	identifies	“subjectivism”	as	the	common	issue	for	both	pure	experience	and	jikaku	(he	is	here	identifying	jikaku	with	Fichte’s	Tathandlung),	it	is	important	to	see	that	two	different	kinds	of	subjectivism	are	involved.	On	the	one	hand,	“pure	experience”	was	problematic	because	 of	 its	 psychologistic	 overtones.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 standpoint	 of	 pure	 experience	 could	 not	adequately	 distinguish	 itself	 from	psychological	subjectivism.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 insofar	 as	 “jikaku”	was	clearly	distinguished	from	psychological	or	empirical	self-consciousness	from	the	outset,	it	did	not	suffer	from	the	same	problem	as	pure	experience.	Nishida	had	overcome	the	shortcomings	of	pure	experience	by	adopting	 a	 transcendental	 standpoint	 akin	 to	 Fichte’s	 position.	 But	 then,	 in	 what	 way	 was	 it	 still	“subjectivistic”?	 This	 was	 presumably	 because,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 Intuition	 and	 Reflection,	 Nishida	 came	 to	understand	 the	 transcendental	 standpoint	 as	 “absolute	will”	 or	 “absolute	 free	will.”31	The	 last	 couple	 of	essays	 that	 comprise	 the	 conclusion	 are	 accordingly	 devoted	 to	 understanding	 the	 relation	 between	intuition	and	reflection	from	the	standpoint	of	absolute	will,	namely	from	the	transcendental	unity	of	will.	Though	this	will	was	nothing	“subjective,”	in	the	sense	that	Nishida	did	not	understand	it	as	the	activity	of	an	 individual	 subject,	 it	was	 nonetheless	 “subjectivistic”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 reality	was	 a	 creation	 of	 this	
																																								 																				
28	For	a	closer	reading	of	how	Nishida	comes	to	appropriate	Royce’s	idea	of	a	self-representative	system,	see:	Maraldo	
(2006).	
29	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	Nishida’s	relationship	to	Fichte’s	philosophy,	see:	Okada	(2000).	
30	NKZ	13,	p.	219.	The	quotation	is	taken	from	the	preface	he	writes	to	Kōyama	Iwao’s	book	,	Nishida	tetsugaku	[Nishida’s	
Philosophy]	(1935).	
31	Nishida	later	says	that	his	position	in	Intuition	and	Reflection	was	“a	kind	of	voluntarist	position	like	that	of	Fichte’s”	
(NKZ	4,	p.	3).	Accordingly,	it	has	become	commonplace	in	the	literature	to	say	that,	with	this	idea	of	absolute	will,	Nishida	
adopts	Fichte’s	view	of	the	primacy	of	the	will	over	the	intellect.	However,	Itabashi	has	pointed	out	that	Fichte	himself	
does	not	thematize	the	will	in	his	Grundlage	der	gesamten	Wissenschaftslehre.	It	was	rather	Nishida’s	interpretation	that	
Fichte’s	idea	of	Tathandlung	implies	the	primacy	of	the	will	(2004,	pp.	91-92).	
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absolute	will.	As	Nishida	says:	“[i]n	the	standpoint	of	the	will,	we	can	freely	create	reality,”32	or,	“[i]n	the	immediate	world	of	absolute	will	[…]	there	is	no	time,	space	or	causation.	In	this	world,	even	the	natural	world,	 which	 we	 think	 of	 as	 the	 only	 real	 one,	 becomes	 a	 symbol.”33	Therefore,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 the	problem	with	the	standpoint	of	 jikaku	was	that	it	 implied	a	kind	of	transcendental	subjectivism,	 that	is,	a	strong	version	of	transcendental	idealism	whereby	the	“transcendental	will”	creates	reality.	Accordingly,	Nishida	 had	 to	 give	 up	 jikaku	 since	 transcendental	 subjectivism	 does	 not	 adequately	 demonstrate	 the	objective	validity	of	knowledge.	Thus,	neither	psychological	subjectivism	nor	transcendental	subjectivism	could	adequately	articulate	how	knowledge	and	reality	are	grounded	in	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	 split.	 Nishida	 had	 yet	 to	 provide	 an	 adequate	 account	 of	 this	 together	 with	 an	 account	 of	philosophical	method	that	clarifies	this	grounding	relation.34		
	
2. Theory	of	basho	in	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing	(1927)	
2.1. The	meaning	of	“basho”	Before	we	examine	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	as	it	first	developed	in	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing	(1927)	and	other	essays	from	that	period,	let	us	first	clarify	the	meaning	of	the	Japanese	word,	“basho,”	as	we	did	for	“jikaku.”	To	begin	with,	the	word	basho	(場所)	is	comprised	of	two	sinographs,	ba	(場)	and	sho	(所)	that	both	signify	“place.”	Moreover,	both	ba	(場)	and	tokoro	(ところ,	 the	alternative	way	of	reading	
sho	 (所),	which	 comes	 from	 the	original	 Japanese	meaning	of	 the	word)	 can	be	employed	on	 their	own	with	 a	 slight	 difference	 in	 nuance	 between	 them,	 either	 taken	 separately	 or	 together.	 Basho	 can	 be	translated	into	English	as	“place.”	Like	“place,”	basho	 is	a	word	used	in	everyday	speech.	They	also	have	similar	connotations.	For	example,	I	would	refer	to	the	Philosopher’s	Path	in	Kyoto	(Nishida	often	walked	this	path	as	he	contemplated	various	philosophical	 issues),	by	saying,	 “koko	wa	watashi	no	tokubetsu	na	
basho	 desu,”	 which	 means,	 “This	 is	 my	 special	 place.”	 Moreover,	 just	 as	 “place”	 can	 be	 conceptually	distinguished	 from	 “space”	 as	 a	 mathematical	 or	 geographical	 concept,	 basho	 in	 Japanese	 is	 also	conceptually	distinguished	from	kūkan	(空間),	which	more	or	less	correlates	with	“space”	in	English.	One	could	arguably	say	that,	while	kūkan	connotes	a	physical	space	or	location	understood	as	a	physical	place,	
																																								 																				
32	NKZ	2,	p.	269/133.	
33	Ibid.,	p.	345/167.			
34	Itabashi	has	provided	a	detailed	account	of	how	Nishida	had	attempted	to	clarify	the	philosophical	standpoint	of	jikaku	
(in	the	period	from	Intuition	and	Reflection	to	the	early	1920s)	and	why	it	had	to	fail.	See:	2004,	chapter	2.	
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basho	 in	ordinary	language	is	suggestive	of	a	socially	and	historically	embedded	meaningful	context	and	hence	of	having	an	intricate	relation	to	the	way	we	interact	in	the	place.			 Nishida	 also	 clearly	 distinguished	 his	 notion	 of	 basho	 from	 kūkan.	 But	 the	 way	 in	 which	 he	employs	the	term	“basho”	goes	far	beyond	the	way	we	would	normally	use	the	word,	as	when	he	speaks	of	the	“basho	of	nothingness”	(mu	no	basho),	“logic	of	basho”	(bashoteki	ronri),	“dialectic	of	basho”	(bashoteki	
benshōhō),	etc.		It	is	therefore	understandable	if	one	were	to	get	the	impression	that	Nishida’s	concept	of	
basho	is	a	philosophically	constructed	concept	having	little	to	do	with	our	ordinary	conception	of	the	term.	Nonetheless,	we	should	bear	in	mind	that	in	making	basho	a	philosophical	concept,	Nishida	is	not	thereby	abstracting	from,	but	rather	deepening,	our	ordinary	understanding	of	basho	as	a	socially	and	historically	embedded	 meaningful	 context.	 This	 is	 an	 important	 point	 worth	 underlining	 since	 the	 way	 Nishida	employs	 the	 concept	 is	 often	 rather	 abstract,	 especially	 in	 the	 earlier	 period	 when	 basho	 was	 initially	introduced.		
2.2. The	place	of	jikaku	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	after	the	Inquiry,	Nishida	attempted	to	articulate	the	ground	of	knowledge	and	reality	on	the	basis	of	the	structure	of	 jikaku.	At	this	point,	 jikaku	or	self-awareness	was	understood	as	the	infinite	activity	of	reflection.	But	eventually,	Nishida	came	to	realize	that	self-awareness	is	not	possible	without	 a	 “place”	wherein	 one	becomes	aware.	Nishida’s	 “discovery”	of	place	 is	 thus	 the	realization	that	the	structure	of	jikaku	already	implies	the	idea	of	place.	We	will	turn	to	this	point	shortly.	But	before	we	do	so,	let	us	take	a	look	at	a	concrete	case	of	jikaku,	that	is,	a	form	of	jikaku	in	the	everyday	social	context.	For	 in	fact,	already	in	our	everyday	usage	of	the	word	 jikaku,	we	can	see	how	the	idea	of	place	 is	 implied	 in	 it.	Although	 this	was	not	Nishida’s	way	of	 arriving	 at	 the	 idea	of	basho,	 looking	 at	 a	concrete	case	will	help	us	understand	the	matter	at	hand.	As	we	saw	earlier,	 jikaku	connotes	coming	to	a	deeper	understanding	about	something	such	that	this	 understanding	 involves	 coming	 to	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 oneself.	 And	 we	 also	 saw	 that	 this	entails	 that	one	must	be	open	to	the	surrounding	world.	This	 then	already	 indicates	how	 jikaku	 implies	place.	 For	 to	 raise	 one’s	 awareness	 about	 something,	 and	 indeed	 to	 be	 self-aware	 at	 all	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
jikaku,	is	to	be	disclosed	to	some	particular	place,	i.e.	meaningful	context.	Let	us	now	see	how	this	is	really	the	 case	 by	 looking	 at	 an	 example:	my	 jikaku	 as	 a	 PhD	 student	 in	 philosophy.	What	 is	 involved	 in	 this	
jikaku?	To	be	aware	of	myself	as	a	PhD	student	in	philosophy	is	to	understand	myself	as	being	in	a	specific	meaningful	 context,	 e.g.	 philosophical	 community,	 university,	 academic	 society,	 etc.	 This	 involves	
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understanding	the	specific	norms	that	are	constitutive	of	being	a	member	of	the	philosophical	community,	university	and	so	on.	However,	merely	understanding	that	is	not	sufficient	for	my	jikaku	as	a	philosophy	PhD	student,	just	as	merely	understanding	what	it	means	to	be	a	mother,	what	is	involved	in	motherhood,	etc.,	is	not	sufficient	for	jikaku	as	a	mother.	For	jikaku	connotes	a	kind	of	deeper	understanding	not	merely	of	 some	subject	matter	but	also	of	oneself.	As	 such,	 these	understandings	must	 reflect	back	on	my	self-understanding	 such	 that	 I	 do	not	merely	understand	what	 it	 is	 to	 be	 a	member	of	 this	 community	but,	rather,	 understand	myself	 as	 a	member	 of	 this	 community.	 And	 this	means	 that	 such	 understanding	 is	reflected	 in	 the	way	 I	 act,	 namely	 in	 carrying	out	my	 research,	 engaging	 in	discussions,	participating	 in	conferences,	etc.	Thus	 to	be	self-aware	 in	 the	sense	of	 jikaku	 is	 to	play	out	one’s	 role	as	a	member	of	a	community	 or,	 as	we	 say	 in	English,	 to	understand	one’s	place	 (but	without	 the	 connotation	 that	 comes	with	the	phrase	that	that	 ‘place’	 is	somehow	fixed).	 In	this	way,	 then,	“place”	 is	 implied	 in	our	everyday	conception	of	jikaku.		Let	us	now	turn	to	Nishida.	In	his	essay,	“On	Internal	Perception,”	 from	1924,	two	years	prior	to	the	publication	of	“Basho,”	he	mentions	basho	in	the	context	of	jikaku:	The	self	reflects	 itself	 inside	 itself.	The	mirror	that	reflects	the	content	of	the	self	 is	none	other	than	itself.	[…]	Commonly,	jikaku	(self-awareness)	is	understood	as	the	unity	of	the	knower	and	known.	Yet	I	 believe	 true	 jikaku	 is	 knowing	 oneself	 within	 oneself.	 […]	 For	 there	 to	 be	 self-awareness,	 they	[knower	and	known]	must	be	accompanied	by	“within	the	self”.	Jikaku	 is	the	unity	of	the	knowing	self,	
the	known	self	and	the	basho	[place]	wherein	the	self	knows	oneself.35				This	 is	 where	 “basho”	 with	 its	 specific	 meaning	 makes	 its	 first	 appearance	 in	 Nishida’s	 text.	 It	 is	introduced	as	the	third	element	of	self-awareness	alongside	the	subject	and	the	object	of	awareness,	 i.e.	the	knower	and	the	known.	The	unity	of	knower	and	known	is	said	to	assume	the	place	wherein	the	unity	is	made	 possible.	 Later	 on,	 jikaku	 is	 given	 the	 following	 concise	 formulation	whereby	 the	 place	 of	 self-awareness	 is	 explicitly	 articulated	 as	 the	 “within”:	 the	self	reflects	or	mirrors	 itself	within	the	self	(jikoga	
jikonioite	jiko	o	utsusu).36	
																																								 																				
35	NKZ	4,	p.	127	(my	emphasis).	
36	The	word	“utsusu”	in	Japanese	can	be	written	in	three	different	ways,	employing	three	different	sinographs:	“写す”,	
“	映す”	and	“移す”	.	Nishida	employs	only	the	first	two,		“写す”	and	“	映す”.	Although	the	two	meanings	are	very	close,	
they	nonetheless	have	slightly	different	connotations.	The	first,	“写す,”	connotes	transferring	or	copying	one	thing	to	
another.	Thus,	a	photograph	is	shashin	(写真),	literally	meaning	the	transference	of	the	true	or	real.	The	second,	“映
す,”connotes	mirroring	or	projecting	some	thing	on	the	surface	of	something	else,	as	in	“映画”	(eiga,	movie),	which	
literally	means	the	projection	of	drawing	or	art.	Despite	the	slight	variations	in	their	connotations,	however,	both	“写す”	
and	“	映す”	mean	mirroring	or	reflecting.	Thus,	in	the	context	of	Nishida’s	works,	the	common	rendering	of	the	word	
“utsusu”	into	English	is	“to	reflect”	or	“to	mirror.”	Here,	I	have	juxtaposed	both	but	in	what	follows,	for	the	sake	of	
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	 As	 the	above	quotation	 indicates,	and	as	we	mentioned	earlier,	basho	was	 initially	 introduced	 in	the	 context	 of	 jikaku	 understood	 as	 a	 basic	 form	 of	 self-awareness,	more	 in	 line	with	 the	 issue	 of	 self-consciousness	 as	 traditionally	 construed.	One	may	accordingly	wonder	 in	what	 sense	 self-awareness	 at	this	more	basic	level	presupposes	the	notion	of	place.	In	order	to	see	this,	let	us	recall	Nishida’s	reference	to	Royce’s	example	of	drawing	a	complete	map	of	England	from	within	England.	In	Intuition	and	Reflection,	Nishida	 employed	 Royce’s	 example	 of	 the	 perfect	 map	 to	 draw	 an	 analogy	 with	 the	 structure	 of	 self-awareness	as	 involving	an	 infinite	 series	of	 self-reflection	or	 self-mirroring	whereby	 the	 representation	contains	a	further	representation	of	itself	and	so	on.	At	this	point,	the	place	of	self-awareness	within	which	this	process	occurs	was	not	yet	articulated.	But	as	Ueda	rightly	points	out,	the	idea	of	place	was	already	tacit	 in	 the	 example	 and	 also,	 for	 that	matter,	 in	Royce’s	 illustration	 of	 the	 perfect	map,	 as	we	will	 see	below.37	This	 is	 an	 important	 point	 since	 it	 indicates	 how	 Nishida’s	 idea	 of	 basho	 developed	 from	understanding	the	place	of	jikaku.		 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 analogy,	 Ueda	 first	 asks:	 what	 is	 it	 that	 corresponds	 to	 the	 “self”	 of	 self-
reflection	in	the	map	example?38	If	it	were	England,	the	analogy	would	be	straightforward:	England	reflects	itself	within	itself.	However,	in	Royce’s	example,	it	is	the	map-maker	who	is	in	England	that	is	representing	the	surface	of	England,	of	which	she	is	a	part.	But	then	the	analogy	does	not	seem	to	work	since	the	map-maker	is	representing	something	that	she	is	part	of	but	that	is	nonetheless	external	to	her.	Accordingly,	in	Royce’s	 example,	 the	map-maker	 is	 left	 out	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 England	 as	 the	 vantage	 point	 that	necessarily	 lies	outside	the	map.	Nonetheless,	 there	is	an	important	sense	in	which	the	map-maker	is	 in	fact	implied	in	this	map	making	process.	For	the	condition	that	makes	the	perfect	map	precisely	a	case	of	a	self-representative	system	is	that	it	 is	drawn	from	within	the	region	to	be	drawn.	In	other	words,	it	was	conditional	 on	 the	map-maker’s	 being	 situated	 in	 England.	 If	 the	 map-maker	 were	 drawing	 a	 map	 of	England	 from	 outside	 England,	 she	 could	 in	 principle	 draw	 a	 perfect	map	 of	 England	without	 thereby	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
simplicity,	I	will	just	opt	for	one	of	the	two	or	merely	use	the	rendering,	“to	reflect.”	However,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	
mind	that	the	original	meaning	of	the	word	“utsusu”	(both	“写す”	and	“	映す”)	in	Japanese	connotes	mirroring,	as	in	the	
phrases,	“the	mirroring	of	the	moon	on	the	surface	of	the	water”	(minamo	ni	utsusareta	tsuki)	or	“the	self-reflection	(self-
mirroring)	in	the	mirror”	(kagami	ni	utsusareta	jibun	no	sugata).	Accordingly,	it	is	important	to	note	that	“to	reflect”	as	the	
rendering	of	“utsusu”	does	not	primarily	connote	the	intellectual	activity	of	reflection	for	Nishida.	In	fact,	to	refer	to	the	
intellectual	activity	of	reflection,	Nishida	uses	a	different	word,	“hansei,”	as	in	the	title	of	the	work,	Intuition	and	Reflection	
in	Self-awareness	(jikaku	ni	okeru	chokkan	to	hansei).	Furthermore,	although	Nishida	himself	does	not	use	the	third	sense	
of	“utsusu”	(移す),	some	commentators	use	all	three	to	articulate	his	position	(e.g.	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	77).	Utsusu	in	the	
sense	of	“移す”	connotes	moving	some	thing	to	another	location.	Thus,	“移動”	(idou)	means	the	movement,	transfer,	or	
relocation	of	something	or	someone.	Nishida	most	likely	did	not	employ	this	sense	so	much	since	it	does	not	have	the	
connotation	of	mirroring	and	reflecting	as	the	other	two	do.			
37	Ueda	1991,	pp.	307-313.	
38	Ibid.,	p.	308.	
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lapsing	into	an	infinite	series	of	representations.	Such	a	perfect	map,	however,	would	not	exemplify	a	self-representative	system.	In	this	sense,	then,	the	map-maker	and	her	situatedness	in	England	are	implied	in	the	example,	though	Royce	makes	no	explicit	mention	of	this	situatedness.			 But	 if	 this	 is	 so,	 returning	 to	 Ueda’s	 question,	 what	 corresponds	 to	 the	 “self”	 in	 self-reflection?	Ueda	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 the	 map-maker,	 but	 only	 insofar	 as	 she	 is	 understood	 as	 necessarily	 situated	 in	
England.39	In	other	words,	it	is	the	map-maker	as	situated	in	England	that	represents	England,	which	she	is	part	 of.	 This	 representation,	 furthermore,	 includes	 a	 representation	 of	 herself	 insofar	 as	 her	 being	 in	England	 is	 part	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 England.	 Thus	 the	 map-maker’s	 representation	 of	 England	 is	analogous	 to	 self-reflection	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 self-representation.	 For	 the	 map-maker	represents	England	as	the	place	in	which	she	is	situated	and	hence	includes	a	representation	of	herself	as	situated	in	England.	Moreover,	Ueda	accordingly	suggests	that	the	“self”	in	self-reflection	can	also	be	said	to	correspond	to	the	map-maker	and	England	in	their	intricate	involvement.40	The	important	point	is	that	the	map-maker	 and	England	are	understood	not	 as	 existing	 independently	of	 each	other	but,	 rather,	 as	existing	 inter-dependently,	 i.e.	 the	 map	 maker	 is	 understood	 as	 situated	 in	 England	 and,	 accordingly,	England	is	understood	as	the	situated	place	of	the	map-maker.		 Now,	 what	 the	 analogy	 in	 fact	 shows	 is	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 place	 is	 necessarily	 implied	 in	 self-awareness	so	long	as	we	understand	self-awareness	as	a	self-representative	system	or	an	infinite	series	of	self-reflection.	For	just	as	the	perfect	map	example	was	conditional	on	the	situatedness	of	the	map-maker	in	 the	mapped	region,	 self-awareness	 is	conditional	on	 the	situatedness	of	the	self	in	one’s	situated	place.	Thus,	self-reflection	 is	not	 just	 the	self	reflecting	on	 itself	but,	rather,	 the	self	reflecting	on	 itself	 in	one’s	
situated	place.	Based	on	this	understanding,	Nishida	formulates	self-awareness	as:	“the	self	reflects	itself	within	the	self.”			 	But	 when	 jikaku	 is	 formulated	 this	 way,	 namely	 as	 the	 self	 reflecting	 itself	within	 the	 self,	 this	seems	 to	 entail	 that	 reflection	occurs	within	 an	 enclosed	 self	 and	hence	 that	 self-awareness	 is	 a	 closed	system.	The	expression	is	somewhat	misleading	since	it	certainly	sounds	as	if	self-reflection	occurs	within	an	enclosed	self.	However,	what	Nishida	really	means	is	the	opposite.	As	Ueda	suggests,	“within	the	self”	should	be	understood	as	“being	open	to	the	place	wherein	the	self	is	situated.”41	Our	earlier	examples	of	more	concrete	forms	of	 jikaku	have	already	indicated	that	 jikaku	would	not	be	possible	if	one	were	self-enclosed.	 For	 it	 is	 only	by	being	open	 to	 the	philosophical	 community	 and	 so	on	 that	 I	 can	understand	
																																								 																				
39	Ibid.,	p.	310.	
40	Ibid.,	ibid.	
41	Ueda	1991,	pp.	318-319.	Compare	also	his	statement	that	“’within	the	self’	[jiko	ni	oite]	indicates	the	original	
implacedness	[genponteki	bashosei]	of	the	‘self’	of	self-awareness.”	(1991,	p.	311).	
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what	it	means	to	be	a	member	of	this	community	and	for	such	understanding	to	reflect	back	on	my	self-understanding.	If	I	were	closed	off	to	the	community,	I	might	still	come	to	some	sort	of	understanding	of	it	but	it	would	not	thereby	affect	my	own	self	(at	least	in	the	way	it	does	so	in	jikaku).	Therefore,	the	self	in	self-awareness	is	necessarily	situated	and	thus	open	to	the	surrounding	world.		 Furthermore,	when	we	understand	self-awareness	in	this	way,	namely	as	defined	by	this	openness,	we	can	see	that	Nishida’s	idea	of	jikaku	is	similar	to	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being.	For	Heidegger,	being-in-the-world	was	 constitutive	 of	 Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being.	 This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 Dasein,	 as	 “being-there,”	is	disclosed	as	being-in-the-world:	“disclosedness	[Erschlossenheit]	is	that	basic	character	of	Dasein	according	to	which	it	is	its	‘there.’”42	For	Nishida	too,	being	disclosed	to	one’s	place	is	constitutive	of	jikaku	in	 the	 sense	 that	 self-awareness	 signifies	 being	 open	 to	 the	 place.	 Both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida,	 then,	understand	the	self	in	terms	of	an	essential	openness.	And	accordingly,	for	both,	“being-in”	signifies	“being	open	to	the	place.”		
2.3. Self-mirroring	structure	of	jikaku	as	the	structure	of	knowledge	in	general	
	 The	discovery	of	the	idea	of	place	through	the	analysis	of	the	structure	of	self-awareness,	namely	as	 the	place	of	 jikaku,	was	 a	 revelation	 for	Nishida	 in	many	 respects.	 Nishida	 himself	 attests	 that,	with	
basho,	 he	 had	 finally	 arrived	 at	 the	 “final	 standpoint”	 (saishū	 no	 tachiba)	 from	 which	 he	 could	 then	systematically	 reconstruct	 his	 earlier	 ideas.43	As	 I	 have	 already	 mentioned,	 however,	 since	 Nishida	continued	to	develop	his	ideas	in	his	subsequent	works,	this	was	not	entirely	correct.	Nonetheless,	to	the	extent	that	his	later	developments	were	developments	of	the	idea	of	basho,	he	was	also	right.	Let	us	quote	again	from	the	preface	to	the	reprint	of	the	Inquiry:		[I]n	 the	 second	half	of	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing,	 through	 the	mediation	of	Greek	philosophy,	 it	[my	thought]	took	a	turn	to	the	idea	of	“basho”.	There,	I	found	the	clue	to	lay	the	logical	base	for	my	ideas.44	Here,	Nishida	expresses	the	significance	of	the	idea	of	basho	in	the	trajectory	of	his	thought	by	stating	that,	with	the	idea	of	basho,	his	thought	underwent	a	“turn.”	Not	surprisingly,	commentators	have	spent	much	time	unraveling	the	sense	of	this	“turn,”	whether	it	signifies	a	turn	away	from	his	earlier	views	or	whether	it	is	more	like	a	turn	within	and	hence	more	a	radicalization	than	an	abandonment	of	his	earlier	thought.	I	
																																								 																				
42	GA	2,	p.	292/263.	
43	NKZ	18,	pp.	303-304.	
44	NKZ	1,	pp.	6-7/xxxii.	
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will	 not	 attempt	 to	 provide	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 my	 interpretation	 of	 this	 issue	 since	 it	 is	 not	 in	 the	interest	of	this	work	to	do	so.	Thus	suffice	it	to	say	that,	 insofar	as	the	idea	of	basho	originated	from	his	reflections	on	the	structure	of	jikaku	in	which	basho	was	already	implicit,	it	seems	reasonable	to	claim	that	the	turn	to	basho	is	more	a	deepening	than	a	rejection	of	his	earlier	views.	We	can	adopt	Ueda’s	language	and	suggest	that	it	is	a	“turn”	(kaiten)	in	the	sense	of	rotation	around	an	axis,	the	development	of	a	core	idea.45	I	would	just	add	that,	with	the	idea	of	basho,	such	spinning	gained	a	stability	that	his	earlier	views	lacked.			 But	whatever	 the	nature	of	 this	 turn	was,	 it	was	a	pivotal	breakthrough	 for	Nishida.	As	we	 saw	earlier,		in	 the	 years	 following	 the	 publication	 of	 the	 Inquiry,	 Nishida	 was	 occupied	 with	 the	 following	questions:	how	could	knowledge	be	grounded	in	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split?	And	what	is	the	
nature	of	philosophical	reflection	that	articulates	this	grounding	relation?	But	neither	pure	experience	nor	
jikaku	 provided	 adequate	 answers	 to	 these	 problems.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 the	 last	 sentence	 of	 the	 above	quotation	proves	its	importance.	For	Nishida	believed	that,	with	the	idea	of	basho,	he	had	finally	found	the	way	to	provide	a	“logical”	(as	opposed	to	psychological	or	subjective)	ground	for	knowledge.			 But	in	what	way	does	the	theory	of	basho	supposedly	provide	the	“logical	base”	for	his	ideas?	Or	put	differently,	how	does	the	theory	of	basho	avoid	the	pitfalls	of	the	subjectivism	that	he	associated	with	his	earlier	views?	As	we	saw	earlier,	the	standpoints	of	both	pure	experience	and	jikaku	were	problematic	insofar	as	neither	could	secure	the	objective	validity	of	knowledge.	Accordingly,	the	real	challenge	was	to	provide	a	 theory	of	knowledge	 that	 could	account	 for	 this.	Nishida	 soon	 realized	 that	 the	 challenge	 can	only	be	sufficiently	answered	if	one	reconsiders	what	“knowledge”	or	“knowing”	consists	of.	As	he	says	in	the	“Basho”	essay:	While	epistemology,	starting	from	the	idea	of	the	subject-object	opposition,	has	previously	conceived	of	knowing	as	the	composition	[kōsei]	of	matter	by	form,	I	would	instead	like	to	start	from	the	idea	of	
																																								 																				
45	Cf.	Ueda	1991,	p.	302.	In	Japanese,	we	often	use	the	word	“tenkai”	(転回)	when	we	speak	of	a	“turn”	in	philosophy.	This	
has	also	been	the	predominant	translation	of	the	German	word,	“Kehre.”	Ueda	seems	to	be	engaging	in	a	bit	of	wordplay	
by	suggesting	that	the	development	of	Nishida’s	thought	from	pure	experience	to	jikaku,	and	from	jikaku	to	basho	is	a	
turn	in	the	sense	of	“kaiten”	(回転).	Both	“tenkai”	and	“kaiten”	mean	“turn”	and	are	comprised	of	the	same	two	
sinographs	(with	merely	different	order),	but	they	have	slightly	different	connotations.	According	to	the	Sanseido	
dictionary,	“tenkai”	means	largely	changing	direction	while	“kaiten”	means	rotation	as	in	a	figure	rotating	around	an	axis.	
Thus,	by	employing	“kaiten”	instead	of	“tenkai,”	Ueda	is	emphasizing	that	the	kind	of	“turn”	that	takes	place	in	Nishida’s	
thought	is	not	so	much	a	major	change	in	direction	as	a	rotation	around	a	core	idea.	For	a	dictionary	entry	on	“kaiten,”	see:	
http://www.weblio.jp/content/%E5%9B%9E%E8%BB%A2#SSDJJ.	For	an	entry	on	“tenkai,”	see:	
http://www.weblio.jp/content/%E8%BB%A2%E5%9B%9E#SSDJJ.	
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self-awareness	wherein	the	self	mirrors	itself	within.	I	think	that	the	fundamental	meaning	of	knowing	
is	that	the	self	mirrors	itself	within	itself.46	Here,	Nishida	supposedly	has	in	mind	Kant	and	the	neo-Kantians	for	whom	the	knower-known	dichotomy,	together	with	hylomorphic	dualism,	is	the	starting	point	of	the	epistemological	problematic.	Against	these	dualisms,	Nishida	wants	to	“start	from	the	idea	of	self-awareness	wherein	the	self	mirrors	itself	within.”	By	 this,	 he	means	 that	 he	wants	 to	 take	 this	 structure	of	 jikaku	 to	 apply	 to	 all	 forms	of	 our	 knowledge	including	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects.	 As	 he	 says,	 “the	 fundamental	 meaning	 of	 knowing	 is	 that	 the	 self	mirrors	 itself	within	 itself.”	This	does	not	mean,	 however,	 that	Nishida	wished	 to	 somehow	 reduce	our	knowledge	of	 objects	 to	 self-knowledge.	That	was	 the	unintended	 result	 of	his	position	 in	 Intuition	and	
Reflection.	Rather,	Nishida’s	claim	is	that	all	knowledge	ultimately	presupposes	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	self-awareness	 in	the	sense	that,	 in	order	to	have	knowledge	of	any	kind,	 including	our	knowledge	of	objects,	 the	 content	 of	 the	 knowledge	 must	 be	 “mirrored”	 or	 “reflected”	 in	 the	 self.	 Furthermore,	understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 knowledge	 in	 this	 way,	 namely	 via	 the	 self-mirroring	 structure	 of	 jikaku,	supposedly	allows	Nishida	to	avoid	subjectivism	insofar	as	it	does	not	presuppose	subject-object	dualism	to	 begin	 with.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 “self”	 that	 mirrors	 itself	 is	 not	 a	 “subject”	 that	 is	 opposed	 to	 some	“object.”	Rather,	it	is	the	place	wherein	subject-object	duality	lies.			 Yet,	 to	say	that	our	knowledge	 in	general	presupposes	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	 jikaku	 still	sounds	as	though	Nishida	was	reducing	knowledge	to	self-knowledge.	This	would	be	the	case,	however,	only	 if	we	misunderstood	the	nature	of	 the	“self”	or	 “consciousness”	 (Nishida	uses	 these	 terms	more	or	less	 interchangeably)	 as	 something	 that	 is	 thing-like	with	an	 “internal”	 realm.	Nishida	was	not	 claiming	that	there	is	something	called	a	“self”	which	mirrors	or	reflects	things	that	are	“external”	to	it.	As	we	saw	earlier,	 Nishida	 intimated	 that	 the	 self	 is	 necessarily	 disclosed	 to	 one’s	 place.	 In	 doing	 so,	 Nishida	was	rejecting	any	notion	of	the	self	and	consciousness	as	thing-like,	 just	as	Heidegger	had	done	with	Dasein.	Furthermore,	since	they	are	no-thing,	self	and	consciousness	are	understood	as	“the	place	of	nothingness”	(mu	no	basho).	Accordingly,	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	jikaku	does	not	commit	Nishida	to	any	kind	of	reductionist	(or	representationalist)	account	of	knowledge	because	there	“is”	nothing	to	which	knowledge	can	be	reduced.	Let	us	now	proceed	to	see	Nishida’s	arguments	for	these	claims.47	
																																								 																				
46	NKZ	4,	p.	215/54.	
47	For	Nishida,	self-mirroring	does	not	entail	that	that	which	mirrors	has	an	independent	existence	from	the	mirrored.	
Accordingly,	the	self-mirroring	of	jikaku	is	rather	different	from	the	mirroring	of	a	mirror	or	lake.	For	in	such	cases,	the	
mirror	and	that	which	is	reflected	in	the	mirror	are	understood	as	two	distinct	entities.	However,	in	the	case	of	jikaku,	that	
which	reflects	(basho)	and	that	which	is	reflected	are	the	same.	As	Nishida	says:	the	“self	mirrors	or	reflects	itself	within	
itself.	The	‘mirror’	that	reflects	the	content	of	the	self	is	itself	the	same	self.	It	does	not	reflect	its	shadow	onto	a	[distinct]	
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	 Nishida’s	 procedure	 for	 showing	 that	 knowledge	 ultimately	 presupposes	 the	 self-mirroring	structure	 of	 jikaku	 is	 twofold.	 First,	 he	 proceeds	 to	 show	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 presupposes	consciousness	qua	place	(bashotoshite	no	ishiki)	or	what	he	also	refers	to	as	“the	plane	of	consciousness”	(ishikimen).	 This	 first	 part	 constitutes	 Nishida’s	 theory	 of	 judgment.	 Then,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 this	consciousness,	as	the	place	that	makes	knowledge	of	objects	possible,	itself	presupposes	a	further	“place,”	namely	 “the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness.”	 This	 latter	 part	 can	 be	 called	 Nishida’s	 theory	 of	consciousness.	In	the	following,	we	will	first	examine	Nishida’s	theory	of	judgment	(2.4)	and	then	proceed	to	his	theory	of	consciousness	(2.5).		
2.4. Theory	of	judgment					 In	 the	 essay	 “Basho,”	 Nishida	 proceeds	 to	 show	 how	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 presupposes	consciousness	 qua	 place	 by	 considering	 the	 basic	 logical	 structure	 of	 judgment,	 specifically	 that	 of	subsumptive	judgment	of	the	form	‘S	is	P’.	At	the	end	of	the	essay,	he	sums	up	this	main	point:	Rather	than	tackling	the	issue	of	knowing	[shiru	to	iukoto]	by	starting	from	the	opposition	of	knower	and	 known	 as	 hitherto	undertaken,	 I	wanted	 to	 start	 off	 even	more	 deeply,	 from	 the	 subsumptive	relationship	of	judgment.48	But	 in	 what	 sense	 is	 starting	 off	 from	 the	 subsumptive	 relationship	 “deeper”	 than	 doing	 so	 from	 the	subject-object	dichotomy?	When	one	begins	from	the	distinction	between	the	knower	and	the	known,	our	understanding	of	consciousness	is	bound	to	the	notion	of	the	epistemic	subject	juxtaposed	to	the	known	object.	 One	 of	 Nishida’s	 aims	 during	 this	 period	 was	 to	 show	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 this	 approach	 for	understanding	 the	nature	of	consciousness.	For,	according	 to	Nishida,	consciousness	 is	not	primarily	an	epistemic	subject	but	the	place	that	makes	knowledge	of	objects,	as	well	as	experience	in	general,	possible.	And	this	understanding	of	consciousness	qua	place	allegedly	cannot	be	reached	by	assuming	the	knower-known	 dichotomy.	 To	 show	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 Nishida	 takes	 a	 step	 back	 and	 examines	 the	 basic	 logical	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																							 								
thing”	(NKZ	4,	127).	Cf.	Fujita	(2007,	pp.	96-97).	In	fact,	Nishida	often	uses	the	metaphor	of	the	mirror	in	describing	the	
self-mirroring	structure	of	jikaku.	Some	commentators	have	pointed	out	that	Nishida	was	led	to	this	metaphor	by	Plotinus’	
interpretation	of	Plato’s	chōra	as	a	“mirror”	that	reflects	the	shadows	of	the	form	(Cf.	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	74,	77;	Fujita	2011,	
pp.	86-87).	It	has	also	been	pointed	out	that	Nishida’s	metaphor	of	the	mirror	deeply	resonates	with	Zen	Buddhist	
references	to	the	mirror.	For	example,	Inoue	Katsuhito	contends	that	Nishida’s	ideas	are	close	to	the	Zen	Buddhist	
Sheunui’s	(Kataku	jinne)	idea	that	the	mirror	exerts	its	true	essence	when	it	does	not	mirror	anything	outside	itself	(Cf.	
Inoue	1996,	p.	266).	On	Nishida’s	metaphor	of	the	mirror,	see	also:	Kakuni	(2003)	and	Dalissier	(2006).	
48	NKZ	4,	p.	289/102.	
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structure	of	judgment	that	does	not	assume	the	subject-object	dichotomy.	Accordingly,	departing	from	the	structure	 of	 subsumptive	 judgment,	 is	 “deeper”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 does	 not	 assume	 the	 nature	 of	consciousness	or	the	subject	at	its	starting	point.		 In	 a	 subsumptive	 judgment,	 for	 example,	 “red	 is	 a	 color”,	 the	 grammatical	 subject	 (red)	 is	 a	particularization	 of	 the	 predicate	 (color).	 Or,	 put	 differently,	 the	 predicate	 (universal)	 subsumes	 the	subject	(particular).	Nishida	understands	judgment	in	terms	of	this	subsumptive	relation:	“[j]udgment	is	the	subsumption	of	the	particular	in	the	universal.”49	He	further	highlights	this	relation	by	reformulating	‘S	is	P’	into	‘S	is	subsumed	in	P’	and,	further,	into	‘S	is	within	P.’	As	Ueda	rightly	notes,	in	formulating	it	this	way,	Nishida	is	able	to	further	articulate	his	understanding	of	judgments	in	terms	of	implacement,	i.e.	the	relation	 between	 “the	 implaced”	 (oitearu	mono)	 and	 “the	 place	 of	 implacement”	 (oitearu	 basho)50:	 the	particular	S	 is	within	the	universal	P	which	is	 ‘the	place	of	 implacement’	of	S.	 In	the	 judgment	 ‘S	 is	P,’	 it	may	 appear	 as	 if	 two	 separate	 terms	 S	 and	 P	 are	 externally	 related	 by	 the	 copula	 ‘is’.	 ‘S	 is	 within	 P,’	however,	underscores	 the	 internal	connection	between	S	and	P	and,	more	specifically,	 that	S	 is	 the	self-determination	of	the	universal	P.51			 Furthermore,	Nishida	emphasizes	that	this	universal	must	be	a	“concrete	universal”	as	opposed	to	an	 “abstract	universal.”	Nishida	 is	here	borrowing	Hegel’s	distinction	between	 the	 “concrete	universal,”	which	 contains	 within	 itself	 its	 particularizations	 and	 the	 individual,	 and	 the	 “abstract	 universal,”	 a	universal	 reached	 by	 abstraction	 from	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 particulars.52	Nishida	 accordingly	adopts	Hegel’s	understanding	of	judgment	as	the	self-differentiation	of	the	concrete	universal.53	
																																								 																				
49	Ibid.,	p.	261/84.	
50	This	distinction	between	“oitearu	mono”	(literally,	that	which	is	in	the	place)	and	“oitearu	basho”	(literally,	the	place	
which	is	placed)	is	the	basic	distinction	that	underlies	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho.	I	have	here	adopted	Krummel’s	neater	
rendering,	“the	implaced”	and	“the	place	of	implacement”	(2015,	p.	24).	
51	Cf.	Ueda	1991,	pp.	332-333.	
52	Cf.	Hegel’s	Encyclopaedia	Logic	§164.	
53	This	is	not	to	say	that	Nishida	uncritically	adopted	Hegel’s	idea	of	the	concrete	universal.	Krummel	argues	that,	while	
Hegel	understood	the	concrete	universal	as	Begriff	or	Idee,	Nishida	reinterpreted	it	in	“a	more	concrete	direction”	as	the	
“holistic	situation	or	context	enveloping	the	terms	in	relation,	serving	as	their	primitive	unity	to	hold	their	dichotomy	in	
place	and	thus	guaranteeing	the	possibility	of	cognition”	(2015,	pp.	21-23).	Nishida	also	refers	to	Hegel’s	understanding	of	
judgment	(Urteil)	in	reference	to	the	etymology	of	Urteil	(Encyclopaedia	Logic,	§166)	as	the	original	division	of	the	concept	
(NKZ	4,	p.	102).	Furthermore,	as	some	commentators	have	pointed	out,	Nishida	was	heavily	influenced	by	Hegel.	It	began	
early	on	during	the	period	of	the	Inquiry	and	extended	to	later	periods,	when	Nishida	explicates	his	thought	vis-à-vis	the	
dialectic	(Cf.	Fujita	2011,	pp.	143-168;	Krummel	2015).	In	an	essay	published	in	1931	titled	“Hegel’s	Dialectic	from	My	
Standpoint,”	Nishida	adds	a	note	saying	that	Hegel’s	thought	has	taught	him	much	and	that	his	ideas	are	“closest	to	Hegel	
than	anyone	else”	(NKZ	12,	p.	84).	As	Fujita	has	pointed	out,	the	way	in	which	Nishida	articulates	his	idea	of	the	“self-
development	of	pure	experience”	(junsui	keiken	no	jihatsu	jiten)	in	the	Inquiry	is	clearly	an	appropriation	of	Hegel’s	idea	of	
“Begriff”	whereby	it	completes	itself	through	the	process	of	self-differentiation	(2011,	p.	146).	This	point	simply	attests	
that	Nishida	had	a	great	affinity	for	Hegel’s	thought	from	early	on.	
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	 Now,	having	articulated	the	structure	of	subsumptive	judgments,	Nishida	finds	a	clue	to	clarifying	the	relation	between	knowledge	(i.e.	conceptual	knowledge	in	judgments)	and	our	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split	(i.e.	prejudgmental	experience)	in	this	very	structure.	Namely,	he	articulates	the	two	“directions”	 one	 can	 take	 in	 understanding	 the	 limits	 of	 judgment:	 that	 of	 particularization	 (i.e.	grammatical	subject)	and	that	of	universalization	(i.e.	predicate).	If	one	takes	the	former,	one	reaches	that	which	 is	 the	 grammatical	 subject	 but	 never	 predicate.	 This	 was	 Aristotle’s	 definition	 of	 “substratum”	(hypokeimenon):	 “the	 substratum	 is	 that	 of	 which	 other	 things	 are	 predicated,	 while	 it	 is	 itself	 not	predicated	of	anything	else.”54	In	the	Metaphysics	Book	VII,	Aristotle	takes	this	notion	of	substratum	as	the	fourth	sense	of	“ousia”	(being	or	substance)	after	essence,	universal	and	genus	and	characterizes	it	as	the	“protē	ousia”,	 i.e.	primary	substance	or	being.55	Then,	 in	the	Categories	 (chapter	5),	primary	substance	is	further	characterized	as	the	individual	thing:		A	substance	[ousia]	–	that	which	is	called	a	substance	most	strictly,	primarily,	and	most	of	all	–	is	that	which	is	neither	said	of	a	subject	nor	in	a	subject,	e.g.	the	individual	man	or	the	individual	horse.56	Accordingly,	for	Aristotle,	individual	things	are	that	which	transcends	judgment.	Nishida	generally	follows	this	 conception	 of	 individual	 things	 as	 that	 which	 is	 the	 grammatical	 subject	 but	 never	 predicate.	 But	insofar	as	such	individual	things	are	still	predicated	of	universals,	they	are	merely	one	of	the	individuals	and	 not	 a	 “true	 individual”	 (shinno	 kobutsu),	 by	 which	 he	 means	 the	 one	 and	 only	 individual	 that	transcends	all	universalization	or	conceptualization.	Thus,	Nishida	goes	further	than	Aristotle	by	seeking	that	which	is	subject	but	never	predicate	in	an	individual	thing	that	is	subject,	never	predicate,	and	that,	furthermore,	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 predicated	 of.	 The	 true	 individual,	 for	Nishida,	 is	 that	which	 transcends	judgment	in	the	direction	of	the	grammatical	subject.		 But	one	can	also	seek	the	limits	of	judgment	in	the	other	direction,	namely	that	of	the	predicate.	If	one	follows	this	direction,	one	reaches	that	which	is	predicate	but	never	subject.	And	it	is	in	this	reversal	of	Aristotle’s	definition	of	hypokeimenon	that	Nishida	finds	“the	true	transcendent”	that	grounds	judgment,	what	he	also	calls	a	“deeper	sense	of	being”:	[C]an	we	not	think	of	an	even	deeper	sense	of	being	by	reversing	this	[Aristotle’s	definition	of	being]	as	 that	 which	 is	 predicate	 but	 never	 subject?	 Aristotle	 sought	 the	 transcendent	 qua	 ground	 of	judgments	solely	in	the	direction	of	the	grammatical	subject.	But	the	true	transcendent	qua	ground	of	
																																								 																				
54	Metaphysics,	1028b1.	
55	Metaphysics,	1028b1.	
56	Categories,	2a11.	
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judgments	 lies	 not	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 grammatical	 subject	 but	 rather,	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	predicate.57	Nishida’s	originality	appears	in	this	reversal	of	Aristotle’s	definition	of	hypokeimenon.	And,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	this	reinterpretation	is	nothing	other	than	the	articulation	of	his	idea	of	basho.	Moreover,	as	this	idea	 reconfigures	 the	 meaning	 of	 “being”	 as	 it	 has	 long	 been	 understood	 in	 the	 history	 of	 Western	philosophy,	it	can	be	understood	as	Nishida’s	most	important	contribution	to	philosophy.	But	what	exactly	does	“that	which	is	predicate	but	never	subject”	refer	to?	If,	by	definition,	it	is	not	something	that	can	be	the	subject	of	a	judgment,	how	can	we	speak	of	it	and	what	warrants	our	assuming	such	a	thing?		 Nishida	 names	 the	 “true	 individual”	 that	 transcends	 all	 predication	 the	 “transcendent	 subject	plane”	 (chōetsuteki	shugomen).58	It	 is	 that	which	 transcends	determination	by	predicates.	But	 insofar	as	this	true	individual	lies	at	the	limit	of	the	grammatical	subject	of	the	subsumptive	judgment,	in	principle	there	 must	 be	 a	 “universal”	 that	 subsumes	 this	 true	 individual.	 Of	 course,	 this	 universal	 cannot	 be	 a	predicate	in	any	ordinary	sense	since	the	true	individual	transcends	all	predication.	Rather,	it	must	be	that	which	subsumes	 the	 true	 individual	without	 itself	being	subject	 to	 further	predication.	 It	is	the	ultimate	
predicate	 that	 can	 be	 predicate	 but	 never	 subject.	 Nishida	 names	 it	 the	 “transcendent	 predicate	 plane”	(chōetsuteki	 jutsugomen).59	But	 if	 this	 “transcendent	 predicate	 plane”	 is	 that	which	 cannot	 itself	 be	 the	subject	 of	 predication	 (and	 hence	 is	 neither	 determinable	 nor	 objectifiable)	 but	 is	 the	 “place”	 that	ultimately	makes	possible	all	predication,	determination	and	objectification,	then	what	else	could	this	be	but	a	description	of	our	consciousness?	After	all,	 consciousness	 is	 that	which	predicates	and	determines	objects	in	judgments	without	which	judgments	could	not	be	made	in	the	first	place.	As	Nishida	writes	in	an	essay	published	not	long	after	“Basho”:	[W]hen	 the	 predicate	 plane	 of	 subsumptive	 judgment	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 predicate	 that	 never	becomes	 the	 subject,	 this	 is	 what	 I	mean	 by	 the	plane	of	 consciousness	 qua	 basho	 [basho	 toshiteno	
ishikimen].	To	know	is	to	be	implaced	within	this	place.	This	is	the	final	thought	that	I	reached	in	the	essay	“Basho.”60	Furthermore,	since	it	is	by	definition	non-determinable	and	non-objectifiable,	consciousness	is	“nothing.”	Thus,	Nishida	speaks	of	 consciousness	as	 “the	place	of	nothingness”	 (mu	no	basho).	Nishida	accordingly	contrasts	 this	 place	 of	 nothingness	 with	 the	 universals	 that	 serve	 as	 the	 “place”	 of	 particular	determination,	one	that	is	nonetheless	still	determinable	in	the	sense	that	it	can	still	become	the	subject	of	
																																								 																				
57	NKZ	12,	p.	13.	
58	Cf.	NKZ	4,	p.	352,	355.	
59	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	319,	332.	
60	Ibid.,	p.	316	(my	italics).	
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predication,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 still	 determined	 by	 consciousness.	 He	 calls	 the	 latter	 the	 “place	 of	 being(s)”	 (u	no	
basho)61.	 In	 this	 way,	 then,	 via	 the	 articulation	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 subsumptive	 judgments,	 and	 by	reversing	Aristotle’s	definition	of	hypokeimenon,	Nishida	arrives	at	his	definition	of	consciousness.	As	he	says	in	“Basho”:	If	we	are	to	define	consciousness	from	the	standpoint	of	judgment,	it	would	be	that	which	thoroughly	becomes	the	predicate	but	not	the	[grammatical]	subject.62			 Now,	what	ultimately	motivated	Nishida	to	conceptualize	consciousness	as	that	which	is	predicate	but	 never	 subject	was	 the	 idea	 that	 consciousness	 is	 the	 ground	 of	 all	 objectification	 that	 is	 itself	 non-objectifiable.	As	such,	it	is	in	essence	“nothing.”	This	may	recall	Jean-Paul	Sartre’s	idea	of	consciousness	as	nothingness	 as	 well	 as	 his	 notions	 of	 being-for-itself	 and	 the	 elusive	 nature	 of	 pre-reflective	 non-positional	consciousness.	Indeed,	the	connection	is	commonly	made,	and	some	have	even	gone	so	far	as	to	say	 that	 Nishida’s	 idea	 of	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness	 is	 “a	 modern	 Buddhist	 counterpart	 to	 Sartre's	existential	 phenomenology”	 and	 that	 it	 can	 be	 translated	 “without	 the	 least	 departure	 from	 Nishida's	meaning"	 in	 terms	 of	 non-positional	 consciousness.63	In	 response	 to	 such	 a	 claim,	 Brian	 Elwood	 has	argued	 that,	 despite	 their	 startling	 resemblance,	 their	 views	 of	 the	 self	 differ	 radically	 due	 to	 their	different	understandings	of	self-negation.64	We	will	not	go	into	the	debate	here.	But	it	is	worth	noting	that,	together	with	“nothingness,”	the	idea	of	self-negation	is	crucial	for	Nishida.	According	to	Nishida,	the	self	negates	 itself	 in	the	sense	that	 it	withdraws	in	order	to	make	room	for	things	to	manifest	themselves	in	consciousness.	And	by	completely	nullifying	or	emptying	oneself,	things	become	manifest	just	as	they	are	in	 themselves.	The	place	of	 absolute	nothingness	 is	 therefore	 the	 complete	 self-negation	of	 the	 self.	We	will	come	back	to	this	point	after	looking	at	Nishida’s	theory	of	consciousness	below.		
																																								 																				
61	Nishida	does	not	make	an	ontological	distinction	between	being	(Sein)	and	beings	or	entities	(Seiendes)	as	Heidegger	
does.	When	Nishida	speaks	of	“u”	(有),	this	usually	means	“arumono”	(有るもの,	that	which	is),	namely	entities.	But	for	
Nishida,	“arumono”	does	not	refer	just	to	entities	but	to	anything	that	can	be	determined	by	consciousness.	In	this	sense,	
both	Heidegger’s	beings	and	being	would	supposedly	be	called	“arumono.”	I	have	accordingly	translated	“u	no	basho”	as	
“the	place	of	being(s).”	
62	NKZ	4,	p.	278/95.	
63	Dilworth	&	Silverman	1978,	p.	91.	
64	Elwood	1994,	p.	305.	
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2.5. Theory	of	consciousness		 After	Nishida	articulates	the	two	layers	of	basho,	namely	the	place	of	determined	things	(i.e.	place	of	 being(s))	 and	 the	 place	 qua	 consciousness	 (i.e.	 place	 of	 nothingness),	 Nishida	 proceeds	 to	 clarify	 a	further	layer	of	basho	by	distinguishing	two	levels	of	consciousness	qua	basho.	Namely,	he	distinguishes	what	he	calls	the	place	of	oppositional	or	relative	nothingness	from	that	of	absolute	or	true	nothingness.	It	is	at	this	point	that	Nishida	develops	his	idea	of	consciousness	from	his	theory	of	judgment.		 In	 the	 “Basho”	 essay	 and	 “The	 Stranded	 Issue	 of	 Consciousness”	 (published	 one	 month	 after	“Basho”)	 Nishida	 terms	 the	 transcendent	 predicate	 plane,	 “the	 place	 of	 oppositional	 nothingness”	(tairitsutekimu	 no	 basho)	 or	 “the	 place	 of	 relative	 nothingness”	 (sōtaimu	 no	 basho).	 It	 is	 termed	 thus	because	this	level	of	consciousness	is	opposed	or	relative	to	“being,”	i.e.	that	which	is	determined	in	our	consciousness.	In	the	“The	Stranded	Issue	of	Consciousness,”	Nishida	says	that	this	consciousness	is	still	an	objectified	 consciousness	 (ishiki	sareta	ishiki)	and	not	 the	consciousness	 that	 is	conscious	(ishiki	suru	
ishiki).65	In	Japanese,	the	same	word	for	consciousness	(ishiki)	has	a	verb	form	(ishiki	suru)	that	in	English	could	 be	 rendered	 as	 something	 like	 to	 consciousize.	 Accordingly,	 we	 can	 say,	 somewhat	 clumsily,	 that	Nishida	distinguishes	the	consciousized	consciousness	from	consciousizing	consciousness	and	claims	that	the	latter	remains	to	be	clarified.	But	what	exactly	is	the	nature	of	this	consciousizing	consciousness	and,	how	does	it	differ	from	the	consciousized	consciousness?	Put	differently,	what	is	the	difference	between	the	place	of	absolute	or	true	nothingness	and	that	of	relative	or	oppositional	nothingness?			 In	clarifying	this	distinction,	Nishida	makes	specific	reference	to	Emil	Lask’s	ideas.	This	reference	to	Lask	deserves	some	attention.	For,	of	all	the	neo-Kantians	who	influenced	Nishida,	it	was	Lask	that	was	most	 influential	 during	 the	 development	 of	 his	 theory	 of	 basho.	 Interestingly,	 this	 corresponds	 to	 the	period	 after	 Nishida’s	 most	 extensive	 engagement	 with	 other	 neo-Kantians,	 specifically	 Windelband,	Rickert	 and	 Cohen.	 In	 fact,	 Nishida’s	 references	 to	 Lask	 are	 almost	 exclusively	 found	 in	 the	 two	 essays	“Basho”	 and	 “The	 Stranded	 Issue	 of	 Consciousness.”66	Yet	 despite	 this	 limited	 context,	 they	nonetheless	prove	 helpful	 in	 clarifying	 the	 theory	 of	 basho	 in	 its	 early	 development	 and	 specifically	 the	 difference	between	the	two	levels	of	consciousness.		 In	his	book	Nishida’s	Philosophy	published	in	1935,	Kōyama	Iwao,	a	student	of	Nishida’s,	famously	remarked	 that	 Lask’s	 idea	 of	 “domain	 category”	 (Gebietskategorie)	 triggered	 the	 establishment	 of	
																																								 																				
65	NKZ	12,	pp.	13-15.	
66	Nishida’s	reference	to	Lask	is	first	made	in	the	essay,	“Basho.”	Aside	from	the	numerous	references	to	Lask	in	“Basho”	
and	“The	Stranded	Issue	of	Consciousness,”	Nishida	makes	only	sporadic	references	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals	
(1930)	and	The	Fundamental	Problems	of	Philosophy	(1933).		
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Nishida’s	idea	of	basho.67	More	recently,	Itabashi	Yūjin	has	developed	this	claim	in	his	detailed	analysis	of	the	Nishida-Lask	 relation.68	I	 have	 elsewhere	 argued	 that	Nishida	was	most	 influenced	by	what	 I	 called	Lask’s	“logical	objectivism”	or,	more	specifically,	the	idea	that	“transcendent	objects”	are	characterized	as	“transoppositional.”69	Lask	located	Kant’s	Copernican	Revolution	in	extending	the	province	of	the	logical	to	 objects	 or,	 put	 differently,	 introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 being	 into	 transcendental	 logic.70	Due	 to	 this	discovery,	objects	were	no	longer	considered	metalogical	but,	rather,	understood	as	having	the	logical	as	a	constituting	moment.	 But	 in	 Lask’s	 view,	 Kant	 and	 the	 epistemological	 logic	 that	 developed	 afterwards	neglected	the	supposedly	evident	fact	that	in	judgments,	one	can	only	judge	the	“after-image”	(Nachbild)	of	objects	and	not	the	objects	themselves.	According	to	Lask,	the	primary	object	of	judgment	is	that	which	has	 either	 true	 or	 false	 value.	 But	 the	 true	 standard	 of	 judgment,	 he	 argues,	must	 itself	 lie	 beyond	 this	opposition	between	truth	and	falsity.71	Accordingly,	he	maintains	that	the	true	standard	of	judgment	is	the	transcendent	 object	 that	 lies	 beyond	 judgments	 (urteilsjenseitig)	 and	 is	 characterized	 by	“transoppositionality”	(Übergegensätzlichkeit)	since	it	is	beyond	the	true/false	opposition.72		 In	 the	essay	 “Basho,”	Nishida	states	his	agreement	with	Lask	 that	 the	only	non-dogmatic	way	 to	make	sense	of	objects	that	 lie	beyond	judgment	 is	to	think	of	them	as	transoppositional,	or,	 in	Nishida’s	words,	 “oppositionless.”	 Thus,	 Nishida	 speaks	 of	 transcendent	 objects	 (i.e.	 “objects	 themselves”)	 as	“oppositionless	objects”	(tairitsunaki	taishō).	Upon	noting	his	agreement,	he	goes	on	to	say:	When	seeing	such	an	object	[oppositionless	object]	we	may	think	that	we	are	transcending	the	field	of	subjective	 consciousness	 that	 establishes	 the	 oppositional	 contents.	 But	 this	 means	 nothing	 other	than	that	we	are	advancing	 from	the	standpoint	of	oppositional	nothingness	 to	 the	standpoint	of	true	
nothingness.	[...]	This	does	not	mean	that	we	are	discarding	the	so-called	standpoint	of	consciousness;	rather	we	are	radicalizing	this	standpoint.73	This	corresponds	to	the	following	passage	from	“The	Stranded	Issue	of	Consciousness”:	Lask’s	 oppositionless	 object	 must	 lie	 completely	 outside	 of	 consciousness.	 But	 how	 can	 such	
transcendent	 object	 relate	 to	 our	 consciousness	 as	 the	 object	 of	 knowledge?	 By	 understanding	
																																								 																				
67	Kōyama	1935,	p.	21.	
68	Itabashi	2004,	pp.	131-146.	Aside	from	Kōyama	and	Itabashi,	Niels	Guelberg	(1997)	and	John	Krummel	(2015,	p.	21,	67)	
have	also	provided	an	analysis	of	the	Nishida-Lask	relation.	
69	Ishihara	2014.	
70	Cf.	Lask	1923b,	p.	28;	1923a,	p.	286.	
71	The	exposition	of	Lask’s	view	that	I	have	given	here	is	only	a	very	rough	outline.	For	a	detailed	account	of	Lask’s	position,	
see:	Crowell	(2001,	chapter	2).	On	Lask’s	theory	of	judgment,	see:	Emundts	(2008).	
72	Cf.	Lask,	Die	Lehre	vom	Urteil,	chapter	2.		
73	NKZ	4,	pp.	221/57-58.	
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consciousness	 as	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness	 and	 when	 this	 place	 becomes	 absolute	 nothingness,	 that	which	is	implaced	becomes	the	oppositional	object.74	In	these	passages,	Nishida	is	agreeing	with	Lask	that	the	objects	themselves	are	not	reducible	to	the	object	of	our	judgment.	Accordingly,	both	Nishida	and	Lask	criticize	Rickert	for	conceiving	the	object	exclusively	in	 relation	 to	 the	 judging	 subject.	 Furthermore,	 they	 are	 also	 in	 agreement	 that	we	have	 an	 immediate	experience	 of	 objects	 themselves	 prior	 to	 our	 grasp	 of	 them	 in	 judgment.75	Here,	 we	 can	witness	 Lask	trying	to	move	beyond	the	subject-object	dualism	inherent	in	Kantian	epistemology.	Indeed,	this	was	one	of	 the	 important	 ideas	 that	 influenced	not	only	Nishida	but,	 interestingly,	 also	early	Heidegger.76	As	 the	above	 passages	 indicate,	 however,	 Nishida	 was	 also	 not	 completely	 satisfied	 with	 Lask’s	 position.	Although	Lask	was	trying	to	overcome	the	epistemological	dualism	by	conceiving	transcendent	objects	as	lying	 in	 a	 realm	 beyond	 judgment,	 Lask	 struggled	 to	 develop	 the	 subjective	 aspects	 of	 his	 logical	objectivism.	 Therefore,	 he	 conceived	 of	 transcendent	 objects	 as	 intuitable	 in	 our	 immediate	 experience	without	 accordingly	 developing	 a	 notion	 of	 subjectivity	 or	 consciousness	 that	 simply	 lives	 in	 this	experience	without	distorting	the	object	as	the	judging	subject	does.77		 As	 we	 can	 see	 from	 the	 above	 passages,	 Nishida	 seeks	 to	 complement	 this	 idea	 of	 the	transoppositional	 object	 by	 reconceiving	 consciousness	 as	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness.	 He	 thus	 says	 that	transcendent	objects	lie	beyond	not	consciousness	per	se	but	only	the	place	of	oppositional	nothingness.	As	he	also	says	in	a	different	passage:		[T]he	 consciousness	 of	 the	 oppositionless	 object	 does	 not	 entail	 consciousness	 transcending	 itself,	but	rather	that	consciousness	enters	deeply	into	itself.	We	say	that	this	is	to	transcend	[consciousness	itself]	because	we	are	looking	only	at	the	relations	between	objects	without	thinking	of	the	essence	of	consciousness	itself.78	
																																								 																				
74	NKZ	12,	p.	15	(my	italics).	
75	Cf.	NKZ	4,	pp.	212-213/52	
76	Krummel	has	also	aptly	pointed	this	out:	“[w]hat	profoundly	affected	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida	was	this	Laskian	
notion	of	a	primal	non-duality	of	being	and	sense	(Sinn)	in	an	‘immediate	intuitable	lived	experience’	(unmittelbare	
anschauliche	Erleben)”	(2015,	p.	21).	For	Lask’s	influence	on	early	Heidegger,	see:	Kisiel	(1995)	and	Crowell	(2001,	chapter	
2,	4).	
77	In	fact,	Lask	does	speak	of	the	subjective	correlate	of	objects	that	transcend	judgments	as	“Empfängerin”	(1923a,	p.	
396),	“Erlebensstätte”	(1923b,	p.	191)	or	“Realisierungsstätte”	(1923a,	448).		He	also	mentions	that	our	knowledge	of	
transcendent	objects	is	a	kind	of	“dedication”	(Hingabe)	(1923a,	p.	396).	Kisiel	has	pointed	out	that	this	idea	of	giving	
ourselves	over	to	the	objects	of	immediate	experience	also	had	an	influence	on	early	Heidegger	(1995,	pp.	214-215).	Lask,	
however,	does	not	develop	these	ideas	in	further	detail.	Therefore,	in	positing	objects	themselves	beyond	the	realm	of	the	
judging	subject	without	providing	an	account	of	how	these	objects	can	be	given	to	the	subject,	Lask’s	position	begins	to	
look	like	a	dogmatic	metaphysical	position.	For	a	great	discussion	of	this	point,	see:	Crowell	2001,	chapter	2.	
78	NKZ	4,	p.	284/99.	
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In	Nishida’s	framework,	the	object	of	judgment	characterized	by	oppositionality	is	implaced	in	the	place	of	
oppositional	 nothingness.	 Now,	 when	 we	 speak	 of	 “transcendent	 objects”	 as	 transcending	 the	 realm	 of	judgment,	we	somehow	think	that	these	objects	are	beyond	consciousness	per	se.	But	according	to	Nishida,	this	is	a	misunderstanding	that	arises	from	not	properly	understanding	the	nature	of	consciousness.	If	we	attend	 to	 the	nature	of	 consciousness	 as	 the	 “place”	wherein	objects	manifest,	 then	we	 can	understand	how	 “transcendent	 objects”	 are	 not	 beyond	 consciousness	 but,	 rather,	 experienced	 at	 a	 deeper	 level	 of	consciousness	 whereby	 there	 is	 no	 more	 opposition	 between	 knower	 and	 known.	 Thus,	 transcendent	objects	are	not	beyond	consciousness	but,	rather,	 implaced	 in	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	 (or	what	he	 here	 also	 calls,	 true	 nothingness).	 Here,	 transcendent	 objects	 are	 not	 experienced	 as	 objects	 of	 our	awareness	since	all	object-awareness	disappears	at	this	level.	In	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness,	things	just	appear	as	they	are	in	themselves	without	seer	or	seen.	Nishida	accordingly	reinterprets	Lask’s	idea	of	transcendent	objects	characterized	 in	 terms	of	 transoppositionality	as	 implaced	 in	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.79		 Accordingly,	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	 (zettaimu	no	basho)	 can	be	distinguished	 from	 the	
place	of	oppositional	or	relative	nothingness	 (tairitsuteki	mu	no	basho,	sōtaimu	no	basho)	 in	 terms	of	 that	which	 is	 implaced	(oitearu	mono).	Namely,	 in	 the	place	of	relative	nothingness,	one	“finds”	 the	object	of	judgment.	This	 is	 to	 say	 that	 objects	 are	 experienced	as	objects	of	our	 judgment.	 Accordingly,	 insofar	 as	these	objects	are	necessarily	correlated	with	the	judging	subject,	consciousness	is	understood	as	relative	nothingness.	In	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness,	however,	one	“finds”	transcendent	objects	in	the	sense	that	we	do	not	experience	these	“objects”	as	objects	of	our	awareness	but,	rather,	we	live	through	them.	In	enjoying	a	piece	of	music	simply	unfold,	we	are	not	making	it	an	object	but	are	living	through	it.	In	being	lost	in	an	exciting	novel,	the	novel	is	no	“object”	but	is	what	I	am	living	through.			 We	can	also	rephrase	this	in	terms	of	the	self-negating	character	of	consciousness	we	mentioned	earlier.	 In	 judging	about	objects,	 consciousness	negates	 itself,	 or	withdraws,	 in	order	 to	make	 room	 for	objects	to	manifest	to	the	judging	subject.	In	entertaining	the	thought	that	the	music	is	loud,	the	object	of	my	awareness,	 “loud	music,”	manifests	 itself	 in	my	consciousness.	Accordingly,	 consciousness	has	made	room	 for	 this	 “loud	 music”	 to	 manifest	 itself.	 But	 in	 such	 experience,	 consciousness	 is	 still	 relative	nothingness;	 it	has	not	fully	negated	itself.	However,	when	I	simply	live	through	the	music	such	that	the	“music”	is	not	so	much	manifesting	to	anyone	as	merely	realizing	 itself,	consciousness	has	negated	itself	completely.	 In	 the	 moment	 of	 my	 absorption	 in	 the	 flow	 of	 the	 music,	 “I”	 am	 not	 there	 anymore.	Consciousness	has	 completely	nullified	or	 emptied	 itself,	 and	 the	 “music”	has	 instead	 filled	 the	place	of	
																																								 																				
79	Cf.	Ishihara	2014,	pp.	79-82.	
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absolute	nothingness,	so	to	say.80	As	Ueda	says,	in	such	experience,	“”I”	am	infinitely	open	as	the	“self-less”	and	fulfilled.”81		 Let	 me	 here	 further	 explain	 the	 difference	 between	 “music	 manifesting	 to	 consciousness”	 and	“’music’	 realizing	 itself.”	 At	 first	 sight,	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 no	 significant	 difference.	 Although	 the	 word	“realize”	may	seem	to	have	less	of	the	connotation	that	the	subject	matter	is	appearing	to	someone,	this	is	not	 so	 clear	 since	 we	 can	 still	 say,	 “the	 music	 realizes	 itself	 in	 consciousness	 (or	 in	 us).”	 Thus,	 the	difference	between	“manifest”	and	“realize”	 is	not	so	much	that	 the	 latter	 is	stripped	of	 the	connotation	that	 the	music	 is	 appearing	 to	 consciousness.	 Rather,	 I	 have	 in	mind	 the	 twofold	meaning	 of	 the	word	“realize,”	namely	“actualize”	and	“understand”	that	Nishitani	Keiji,	a	student	of	Nishida’s,	appeals	to	in	his	choice	of	this	word	to	express	what	he	calls	“the	self-realization	of	reality.”82	When	we	say	that	the	“music”	realizes	itself	 in	“us,”	this	entails,	on	the	one	hand,	that	the	“music”	actualizes	 itself	 in	“us.”	On	the	other	hand,	 it	 entails	 our	 coming	 to	 an	 understanding,	 or	 what	 Nishida	 calls	 “appropriating	 through	understanding,”	that	the	“music”	is	indeed	actualizing	itself	in	“us.”	Accordingly,	when	the	“music”	realizes	itself	in	“us,”	it	is	not	the	case	that	it	merely	manifests	itself	to	us.	Rather,	it	is	coupled	with	the	alteration	of	our	understanding	of	ourselves	and	the	reality.	To	employ	the	language	of	Nishida	and	others83,	when	the	“music”	realizes	itself	 in	“us,”	I	have	understood	that	“I	am	the	music,	and	the	music	is	me.”	Thus,	 in	absolute	 nothingness,	 it	 is	 not	 as	 if	 consciousness	 somehow	 completely	 disappears.	 It	 is	 only	 that	consciousness	 is	no	 longer	understood	within	 the	subject-object	 framework;	 it	 is	not	a	subject	 to	which	the	object	appears.	It	has	completely	nullified	itself.	And	in	this	complete	nullification,	“I”	have	understood	
																																								 																				
80	Since	it	is	somewhat	inevitable	that	we	employ	the	language	of	the	subject-object	framework	in	describing	experience	
that	is	beyond	it,	I	put	quotation	marks	around	the	subject	(I,	we,	me,	us)	and	object	(music,	reality,	etc.)	when	I	am	
speaking	about	experience	at	the	level	of	absolute	nothingness.		
81	Ueda	makes	this	claim	in	his	description	of	what	he	calls	“original	experience”	(genkeiken,	原経験).	Referring	to	
Nishida’s	quotation	from	the	Inquiry	on	pure	experience,	he	says:	“’[i]n	the	very	moment	of	seeing	a	color,	hearing	a	
sound,	there	is	not	yet	subject	nor	object.’	In	such	experience,	‘I’	am	infinitely	open	as	the	‘self-less’	and	fulfilled.”	And	
shortly	after,	he	also	says	it	is	the	“direct	fulfillment	of	experience”	(2000,	p.	168).	
82	Nishitani	1982,	p.	5.	Compare	what	he	says:	“I	am	using	the	word	[‘realize’]	to	indicate	that	our	ability	to	perceive	reality	
means	that	reality	realizes	(actualizes)	itself	in	us;	that	this	in	turn	is	the	only	way	that	we	can	realize	(appropriate	through	
understanding)	the	fact	that	reality	is	so	realizing	itself	in	us;	and	that	in	so	doing	the	self-realization	of	reality	itself	takes	
place”	(1982,	p.	5).			
83	In	his	“Fragmentary	Notes	on	Pure	Experience”	(Junsuikeiken	ni	kansuru	danshō),	Nishida	gives	the	following	simple,	yet	
powerful,	description	of	pure	experience:	“I	am	looking	at	the	flower.	At	this	moment,	the	flower	is	me	and	I	am	the	
flower”	(NKZ	16,	p.	430).	See	also:	Ueda	(1991),	Maraldo	(2012).	In	Maraldo’s	paper,	he	cites	the	Japanese	calligrapher	
Morita	Shirū’s	(1912-1998)	description	of	his	own	experience	of	practicing	calligraphy:	“[o]nly	in	the	moment	I	and	the	
brush	truly	become	one,	does	it	really	happen	that	‘I	do	calligraphy’	[…]	I	and	the	brush	are	one.	I	am	the	brush,	the	brush	
is	me”	(Morita	1971,	pp.	124-125;	cited	in	Maraldo	2012,	p.	69	[Maraldo’s	translation]).	
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and	appropriated	the	fact	that	“reality”	 is	realizing	itself	 in	“me”	and	that	“I”	am	absolutely	no-thing	but	this	realizing	“reality.”		
2.6. Three	levels	of	basho		 We	have	now	outlined	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	as	it	was	first	developed	in	From	the	Acting	to	the	
Seeing.	It	should	now	be	clear	that	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	is	a	complex	theory	that	combines	the	theory	of	judgment	and	the	theory	of	consciousness.	It	is	basically	an	attempt	to	show	that	things	or	objects	in	a	broad	 sense	 (i.e.	 anything	 determinable	 by	 consciousness)	 presuppose	 consciousness	 as	 the	 ground	 of	determination	and	objectification	and,	furthermore,	that	this	ground	of	determination,	i.e.	“consciousness,”	has	two	levels:	the	place	of	relative	nothingness	and	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	At	this	point,	then,	we	 can	 lay	 out	 the	 three	 levels	 of	 basho	 Nishida	 articulates	 in	 this	 period:	 the	 place	 of	 being(s)	 (u	no	
basho),	 the	 place	 of	 relative	 nothingness	 (sōtaimu	 no	 basho)	 and	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	(zettaimu	 no	 basho).	 Nishida’s	 theory	 of	 basho,	 then,	 involves	 what	 Krummel	 calls	 a	 “series	 of	implacements	within	implacements”84	that	moves	from	the	more	abstract	level	to	the	more	concrete	level	that	 serves	 as	 the	 ground	 of	 its	 possibility.	 In	 light	 of	Nishida’s	 basic	 distinction	 between	 the	 implaced	(oitearu	mono)	and	 the	place	of	 implacement	 (oitearu	basho),	we	can	say	 that	 the	 theory	of	basho	 casts	light	 on	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 deepening	 of	 the	 place	 of	 implacement	and	 the	meaning	 of	 being	 as	 being	implaced.			
3. Theory	of	basho	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals	(1930)		 After	laying	bare	the	basic	structure	of	the	theory	of	basho	in	the	latter	half	of	From	the	Acting	to	
the	Seeing	(1927),	Nishida	goes	on	to	develop	this	theory	in	more	detail	 in	his	subsequent	works.	In	this	section,	we	will	be	looking	at	his	subsequent	book,	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals	published	in	1930.	We	will	be	 focusing	mainly	on	 the	book’s	 fourth	essay,	 “The	 Intelligible	World,”	 first	published	 in	1928.	This	essay	is	particularly	important	in	that	it	summarizes	his	main	points	of	this	period,	as	he	himself	says	in	the	preface,	and	introduces	the	Husserlian	noesis-noema	distinction	for	the	first	time.	This	latter	point	will	 be	 especially	 relevant	 for	 us	 in	 the	 next	 chapter.	 Yet	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 I	 will	 not	 attempt	 to	provide	 an	 exhaustive	 account	 of	 the	 theory	 of	basho	 as	 it	was	 developed	 in	 this	 period,	 for	 the	whole	
																																								 																				
84	Krummel	2015,	p.24.	
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picture	Nishida	draws	of	it	in	these	essays	is	quite	intricate	and	complicated	and	far	exceeds	the	scope	of	this	chapter.	Therefore,	I	will	only	focus	on	the	points	relevant	to	the	current	discussion.		
3.1. Three	levels	of	universals		 Upon	 introducing	his	 theory	 of	basho	 in	 the	 latter	 half	 of	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing,	Nishida	comes	 to	 formulate	 the	 three	 levels	of	basho	 into	 three	 levels	of	universals.85	In	 the	“Intelligible	World,”	Nishida	begins	by	identifying	these	three	levels:	“the	judging	universal”	(handanteki	ippansha),	“the	self-aware	universal”	(jikakuteki	ippansha)	and	“the	intelligible	universal”	(eichiteki	ippansha)86.	In	accordance	with	these	three	universals,	he	distinguishes	three	worlds	that	are	respectively	implaced	and	determined	by	the	universal:	the	world	of	nature	(shizenkai),	the	world	of	consciousness	(ishikikai)	and	the	world	of	intelligibility	(eichitekisekai).	Now,	in	the	previous	section,	we	posed	the	question	regarding	the	nature	of	the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness.	 In	From	the	Acting	 to	 the	Seeing,	we	 saw	 that	Nishida	 articulated	 its	difference	from	the	place	of	relative	nothingness	vis-à-vis	the	object	that	is	implaced.	Here,	Nishida	poses	a	similar	question	but	in	terms	of	“the	intelligible	world”:		The	intelligible	world	is	that	which	transcends	our	thinking.	In	what	way	are	we	able	to	think	of	such	a	world?	If	thinking	involves	the	self-determination	of	a	universal,	what	kind	of	self-determination	of	the	universal	allows	us	to	think	of	the	intelligible	world?87	By	claiming	that	the	intelligible	world	is	that	which	“transcends”	our	thinking,	Nishida	is	saying	that	such	a	 world	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 object	 of	 our	 thought.	 But	 in	 fact,	 since	 he	 understands	 this	intelligible	world	to	also	“transcend”	our	volition,	in	the	sense	that	it	cannot	be	the	object	of	our	will,	his	question	 should	 be:	 in	 what	 way	 do	 we	 come	 to	 “know”	 the	 world	 if	 it	 can	 be	 the	 object	 of	 neither	 our	
thought	nor	our	will?	Indeed,	the	majority	of	the	essay	is	devoted	to	answering	this	question.	But	Nishida	proceeds	here	 in	 a	much	more	 systematic	 fashion	 than	before.	What	 is	 especially	 interesting	 is	 that	 he	incorporates	Husserl’s	noesis-noema	distinction	into	this	discussion	in	order	to	elucidate	the	structure	of	
																																								 																				
85	To	be	precise,	the	three	basho	do	not	correspond	exactly	to	the	three	levels	of	universals.	While	the	first	two	basho	(the	
place	of	being(s)	and	the	place	of	relative	nothingness)	roughly	correspond	to	the	first	two	levels	of	universals	(the	judging	
universal	and	the	self-aware	universal),	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	does	not	correspond	to	the	intelligible	universal.	
Nishida	in	fact	sees	an	even	deeper	universal	that	envelops	the	intelligible	universal	and	calls	this	“the	universal	of	
absolute	nothingness”	(NKZ	5,	p.	179).	
86	In	the	essay	“Intelligible	World,”	Nishida	calls	this	universal,	the	“universal	of	intellectual	intuition”	(chitekichokkan	no	
ippansha).	But	later,	he	comes	to	prefer	the	term	“intelligible	universal.”	Cf.	NKZ	5,	p.	140.	
87	NKZ	5,	pp.	123-124.	
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the	 self-aware	 universal	 and	 the	way	 in	which	we	 come	 to	 think	 of	 the	 intelligible	 universal.	 Nishida’s	strategy	is	quite	simple.	He	attempts	to	show	that	there	is	a	structural	parallel	between	all	three	levels	of	universals.	He	 first	proceeds	 to	 show	 that	 the	 structure	of	 the	 self-aware	universal	parallels	 that	of	 the	judging	universal.	Then,	he	goes	on	to	show	that	the	structure	of	the	intelligible	universal	parallels	that	of	the	self-aware	universal.	This	allows	him	to	then	draw	an	analogy	between	the	way	in	which	we	come	to	understand	 the	 self-aware	 universal	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 we	 come	 to	 understand	 the	 intelligible	universal.		
3.2. From	the	judging	universal	to	the	self-aware	universal		 The	 judging	 universal	 corresponds	 to	 what	 Nishida	 called	 “the	 place	 of	 being(s)”	 in	 From	 the	
Acting	to	the	Seeing.	That	which	was	 implaced	 in	 the	place	of	being(s)	was	said	 to	be	 that	which	can	be	determined	in	our	consciousness	in	the	form	of	judgments.	Accordingly,	Nishida	comes	to	call	the	place	of	being(s)	 the	 judging	 universal	 or	 the	 universal	 of	 judgments.	 To	 recall,	 Nishida	 sought	 the	 ground	 of	judgment	in	the	direction	of	the	grammatical	subject	and	the	predicate	and	finally	came	to	his	definition	of	consciousness	as	the	transcendent	predicate	plane.	Moreover,	insofar	as	this	place	cannot	be	determined	as	the	grammatical	subject,	Nishida	called	consciousness	“the	place	of	nothingness.”	Accordingly,	the	place	of	nothingness	was	understood	as	enveloping	the	place	of	being(s).	Following	the	same	line	of	reasoning,	Nishida	comes	 to	call	 this	place	of	 implacement	of	 the	 judging	universal	 “the	self-aware	universal.”	 It	 is	called	 this	 because	 we	 become	 aware	 of	 ourselves	 here,	 i.e.	 consciousness	 becomes	 the	 object	 of	 our	awareness.88		 At	this	point,	Nishida	distinguishes	two	meanings	of	“being,”	which	is	 implaced	in	the	self-aware	universal.	These	correspond	to	the	two	ways	in	which	one	can	become	aware	of	oneself.	Nishida	calls	the	first	“intellectual	self”	(chiteki	jiko)	which	he	says	 is	a	“formal”	self.	 It	 is	 formal	because	the	“content”	or	correlate	of	the	intellectual	self	is	merely	the	content	of	judgment:		The	 intellectual	 self	 is	 that	which	 is	 self-aware	and	has	as	 its	 content	of	 consciousness	directly	 the	content	of	 the	 judging	universal	 as	 it	 is	 in	 itself.	The	 intellectual	 self,	 as	 implaced	 in	 the	 self-aware	universal,	is	merely	a	formal	being	that	does	not	yet	have	its	own	self-aware	content.89	
																																								 																				
88	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	125.	
89	Ibid.,	pp.	126-127.	
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In	other	words,	since	the	 intellectual	self	 is	merely	 the	 formal	correlate	of	 the	content	of	 judgment,	 it	 is	said	to	lack	its	own	content,	by	which	he	means	one’s	“self-aware	content.”	In	order	to	“have	its	own	self-content,”	 Nishida	 contends	 that	 we	 must	 delve	 deeper	 into	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 being	 of	 that	 which	 is	implaced	in	the	self-aware	universal.	Subsequently,	at	this	depth,	we	find	the	“volitional	self”	(ishiteki	jiko).	At	 this	 point,	 consciousness	 is	 now	 understood	 not	 merely	 as	 the	 transcendent	 predicate	 plane	 of	
judgment	 but,	 rather,	 as	 the	 “self-aware	 conscious	plane	 that	 reflects	 or	mirrors	 its	 own	 content.”90	But	here	we	must	pause	and	ask:	in	what	sense	could	it	be	said	that	the	volitional	self	“reflects	or	mirrors	its	own	content”	while	the	intellectual	self	does	not?		 It	 is	 useful	 here	 to	 refer	 back	 to,	 as	 Nishida	 himself	 does,	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 concrete	universal	 and	 the	 abstract	 universal	 in	 judgment.	 The	 two	 are	 distinguished	 in	 that,	while	 the	 abstract	universal	 is	 reached	by	 abstracting	 from	 the	differences	 and	hence	does	not	 contain	 its	particulars,	 the	concrete	universal	contains	within	itself	 its	particularizations.	Accordingly,	 judgment	was	understood	as	the	 self-determination	 of	 the	 concrete	 universal.	 Now,	 the	 volitional	 self	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 concrete	universal	in	that	it	self-determines	itself.	Put	differently,	it	includes	within	itself	its	own	determination.	To	give	 an	 example,	 when	 I	 will	 to	 read	 Plato’s	 Republic,	 I	 am	 expressing	 my	 inner	 drive	 to	 fulfill	 my	intellectual	 curiosity.	 In	 expressing	 this	 will,	 I	 am	 therefore	 determining	 myself	 and,	 accordingly,	 the	content	of	 the	will	 is	my	own.	 This	 is	not	 the	 case,	however,	 in	 intellectually	or	 theoretically	 relating	 to	things.	For	the	intellectual	self	merely	relates	to	the	content	of	judgments	in	an	external	way.	For	example,	when	I	 judge	that	 the	Republic	 is	one	of	Plato’s	 longest	works,	 the	content	of	 the	 judgment	 is	 in	no	way	conceivable	as	the	self-determination	of	myself.	Therefore,	 insofar	as	we	become	aware	of	our	own	self-aware	content	only	in	the	volitional	self,	Nishida	claims	that	“[t]rue	self-awareness	is	not	mere	intellectual	self-awareness	but	rather,	volitional	self-awareness.”91			 Now,	 for	 any	 kind	 of	 self-determination	 of	 the	 universal,	 Nishida	 says	 that	 there	 must	 be	 a	“determining	act”	 (gentei	sayō)	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	 this	determination.92	In	 the	 judging	universal,	 the	determining	act	is	said	to	be	the	judgment	insofar	as	the	grammatical	subject	and	the	predicate	are	related	in	judgment.	But	what	then	is	the	determining	act	of	the	self-aware	universal?	According	to	Nishida,	the	self-aware	 universal	 determines	 itself	 through	 the	 noesis-noema	 correlation.93	This	 is	 just	 to	 say	 that,	when	we	become	aware	of	ourselves,	we	are,	on	the	one	hand,	aware	of	objects	or	things	as	determined	in	the	judging	universal	and,	on	the	other	hand,	aware	of	ourselves.	Taking	up	Husserl’s	terminology,	Nishida	
																																								 																				
90	Ibid.,	p.	128.	
91	Ibid.,	p.	133.	
92	Ibid.,	pp.	140,	152-153.	
93	Ibid.,	p.	124.	
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refers	to	the	former	as	the	“noema”	and	the	latter	“noesis.”	Yet,	Nishida	does	not	identify	intentionality	as	the	 determining	 act	 of	 the	 self-aware	 universal.	 Rather,	 he	 identifies	 it	 with	 jikaku.94	In	 order	 to	 see	Nishida’s	reason	for	this,	it	may	be	helpful	to	refer	to	the	level	of	the	judging	universal	again.	As	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	Nishida	understood	the	relation	between	the	grammatical	subject	and	the	predicate	specifically	as	the	self-determination	of	the	concrete	universal.	As	we	have	already	intimated,	here	Nishida	similarly	wants	 to	understand	 the	self-aware	universal	as	 that	which	determines	 itself	within	 itself.	But	intentionality,	 according	 to	 Nishida,	 cannot	 do	 this	 job.	 It	 highlights	 the	 structure	 of	 consciousness	 as	referring	beyond	itself	to	objects	but	it	 is	not	self-determining.	Only	when	we	understand	consciousness	as	reflecting	or	mirroring	itself	within	itself,	namely	as	self-mirroring,	does	this	self-determining	aspect	of	consciousness	become	apparent,	or	so	Nishida	contends.	In	this	way,	Nishida	understands	jikaku	qua	self-mirroring	as	the	determining	act	of	the	self-aware	universal.	Accordingly,	both	the	intellectual	self	and	the	volitional	self	are	self-aware	(jikakuteki)	insofar	as	they	are	determined	in	the	self-aware	universal.		
3.3. From	the	self-aware	universal	to	the	intelligible	universal		 After	 introducing	 the	 noesis-noema	 correlation	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 self-aware	 universal	 as	 the	equivalent	of	 the	relation	between	the	grammatical	subject	and	the	predicate	at	 the	 level	of	 the	 judging	universal,	Nishida	proceeds	to	articulate	the	third	level	of	the	universal,	namely	the	intelligible	universal.	At	 this	point,	 the	 initial	question	 is	posed	again	but	 in	a	slightly	different	way:	 “[w]hat	does	 it	mean	 for	consciousness	to	transcend	consciousness?”95	As	the	question	is	not	at	all	clearly	put,	we	can	rephrase	it	thus:	how	does	self-awareness	(jikaku)	extend	to	the	level	of	the	intellectual	universal?		 Nishida’s	strategy	is	to	draw	a	parallel	with	the	transition	from	the	judging	universal	to	the	self-aware	universal.	As	we	 saw	 in	 the	previous	 section,	 that	which	 transcends	 judgment	was	 sought	 in	 the	direction	 of	 the	 grammatical	 subject	 and	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 predicate.	 In	 the	 latter	 direction,	 Nishida	found	 consciousness	 to	 be	 the	 transcendent	 predicate	 plane.	 Similarly,	 Nishida	 seeks	 that	 which	transcends	consciousness	 in	the	two	directions,	namely	noema	and	noesis.	And	in	this	transcendence	 in	the	direction	of	noesis,	or	what	Nishida	calls	 “noetic	 transcendence”	 (noesisteki	chōetsu),	one	enters	 the	“intelligible	 world,”	 or	 what	 he	 also	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 “transcendent	 world.”	 That	 which	 is	 implaced	 is	accordingly	 called	 the	 “transcendent	 self.”	 In	 this	way,	 by	 analogy,	 Nishida	 comes	 to	 conceptualize	 the	
																																								 																				
94	Ibid.,	p.	140.	
95	Ibid.,	p.	132.	
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universal	that	further	envelops	the	self-aware	universal.	But	what	exactly	is	the	nature	of	this	“intelligible	world”	or	what	he	also	referred	to	as	the	“world	of	intellectual	intuition”?			 Nishida	 clearly	 had	 in	 mind	 these	 terms	 as	 used	 by	 Plato	 and	 the	 Neoplatonists	 (specifically,	Plotinus).	But	Nishida	reconceived	these	 ideas	 in	terms	of	his	notion	of	noetic	transcendence.	Both	Plato	and	 Plotinus	 understood	 the	 intelligible	 world	 as	 that	 which	 transcends	 this	 world.	 But	 according	 to	Nishida,	 this	 is	 because	 they	 understood	 transcendence	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 noema.	 For	Nishida,	 the	intelligible	world	does	not	 transcend	this	world	noematically	but,	 rather,	noetically.	 In	other	words,	 the	intelligible	world	is	not	beyond	this	world	in	some	transcendent	realm	but,	rather,	it	is	found	in	the	depths	
of	 our	 awareness.	 Nishida’s	 understanding	 of	 intellectual	 intuition	 is	 accordingly	 also	 at	 odds	 with	 its	traditional	meaning.	According	to	Nishida,	subject	and	object	come	into	unity	in	intellectual	intuition.	But	this	is	not	to	say	that	we	first	posit	the	subject	and	object	and,	subsequently,	a	unity	between	the	two	is	reached.	Nishida	 contends	 that	 this	 is	 the	 traditional	 understanding	of	 intellectual	 intuition.	Rather,	 for	Nishida,	 intellectual	 intuition	means	 that	 “the	 self	 sees	 itself	 directly,”	 and	 solely	 that.96	By	 the	 phrase	“seeing	 oneself	 directly,”	 Nishida	 is	 implying	 the	 level	 of	 our	 awareness	 that	 has	 annihilated	 object-awareness.	Accordingly,	to	see	oneself	directly	is	to	see	oneself	non-objectively.	Thus,	while	consciousness	determined	by	the	self-aware	universal	was	characterized	by	the	noesis-noema	correlation,	at	the	level	of	the	intelligible	universal,	any	sort	of	subject-object	dichotomy	is	superseded.	As	he	says:	In	 the	 universal	 of	 intellectual	 intuition,	 such	 opposition	 of	 consciousness	 [the	 noesis-noema	opposition]	must	disappear.	The	noema	must	withdraw	[bossuru]	into	the	noesis.	The	objective	world	must	be	totally	subjectified.97		 Based	 on	 this	 view,	 Nishida	 accordingly	 reinterprets	 Plato’s	 ideas	 and	 those	 highest	 values,	specifically	 truth,	 beauty	 and	 goodness,	 by	 distinguishing	 three	 levels	 of	 the	 intelligible	 self	 (or	 the	transcendent	self),	namely,	that	which	sees	the	idea	of	truth	(the	intellectual	intelligible	self),	the	idea	of	beauty	(the	emotive	intelligible	self)	and	the	idea	of	goodness	(the	volitional	intelligible	self).98	And	just	as	the	intellectual	self	in	the	self-aware	universal	was	said	to	be	“merely	formal”	in	that	it	does	not	mirror	its	own	 content,	 Nishida	maintains	 that	 the	 intellectual	 intelligible	 self	 is	 also	merely	 formal	 for	 the	 same	reason.99	When	one	sees	 the	 idea	of	beauty,	however,	one	comes	 into	unity	with	 the	beautiful	 such	 that	this	reflects	or	is	expressive	of	one’s	own	emotion.	In	this	sense,	then,	the	emotive	intelligible	self	is	said	to	
																																								 																				
96	Ibid.,	pp.	140,	159.	
97	Ibid.,	p.	158.	
98	Ibid.,	p.	167.	
99	Ibid.,	p.	160.	
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have	its	own	content.	Yet	in	Nishida’s	view,	seeing	the	goodness	goes	even	deeper	insofar	as,	at	this	level,	one	becomes	moral	and	“sees”	oneself	purely	by	practically	acting	in	conscience.100			 At	this	point,	it	is	also	worth	mentioning	that,	with	his	idea	of	place,	Nishida	explicitly	had	in	mind	Plato’s	idea	of	chōra	(χώρα)	in	the	Timaeus	as	the	place	of	ideas.	As	he	says	in	the	essay	“Basho”:		Following	the	words	of	Plato’s	Timaeus,	I	shall	call	the	receptacle	of	the	ideas	[...]	basho.	Needless	to	say,	I	am	not	suggesting	that	what	I	call	basho	is	the	same	as	Plato’s	“space”	or	“receptacle	place.”101	For	Plato,	chōra	is	the	receptacle	of	ideas	that	defies	determination.	In	this	sense,	it	is	similar	to	Nishida’s	
basho.	But	it	is	also	dissimilar	in	the	sense	that,	as	Krummel	writes,	“basho	is	not	a	mere	receptacle	for	the	ideas’	 formations	 but	 rather	 a	 self-forming	 formlessness.”102	Granting	 this	 difference,	 the	 comparison	 is	nonetheless	fruitful	in	that	it	helps	us	understand	the	nature	of	“basho.”	In	fact,	Krummel	goes	so	far	as	to	interpret	Nishida’s	later	dialectical	logic	of	place	as	a	kind	of	“chorology.”103	Although	it	is	not	my	intention	to	 follow	 Krummel’s	 interpretation	 here,	 I	 agree	with	 his	 suggestion	 that	 one	 should	 acknowledge	 the	“chōratic	 nature”	 of	 Nishida’s	 notion	 of	 place	 inasmuch	 as	 Nishida	 was	 inspired	 by	 Plato’s	 ideas.104	Accordingly,	as	I	have	already	done	in	my	description	of	the	place	of	nothingness	in	the	previous	section,	I	would	 like	 to	 adopt	 Krummel’s	 language	 of	 speaking	 of	basho	 as	 the	 undeterminable	 field	 that	 “makes	room”	or	“clears	room”	for	its	determinations.	As	Krummel	says:	Like	 chōra,	 Nishida’s	 basho	 at	 its	 most	 concrete	 level	 eludes	 positive	 description,	 yet	 in	 its	 no-thingness	 it	opens	a	space	 for	 things	determined	and	differentiated	from	one	another	and	envelops	them.	It	recedes	into	the	dark	to	make	room	for	the	objects	of	our	attention.105		 Lastly,	I	will	briefly	mention	that	Nishida	did	not	stop	at	this	level	of	the	intelligible	world.	As	he	says,	 “I	do	not	 think	 that	 the	universal	of	 intellectual	 intuition	 is	 the	 last	 level.”106	Nishida	believed	 that	beyond	one’s	conscience	 lies	 the	path	 to	religious	enlightenment.	Or	he	also	explains	 that,	 in	seeing	 the	
																																								 																				
100	Ibid.,	pp.	161-162.	He	also	notes	that	the	idea	of	goodness	cannot	be	seen	objectively	but	is	only	practically	
experienced	in	acting	out	our	will	(NKZ	5,	p.	168).	
101	NKZ	4,	p.	209/50.	
102	Krummel	2015,	p.	75.	
103	More	precisely,	he	interprets	Nishida’s	dialectical	logic	of	place	as	a	“chiasmatic	chorology.”	Cf.	Krummel	(2015,	
especially	chapter	10).	
104	Accordingly,	I	also	agree	with	Krummel	that	the	meaning	of	Nishida’s	“basho”	is	closer	to	Plato’s	“chōra”	than	to	“topos”	
(2015,	p.	203;	Cf.	p.	262,	note	38).	This	point	is	especially	important	since	some	English	translators	have	rendered	“basho”	
by	“topos,”	which	is	somewhat	misleading,	given	the	specific	meaning	of	“basho”	(cf.	my	Introduction,	note	10).	For	
discussions	on	the	chōra-topos	distinction,	see	also:	Casey	(1997),	Sallis	(1999),	Berque	(2002).	
105	Krummel	2015,	p.	203.	
106	NKZ	5,	p.	172.	
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ideas	of	truth,	beauty	and	goodness,	“there	is	still	the	knower	that	knows	itself	as	the	seer	of	ideas.”107	In	absolute	nothingness,	however,	everything	that	is	seen	including	those	ideas	and	highest	values	dissipates	in	the	face	of	religious	values.108	Accordingly,	Nishida	saw	“the	universal	of	absolute	nothingness”	at	 the	very	basis	of	his	system	of	universals	that	envelops	the	intelligible	universal.	He	explains	this	level	in	the	following	way:	That	 which	 envelops	 even	 the	 universal	 of	 intellectual	 intuition	 and	 that	 wherein	 our	 true	 self	 is	implaced,	 is	 what	 should	 be	 called	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness,	 namely	 the	 religious	consciousness.	[...]	When	one	goes	beyond	this	[the	universal	of	intellectual	intuition],	one	cannot	say	anything	about	 that	which	 is	 implaced	 in	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	 It	 is	 totally	beyond	 the	standpoint	of	conceptual	knowledge.		It	is	the	world	of	spiritual	intuition	that	is	beyond	language	and	thought.109	Ultimately,	 then,	 in	 Nishida’s	 view,	 all	 our	 conceptual	 knowledge	 must	 be	 based	 on	 this	 universal	 of	absolute	 nothingness	 that	 transcends	 any	 conceptualization,	 or	 what	 Nishida	 calls	 “absolute	 noetic	transcendence”	 (zettai	 no	 noesisteki	 chōetsu).110	Insofar	 as	 Nishida	 explicitly	 characterizes	 this	 level	 in	terms	of	 religious	experience,	we	can	now	see	how	commentators	have	wanted	 to	put	emphasis	on	 the	religious	dimension	of	his	theory	of	basho.	Indeed,	Nishida’s	colleague	Tanabe	Hajime	famously	criticized	Nishida	 for	basing	his	philosophy	on	 religious	experience	and	 thereby	ending	up	 in	a	kind	of	Plotinean	emanationism.111	While	Tanabe’s	criticism	is	rather	harsh,	 it	does	prompt	Nishida	to	put	more	emphasis	on	the	dialectical	nature	of	the	self-determination	of	absolute	nothingness	and	to	reconceive	his	 logic	of	
basho	as	a	dialectical	logic.	As	it	exceeds	the	scope	of	this	work,	however,	I	will	not	examine	his	criticism	in	any	detail.	We	will	nonetheless	touch	on	this	point	in	the	following	chapter	in	the	context	of	articulating	Nishida’s	distinction	between	the	religious	and	philosophical	standpoint.		
Conclusion	
	 By	way	of	 conclusion,	 let	us	 sum	up	Nishida’s	 theory	of	basho	 by	asking	 the	 following	question:	
how	 did	 Nishida’s	 theory	 of	 basho	 respond	 to	 the	 challenge	 after	 the	 Inquiry	 to	 provide	 a	 theory	 of	
																																								 																				
107	Ibid.,	p.	175.	
108	Cf.	NKZ	5,	p.	177.	
109	Ibid.,	p.	180.	
110	Ibid.,	p.	180.	
111	Tanabe	published	his	first	critical	essay	towards	Nishida	in	1930	under	the	title,	“Requesting	Professor	Nishida’s	
teachings.”	Cf.	Tanabe	(1963).		
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knowledge	that	adequately	accounts	for	the	objective	validity	of	knowledge?	To	begin	with,	by	attending	to	the	place	of	jikaku,	Nishida	came	to	understand	“knowledge”	or	“knowing”	in	terms	of	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	 jikaku,	namely	as	“the	self	mirroring	or	reflecting	 itself	within	 itself.”	 In	Nishida’s	view,	this	way	of	understanding	our	knowledge	avoids	the	pitfalls	of	subjectivism	(inherent	in	his	previous	ideas	of	pure	 experience	 and	 jikaku)	 and	 Kantian	 epistemological	 dualism	 insofar	 as	 it	 does	 not	 assume	 a	problematic	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 consciousness.	 The	 “self”	 in	 the	 self-mirroring	 structure	 of	
jikaku	is	not	a	subject	standing	over	against	an	object;	it	is	not	some	“internal”	realm	that	is	juxtaposed	to	the	“external”	world.	Rather,	the	self	is	necessarily	disclosed	to	one’s	place.	Put	in	terms	of	consciousness,	consciousness	 is	 not	 thing-like	 but	 it	 is	 the	 “place	 of	 nothingness.”	 Accordingly,	 Nishida	 sought	 to	demonstrate	that	all	our	knowledge,	including	that	of	objects,	presupposes	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	
jikaku.	 Nishida’s	 argument	 was	 twofold.	 Firstly,	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 presupposes	 consciousness	 qua	place	 of	 nothingness	 insofar	 as	 whatever	 is	 determinable	 in	 judgments	 presupposes	 the	 ground	 of	determination,	 predication	 and	 objectification,	 i.e.	 consciousness.	 Secondly,	 such	 consciousness	 qua	ground	of	judgment	itself	presupposes	a	further	“place.”	In	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing,	this	further	place	was	identified	as	“the	place	of	absolute	nothingness”	while,	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals,	Nishida	identified	“the	intelligible	universal”	before	“the	absolute	nothingness.”	These	differences	aside,	what	led	to	 the	 further	 deepening	 of	 jikaku	 and,	 accordingly,	 consciousness	 was	 Nishida’s	 conviction	 that	 our	experience	of	“transcendent	objects,”	i.e.	things	in	themselves,	cannot	be	reduced	to	our	grasp	of	them	in	the	place	of	relative	nothingness.	In	other	words,	the	ultimate	ground	of	judgment	cannot	be	understood	as	 the	relative	nothingness	 that	 is	opposed	 to	objects,	 i.e.	 the	subject	 that	grasps	 the	object.	Rather,	 the	very	ground	of	 judgment	must	be	understood	as	the	absolute	nothingness	whereby	“objects”	or	“things”	realizes	themselves	 in	“us.”	 In	the	end,	then,	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	has	the	following	basic	structure:	The	place	of	being(s)	is	implaced	in	the	place	of	relative	nothingness	(self-aware	consciousness),	which	is	subsequently	 implaced	 in	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 (or	 the	 intelligible	 world,	 which	 is	 then	implaced	 in	 absolute	 nothingness).	 Therefore,	 Nishida	 sought	 to	 secure	 the	 objective	 validity	 of	knowledge	 by	 showing	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 ultimately	 presupposes	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness,	i.e.	by	grounding	our	knowledge	of	objects	in	our	experience	of	transcendent	objects,	that	is,	our	experience	of	“reality”	realizing	itself	in	“us.”		
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Chapter	6:	Nishida’s	critical	engagement	with	the	transcendental	in	his	early	theory	of	
basho	
Introduction		 The	 aim	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 twofold.	 The	 first	 aim	 is	 to	 clarify	 Nishida’s	 engagement	 with	transcendental	philosophy	in	his	early	theory	of	basho	 in	the	late	1920s.	Specifically,	I	will	articulate	the	extent	 to	 which	 the	 theory	 of	 basho	 operates	 within	 a	 traditional	 transcendental	 framework	 and	 the	extent	to	which	it	attempts	to	go	beyond	it.	I	will	do	so	by	examining	how	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	fits	(or	does	not	fit)	with	the	three	criteria	of	transcendental	philosophy	established	in	Chapter	2.	The	second	aim	is	to	shed	light	on	the	similarities	and	dissimilarities	between	Nishida’s	and	Heidegger’s	engagement	with	transcendental	philosophy.	Therefore,	although	 the	general	 structure	of	 this	chapter	will	 run	parallel	 to	that	 of	 Chapter	 4,	 this	 chapter	 will	 be	 different	 in	 that	 I	 will	 be	 contrasting	 Nishida’s	 position	 with	Heidegger’s	which	we	saw	in	Chapter	4.	As	such,	this	chapter	will	reflect	our	findings	in	Chapter	4.		 In	 important	 respects,	 Nishida’s	 relationship	 to	 transcendental	 philosophy	 parallels	 that	 of	Heidegger’s.	 To	 begin	 with,	 both	 were	 more	 expressive	 of	 their	 critical	 rather	 than	 approving	 stance	towards	the	tradition.	Nonetheless,	 they	were	following	the	tradition	in	many	ways.	Moreover,	since	we	are	 (rather	 incidentally)	 dealing	with	 their	 philosophy	 in	 the	 same	 period	 of	 the	 late	 1920s,	 they	 also	share	the	historical	background	to	which	they	were	responding.	At	that	time,	the	neo-Kantian	movement	had	already	lost	its	potency	with	the	rise	of	phenomenology.	Thus	by	the	late	1920s,	they	were	reacting	more	to	Husserl’s	phenomenology	than	to	neo-Kantianism.	But	as	Kant	was	revived	by	Husserl’s	turn	to	transcendental	phenomenology,	 he	 gained	more	 relevance	 for	Heidegger	 and	Nishida	 than	before.	Both	Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 BT	 and	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	 accordingly	 developed	 through	 critical	engagement	with	Husserl’s	transcendental	phenomenology	and	Kant’s	transcendental	philosophy.		 Unlike	 Heidegger,	 however,	 Nishida	 was	 largely	 indebted	 to	 the	 ideas	 of	 the	 German	 idealist	thinkers	 after	 Kant,	most	 conspicuously	 Hegel	 and	 Fichte.1	But	 since	 Fichte’s	 influence	 on	 Nishida	was	mainly	during	the	period	of	jikaku,	this	has	less	relevance	for	my	purposes	in	this	chapter.	And	although	Hegel’s	 influence	 on	 Nishida	 extended	 from	 early	 to	 later	 periods,	 we	 will	 not	 be	 focusing	 on	 Hegel’s	influence	on	Nishida	either.	For,	as	some	commentators	have	argued,	although	Nishida	was	influenced	by	Hegel	from	early	on,	it	is	not	until	the	later	period,	when	he	develops	his	ideas	in	the	form	of	a	dialectic,	
																																								 																				
1	Interestingly,	Thomas	Wentzer	(2003)	has	argued	that	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	of	facticity	is	in	a	certain	way	a	
continuation	of	Hegelianism.		
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that	he	becomes	more	expressive	about	his	critical	stance	towards	Hegel.2	During	the	initial	period	of	the	development	of	the	theory	of	basho,	Nishida	was	more	explicitly	formulating	his	thought	against	Kant	and	Husserl.	Accordingly,	while	we	certainly	do	not	deny	the	presence	of	 the	Hegelian	 influence	 in	his	early	theory	of	basho	 in	 the	 late	1920s,	 insofar	as	 it	 is	only	 implicit,	we	will	 rather	 focus	on	Nishida’s	 critical	stance	towards	Kant	and	Husserl.		 Now,	 despite	 this	 apparent	 parallel	 between	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 in	 their	 engagement	 with	transcendental	thought	in	the	late	1920s,	there	is	rather	large	discrepancy	in	the	scholarships	regarding	this	 issue.	As	we	have	seen	 in	Chapter	4,	within	Heidegger	scholarship,	 it	has	become	less	controversial	and	 more	 commonplace	 to	 acknowledge	 Heidegger’s	 engagement	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy	especially	 during	 the	 time	 of	 BT.	 This	 is	 not	 paralleled	 in	 Nishida	 scholarship.	 Commentators	 have	certainly	acknowledged	Nishida’s	 indebtedness	to	Kant,	German	idealism,	neo-Kantianism	and	Husserl’s	phenomenology.	 Furthermore,	 considerable	 efforts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 unravel	 their	 influence	 on	Nishida’s	 thought.	 Despite	 all	 this,	 however,	 very	 few	 attempts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 systematically	articulate	Nishida’s	relationship	to	transcendental	thought	until	today.3	What	is	to	account	for	this	neglect?		 I	believe	that	we	can	identify	at	least	two	possible	reasons	for	this	lacuna	in	Nishida	scholarship.	Firstly,	Nishida’s	philosophy	has	often	been	misunderstood	or	misrepresented	by	scholars	who	specialize	in	Western	 philosophy.	 To	 take	 one	 example,	 a	 prominent	Kantian	 scholar	 in	 Japan,	 Iwaki	Kenichi,	 has	criticized	Nishida’s	philosophy	on	the	grounds	that	Nishida	distorts	Kantian	philosophy	from	his	Buddhist	or	 Eastern	 perspective	 in	 a	way	 that	 undermines	 the	 critical	 nature	 of	 Kant’s	 philosophy.	 According	 to	Iwaki,	 to	 take	 the	 standpoint	 of	 basho	 is	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 subject-object	 dichotomy	 inherent	 in	 the	experienced	 world	 (which	 is	 supposedly	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 small	 self	 in	 Buddhism)	 towards	 the	standpoint	of	the	great	self,	which	is	beyond	all	linguistic	articulation.	Moreover,	such	a	standpoint	entails	a	 philosophy	 that	 ultimately	 affirms	 everything	 (“philosophy	 of	 absolute	 affirmation,”	 zettai	 kōtei	 no	
tetsugaku)4.	Iwaki	thus	argues	that	Nishida	renders	Kant’s	critical	philosophy	uncritical	by	reinterpreting	Kant’s	transcendental	apperception	as	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	Accordingly,	Nishida’s	“Buddhist	(or	 Eastern)	 understanding	 of	 Kant’s	 philosophy”	 is	 a	 distortion	 of	 Kantian	 philosophy.	5	Furthermore,	Iwaki	argues	that	because	it	is	uncritical,	Nishida’s	philosophy	is	itself	problematic.		
																																								 																				
2	Cf.	Fujita	(1994)	and	Krummel	(2015,	chapter	1).		
3	One	of	these	few	attempts	has	been	made	by	Itabashi	Yūjin	(2004).	For	less	systematic	but	nonetheless	important	
attempts	at	this,	see:	Ōhashi	(1995),	Ueda	(1991),	Nitta	(1998).	
4	Iwaki	2005,	p.	60.	
5	Iwaki	2005,	pp.	59-60.	
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	 The	main	problem	with	Iwaki’s	assessment	of	Nishida	is	that	he	oversimplifies	Nishida’s	position	by	focusing	almost	exclusively	on	the	Buddhist	or	Eastern	aspects	of	his	philosophy.	At	the	beginning	of	his	 article,	 he	writes	 that	 Nishida	 “referred	 to	Western	 thought	 in	 order	 to	 theoretically	 articulate	 the	philosophical	 significance	 of	 Eastern	 thought	 to	 which	 he	 was	 accustomed.”6	In	 this	 quotation	 and	elsewhere	in	the	article,	Iwaki	seems	to	be	suggesting	that	Nishida	was	trying	to	provide	a	philosophical	basis	for	Buddhist	and	Eastern	thought.	But	Nishida	was	interested	in	not	so	much	formulating	a	Buddhist	philosophy	 as	 responding	 to	 Western	 problematics.	 Admittedly,	 he	 did	 this	 by	 incorporating	 ideas	inherited	from	the	Eastern	and	Buddhist	traditions	but	that	does	not	entail	that	he	was	trying	to	formulate	a	Buddhist	philosophy.	If	we	pay	heed	to	the	early	development	of	the	theory	of	basho,	for	example,	it	is	clear	that	the	influence	of	these	traditions	is	only	implicit	in	the	background.	The	explicit	focus	was	rather	on	the	epistemological	problematics	developed	in	the	Western	tradition.	Therefore,	although	it	may	well	be	true	that	there	is	something	Buddhist	or	Eastern	about	Nishida’s	understanding	of	Kant,	that	does	not	mean	 that	 Nishida	 was	 trying	 to	 read	 Kant	 through	 Buddhist	 or	 Eastern	 lenses	 or,	 as	 Iwaki	 puts	 it,	“Japanize	Kant’s	philosophy.”7	Such	a	misrepresentation	of	Nishida’s	philosophy	as	essentially	Buddhist	or	Eastern	 simply	underestimates	his	 indebtedness	 to	 the	 transcendental	 tradition	 and	hence	undermines	any	effort	to	take	this	relationship	seriously.			 Another	 possible	 reason	 for	 the	 neglect	 of	 this	 issue	 is	 related	 to	 the	 first	 but	 comes	 from	 the	general	attitude	within	Nishida	scholarship.	Historically,	Nishida	scholarship	has	 tended	 to	 focus	on	 the	religious	 dimensions	 of	 his	 philosophy,	 specifically	 its	 relation	 to	 Zen	 Buddhism	 and	 other	 Mahayana	Buddhist	traditions.	This	 is	due	to	the	fact	that	Nishida’s	originality	has	often	been	identified	with	 ideas	such	 as	 the	 “place	 of	 nothingness”	 (mu	 no	 basho)	 that	 are	 evident	 appropriations	 of	 these	 Eastern	religious	 traditions.	Again,	 although	 I	 do	not	 disagree	 that	Nishida’s	 originality	 can	be	 tracked	down	 to	ideas	 that	 originate	 in	 the	 East,	 one	 also	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 fact	 that	 Nishida	 was	 responding	 to	philosophical	problematics	developed	in	the	West.	More	specifically,	one	cannot	underestimate	the	extent	to	which	 he	was	working	within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 transcendental	 tradition	 in	 the	 1920s.	 Thus,	 in	order	 to	 really	 understand	 the	 originality	 of	 the	 theory	 of	basho,	we	must	 carefully	 unravel	 the	way	 in	which	Nishida	was	 critically	 appropriating	 the	 ideas	 and	method	of	 the	 transcendental	 tradition.	While	some	attempts	have	been	made	to	thematize	this	aspect	of	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho,	this	field	of	research	is	still	underdeveloped	compared	to	attempts	that	thematize	its	Buddhist	or	religious	aspects.	
																																								 																				
6	Ibid.,	p.	54.	
7	Ibid.,	p.	55.	
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	 From	 the	above,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 failure	 to	examine	Nishida’s	 relationship	 to	 transcendental	philosophy	 is	closely	 tied	 to	 the	 tendency	 in	 the	scholarship	 to	overemphasize	 the	Buddhist,	Eastern	or	religious	aspects	of	his	philosophy	at	the	expense	of	other	aspects	that	are	more	in	line	with	the	Western	philosophical	tradition.	But	apart	from	the	above	reasons,	there	may	be	a	more	basic	reason,	namely,	the	sheer	difficulty	of	articulating	the	influences	on	Nishida’s	thought.	To	begin	with,	Nishida	is	notorious	for	not	giving	exact	references.	Thus,	there	is	a	much	more	greater	burden	on	the	reader	to	trace	down	the	influences.	Furthermore,	Nishida’s	criticisms	 in	general	are	often	sporadic	and	his	way	of	appropriating	the	 terminology	 of	 other	 thinkers	 is	 also	 quite	 specific.	 In	 general,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 bear	 in	mind	 that	Nishida’s	interest	was	never	to	primarily	understand	the	work	of	a	philosopher,	say	Kant.	His	interest	was	rather	 to	 reinterpret	 it	 in	 the	 light	 of	 his	 own	 concerns.	 Accordingly,	 criticisms	 that	 target	 Nishida’s	understanding	of	Kant,	for	example,	solely	on	the	basis	that	he	misunderstands	and	distorts	Kant	simply	miss	the	point	since	Nishida	was	never	trying	to	do	Kant	scholarship.	In	this	sense,	then,	Iwaki	also	seems	to	be	making	this	mistake.	This	is	also	an	important	point	regarding	Nishida’s	appropriation	of	Husserl’s	noesis-noema	 distinction.	 In	 employing	 these	 terms,	 Nishida	 was	 not	 trying	 to	 be	 faithful	 to	 Husserl’s	original	 understanding.	 Rather,	 he	 reinterpreted	 them	 in	 a	 liberal	 manner	 to	 situate	 them	 within	 the	framework	of	his	theory	of	basho.		 This	 chapter	 attempts	 to	 remedy	 this	 apparent	 neglect	 in	 the	 literature	 by	 articulating	 the	“transcendental	Nishida.”	Yet,	in	putting	it	this	way,	it	must	be	emphasized	that	it	is	not	my	aim	to	solely	establish	 that	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho,	 to	 a	 certain	 extent,	 works	 within	 a	 traditional	transcendental	framework.	This	is	only	one	side	of	the	coin.	For,	as	with	Heidegger,	it	is	simply	wrong	to	say	that,	with	his	theory	of	basho,	Nishida	was	working	within	the	bounds	of	a	traditional	transcendental	framework.	 Rather,	my	 aim	 is	 to	 articulate	 the	 extent	 to	which	Nishida	works	within	 a	 transcendental	framework	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	 he	 goes	 beyond	 it.	 Put	 differently,	 then,	 it	 is	my	 aim	 to	 clarify	 the	ambivalent	 relation	 to	 the	 transcendental	 inherent	 in	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho.	 As	 we	 did	 with	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT,	I	will	proceed	by	asking	how	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	accords	(or	does	not	 accord)	 with	 the	 three	 criteria	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 namely,	 (1)	 it	 is	 a	 search	 for	 the	
foundation	 of	 our	experience	and	knowledge	 (though	 in	a	 specific	 sense),	 (2)	 it	 employs	 transcendental	
reflection,	and	(3)	it	entails	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world.			
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1. Transcendental	orientation	of	the	early	theory	of	basho		 Before	we	proceed	to	assess	the	transcendental	orientation	of	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	vis-
à-vis	 the	 three	 criteria	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 let	 us	 bring	 to	 light	 some	 issues	 at	 stake	 in	addressing	 his	 relationship	 to	 transcendental	 thought	 in	 the	 late	 1920s.	 As	 suggested	 above,	 Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	embodies	an	ambivalence	when	it	comes	to	its	relation	to	the	transcendental.	On	the	one	 hand,	 it	 is	 a	 continuation	 of	 Kant’s	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 philosophy	 insofar	 as	 Nishida	appropriates	their	approach.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	Nishida	explicitly	attempts	to	go	beyond	them	with	 his	 notion	 of	 “the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness.”	 This	 latter	 aspect	 of	 discontinuity	 is	 what	 has	gained	most	attention	in	the	literature,	and	not	without	reason	since	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	is,	in	a	certain	sense,	 the	crux	of	 the	 theory	of	basho.	Ōhashi	Ryōsuke,	 for	example,	 suggests	 that	Nishida’s	historical	contribution	to	philosophy	lies	in	the	very	idea	of	the	place	of	nothingness	and	claims	that	the	turn	to	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	has	seen	no	precedent	in	the	history	of	philosophy.8			 Now,	one	of	the	most	pressing	questions	for	us	concerns	the	nature	of	this	discontinuity,	i.e.	what	this	 turn	 to	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	signifies	 in	relation	 to	 the	 transcendental,	namely,	does	 it	signify	 an	 abandonment	 of	 the	 transcendental	 or,	 rather,	 a	 radicalization?	 It	 seems	 to	 me	 that	commentators	have	remained	ambiguous	on	this	point,	even	when	this	discontinuity	 is	spelled	out	with	reference	 to	 the	 transcendental.	 For	 example,	 Ōhashi	 expressively	 contrasts	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness	with	transcendental	consciousness:		In	 the	 standpoint	 of	 absolute	 nothingness,	 seeing	 a	 table	 is	 not	 to	 see	 it	 as	 constituted	 by	transcendental	consciousness	but	rather,	to	nullify	even	that	consciousness	that	sees	and	to	see	it	in	nothingness.9		Elsewhere,	he	contrasts	the	(self-)determination	of	basho	(bashoteki	gentei)	with	the	idea	of	constitution	by	transcendental	consciousness:	The	 determination	 of	 basho	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 “constitution”	 of	 the	 noema	 by	 noetic	consciousness.	Rather,	 it	 is	for	the	noema	to	get	absorbed	in	[botsunyū	suru]	the	noesis	and	for	that	noema	to	appear	as	the	content	of	the	noetic	act	itself.	[...]	That	“the	noema	becomes	absorbed	in	the	noesis”	 is	 for	 the	 noesis-noema	 relation	 to	 dissipate	 in	 the	 “basho.”	 Or	 put	 differently,	 it	 is	 the	revealing	of	the	world	just	as	it	is	[jijitsu	sonomono	no	sekai	no	genshutsu].10	
																																								 																				
8	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	79.	
9	Ibid.,	p.	81.	
10	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	183.	
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We	will	examine	the	exact	meaning	of	 these	passages	 later	 in	 this	chapter.	For	now,	suffice	 it	 to	merely	point	 out	 that	 Ōhashi	 contends	 that	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 must	 be	 distinguished	 from	transcendental	 consciousness	 insofar	 as	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 supersedes	 the	 distinction	between	the	noesis	and	noema	or	the	constituting	and	constituted.	In	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness,	there	is	supposedly	neither	seer	nor	seen.		 Ueda	 Shizuteru	makes	 a	 similar	 distinction	 between	 constitution	 by	 transcendental	 subjectivity	and	the	self-determination	of	basho.	Ueda	argues	that	Nishida’s	notion	of	 jikaku	as	seeing	oneself	within	the	self	entails	that	one	sees	oneself	in	nothingnesss	or	in	nullification:	“‘[w]ithin	the	self’	[in	the	structure	of	 jikaku	 qua	 the	 self	 reflecting	 itself	 within	 the	 self]	 is	 the	 same	 as	 ‘making	 oneself	 nothingness’	 (or	nullifying	oneself).”11	As	we	saw	 in	 the	previous	chapter,	 jikaku	 entailed	being	open	 to	one’s	own	place.	According	 to	Ueda,	 this	openness	can	ultimately	only	be	secured	by	opening	oneself	 to	 the	 infinitude	of	openness	(mugen	no	hirake)	as	the	no-self	(jiko	nashi),	or,	more	simply	put,	by	completely	nullifying	the	self.12	This	 is	 the	same	point	Ōhashi	makes,	namely	that,	 in	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness,	 the	self	 is	completely	 nullified	 and,	 in	 turn,	 one	 becomes	 open	 to	 the	 world	 purely	 as	 it	 reveals	 itself	 in	 itself.	Furthermore,	 if	 one	 follows	 this	 line	 of	 thought	 of	 seeing	 oneself	 in	 nothingnesss	 or	 in	 nullification	 by	completely	nullifying	the	self,	Ueda	says	that	we	are	able	to	reverse	the	perspective	and	“see	ourselves	as	the	 self-determination	 of	 the	 place.”	 Thus	 he	 claims	 that,	 “‘[t]o	 see	 the	 self	 within	 the	 self’	 is	simultaneously,	 to	 see	 oneself	 as	 the	 self-determination	 of	 the	 place	 that	 one	 is	 implaced.”13	And	 he	continues:	“[h]ere	we	see	one	of	Nishida’s	very	specific	and	basic	ideas,	namely	the	‘the	self-determination	of	the	place’	as	opposed	to	the	idea	of	constitution	by	(transcendental)	subjectivity.”14		 Accordingly,	 both	 Ōhashi	 and	 Ueda	 distinguish	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 from	transcendental	 subjectivity	 or	 consciousness	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 the	 former	 implies	 a	 standpoint	whereby	the	self	or	the	seer	is	nullified	and	hence	the	distinction	between	the	constituting	subject	and	the	constituted	object	is	also	nullified.	In	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness,	the	world	is	not	constituted	by	us,	but,	rather,	we	completely	nullify	ourselves	such	that	“we”	become	open	to	the	world	as	“it”	reveals	itself	in	itself.	But	what	are	the	implications	of	this	for	the	theory	of	basho	vis-à-vis	its	relation	to	transcendental	philosophy?	 If	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 cannot	 be	 identified	 with	 transcendental	 subjectivity,	what	is	its	status?	Could	we	say	that	it	is	in	some	sense	a	radicalization	of	transcendental	subjectivity	or	is	it	 rather	 something	 else?	 Ōhashi	 and	 Ueda	 remain	 ambiguous	 on	 this	 point.	 One	 of	 our	 tasks	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
11	Ueda	1991,	p.	321.	
12	Ibid.,	p.	321.	
13	Ibid.,	p.	322.	
14	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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following	 is	 thus	 to	 articulate	 and	 assess	 the	 proposed	 discontinuity	 between	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness	and	transcendental	subjectivity	and,	accordingly,	to	clarify	the	status	of	the	former.			 Now,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 aspect	 of	 discontinuity	 has	 gained	 greater	 attention,	 the	 other	aspect	 of	 the	 ambivalence	 in	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho,	 namely	 the	 continuity	 with	 Kant’s	 and	Husserl’s	approach,	has	not	gone	unnoticed	either.	In	fact,	Ōhashi	also	highlights	the	common	thread	that	runs	through	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	and	the	transcendental	tradition.	In	the	context	of	explicating	the	three	layers	of	basho	as	they	first	appeared	in	From	the	Acting	to	the	Seeing,	namely	the	basho	of	being(s),	
basho	of	relative	nothingness	and	the	basho	of	absolute	nothingness,	Ōhashi	says,	“[u]p	until	here	[from	the	 “basho	 of	 being(s)”	 to	 the	 “basho	 of	 relative	 nothingness”],	 one	 can	 observe	 the	 common	 line	 of	thinking	with	Western	idealism	or	modern	epistemologies.”	And	then	he	continues,	“But	when	it	comes	to	the	 turn	 towards	 ‘the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness,’	 there	 has	 been	 no	 precedent	 in	 the	 history	 of	philosophy.”15	In	 this	way,	 then,	 Ōhashi	 clearly	 sees	 both	 the	 continuity	 and	 the	 discontinuity	with	 the	transcendental	tradition	that	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	embodies.			 As	a	matter	of	fact,	in	the	context	of	explicating	Nishida’s	idea	of	philosophical	reflection,	Ueda	also	makes	explicit	note	of	the	continuity.	He	argues	that,	for	Nishida,	philosophical	reflection	must	start	from	pre-reflective	experience,	which	is	not	only	understood	as	prior	to	reflection	but	also	experienced	as	the	“limits	of	reflection”	(hansei	no	genkai)	or	the	“rupture	of	reflection”	(hansei	no	yabure).	Once	this	rupture	is	 experienced,	 reflection	 and,	 indeed,	 transcendental	 reflection	 can	 then	 be	 employed	 to	 disclose	 the	structures	of	reality.	According	to	Ueda,	this	kind	of	reflection	is	different	from	that	which	merely	begins	with	 reflection	 and	 proceeds	 to	 higher-order	 transcendental	 reflection.16	Details	 aside	 for	 now,	 the	important	 point	 is	 that	 Ueda	 seems	 to	 be	 suggesting	 that	 Nishida’s	 philosophical	 reflection	 is	 more	 a	radicalization	of	transcendental	reflection	than	a	complete	rejection.	We	will	be	coming	back	to	this	point	in	assessing	the	second	criterion	(1.2).		 Aside	 from	 Ōhashi	 and	 Ueda,	 others	 have	 also	 suggested	 that	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	embodies	 a	 transcendental	 orientation.	 In	 his	 extensive	 study	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 Nishida’s	philosophy	and	Husserlian	phenomenology,	Mine	Hideki	notes	that	the	central	connection	is	found	in	the	fact	that	“both	thinkers	lay	down	the	most	direct	kind	of	intuition	at	the	basis	of	knowledge	and,	through	an	analysis	of	consciousness,	conducted	a	critique	of	cognition	and	a	transcendental	critique	of	reason.”17	To	take	another	example,	in	the	context	of	articulating	Nishida’s	philosophical	position,	Gereon	Kopf	has	
																																								 																				
15	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	79.	
16	Ueda	1991,	p.	368.	
17	Mine	2015,	p.	323	(my	italics).	
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argued	that	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	 is	committed	to	what	he	calls,	“transcendental	relativism,”	namely	the	position	that	“recognizes	the	need	to	postulate	a	transcendental	ground	of	human	knowledge,	while	at	the	 same	 time	acknowledging	both	 the	 elusiveness	of	 this	 ground	and	 the	 fundamental	 epistemological	limitations	 of	 human	 existence	 that	 condemns	 philosophical	 discourse	 to	 an	 inherent	 historicism	 and	relativism.”18			 Perhaps	 in	 a	 more	 subtle	 way,	 we	 can	 also	 see	 evidence	 of	 this	 in	 the	 rendering	 of	 Nishida’s	terminology	into	English	by	some	English-speaking	commentators.	For	example,	 in	the	entry	on	Nishida	Kitarō	in	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	John	Maraldo	has	translated	Nishida’s	term	“chōetsuteki	
jyutsugo”	as	“transcendental	predicate.”19	John	Krummel	has	done	the	same	in	his	most	recent	work	from	2015.	20	But	 insofar	as	the	direct	translation	of	“chōetsuteki”	 is	“transcendent”	(which	is	the	translation	I	have	 used	 in	 Chapter	 5	 and	 the	 term	 Krummel	 adopts	 in	 his	 translation	 of	 the	 essay	 “Basho”	 with	Nagatomo	 Shigenori),	 we	 can	 see	 that	 Maraldo’s	 and	 Krummel’s	 rendering	 it	 “transcendental”	 reflects	their	 interpretation	 of	 the	 term.	 In	 fact,	 Nishida’s	 own	 rendering	 of	 the	 term	 “transcendental”	 or	“transzendental”	 in	German	is	“senkenteki,”	which	was	the	common	translation	of	the	term	at	the	time.21	Although	Nishida	occasionally	uses	this	term	to	positively	characterize	his	own	position	during	the	period	of	 jikaku,	 he	 rarely	 does	 so	 after	 the	 period	 of	basho.	 It	 is	 therefore	 all	 the	more	 interesting	 that	 both	Maraldo	 and	 Krummel	 render	 “chōetsuteki”	 as	 it	 appears	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 basho	 as	“transcendental.”	Unfortunately,	however,	neither	of	them	explicitly	provides	a	reason	for	this	rendering.		 In	 one	 way	 or	 another,	 all	 these	 studies	 highlight	 the	 transcendental	 orientation	 of	 Nishida’s	theory	of	basho.	However,	none	of	 the	 studies	provides	a	 systematic	 account	of	 this	orientation.	 If	 they	provide	 some	 account	 of	 this,	 they	 shed	 light	 on	 one	 aspect	 of	 this	 orientation,	 as	 in	 Mine’s	 focus	 on	Husserl	or	Kopf’s	focus	on	the	later	theory	of	basho	(from	the	late	1930s	onwards).	Accordingly,	it	remains	our	task	to	put	these	puzzle	pieces	together	to	work	out	the	bigger	picture.	For	this	purpose,	and	that	of	articulating	the	nature	of	the	discontinuity	with	the	transcendental	tradition,	our	three	criteria	will	prove	
																																								 																				
18	Kopf	2003,	p.	24.	
19	See	Maraldo	2015.	
20	See	e.g.,	Krummel	2015,	pp.	25,	66,	68,	69.	
21	The	standard	translation	of	“transcendental”	in	Nishida’s	time	was	“senkenteki”	(先験的),	but	it	is	now	more	
commonplace	to	translate	“transcendental”	as	“chōetsuronteki”	(超越論的).	This	was	prompted	by	Kuki	Shūzo	who	first	
suggested	this	alternative	translation	on	the	grounds	that	the	Japanese	term	“senkenteki”	which	literally	means	“prior	to	
experience,”	is	inappropriate	as	a	translation	of	“transcendental.”	In	his	lecture	notes	on	“History	of	Western	Modern	
Philosophy”	from	1937	to	1938,	Kuki	points	out	that,	for	Husserl,	the	transcendental	can	also	be	found	in	experience	and,	
accordingly,	he	says,	“[i]n	Husserl’s	use	of	the	term,	it	makes	no	sense	if	one	translates	the	transcendental	as	senkenteki	
[prior	to	experience].	We	should	[instead]	translate	it	as	chōetsuronteki	in	accordance	with	its	etymology.”	He	also	points	
out	that	chōetsuronteki		is	a	better	candidate	in	the	sense	that	it	preserves	the	essential	relation	that	Kant	had	in	mind	to	
the	term,	“transcendent”	(chōetsuteki,	超越的)	(Kuki	1981,	pp.	41-44).	
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useful	in	working	out	a	more	systematic	account	of	the	transcendental	orientation	of	the	early	theory	of	
basho.		
	
1.1. Transcendental	foundationalism	
	 The	 first	 set	 of	 questions	 we	 will	 be	 addressing	 is	 the	 following:	 was	 Nishida	 engaging	 in	 a	
foundational	 project?	 If	 so,	 was	 he	 committed	 to	 transcendental	 foundationalism?	 In	 other	 words,	 was	Nishida	searching	for	some	kind	of	foundation	in	his	early	theory	of	basho?	And,	if	so,	could	we	then	say	that	 this	 foundation	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 transcendental	 priority,	 i.e.	 the	 specific	 priority	 relation	between	transcendental	subjectivity	and	the	world	whereby	the	former	constitutes	the	latter’s	meaning?	For	this	 latter	question,	we	will	have	to	examine	the	extent	to	which	basho	can	be	called	transcendental	subjectivity.		
1.1.1. Search	for	a	foundation		 From	 the	 very	 beginning	 to	 the	 very	 end,	 Nishida’s	 main	 concern	 was	 to	 find	 the	 grounds	 of	knowledge	and	reality	in	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.	Therefore,	there	is	certainly	a	sense	in	which	Nishida’s	philosophy	 is	marked	by	 the	search	 for	 some	kind	of	 foundation.	 In	 fact,	Ching-yuen	Cheung	has	recently	argued	that	Nishida	was	committed	to	a	kind	of	foundationalism	in	his	early	period	of	pure	 experience.	 Cheung	 further	 labels	 Nishida	 a	 “neo-Cartesian	 foundationalist.”22	By	 the	 term	 “neo-Cartesian,”	he	explicitly	has	in	mind	Husserl’s	use	of	the	term	in	the	Cartesian	Meditations	where	he	states	that	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 can	 be	 called	 neo-Cartesianism	 insofar	 as	 it	 attempts	 to	 rest	philosophy	 on	 indubitable	 self-evident	 grounds	 while	 rejecting	 the	 doctrinal	 aspects	 of	 Cartesian	philosophy.23	According	 to	 Cheung,	 Nishida	 can	 also	 be	 called	 a	 neo-Cartesian	 insofar	 as	 he	 shares	Descartes’	aspiration	for	indubitable	self-evident	truths	as	the	foundation	of	our	knowledge.	But,	Cheung	claims,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 Nishida’s	 foundationalism	 is	 the	 same	 as	 Cartesian	 foundationalism.	Following	 Ueda’s	 interpretation	 of	 Nishida,	 Cheung	 points	 out	 that	 Nishida’s	 starting	 point	 in	 pure	experience	is	different	from	Descartes’	cogito	ergo	sum	or	ego	sum	ego	existo	insofar	as	it	does	not	take	the	
																																								 																				
22	Cf.	Cheung	2011,	p.	70.	
23	Cf.	Hua	I,	p.	43/1.	Interestingly,	as	Cheung	also	notes,	Nishida	himself	referred	to	Husserl’s	statement	in	Cartesian	
Meditations	regarding	neo-Cartesianism	in	his	essay	of	1944,	“On	Cartesian	Philosophy”	(2011,	p.	70).	Cf.	NKZ	11,	p.	179.	
180	
	
“I”	 as	 its	 starting	 point.	 Rather,	 in	 pure	 experience,	 there	 is	 no	 subject	 or	 object	 yet;	 it	 is	 “selfless”	(warenashi),	as	Ueda	puts	it.	24	Cheung	thus	argues	that	Nishida	did	not	attempt	to	found	his	philosophy	on	the	“I”	or	“my	experience”	but	rather,	on	selfless	experience.	According	to	Cheung,	it	is	in	this	sense	that	Nishida	can	be	called	a	neo-Cartesian.		 Although	Cheung	 limits	 his	 study	 to	 the	period	of	 pure	 experience	 in	 the	 Inquiry,	 insofar	 as	 the	theory	 of	basho	 is	 a	 development	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 pure	 experience,	 I	 believe	 the	 general	 line	 of	 Cheung’s	argument	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 Nishida’s	 thought	 during	 the	 period	 of	 basho.	 But	 I	 also	 have	 some	reservations	 about	 characterizing	 the	 kind	 of	 foundationalism	 at	 play	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 basho	 as	 neo-Cartesian.	 For,	 during	 this	 period,	Nishida	was	more	 indebted	 to	 the	Kantian	 idea	 of	 philosophy	 as	 the	foundational	science	for	all	other	sciences.25	Accordingly,	when	Nishida	develops	his	early	theory	of	basho,	he	 does	 not	 formulate	 his	 ideas	 as	 a	 search	 for	 indubitable	 self-evident	 truths.	 Rather,	 he	 explicitly	formulates	his	problematic	vis-à-vis	Kant’s	critical	approach.		 We	can	see	evidence	of	this	in	his	essay,	“A	Reply	to	Dr.	Sōda”	(1927).	This	essay	was	written	as	a	reply	 to	 Sōda	Kiichirō,	who	published	 a	 critical	 essay	 against	Nishida’s	 position	 a	 few	months	 after	 the	publication	 of	 “Basho.”	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 essay,	 Sōda	 acknowledges	 the	 significance	 of	 Nishida’s	works	 and	 attests	 that	 with	 the	 essay	 “Basho”	 and	 that	 published	 just	 before,	 “Hatarakumono”	 (“The	Acting”),	Nishida’s	thought	gained	a	systematicity	that	deserves	to	be	called	“Nishida	tetsugaku,”	literally,	Nishida	philosophy	or	philosophy	of	Nishida.26	Ever	since,	it	has	been	commonplace	in	the	scholarship	to	refer	to	Nishida’s	philosophy	as	Nishida	tetsugaku.		Now,	despite	this	recognition,	the	prevalent	tone	of	the	essay	is	highly	critical,	and	Sōda	provides	many	reasons	why	Nishida’s	philosophy	is	unacceptable.	Since	the	purpose	here	is	not	to	examine	Sōda’s	criticisms	in	detail,	suffice	it	to	say	that	their	main	crux	was	that	Nishida	steps	beyond	the	bounds	of	theoretical	reason	by	seeking	the	grounds	of	knowledge	in	that	which	is	beyond	reason	and	thereby	falls	into	a	pre-critical	dogmatic	metaphysical	position.27			 In	 “A	 Reply	 to	 Dr.	 Sōda,”	 Nishida	 responds	 to	 these	 accusations.	 He	 does	 this	 not	 by	 directly	answering	Sōda’s	questions	but	by	 critically	 formulating	his	position	vis-à-vis	 that	 of	Kant	 and	 the	neo-Kantians.	 In	 other	words,	 he	 rebuts	 Sōda’s	 criticisms	 by	 showing	 that	 his	 position	 is	 a	 critical	 position	insofar	as	it	arises	from	internally	criticizing	and	developing	Kant’s	critical	philosophy.	Nishida	proceeds	
																																								 																				
24	Cheung	2011,	p.	66.	
25	Nitta	Yoshihiro	points	out	that	the	fact	that,	in	his	theory	of	basho,	Nishida	began	with	our	knowledge	of	objects	and,	
specifically,	with	the	structure	of	subsumptive	judgments	“S	is	P”	reflects	his	intention	to	“give	scientific	knowledge	in	the	
West	its	proper	place	within	the	whole	of	knowledge”	(1998,	p.	22).	
26	Sōda	1998,	p.	44.	
27	Cf.	Ibid.,	pp.	62,	64.	
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by	articulating	the	different	kinds	of	knowledge	and	their	order.	He	first	argues	that	there	are	at	least	two	kinds	 of	 knowledge,	 namely	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 and	 self-knowledge	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 jikaku.	 Then,	 he	attempts	to	show	that	all	forms	of	the	former	are	based	on	the	latter.	Indeed,	the	aim	of	the	“Basho”	essay,	wherein	the	theory	of	basho	is	developed,	was	meant	to	show	that	our	knowledge	of	objects	presupposes	the	self-mirroring	structure	of	jikaku,	or,	in	Nishida’s	language,	that	the	place	of	being(s)	presupposes	the	place	 of	 nothingness	 qua	 consciousness.	 In	 “A	 Reply	 to	 Dr.	 Sōda,”	 however,	 the	 emphasis	 is	 put	 on	clarifying	 his	 own	 position	 in	 relation	 to	 Kant’s	 critical	 position	 (as	 well	 as	 that	 of	 neo-Kantians).	Accordingly,	 one	 can	 see	 that,	 in	 this	 essay,	 the	 theory	 of	 basho	 is	 framed	 more	 explicitly	 in	epistemological	terms.			 Now,	Kant’s	aim	 in	 the	 first	Critique	was	 to	clarify	how	synthetic	a	priori	knowledge	 is	possible.	According	to	Nishida,	critical	knowledge	is	distinct	from	knowledge	of	objects,	taken	in	a	broad	sense,	due	to	 its	higher-order	status.	For	critical	philosophy	 takes	knowledge	of	objects	as	 its	object	of	knowledge.	Therefore,	a	critical	philosopher	already	stands	in	a	higher	order	position	than	that	in	which	one	cognizes	objects.28	For	Nishida,	this	is	to	say	that	the	critical	philosopher	is	self-aware	[jikakuteki]	in	the	sense	that	he	 or	 she	 is	 aware	 of	 that	 which	 constitutes	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 as	 pertaining	 to	 the	 structures	 of	
subjectivity.29	Accordingly,	the	critical	philosopher	already	has	jikaku	(or	is	self-aware)	in	the	sense	of	self-knowledge.	(We	should	recall	that	jikaku	in	Japanese	entails	self-understanding.)	Yet,	according	to	Nishida,	Kant	stopped	short	of	articulating	the	self-aware	standpoint	of	the	critical	philosopher	herself.	As	he	says:	Kant	clarified	the	possibility	of	mathematical	knowledge	and	knowledge	of	pure	physics.	However,	he	did	not	clarify	the	standpoint	of	critical	philosophy	itself	that	criticizes	such	knowledge	of	objects.30		 Nishida’s	 criticism	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 question	 concerning	 the	 possibility	 of	 critical	philosophy	 itself.	While	 Kant’s	 critical	 philosophy	 asked	 how	 synthetic	 a	 priori	 knowledge	 is	 possible,	Nishida	was	asking	how	such	a	critical	philosophy	is	itself	possible.	In	fact,	such	criticism	of	Kant’s	critical	philosophy	is	of	rather	long	standing	and	can	be	traced	back	to	Kant’s	own	lifetime.	Frederick	Beiser	tells	us	that	such	a	meta-critical	question,	namely	how	we	can	know	the	necessary	conditions	for	any	possible	knowledge,	was	a	crucial	question	to	which	Kant	failed	to	provide	a	sufficient	answer:	The	 sad	 truth	of	 the	matter	 is	 that	 he	 [Kant]	 never	developed	 a	 general	meta-critical	 theory	 about	how	to	acquire	knowledge	of	the	first	principles	of	criticism.	If	self-knowledge	was	the	most	difficult	
																																								 																				
28	Cf.	NKZ	4,	p.	291.	
29	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	292.	
30	NKZ	4,	p.	293.	
182	
	
of	 all	 reason's	 tasks,	 Kant	 was	 still	 not	 forthcoming	 with	 any	 advice	 about	 how	 this	 was	 to	 be	achieved.31	Thus,	Beiser	observes	 that,	while	his	successors	accepted	Kant’s	contention	that	 the	authority	of	reason	depends	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 criticism,	 they	 looked	 critically	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 critical	 reason	 itself.	Therefore:	 “[i]f	 the	meta-critical	problem	 is	 the	point	where	Kant's	philosophy	ends,	 it	 is	 also	 the	point	where	much	post-Kantian	philosophy	begins.”32	We	can	accordingly	situate	Nishida	here	as	following	the	general	line	of	post-Kantian	philosophy	that	developed	in	the	meta-critical	direction.			 Nishida,	however,	did	not	succumb	to	skepticism	or	dogmatism,	as	did	some	other	post-Kantian	philosophers.33	Rather,	he	wanted	to	clarify	 the	very	grounds	of	critical	philosophy	 itself	upon	which	 its	validity	 can	 be	 established.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 so,	 Nishida	 sought	 to	 deepen	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 critical	philosopher’s	standpoint,	or	what	he	calls	“the	self-aware	standpoint”:	If	knowledge	of	critical	philosophy	is	allowed	to	stand	beyond	mere	object	cognition,	to	what	extent	is	it	possible	to	deepen	this	standpoint	[of	the	critical	philosopher]?	The	standpoint	of	knowledge	that	criticizes	knowledge	in	the	general	sense,	namely	the	self-aware	standpoint	[jikakuteki	tachiba],	must	have	 its	own	positive	 standpoint.	 […]	What	 is	our	 true	 self-awareness?	Self-awareness	must	 reflect	deeply	into	itself.	Knowledge	of	critical	philosophy	is	established	on	this	standpoint	[i.e.	standpoint	of	true	self-awareness].34	Nishida	is	here	suggesting	that,	in	order	to	clarify	the	self-aware	standpoint	of	the	critical	philosopher,	we	must	articulate	the	depths	of	self-awareness.	Thus,	the	remainder	of	the	essay	is	devoted	to	clarifying	the	deepest	sense	of	self-awareness,	or	what	Nishida	calls	“true	self-awareness.”	We	find	him	explaining	that	“true	self-awareness	lies	wherein	the	consciousness	of	self-awareness	itself	disappears.”35	So	long	as	there	is	 still	 the	 consciousness	of	 self-awareness,	Nishida	claims	 that	 there	 is	 still	 an	objectified	world	 that	 is	seen	in	opposition	to	the	subject.	Consciousness	is	still	“the	place	of	relative	nothingness”	or	what	he	also	called	“consciousized	consciousness.”	When	we	go	beyond	this,	we	go	beyond	the	realm	of	knowledge	in	the	general	sense	(i.e.	knowledge	determinable	by	the	knowing	subject)	and	enter	the	realm	of	“intuition.”	By	 “intuition,”	 Nishida	 means	 a	 kind	 of	 non-objectifying	 knowing	 and	 knowledge.	 This	 intuition,	furthermore,	not	only	transcends	knowledge	but	establishes	its	possibility:	
																																								 																				
31	Beiser	1987,	p.	7.	
32	Ibid.,	p.	7.	
33	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	7.	
34	NKZ	4,	p.	292.		
35	Ibid.,	p.	309.	
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I	believe	that	intuition	in	this	sense	is	the	ultimate	of	knowledge.	It	is	not	itself	conceptual	knowledge	but	 it	 is	 true	 knowledge	 and	 the	 fundamental	 condition	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 knowledge	 [in	 the	general	sense].36		Accordingly,	we	 can	 say	 that	Nishida	attempted	 to	demonstrate	 the	possibility	of	 critical	philosophy	by	articulating	the	deepest	level	of	jikaku	in	the	sense	of	self-knowledge.	One	could	even	say	that,	insofar	as	every	 kind	 of	 object-awareness	 disappears	 at	 this	 level,	 this	 kind	 of	 self-knowledge	 is	 in	 fact	 selfless-knowledge.	In	this	regard,	what	Cheung	said	of	Nishida’s	foundationalism	in	the	period	of	pure	experience	equally	applies	to	this	period,	namely,	that	Nishida	sought	to	found	his	philosophy	not	on	the	“I”	or	“my	experience”	but,	rather,	on	selfless	experience.		 Hereto,	we	have	seen	that	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	as	based	on	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	developed	by	critically	advancing	Kant’s	critical	philosophy.	Insofar	as	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	is	beyond	reason,	both	theoretical	and	practical,	Sōda	is	correct	in	pointing	out	that	Nishida	goes	beyond	the	bounds	of	reason.	But	is	he	also	correct	in	claiming	that	Nishida	falls	back	into	a	dogmatic	metaphysical	position?	I	think	not.	For	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	is	not	a	metaphysical	posit	as	some-thing	that	lies	beyond	reason	but,	 rather,	 it	 is	 the	deepest	 level	of	our	experience	or	awareness	 that	 is	reached	by	critically	approaching	critical	reason.	At	the	beginning	of	the	first	essay	compiled	in	The	Self-Aware	System	
of	Universals,	 Nishida	writes	 that	 he	 is	 not	 trying	 to	 articulate	 some	kind	 of	 transcendent	 reality	 in	 the	sense	of	Kant’s	thing-in-itself.	He	says,	“I	am	not	a	metaphysician	in	that	sense.”	He	then	continues:	“I	want	to	 maintain	 the	 standpoint	 of	 reflection	 on	 conceptual	 knowledge	 itself.	 In	 this	 regard,	 I	 believe	 I	 am	rather	following	the	path	of	Kant’s	critical	philosophy.”37	Nishida	is	indeed	true	to	his	words	insofar	as	the	procedure	 of	 getting	 at	 the	 deepest	 level	 of	 our	 awareness	 was	 accomplished	 by	 critically	 advancing	rather	 than	abandoning	the	critical	philosopher’s	standpoint.	Namely,	Nishida	argued	that,	 if	 the	critical	philosopher	 is	 to	 be	 critical	 of	 his	 or	 her	 own	 position,	 he	 or	 she	must	 inquire	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 self-knowledge	 that	 makes	 critical	 knowledge	 possible.	 Ultimately,	 such	 “self”-knowledge	 must	 be	characterized	 by	 the	 complete	 eradication	 of	 the	 subject-object	 dichotomy.	 Accordingly,	 the	 place	 of	absolute	nothingness	 is	 that	 level	 of	 experience	wherein	 there	 is	 no	 subject	 or	 object	 but	 only	 selfless-knowledge.	 As	 Nishida	 says	 in	 the	 essay	 “The	 Intelligible	 World”	 (1928),	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 religious	awareness.38		
																																								 																				
36	Ibid.,	ibid.	
37	NKZ	5,	p.	8.	As	Itabashi	has	pointed	out,	the	original	German	term	Nishida	has	in	mind	for	what	I	have	here	translated	as	
“critical	philosophy”	(hihyō	shugi)	is	“Kritizismus”	(2004,	p.	8).	
38	NKZ	5,	p.	180.	
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	 There	 is,	 however,	 still	 a	 related	worry	 in	 seeking	 the	 foundation	 of	 philosophy	 in	 the	 place	 of	absolute	nothingness.	Namely,	 if	 this	place	of	absolute	nothingness	 is	beyond	reason	and	described	as	a	kind	of	 religious	 awareness,	 is	Nishida	 then	 trying	 to	 base	his	 philosophy	on	 religious	 experience?	The	answer	is	negative	if	we	pay	heed	to	the	distinction	Nishida	makes	between	the	religious	standpoint	and	the	philosophical	 standpoint	 at	 the	end	of	 the	essay	 “Intelligible	Universal.”	The	 religious	 standpoint,	he	argues,	is	that	which	completely	transcends	conceptual	knowledge.	Accordingly,	the	religious	experience	of	 absolute	 nothingness	 cannot	 be	 described	 conceptually.	 The	 philosophical	 standpoint,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	does	not	leave	the	realm	of	knowledge	behind.	In	Nishida’s	words,	“there	must	still	remain	a	sense	of	 ‘reflection	 or	mirroring’	 [utsusu].”39	The	 aim	 of	 philosophy,	 then,	 is	 to	 clarify	 the	way	 in	which	 such	experience	must	 serve	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 all	 our	 other	 knowledge.	 Therefore,	 from	 the	 philosophical	standpoint,	absolute	nothingness	is	the	foundational	knowledge	for	all	our	knowledge.	In	other	words,	the	very	 experience	of	 absolute	 nothingness,	which	 transcends	 conceptual	 knowledge	 can	 be	 distinguished	from	our	conceptualization	of	it.40	With	this	distinction	at	hand,	we	can	say	that	Nishida	did	not	seek	the	philosophical	foundation	in	religious	experience	itself	but,	rather,	in	absolute	nothingness	as	the	ultimate	kind	of	knowledge	that	founds	other	kinds	of	knowledge.	Accordingly,	Nishida	claims:	Philosophy,	 in	 its	pure	 sense,	 is	 the	 clarification	of	 the	various	 standpoints	of	 knowledge	and	 their	structure	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 knowledge	 that	 transcends	 all	 knowledge.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	articulates	 the	 various	 determinations	 of	 the	 universals	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 universal	 of	absolute	nothingness	that	envelops	these	universals.	If	the	self-determination	of	the	universal	can	be	called	reason	in	a	broad	sense,	then	we	can	say	that	it	is	the	self-reflection	of	reason	itself.41	And	 shortly	 after,	 with	 Kant	 clearly	 in	 mind,	 we	 find	 Nishida	 calling	 his	 philosophy	 “radical	 critical	philosophy”	(tetteiteki	hihyō	shugi)42:	I	 seek	 to	 clarify,	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 radical	 critical	 philosophy,	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 formation	 of	knowledge	and	 to	give	 the	different	kinds	of	 knowledge	 their	own	standpoint	 and	 claim	as	well	 as	their	interrelation	and	order.	43		 What	 I	wish	 to	 underline	 here	 is	 that,	 for	 Nishida,	 philosophical	 knowledge	 is	 the	 foundational	knowledge	 that	 clarifies	 the	 foundation	 for	 all	 other	 knowledge.	 Accordingly,	 philosophy	 is	 the	
																																								 																				
39	Ibid.,	p.	182.		
40	Nitta	Yoshihiro	has	also	underlined	this	distinction	as	one	between	“the	experience	itself”	and	“the	logic	that	explicates	
the	basic	structure	of	the	formation	of	such	experience.”	He	further	notes	that	this	“crucial	distinction”	has	not	always	
been	articulated	in	Nishida	scholarship	(1998,	p.	43).	
41	NKZ	5,	p.	183.	
42	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	Nishida’s	idea	of	the	radical	critical	philosophy,	see:	Itabashi	(2004).	
43	NKZ	5,	p.	184.	
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foundational	science	for	all	other	sciences.	Therefore,	we	can	say	that,	in	his	early	theory	of	basho,	Nishida	was	committed	to	a	kind	of	foundationalism,	and	of	a	Kantian	sort	insofar	as	he	was	critically	developing	Kant’s	critical	philosophy.		
1.1.2. Transcendental	priority		 Now,	 this	 conclusion	allows	us	 to	 address	 the	 second	part	of	 the	question,	namely	whether	 this	commits	Nishida	to	transcendental	foundationalism.	From	what	we	have	seen	so	far,	it	is	tempting	to	say	that	it	does.	For	if	he	was	critically	advancing	Kant’s	critical	position,	does	this	not,	by	implication,	commit	him	to	the	idea	that	the	foundation	of	our	experience	is	sought	in	the	a	priori	structures	of	subjectivity?	However,	 before	 we	 jump	 to	 any	 conclusions,	 we	 must	 reexamine	 the	 alleged	 radicalness	 of	 Nishida’s	“radical	 critical	 philosophy.”	 For,	 as	 Ōhashi	 and	 Ueda	 argued,	 the	 self-determination	 of	 absolute	nothingness	 cannot	 be	 identified	 with	 the	 constitution	 of	 objects	 by	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 and,	accordingly,	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 cannot	 be	 identified	with	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 as	traditionally	 understood.	 But	 if	 this	 is	 the	 case,	 then	 we	 apparently	 do	 not	 have	 a	 case	 where	
transcendental	subjectivity	has	priority	in	the	sense	that	it	constitutes	 the	meaning	of	objects.	In	order	to	clarify	 the	 nature	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 in	 relation	 to	 transcendental	 subjectivity,	 let	 us	 examine	Nishida’s	 interpretation	 of	 Kant’s	 transcendental	 consciousness	 and,	 insofar	 as	 Nishida	 comes	 to	appropriate	Husserl’s	phenomenology,	also	his	interpretation	of	Husserl’s	pure	consciousness.		 According	 to	 Nishida,	 Kant’s	 epistemic	 subject,	 namely	 transcendental	 consciousness	 or	“consciousness	 in	 general,”	 is	 still	 a	 kind	 of	 “determined	basho”	 and	 not	 yet	 the	basho	 that	 determines	itself	while	being	 indeterminable	by	anything	else.	 In	the	“Basho”	essay,	he	claims	that	consciousness	 in	general	 is	 the	 “entrance	 gate”	 (kadoguchi)	 from	 relative	 nothingness	 to	 true	 or	 absolute	 nothingness.44	Nishida	 therefore	 understood	 consciousness	 in	 general	 as	 halfway	 to	 the	 ultimate	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness.	While	this	is	not	too	informative,	 it	 is	nonetheless	an	important	point	since	it	suggests	that	Nishida	 understood	 basho,	 or,	 more	 specifically,	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness	 (mu	 no	 basho),	 as	 a	 kind	 of	
transcendental	place.	In	fact,	in	“A	Reply	to	Dr.	Sōda,”	Nishida	states	that	his	basho	corresponds	to	Kant’s	epistemic	subject.45	This	claim,	however,	must	be	read	with	care	since	Nishida	does	not	mean	that	basho	is	merely	 what	 the	 epistemic	 subject	 is	 for	 Kant.	 Rather,	 what	 he	 means	 is	 that,	 if	 we	 understand	consciousness	 as	 basho	 (or	 as	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness),	 then	 the	 Kantian	 epistemic	 subject	 can	 be	
																																								 																				
44	Cf.	NKZ	4,	pp.	234,	236.	
45	Ibid.,	p.	322.	
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interpreted	 as	 basho,	 though	 not	 the	 ultimate	 basho.	 Accordingly,	 we	 can	 even	 say	 that	 Nishida	reconfigured	transcendental	consciousness	as	the	place	of	nothingness.			 Kant’s	position	within	the	theory	of	basho	gains	more	clarity	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals.	From	the	beginning	of	the	development	of	the	theory	of	basho,	Nishida	understood	both	Kant’s	epistemic	subject	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 ego	 as	 determined	 (and	 not	 determining)	 basho	 or	 consciousized	(and	not	consciousizing)	consciousness.46	In	the	“Intelligible	World”	(1928),	however,	Nishida	refines	his	view	 and	 comes	 to	 articulate	 Kant’s	 consciousness	 in	 general	 and	Husserl’s	 pure	 consciousness	 as	 two	sides	 of	 the	 intelligible	 self.47 	He	 thus	 comes	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 they	 both	 noetically	 transcend	consciousness	 and,	 as	 such,	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 consciousizing	 consciousness	 or	 what	 he	 now	 calls	 the	intelligible	self.	But,	according	to	Nishida,	both	consciousness	in	general	and	pure	consciousness	are	at	the	level	of	the	 intellectual	 intelligible	self	 insofar	as	they	do	not	reflect	or	mirror	their	own	content	but	are	only	the	formal	correlate	of	the	content	of	the	self-aware	universal.48	As	such,	they	are	not	self-determining	(since,	according	to	Nishida,	the	self	is	self-determining	only	when	it	reflects	or	mirrors	its	own	content).			 Now,	according	to	Nishida,	Kant’s	consciousness	in	general	does	not	reflect	its	own	content	since,	although	 it	 is	 object-constituting,	 it	 cannot	 itself	 be	 known.	 This	 was	 due	 to	 Kant’s	 limited	 notion	 of	intuition	 as	 that	 which	 is	 given	 in	 space	 and	 time.	 As	 such,	 and	 as	 we	 saw	 above,	 Kant	 could	 not	sufficiently	account	for	self-knowledge.	For	Nishida,	this	meant	that	consciousness	in	general	 is	not	self-determining.	Husserl’s	pure	consciousness,	on	the	other	hand,	developed	this	intuitive	side	of	subjectivity	but	at	the	expense	of	the	object-constituting	aspect.	49	Now,	as	Mine	has	aptly	pointed	out,	this	just	sounds	as	 if	 Nishida	 failed	 to	 understand	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	 phenomenology. 50 	For,	 when	 properly	understood,	 transcendental	 phenomenology	 has	 everything	 to	 do	 with	 clarifying	 the	 structure	 of	consciousness	 in	 its	object-constituting	 role.	But	here	we	must	clarify	what	Nishida	understands	by	 the	object-constituting	 aspect	 of	 subjectivity.	 In	 Nishida’s	 view,	 to	 constitute	 objects	 is	 to	 do	 so	 within	
consciousness.	Or	put	differently,	when	objects	are	understood	as	constituted	by	subjectivity,	we	can	say	that	 they	 manifest	 themselves	 to	 consciousness.	 This	 much	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 phenomenological	understanding	 of	 consciousness	 as	 the	 dative	 of	 manifestation.	 And	 here	 we	 can	 see	 how	 speaking	 of	consciousness	 as	 a	 “place”	 is	 not	 at	 all	 foreign	 to	 Kant’s	 idea	 of	 subjectivity	 as	 the	 “place”	 that	makes	object-cognition	possible	or	Husserl’s	 idea	of	subjectivity	as	the	“place”	of	the	manifestation	of	meaning.	
																																								 																				
46	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	319;	NKZ	12,	p.	16.	
47	NKZ	5,	p.	149.	
48	Cf.	Ibid.,	pp.	141,	147.	
49	Ibid.,	pp.	149.	
50	Mine	2015,	p.	324.	
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But	 Nishida	 also	 understood	 this	 consciousness	 as	 essentially	 self-determining,	 namely	 as	 the	 self-determination	 of	 the	 place.	 In	 other	 words,	 consciousness	 determines	 itself	 within	 itself.	 From	 the	perspective	of	that	which	is	implaced	(or	that	which	is	determined),	this	is	to	say	that	the	implaced	must	ultimately	reflect	or	mirror	the	content	of	its	own	place	(i.e.	consciousness).	And	it	is	from	this	standpoint	that	 Nishida	 criticizes	 Husserl.	 Namely,	 Husserl’s	 pure	 consciousness	 does	 not	 reflect	 its	 own	 content	insofar	as	objects	cannot	be	said	 to	reflect	or	mirror	 the	content	of	 consciousness.	Accordingly,	Husserl	may	 have	 clarified	 transcendental	 consciousness	 as	 object-constituting	 but	 he	 failed	 to	 clarify	 that	 this	object-constitution	is	in	fact	a	kind	of	self-constitution,	or,	in	Nishida’s	terminology,	self-determination.51		 As	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 Nishida	 saw	 that	 the	 intelligible	 self	 must	 deepen	 its	 self-awareness	in	order	to	reflect	its	own	content.	Accordingly,	he	saw	the	emotive	self	and	the	volitional	self	or	what	he	also	refers	to	as	the	moral	self	at	the	depths	of	the	intelligible	self.	In	fact,	Nishida	eventually	comes	 to	 identify	 the	 “acting	 self”	 (kōiteki	 jiko)	 as	 the	 deepest	 level	 of	 the	 intelligible	 self.	 For	Nishida,	acting	is	“taking	the	external	world	that	is	beyond	one’s	self	into	the	self.	The	external	events	become	the	expressions	of	one’s	own	content	as	the	realization	of	one’s	will.”52	For	example,	in	writing	an	article,	I	am	expressing	my	mind,	so	to	say,	but	in	doing	so,	I	am	incorporating	the	ideas	of	other	thinkers	and	engaging	in	discussions	that	are	in	no	way	to	be	found	inside	my	mind.	My	computer,	books,	pens	and	notebooks	are	also	external	objects	that	I	employ	and	thereby	“take	in”	in	my	activity	of	writing.	And	finally,	when	the	article	 comes	 out,	 the	 typed	 words	 in	 the	 journal	 do	 not	 merely	 have	 some	 content	 and	meaning	 but,	rather,	 they	 are	 expressive	 of	my	 embodied	 and	 embedded	 engagement	with	 the	 thinkers,	 thought	 and	things	around	me.	In	this	way,	the	acting	self	is	expressive	of	my	own	content.			 Ultimately,	however,	the	acting	self	cannot	be	the	true	consciousness	or	the	true	self	 that	 is	self-determining	while	itself	non-determined,	that	is,	no-thing.	Nishida	explains	somewhat	cryptically:	Originally,	the	acting	self	 is	that	which	sees	itself	as	nothing.	[However,]	as	 long	as	the	acting	self	 is	still	seen,	this	is	not	to	see	oneself	as	nothing.	In	this	sense,	the	acting	self	is	contradictory.53	Nishida	 seems	 to	 be	 suggesting	here	 that,	 so	 long	 as	 the	 acting	 self	 is	 still	 in	 some	 sense	 objectified	 or	determined,	as	the	agent	of	the	action,	for	example,	it	is	not	the	true	self	that	“sees	itself	as	nothing.”	For	
																																								 																				
51	Admittedly,	Nishida’s	arguments	for	why	Kant	and	Husserl’s	transcendental	consciousness	is	not	self-determining	are	
not	very	clear.	Furthermore,	for	Husserl,	transcendental	consciousness	is	not	only	object-constituting	but	also	self-
constituting.	I	am	not	sure	whether	this	could	save	Husserl	from	Nishida's	criticism	but	Nishida	does	not	seem	to	have	
understood	this	point.	Cf.	Husserl’s	lectures,	On	the	Phenomenology	of	the	Consciousness	of	Internal	Time	(1983-1917)	
(Hua	X).	
52	NKZ	5,	p.	155.	
53	Ibid.,	p.	445.	This	quotation	is	taken	from	his	last	essay	in	The	Self-aware	System	of	Universals.	In	this	essay,	“General	
Remarks,”	Nishida	sums	up	his	final	standpoint	as	developed	during	these	years.	
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Nishida,	one	can	only	really	see	oneself	as	nothing	in	some	kind	of	religious	experience	whereby	the	self	is	completely	nullified	into	nothingness.	As	he	says:	“[i]n	religious	experience,	the	seeing	self	in	any	sense	of	the	word	disappears	and	one	becomes	truly	selfless.	We	then	live	in	the	deep	internal	 life.”54	In	the	self-awareness	of	absolute	nothingness,	“there	is	neither	seer	nor	seen.”55		 Nishida	accordingly	understood	Kant’s	consciousness	in	general	and	Husserl’s	pure	consciousness	as	the	intelligible	self	in	its	most	formal	and	abstract	form.	For	Nishida,	consciousness	must	delve	into	its	more	emotive	and	volitional	depths	and	concretize	itself	in	our	embodied	and	embedded	activities.	At	this	point,	we	can	draw	a	parallel	with	Heidegger’s	criticism	of	Husserl	that	intentionality	must	be	based	on	an	understanding	 of	 the	 being	 of	 Dasein	 as	 care.	 As	we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 Heidegger	 argued	 that	 Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	 is	 the	 condition	of	possibility	 for	 intentionality.	Thus,	 according	 to	Heidegger,	 a	simple	act	of	perception	 is	only	possible	against	 the	backdrop	of	my	understanding	of	 the	pen	as	being	involved	in	a	complex	in-order-to	relation.	For	example,	to	perceive	the	pen	as	a	pen	is	to	perceive	it	as	something	useful	for	writing	in	order	to	conduct	research.	It	thus	points	to	my	practical	engagement	with	things.	In	this	sense,	as	Crowell	says,	Heidegger’s	phenomenology	suggests	how	“practical	intentionality”	provides	the	condition	of	possibility	for	“act	intentionality.”56	But	Crowell	rightly	adds	that	Heidegger	did	not	merely	substitute	the	theoretical	subject	for	the	practical	one.	As	Heidegger	says	in	The	Metaphysical	
Foundations	 of	 Logic,	 the	 transcendence	 of	 Dasein	 cannot	 be	 understood	 theoretically,	 aesthetically	 or	practically	as	it	is	not	itself	an	ontic	activity:	The	central	task	in	the	ontology	of	Dasein	is	to	go	back	behind	those	divisions	into	comportments	to	find	 their	 common	 root,	 a	 task	 that	 need	 not,	 of	 course,	 be	 easy.	 Transcendence	 precedes	 every	possible	mode	of	activity	in	general,	prior	to	νόησις	[noesis]	but	also	prior	to	ὄρεξις	[orexis,	desire].57	For	Heidegger,	 I	perceive	 the	pen	as	something	useful	 for	writing	 in	order	 to	conduct	 research	because	ultimately	 I	 care	 about	 conducting	 research.	 This	 “care”	 is	 not	 an	 intentional	 act	 but	 a	 kind	 of	 self-
understanding.	It	is	because	I	understand	myself	as	caring	about	conducting	research	that	I	act	in	light	of	specific	 norms	 such	 as	 writing	 an	 article.	 This	 kind	 of	 self-understanding	 is	 still	 “practical”	 and	 not	theoretical	in	the	sense	that	one	understands	oneself	in	one’s	actions.	We	can	see	how	this	is	quite	similar	to	Nishida’s	notion	of	 the	acting	 self	whereby	one	 “takes	 the	external	world	 into	oneself”	 and	 “external	events	become	the	expressions	of	one’s	own	content	as	the	realization	of	one’s	will.”	As	such,	in	expressing	
																																								 																				
54	Ibid.,	p.	444.	
55	Ibid.,	p.	442.	
56	Crowell	2013,	p.	26.	
57	GA	26,	pp.	235-236/183.		
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ourselves	 through	 practical	 engagement	 with	 things	 external	 to	 us,	 we	 understand	 ourselves	 in	 our	primordial	 constitution.	As	Nishida	 says,	 in	 acting,	 one	does	not	 lose	 the	 subjective	 self	 and	become	an	external	object	but,	rather,	“we	in	fact	become	more	deeply	aware	of	ourselves.”58	In	this	sense,	then,	both	Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 saw	 a	 deeper	 level	 of	 our	 being	 in	 the	 self-understanding	 that	 unfolds	 in	 our	practical	engagements.59		 Yet,	 from	 Heidegger’s	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 might	 be	 argued	 that	 Nishida	 is	 still	 working	 with	 the	phenomenology	 of	 “consciousness”	 since	 the	 intelligible	 acting	 self	 is	 understood	within	 the	 depths	 of	consciousness	or	self-awareness.	 If	one	were	 to	develop	a	phenomenology	of	our	practical	engagement,	one	 cannot	 stay	 within	 the	 bounds	 of	 a	 phenomenology	 of	 consciousness.	 Such	 criticism	 may	 hold	 if	Nishida	was	assuming	that	“consciousness”	is	a	kind	of	inner	realm	that	reaches	out	to	the	external	realm.	Indeed,	if	that	were	the	case,	he	would	be	susceptible	to	Heidegger’s	criticism	of	Husserl	that	he	does	not	question	 the	 being	 of	 consciousness	 but	 merely	 assumes	 it.	 Yet,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 Nishida	 never	presupposed	 such	 understanding	 of	 consciousness.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 according	 to	Nishida,	 consciousness	 is	 not	 primarily	 intentional	 but	 self-mirroring.	 It	 is	 not	 primarily	 a	 subject	 that	transcends	toward	objects	but	it	is	the	place	that	mirrors	or	reflects	itself	within	itself.	Accordingly,	while	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho,	based	on	the	idea	of	jikaku,	may	be	called	a	theory	of	consciousness,	this	does	not	make	him	susceptible	to	Heidegger’s	criticisms	of	the	phenomenology	of	consciousness.	Nonetheless,	in	 the	 1930s	 and	 ‘40s,	 Nishida’s	 focus	 does	 move	 away	 from	 consciousness	 as	 such	 to	 our	 social	 and	historical	engagement	with	the	world.	While	this	move	reflects	not	so	much	a	rejection	as	a	development	of	his	early	theory	of	basho,	it	might	still	be	argued	that	his	focus	on	epistemological	problems	limited	the	scope	of	what	he	could	say	about	our	practical	engagements	with	the	world.60		 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 that	 the	problem	of	 transcendence	was	one	of	 the	 central	 problematics	 for	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida	in	the	late	1920s.	As	we	saw	in	Chapter	4,	Heidegger	explicitly	formulated	the	problem	of	being	in	terms	of	that	of	transcendence.	For	Heidegger,	the	problem	of	transcendence	was	not	
																																								 																				
58	NKZ	5,	p.	155.	
59	In	fact,	Nishida	himself	acknowledged	Heidegger’s	advancement	of	Husserl’s	phenomenology	on	the	grounds	that	he	
developed	the	idea	of	the	“self-awareness	of	the	acting	self”	(NKZ	5,	463).	However,	he	also	claims	that	Heidegger’s	
hermeneutic	phenomenology	still	suffers	from	“the	fundamental	flaws	associated	with	the	phenomenological	standpoint	
itself”	(NKZ	5,	p.	350).	Nishida	first	mentions	Heidegger	critically	in	his	essay,	“The	Relation	Between	the	Implaced	in	the	
Self-aware	Universal	and	That	Which	is	Behind	it”	(1929).	His	critical	remarks	about	Heidegger	then	continue	in	his	
subsequent	essays	from	1930	to	1934.	His	main	critique	was	that	Heidegger’s	understanding	of	being	is	an	“insufficient	
jikaku”	(fujyūbun	na	jikaku).	I	will	not	go	into	the	details	of	his	critique	as	they	are	sporadic	and	difficult	to	understand.	For	
discussions	concerning	such	details,	see:	Ōhashi	(1995,	pp.	179-198)	and	Ōta	(2012).		
60	In	the	preface	for	the	reprint	of	the	Inquiry	written	in	1936,	he	says:	“That	which	I	called	in	the	present	book	the	world	
of	direct	or	pure	experience,	I	have	now	come	to	think	of	as	the	world	of	historical	reality.	The	world	of	acting-intuition	–	
the	world	of	poiesis	–	is	none	other	than	the	world	of	pure	experience.”	(NKZ	1,	p.	7/xxxiii)	
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identical	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 intentionality,	 or	 what	 he	 called	 “ontic	 transcendence.”	 Rather,	 Heidegger	wanted	to	show	that	ontic	transcendence	is	possible	only	on	the	basis	of	“primal	transcendence,”	namely	the	 transcendence	 of	 Dasein.	 Nishida,	 too,	 was	 dealing	with	 the	 problem	 of	 transcendence	 in	 his	 early	theory	of	basho,	though,	unlike	Heidegger,	he	never	explicitly	stated	so.	This	becomes	clear	when	we	recall	his	 engagement	with	 Lask’s	 idea	 of	 transcendent	 objects	 (things	 in	 themselves)	 and	 his	 questioning	 of	how	 they	 can	 be	 known	 to	 us.	 Or,	 more	 generally,	 it	 is	 quite	 evident	 in	 his	 commitment	 to	 Kantian	problematics	 in	 the	 late	 1920s.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 also	 interesting	 that,	 like	 Heidegger	with	 his	 primal	transcendence,	Nishida	also	conceived	of	the	intelligible	self	in	terms	of	a	kind	of	transcendence,	namely	as	the	“transcendent	self”	reached	through	“noetic	transcendence.”	But	it	should	be	noted	that,	insofar	as	Nishida	 does	 not	 emphasize	 the	 transcending	 aspect	 of	 the	 self	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 going	 beyond	 itself,	 as	Heidegger	 does	 with	 Dasein’s	 primal	 transcendence	 as	 projection,	 the	 specific	 meaning	 of	 the	transcendence	of	the	self	does	diverge	in	the	two.	For	Nishida,	the	transcendent	self	is	understood	vis-à-vis	the	transcendent	world	where	the	highest	values	reside.	As	such,	the	transcendent	self	is	understood	not	so	 much	 as	 transcending	 as	 that	 which	 sees	 truth,	 beauty	 and	 goodness.	 Despite	 this	 difference,	 it	 is	interesting	that	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida	conceive	the	fundamental	constitution	of	our	being	in	terms	of	transcendence.	Indeed,	this	brings	us	to	an	important	point.		 In	 Chapter	 4,	 we	 saw	 how	 Heidegger’s	 focus	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 transcendence	 and	 his	understanding	 of	 Dasein’s	 being	 in	 terms	 of	 primal	 transcendence	 highlighted	 the	 transcendental	orientation	 of	 his	 thought.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 Nishida’s	 focus	 on	 the	 problem	 of	transcendence	and	his	understanding	of	 the	 intelligible	self	as	the	transcendent	self	reached	by	noetically	
transcending	 our	 consciousness	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 transcendental	 orientation	 of	 his	 philosophy.	 In	 fact,	when	Nishida	contrasted	“noetic	transcendence”	with	transcendence	in	the	direction	of	the	noema,	he	was	contrasting	 the	 former	with	 the	 traditional	 idea	 of	 transcending	 this	 world.	 Accordingly,	 what	 Nishida	refers	to	as	noetic	transcendence	seems	to	correspond	to	the	idea	of	going	beyond	into	the	transcendental	dimension.	 Therefore,	 the	 intelligible	 self	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 transcendental	 and	 not	 transcendent	 in	 the	traditional	sense.	In	this	way,	then,	Nishida’s	articulation	of	the	deepening	of	the	intelligible	self	is	a	clear	continuation	of	Kant’s	and	Husserl’s	analyses	of	transcendental	subjectivity.				 At	this	point,	then,	we	can	agree	with	some	commentators’	rendering	of	Nishida’s	term	that	refers	to	 consciousness,	 namely	 “chōetsuteki	 jutsugomen,”	 as	 “transcendental	 predicate	 plane”	 instead	 of	 the	literal	translation,	“transcendent	predicate	place.”	For	we	can	say	that,	in	transcending	in	the	direction	of	the	predicate,	Nishida	was	seeking	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	knowledge	of	objects.	In	this	sense,	consciousness	 is	 the	 transcendental	 predicate	 plane.	 But	 Nishida	 further	 sought	 the	 conditions	 of	
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possibility	 for	 the	consciousness	 that	 is	opposed	 to	 that	which	 is	determined	 in	consciousness.	 In	other	words,	 Nishida	 also	 sought	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 intentionality.	 And	 by	 transcending	 in	 the	direction	 of	 the	 noesis	 (i.e.	 via	 noetic	 transcendence),	 Nishida	 found	 the	 intelligible	 self	 to	 be	 the	transcendental	 ground	 of	 intentionality.	 Both	 Nishida	 and	 Heidegger,	 then,	 sought	 the	 grounds	 of	transcendence	in	the	structures	of	transcendental	subjectivity,	which	is	not	another	“subject”	opposed	to	the	 “object.”	 For	 Heidegger,	 this	 was	 Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being	 while,	 for	 Nishida,	 this	 was	 the	intelligible	self.		 But	 the	 parallel	with	Heidegger	 seems	 to	 end	 just	 there	 insofar	 as	Nishida	 saw	 an	 even	 deeper	level	 of	 self-understanding	 or	 self-awareness	 whereby	 one	 “sees	 oneself	 as	 nothing”	 and	 understands	oneself	as	absolute	nothingness.	In	fact,	Nishida	himself	criticizes	Heidegger’s	“understanding	of	being”	as	an	“insufficient	 jikaku”	(fujyūbun	na	jikaku)	 insofar	as	it	stops	short	of	an	analysis	of	this	deeper	level	of	self-awareness.61	It	is	at	this	point	that	we	can	finally	ask	the	pressing	question	we	raised	much	earlier:	is	
this	turn	to	absolute	nothingness	an	abandonment	of	the	transcendental	or	a	radicalization	of	it?		 From	 what	 we	 have	 seen	 so	 far,	 there	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	nothingness	 is	 a	 radicalization	 of	 the	 transcendental	 rather	 than	 its	 abandonment.	 First	 of	 all,	 as	 I	suggested	 above,	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	 is	 a	 search	 for	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	knowledge	of	objects	and	our	intentional	consciousness.	The	intelligible	self	is	accordingly	understood	as	the	 transcendental	 ground	 of	 both.	 But	 Nishida	 went	 further	 and	 asked:	 what	 is	 the	 universal	 that	envelops	 the	 intelligible	 universal?	 Put	 differently:	 what	 are	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 the	intelligible	 self?	Phrased	 this	way,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	place	of	 absolute	nothingness	was	 sought	as	 the	ultimate	 condition	 of	 possibility	 or	 the	 ultimate	 transcendental	 ground	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects,	intentionality	and	the	intelligible	self.	Or,	to	use	Nishida’s	threefold	description	in	“The	Intelligible	World,”	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	is	the	ultimate	transcendental	ground	of	the	world	of	nature,	the	world	of	consciousness	and	the	world	of	intelligibility.	Secondly,	just	as	the	intelligible	self	was	reached	through	“noetic	 transcendence,”	according	to	Nishida,	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	or	 the	self-awareness	of	absolute	 nothingness	 is	 reached	 through	 “absolute	 noetic	 transcendence.”62	We	 have	 already	 suggested	that	noetic	transcendence	is	a	kind	of	going	beyond	into	the	transcendental	dimension.	If	we	follow	this	line	of	 thought,	 then	absolute	noetic	 transcendence	toward	absolute	nothingness	 is	none	other	 than	the	deepening	of	the	transcendental	dimension.	
																																								 																				
61	Compare	Ōhashi’s	following	statement:	the	“reason	why	Heidegger’s	understanding	of	being	is	an	‘insufficient	jikaku’	is	
because	‘understanding’	still	drags	the	residuum	of	subjective	consciousness.	As	such,	it	does	not	reach	the	level	of	‘seeing	
oneself	as	nothing’	(1995,	p.	184).	See	also	note	59.	
62	NKZ	5,	p.	180.	
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	 There	are,	however,	also	reasons	to	doubt	that	absolute	nothingness	can	be	called	transcendental	“subjectivity.”	To	begin	with,	Nishida	had	claimed	that	even	at	the	level	of	the	intelligible	self,	there	is	no	opposition	between	noesis	and	noema,	subject	and	object.	Or	better,	the	deeper	one	goes	into	the	depths	of	 the	 intelligible	 self,	 the	 more	 the	 opposition	 dissipates.	 In	 this	 sense,	 then,	 though	 it	 may	 be	transcendental,	 the	 “true”	 intelligible	 self,	 namely	 the	 practically	 acting	 intelligible	 self	 cannot	 be	understood	as	subjectivity	“constituting”	objects.	As	Nishida	says:	In	 the	 universal	 of	 intellectual	 intuition	 [i.e.	 the	 intelligible	 universal],	 such	 opposition	 in	consciousness	 [the	 noesis-noema	 correlation]	must	 dissipate.	 The	noema	must	withdraw	 [bossuru]	into	the	noesis.	The	objective	world	must	be	totally	subjectified.63	Nishida	supposedly	means	here	that	the	intelligible	self	does	not	have	the	world	as	its	objective	correlate.	It	is	not	opposed	to	the	world	as	the	“subject”	is	to	“objects.”	As	he	says	about	the	moral	self,	one	does	not	see	 the	 idea	of	 goodness	objectively.	Rather,	 one	 can	only	practically	 experience	 the	 good	 in	 acting	out	one’s	will.64		 But	at	the	level	of	absolute	nothingness,	there	is	the	further	radicalization	of	getting	rid	of	the	last	“seer”	 that	 was	 still	 remaining	 in	 the	 intelligible	 self.	 For,	 as	 Nishida	 had	 claimed,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	intelligible	self,	“there	is	still	the	knower	that	knows	itself	as	the	seer	of	ideas.”65	In	absolute	nothingness,	however,	there	is	merely	“seeing	without	the	seer.”66	Whatever	reveals	itself	is	no	longer	seen	as	an	object	for	 us	 but,	 rather,	 is	 revealed	 as	 “reality”	 realizing	 itself	 in	 “us.”	 As	 I	 stressed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	“‘reality’	 realizing	 itself	 in	 ‘us’”	 is	a	very	different	phenomenon	 from	“objects	manifesting	 themselves	 in	consciousness.”	 In	 the	 former,	 the	actualizing	of	 “reality”	 is	 coupled	with	my	understanding	 that	 “I”	 am	absolutely	no-thing	but	the	realizing	of	“reality.”	The	self	has	completely	nullified	itself	so	as	to	make	room	for	 “things”	 to	realize	 themselves	as	 they	are	 in	 themselves.	 In	 this	sense,	 then,	 I	am	 in	agreement	with	Ōhashi	 when	 he	 claims	 that	 “[t]he	 determination	 of	 basho	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 ‘constitution’	 of	 the	noema	by	noetic	consciousness.”67	For,	in	the	self-determination	of	absolute	nothingness,	there	is	no-thing	that	 is	 doing	 the	 determining.	 That	which	 is	 self-determining	 is	 absolute	 no-thingness.	 From	 the	 above	considerations,	then,	although	we	can	maintain	that	absolute	nothingness	is	the	ultimate	transcendental	ground	 of	 our	 experience,	 it	 cannot	 be	 called	 a	 “subjectivity”	 that	 is	 said	 to	 “constitute”	 objects.	 For	absolute	 nothingness	 is	 the	 transcendental	 ground	 that	 determines	 reality	 in	 complete	 self-negation.		
																																								 																				
63	Ibid.,	p.	158.	
64	Ibid.,	p.	168.	
65	Ibid.,	p.	175.	
66	Ibid.,	p.	442.	
67	Ōhashi	1995,	p.	183.	
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Furthermore,	from	this	standpoint,	the	distance	to	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	is	clear-cut,	for	Dasein	is	still	some-thing	that	projects	the	understanding	of	the	being	of	objects	and	the	world.	In	other	words,	it	is	still	posited.	As	such,	although	Heidegger	too	saw	the	ground	of	the	subject-object	relation	in	Dasein’s	being,	which	is	not	itself	a	subject	standing	over	against	objects,	from	Nishida’s	standpoint,	“Dasein”	has	yet	to	“see	itself	as	nothing.”		
1.1.3. Weak	transcendental	foundationalism		 Let	 us	 now	 come	 back	 to	 our	 main	 concern,	 namely	 whether	 Nishida	 is	 committed	 to	transcendental	 foundationalism	 in	 his	 early	 theory	 of	 basho.	 Insofar	 as	 Nishida’s	 idea	 of	 the	 place	 of	absolute	 nothingness	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 “subjectivity”	 that	 “constitutes”	 objects,	we	 do	 not	seem	 to	 have	 the	 specific	 priority	 relation	 involved	 in	 transcendental	 foundationalism.	 Nevertheless,	 I	believe	 that	we	can	still	 say	 that	Nishida	 is	 committed	 to	a	weak	transcendental	 foundationalism	 to	 the	extent	that	there	is	a	kind	of	priority	relation	at	work	in	his	early	theory	of	basho	that	resembles	the	one	above.		 At	the	basis	of	Nishida’s	theory	of	basho	lies	the	basic	idea	of	the	self-determination	of	the	place	or	universal.	One	of	the	characteristic	features	of	this	idea	is	that	it	is	coupled	with	the	self-determination	of	the	implaced	or	the	individual.	 In	this	sense,	there	is	a	symmetrical	determining	relation.	For	example,	a	red	object	expresses	the	universal,	redness,	and,	as	such,	the	individual	red	object	is	a	self-determination	of	 the	concrete	universal,	redness.	Simultaneously,	however,	since	the	concrete	universal	would	be	only	an	empty	concept	without	its	particularizations,	the	concrete	universal,	redness,	can	be	seen	as	the	self-determination	of	the	particular	redness	in	the	individual	object.	Or	let	us	take	the	example	of	my	jikaku	as	a	PhD	student.	In	the	previous	chapter,	we	saw	how	my	jikaku	as	a	PhD	student	is	only	possible	by	being	open	 to	 the	 surroundings	 that	 make	 this	 possible,	 say	 the	 academic	 community.	 Accordingly,	 my	individuality,	 just	as	with	any	other	 individual	PhD	student,	 is	an	expression,	or	a	self-determination,	of	the	academic	community.	At	the	same	time,	however,	since	the	academic	community	would	be	an	empty	concept	 without	 its	 members,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 the	 self-expression	 (i.e.	 self-determination)	 of	 the	individual	 members,	 including	 myself	 as	 a	 PhD	 student.	 In	 this	 way,	 Nishida	 tried	 to	 emphasize	 the	reciprocal	relationship	between	the	universal	and	the	individual,	the	place	and	the	implaced.			 At	the	same	time,	however,	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	was	characterized	by	the	prioritization	of	 the	predicate	over	 the	grammatical	subject,	 the	universal	over	 the	 individual	and	 the	noesis	over	 the	noema.	This	 is	most	evident	 in	his	methodology	of	seeking	the	grounds	of	 judgment	 in	the	transcendent	
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(or	transcendental)	predicate	plane	or	the	grounds	of	 intentionality	 in	noetic	transcendence.	But	 it	 is	also	evident	 in	the	way	he	 formulates	his	own	“logic”	at	 the	time,	namely	as	predicate-oriented.	Later	on,	he	comes	to	explicitly	articulate	this	as	“predicate	logic”	(jutsugo	no	ronri)	in	opposition	to	what	he	calls	the	“logic	of	the	grammatical	subject”	(shugoteki	ronri)	or	“object	logic”	(taishō	ronri).68	By	the	latter,	Nishida	means	 the	kind	of	 thinking	 that	prioritizes	objects	 and	 the	objectified.	 For	Nishida,	Aristotle’s	 logic	 is	 a	typical	case	of	the	latter	in	that	Aristotle	sought	the	grounds	of	judgment	in	individual	objects	defined	as	that	which	is	subject	but	never	predicate.	In	reversing	this	logic	and	seeking	that	which	grounds	judgment	in	the	direction	of	the	predicate,	Nishida	saw	himself	as	pursuing	predicate	logic.	For	Nishida,	this	is	the	kind	of	logic	that	prioritizes	the	objectifying	act	and	the	non-objectified	over	the	objectified.	Now,	Nishida	saw	 that	 Kant	 had	 also	 pursued	 predicate	 logic	 insofar	 as	 Kant	 sought	 the	 ground	 that	 unifies	 our	cognition	 of	 objects	 in	 consciousness	 in	 general	 which,	 for	 Nishida,	 corresponds	 to	 the	 intellectual	intelligible	 self.	 In	 this	 way,	 Nishida’s	 early	 logic	 of	 basho	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 a	 continuation	 of	 Kant’s	transcendental	logic.		 As	 Krummel	 rightly	 notes,	 however,	 Nishida	 eventually	 comes	 to	 seek	 the	 unity	 or	 ground	 of	judgment	and	cognition	not	so	much	in	the	predicate	but	in	the	dialectical	interplay	between	the	opposing	terms:	At	 this	 stage	 in	 his	 lifework	 [the	 1930s]	Nishida	 founds	 their	 unity	 by	 taking	 it	 beyond	 his	 earlier	1920s	predicate-oriented	formulation	of	 the	epistemology	of	place.	He	reformulates	their	unity	this	time	more	explicitly	 in	 light	of	the	contextual	matrix	of	the	world	of	 interactivity	as	a	contradictory	identity	between	grammatical	subject	and	predicate,	the	transcendent	object	and	the	transcendental	predicate,	epistemological	object	and	subject,	world	and	self,	universal	and	individual.69	As	a	matter	of	fact,	this	is	an	important	observation	that	underscores	the	presence	of	the	prioritization	of	the	predicate	 in	 the	 late	 1920s	 that	 is	 later	 revised	 in	 the	1930s.	Upon	 coming	 to	 see	 the	deficiency	 of	predicate	 logic,	 Nishida	 eventually	 started	 putting	 more	 emphasis	 on	 the	 symmetrical	 relationship	between	the	two	opposing	terms.	Accordingly,	as	Krummel	attests	above,	in	the	1930s	and	1940s,	Nishida	develops	 his	 theory	 of	 basho	 into	 a	 dialectical	 logic	 or	 what	 he	 calls	 “dialectic	 of	 place”	 (bashoteki	
benshōhō).	The	dialectic	of	place	 is	peculiarly	dialectical	 in	 that,	 unlike	Hegel’s	dialectic,	which	 seeks	 to	sublate	the	oppositions,	 it	seeks	unity	 in	the	non-reducible	oppositions,	or,	 in	Nishida’s	terms,	“absolute	contradictory	self-identity”	(zettai	mujunteki	jikodōitsu).	Immediately	after	the	above	quotation,	Krummel	goes	on	to	explain	this	change	in	Nishida’s	thought:		
																																								 																				
68	For	example,	see:	“Logic	and	Life”	(Ronri	to	seimei,	1936)	in	NKZ	8,	pp.	273-394.	
69	Krummel	2015,	p.	109.	
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Although	 the	 basic	 idea	 is	 the	 same,	 this	 slight	 alteration	 in	 the	 1930s	 reflects	 further	 caution	 on	Nishida’s	 part	 to	 preclude	 any	 uni-directional	 prioritization	 of	 noesis	 over	 noema,	 determining	 act	over	determined	content,	predicate	plane	over	grammatical	subject,	and	epistemological	subject	over	object.	Instead,	he	emphasizes	the	balance	of	the	two	opposing	terms	in	terms	of	their	contradictory	self-identity.	He	wants	to	avoid	engendering	any	tendency	that,	on	the	basis	of	his	earlier	predicate-oriented	logic,	would	incline	in	the	direction	of	an	idealist	monism	or	transcendentalism.70	Krummel’s	 observation	 above,	 namely	 that	 Nishida’s	 move	 towards	 a	 dialectical	 logic	 in	 the	 1930s	“reflects	 further	 caution	 on	 Nishida’s	 part	 to	 preclude	 any	 uni-directional	 prioritization	 of	 noesis	 over	noema,”	 is	crucial	 for	my	discussion	here.	For	 it	allows	us	to	characterize	Nishida’s	early	(but	not	 later)	theory	 of	 basho	 as	 prioritizing	 the	 predicate	 over	 the	 grammatical	 subject,	 the	 universal	 over	 the	individual	and	the	noesis	over	the	noema.			 Moreover,	it	also	allows	us	to	properly	understand	Kopf’s	following	statement,	which	prima	facie	puts	some	pressure	on	my	claim:	“even	though	Nishida	orients	his	logic	towards	the	predicate,	his	model	[of	the	logic	of	basho]	is	too	radically	dialectical	to	allow	for	the	self-determining	universal	to	be	accorded	primacy	over	the	self-determining	individual.”71	In	light	of	the	above	observation,	we	can	say	that	this	is	true	of	Nishida’s	mature	theory	of	basho,	which	is	what	Kopf	mainly	focuses	on,	but	not	necessarily	true	of	his	early	theory	of	basho	in	the	1920s.	Clarifying	this	difference	is	all	the	more	important	since,	based	on	his	 view	 that	 the	 logic	 of	 basho	 is	 “radically	 dialectical,”	 Kopf	 argues	 that	 Nishida	 is	 an	 anti-	 or	 non-foundationalist.	 According	 to	 Kopf,	 although	 Nishida	 acknowledges	 the	 transcendental	 ground	 of	 our	experience,	 insofar	 as	 he	 sought	 this	 in	 the	 absolute	 contradictory	 self-identity,	 it	 precludes	his	 finding	any	absolute	foundation.	Calling	this	kind	of	position	“transcendental	relativism,”	he	concludes:	Like	 transcendental	 relativism,	 Nishida’s	 philosophy	 acknowledges	 a	 transcendental	 ground	 but	 at	the	same	time	realizes	its	absolute	elusiveness,	thus	barring	philosophy	from	absolute	truth	claims.72		Now,	although	I	am	quite	sympathetic	to	Kopf’s	arguments,	I	believe	their	force	depend	on	the	dialectical	logic	 that,	 according	 to	 my	 view	 as	 well	 as	 Krummel’s,	 only	 becomes	 pronounced	 in	 the	 1930s.	Accordingly,	while	Kopf’s	arguments	are	interesting	and	call	 for	further	consideration,	I	do	not	think	his	arguments	in	favor	of	transcendental	relativism	have	much	bearing	on	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	in	the	late	1920s.		 From	the	above	considerations,	we	can	derive	the	following	conclusion.	On	the	one	hand,	Nishida’s	idea	of	 the	place	of	absolute	nothingness	 cannot	be	 said	 to	be	a	kind	of	 “subjectivity”	 that	 “constitutes”	
																																								 																				
70	Ibid.,	ibid.	
71	Kopf	2003,	p.	33.	
72	Ibid.,	p.	45.	
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objects.	 As	 such,	 Nishida	 is	 not	 committed	 to	 the	 kind	 of	 transcendental	 foundationalism	 we	 find	 in	Husserl,	 Kant	 and	 Heidegger	 in	 BT.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 to	 the	 extent	 that,	 in	 his	 late	 1920s,	Nishida	prioritizes	the	predicate	over	the	grammatical	subject,	 the	universal	over	the	individual	and	the	noesis	 over	 the	 noema,	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 is,	 despite	 its	 appearance	 to	 the	 contrary,	nonetheless	given	a	privileged	role	as	the	transcendental	ground	of	our	experience.	In	this	sense,	then,	we	can	say	that	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	is	committed	to	weak	transcendental	foundationalism.		
1.2. Transcendental	reflection		 The	second	question	we	need	to	address	is	whether	we	can	say	that	Nishida	employed	a	second-order	 reflection	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 experience,	 namely	 transcendental	 reflection.	The	 problem	 of	 reflection,	 and	 specifically	 philosophical	 reflection,	 has	 a	 peculiar	 place	 in	 Nishida’s	philosophy.	On	the	one	hand,	to	the	extent	that	he	does	not	thematize	philosophical	reflection	as	such	in	his	writings,	 it	 seems	 that	 it	was	 not	 so	much	 a	 “problem”	 for	Nishida.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 if	
jikaku	can	be	understood	as	a	special	form	of	reflection,	then	the	problem	of	reflection	belongs	to	the	very	core	of	his	philosophy.	Indeed,	although	philosophical	reflection	is	never	or	very	rarely	thematized	as	such,	Nishida	 was	 very	 keen	 to	 clarify	 the	 method	 of	 philosophy	 and,	 on	 many	 occasions,	 he	 speaks	 of	 the	“standpoint	 of	 philosophy.”	 For	 him,	 this	 means	 clarifying	 the	 particular	 method	 of	 philosophy	 in	distinction	from	the	other	methods	and	their	standpoints.	Accordingly,	Nishida	does	discuss	philosophical	reflection	throughout	his	writings,	albeit	indirectly.			 In	 fact,	 our	 investigations	 up	 to	 this	 point	 have	 already	 pointed	 to	 a	 positive	 answer	 to	 the	question	 of	 whether	 Nishida	 is	 employing	 transcendental	 reflection.	 For	 in	 seeking	 the	 transcendental	ground	of	 the	 three	 “worlds,”	namely	 the	world	of	nature,	 the	world	of	 consciousness	and	 the	world	of	intelligibility,	 we	 can	 certainly	 maintain	 that	 Nishida	 was	 following	 Kant’s	 (and,	 for	 that	 matter,	 also	Husserl’s)	 transcendental	 method.	 Nishida	 was	 not	 undertaking	 a	 first-order	 inquiry	 that	 thematizes	objects	 with	 a	 view	 to	 determining	 their	 real	 properties	 but,	 rather,	 a	 second-order	 inquiry	 into	 the	conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 knowledge	 of	 objects	 (and	 for	 intentionality	 and	 the	 intelligible	 self).	Perhaps	it	is	nowhere	more	evident	that	Nishida	was	explicitly	following	Kant’s	critical	or	transcendental	method	than	in	his	pronouncement	of	doing	“radical	critical	philosophy.”			 But	 it	 is	 precisely	 at	 this	 point	 that	we	 need	 to	 question	 the	 radicalness	 of	 this	 “radical	 critical	philosophy,”	 this	 time	 with	 regard	 to	 its	 method.	 For,	 in	 furthering	 Kant’s	 critical	 philosophy	 by	questioning	the	possibility	of	critical	philosophy	itself,	we	can	say	that	Nishida	was	also	questioning	the	
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possibility	 of	 reflection	 itself.	 Namely,	 it	 was	 Nishida’s	 contention	 that,	 although	 Kant	 had,	 through	transcendental	reflection,	clarified	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	knowledge	of	objects,	he	failed	to	clarify	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	transcendental	knowledge	itself.	Put	differently,	he	failed	to	clarify	the	 kind	 of	 reflection	 that	 enables	 knowledge	 of	 transcendental	 knowledge,	 or,	 more	 simply,	 self-knowledge	 (i.e.	 knowledge	 of	 the	 structures	 of	 subjectivity).	 But,	 according	 to	 Nishida,	 this	 is	 where	“reflection”	 finds	 its	 limits.	He	 thus	argues,	as	we	saw	 in	“A	Reply	 to	Dr.	Sōda,”	 that	one	must	seek	self-knowledge	not	 through	 reflection	 but	 in	 “intuition”	whereby	 one	 completely	 nullifies	 oneself	 and	 gives	oneself	over	to	things.	Since	there	is	no	subject	opposed	to	an	object	in	intuition,	this	kind	of	pre-reflective	experience	is	also	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.	Accordingly,	we	can	see	Nishida	here	reformulating	his	basic	idea	in	the	Inquiry	to	ground	reality	in	pure	experience,	namely	that	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	dichotomy.	But	if	this	is	the	case,	then	isn’t	Nishida	giving	up	transcendental	reflection	in	favor	of	a	
kind	of	non-reflective	intuitive	experience?			 I	think	that	Nishida	is	not	so	much	giving	up	transcendental	reflection	as	radicalizing	it.		For	what	Nishida	is	doing	is	not	dogmatically	positing	pre-reflective	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split	but,	rather,	philosophically	reflecting	on	the	transcendental	grounds	of	our	experience	and	pointing	to	the	pre-reflective	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.	In	this	sense,	Nishida	is	radicalizing	transcendental	reflection	by	taking	it	back	to	its	pre-reflective	origin.	As	Ueda	says:	“[i]nsofar	as	philosophy	is	a	reflective	discipline,	 reflection	 on	 the	 pre-reflective	 is	 a	 form	 of	 radicalized	 reflection.”73	But	 it	 must	 also	 be	emphasized	that,	for	Nishida,	this	pre-reflective	origin	is	completely	rid	of	the	subject-object	dichotomy	to	the	extent	 that	 there	 is	not	 even	a	pre-reflective	 “self.”74	This	 is	where	 the	 true	 radicalness	of	Nishida’s	philosophical	 reflection	 lies.	 For	 Nishida,	 philosophical	 reflection	 must	 reflect	 on	 the	 very	 ground	 of	experience,	which	is	ultimately	selfless.	
																																								 																				
73	Ueda	1991,	p.	368.	
74	In	my	article	from	2011,	“Later	Nishida	on	Self-awareness:	Have	I	lost	myself	yet?”,	I	presented	Nishida’s	later	account	
of	jikaku	in	contrast	to	the	phenomenological	and	higher-order	accounts	of	self-awareness.	There,	I	argued	that	Nishida	
ultimately	challenges	the	phenomenological	analysis	(most	famously	offered	by	Sartre)	that	consciousness	is	necessarily	
positionally	aware	of	an	object	and	non-positionally	(pre-reflectively)	aware	of	itself.	According	to	Nishida,	in	pure	
experience,	one	is	merely	intransitively	conscious	and	not	positionally	aware	of	anything.	In	other	words,	“there	is	a	mode	
of	experience	devoid	of	any	sense	of	differentiation,	even	of	a	minimal	sort.”	Cf.	Ishihara	(2011,	p.	206).	One	of	the	aims	of	
the	article	was	to	show	that	Nishida’s	philosophy	has	much	to	offer	to	contemporary	debates	on	self-awareness,	both	in	
the	phenomenological	and	analytic	traditions.	Although	such	a	dialogue	is	only	starting,	attempts	to	put	the	Indian	
Buddhist	tradition	in	dialogue	with	these	traditions	are	increasing.	For	a	significant	contribution	to	this	dialogue,	see	the	
volume	co-edited	by	Mark	Siderits,	Evan	Thompson	and	Dan	Zahavi,	Self,	No	Self?	Perspectives	from	Analytical,	
Phenomenological,	and	Indian	Traditions	(2011).	This	work	also	proves	to	be	important	in	bringing	Nishida	into	dialogue	
with	these	traditions,	as	the	essays	shed	light	on	important	debates	that	lie	at	the	intersection	of	the	dialogue	between	
the	Eastern	and	Western	traditions.	
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	 At	this	point,	let	us	turn	to	Ueda’s	distinction	between	two	kinds	of	reflection,	what	he	calls	“small	turn	reflection”	(komawari	no	hansei)	and	“big	turn	reflection”	(oomawari	no	hansei).75	According	to	Ueda,	while	 the	 former	 kind	 of	 reflection	 is	 prevalent	 in	 the	 Western	 philosophical	 tradition,	 Nishida’s	philosophical	 reflection	belongs	 to	 the	 latter.	While	Nishida	himself	does	not	make	 this	distinction,	 it	 is	helpful	in	understanding	the	radicalness	of	his	concept	of	reflection.	The	following	is	a	general	outline	of	Ueda’s	discussion.76			 As	his	starting	point,	Ueda	takes	an	example	from	one	of	Nishida’s	early	writings:	the	experience	of	
looking	at	a	flower.77	Competing	views	exist	on	whether	or	not	 there	 is	some	sort	of	 “I”	or	“self”	 in	such	experience	prior	to	reflection.	In	a	very	rough	sketch,	the	Buddhist	tradition	denies	that	there	is	while	the	Western	 philosophical	 tradition	 argues	 otherwise.	 Rather	 than	 choosing	 one	 way	 or	 the	 other,	 Ueda	brackets	this	question.	Instead,	he	begins	with	the	relatively	uncontroversial	point:	when	we	reflect	on	the	
experience,	we	become	aware	of	the	“I”	that	is	reflecting	on	the	experience.	At	this	point,	Ueda	points	to	two	directions	our	thinking	can	take	 from	this	evident	starting	point.	On	the	one	hand,	one	can	think	of	 this	whole	experience	from	the	perspective	of	the	reflecting	“I”	and	interpret	our	pre-reflective	experience	of	looking	at	the	flower	as	constituted	by	the	higher-order	“I”.	According	to	this	view,	the	“I”	is	the	condition	of	possibility	 for	our	experience.	We	come	to	see	 that	our	 initial	experience	of	seeing	 the	 flower	 is	only	possible	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 constitution	 by	 the	 “I.”	 Indeed,	 Ueda	 sees	 the	 culmination	 of	 this	 way	 of	thinking	in	the	idea	of	transcendental	subjectivity.78	Ueda	argues	that	this	is	a	way	of	articulating	 the	“I”	that	is	implicit	in	pre-reflective	experience.			 The	other	direction,	on	the	other	hand,	proceeds	to	eliminate	the	“I.”	This	view	also	acknowledges	that,	when	we	reflect	on	our	initial	experience,	we	come	to	see	that	the	“I”	constitutes	the	experience.	But	instead	of	then	interpreting	the	initial	experience	as	that	which	is	only	possible	on	the	basis	of	the	“I,”	the	initial	 experience	 is	 understood	 as	 the	 “original	 experience”	 (genkeiken)	 from	 which	 the	 “I”	 arises	(together	with	the	constituted	experience).	Here,	Ueda	emphasizes	that	it	is	not	as	if	we	come	to	interpret	the	 initial	 experience	 in	 this	 way	 upon	 reflection.	 The	 understanding	 of	 the	 initial	 experience	 as	 the	original	 experience	 is	 unachievable	 in	 reflection.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 something	 that	 only	 our	 experience	 can	
																																								 																				
75	Ueda	1994,	pp.	103-104,	108-113.	
76	I	am	here	presenting	the	general	outline	of	Ueda’s	discussion	in	two	of	his	works	from	1994	(pp.	98-119)	and	2000	(pp.	
165-170).		
77	Nishida	raises	this	example	in	his	early	writing,	“Fragmentary	Notes	on	Pure	Experience”	(Junsuikeiken	ni	kansuru	
danshō)	published	posthumously.	Though	the	exact	years	in	which	these	notes	were	written	are	unknown,	they	were	
supposedly	written	around	the	time	of	the	Inquiry.	Cf.	NKZ	16,	pp.267-572.	See	also	the	afterward	written	by	Tokuryū	
Yamauchi	(NKZ	16,	pp.	673-674).	In	Ueda’s	work	from	2000,	he	gives	a	different	example	of	the	experience	of	looking	at	a	
mountain	but	the	idea	remains	the	same.	
78	Cf.	Ueda	2000,	167.	
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reveal.	Thus,	 in	the	original	experience,	one	simply	understands	oneself	as	completely	nullified	and	selfless.	As	Ueda	says:	“[s]uch	original	experience	is	given	in	a	‘selfless’	manner	[…]	through	the	breaking	down	of	the	subject	(‘I’)	 into	nothingness.”79	He	also	calls	such	experience	“kaku”	(覚)	meaning	“awakening.”80	As	this	 word	 suggests,	 in	 some	 sense,	 this	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 religious	 experience.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 something	 so	inaccessible	either.	As	a	typical	case	of	such	awakening	experience,	Ueda	refers	to	Nishida’s	description	of	pure	experience	in	the	opening	to	the	Inquiry:	“[i]n	“the	moment	of	seeing	a	color,	hearing	a	sound,”	the	subject-object	frame	breaks	and	one	becomes	open	to	the	clearing.	This	is	‘awakening’	[kaku,	覚].”81		 We	may	also	recall	my	example	in	the	previous	chapter	of	listening	to	music.	In	my	experience	of	complete	absorption	in	the	flow	of	the	music,	I	do	not	experience	that	the	music	is	manifesting	to	me.	“I”	am	simply	not	there	anymore.	Now,	one	may	admit	to	having	such	momentary	experiences	from	time	to	time	but	deny	that	they	amount	to	any	kind	of	“awakening”	experience.	There	is	nothing	“religious”	about	it.	To	be	sure,	most	of	the	time,	after	those	momentary	experiences,	we	just	go	on	with	our	lives	and	do	not	 give	 them	much	 thought.	 But,	 when	 those	 experiences	 are	 powerful	 enough	 to	 pull	 us	 out	 of	 our	ordinary	way	of	understanding	ourselves	 (that	 is,	as	self-enclosed,	 self-sustaining),	 then	 this	experience	becomes	an	awakening	experience.	 It	 is	not	 that	we	give	 it	more	thought.	Rather,	 the	experience	simply	reveals	that	“I”	am	no-thing	but	the	realizing	“reality,”	i.e.	that	“I”	am	selfless.	It	is	in	such	experience	that	we	are	led	to	say,	“I	am	the	music,	and	the	music	is	me.”				 So	then,	under	this	view,	reflection	takes	the	following	form:	at	first,	there	is	the	selfless	presence	of	the	“flower.”82	This	is	the	experience	of	“kaku.”	Then,	upon	“coming	back”	to	oneself,	one	reflects	on	this	experience	and	says,	 “I”	am	seeing	the	 flower.	 It	 is	here	 that	 the	subject-object	dichotomy	arises	 for	 the	first	time.	Furthermore,	it	is	here	that	ji-kaku	arises.	This	kind	of	reflection	(namely,	reflection	qua	jikaku)	is	very	different	 from	that	under	 the	 first	view	since	one	has	understood	 its	non-reflective	origin	 in	 the	awakening	experience.	Thus,	coming	from	such	experience,	the	reflective	I	says:	the	“self	is	the	self	in	self-
negation,”	 or,	 the	 “self	 is	 –	 selflessly	 –	 the	 self”	 (ware	wa	warenarazushite	ware	dearu).83	Ueda	 calls	 this	kind	of	reflection	“big	turn	reflection”	since	it	turns	back	on	itself	through	self-negation.	In	contrast	to	this,	he	calls	the	other	kind	“small	turn	reflection”	since	it	simply	comes	back	to	itself	without	self-negation.	As	such,	it	merely	says,	“the	self	is	the	self”	(ware	wa	ware	dearu).	
																																								 																				
79	Ibid.,	p.	167.	
80	Cf.	Ibid.,	p.	146;	Ueda	1991,	p.	250.	Ueda	specifically	describes	such	“kaku”	as	the	awakening	to	one’s	true	mode	of	
being	in	the	clearing	(1991,	p.	372).	
81	Ueda	1991,	p.	250.	The	original	reads:	「「色を見、音を聞く刹那」、意識を閉ざしていた主客の枠が破れ、開け
に開かれます。これが「覚」です。」	
82	Cf.	Ueda	1994,	p.	102.	
83	Ibid.,	ibid.	
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	 Now,	according	to	Ueda,	Nishida’s	jikaku	exemplifies	the	second	kind	of	reflection.	“Jikaku,”	which	literally	 means	 “self-awakening”	 (“ji”	 means	 “self”,	 “kaku”	 means	 “awakening”),	 is	 the	 reflective	 self-awareness	that	is	ultimately	grounded	in	the	experience	of	“kaku.”	When	the	experience	of	“kaku”	(which	is	itself	non-reflective)	is	brought	to	light	through	reflection,	one	becomes	reflectively	aware	of	such	non-reflective	 experience.	 According	 to	 Ueda,	 this	 is	 what	 Nishida	 means	 by	 “true	 jikaku”	 or	 “true	 self-awareness.”84	But	if	 jikaku	 is	a	kind	of	philosophical	reflection,	as	Ueda	seems	to	be	suggesting,	then	the	pertinent	 question	 is:	what	 is	 its	 relation	 to	 transcendental	 reflection?	 Since	 Ueda	 identifies	 traditional	forms	 of	 transcendental	 reflection	 as	 the	 first	 kind	 of	 reflection,	which	 is	 oblivious	 to	 the	 self-negating	moment	in	reflection,	this	may	give	one	the	impression	that	Ueda	understands	Nishida’s	jikaku	as	a	non-
transcendental	kind	of	reflection.	But,	contrary	to	appearances,	Ueda	seems	to	be	suggesting	that	jikaku	is	in	fact	a	radicalized	form	of	transcendental	reflection.	Let	us	quote	at	length	the	passage	where	he	makes	this	point	most	explicitly:	Instead	 of	 beginning	 with	 reflection	 and	 proceeding	 transcendentally	 to	 a	 higher-order	 reflection	(“reflection	of	reflection”),	Nishida	goes	the	other	way	around	 in	“taking	a	step	back	by	turning	the	light	 in	 upon	 oneself”	 [ekōhenshō	 no	 taiho].85	First,	 the	 rupture	 of	 reflection	 [hansei	 no	 yabure]	 is	experienced	which	 then	 gives	 rise	 to	 the	 awareness	 of	 the	 limits	 of	 reflection.	 Then,	 through	 such	
awareness	[jikaku]	of	 its	 limits,	 the	 limits	are	permeated	and	 the	space	of	 reflection	expands	 to	 the	pre-reflective	by	way	of	 returning	 to	 its	origin.	From	there	 it	proceeds	 to	 reflection	and	 then	on	 to	reflection	of	reflection	(now	having	the	function	of	transcendental	reflection).86	It	 will	 help	 to	 rephrase	 this	 difficult	 passage	 in	 light	 of	 our	 earlier	 discussion:	 for	 Nishida,	 jikaku	 qua	philosophical	 reflection	 differs	 from	 traditional	 transcendental	 reflection	 in	 that	 it	 begins	 with	 the	“rupture	of	reflection”	(that	is,	the	experience	of	“kaku”).	From	here,	philosophical	reflection	proceeds	to	reflect	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 experience.	 Therefore,	 jikaku	 is	 a	 kind	 of	 transcendental	reflection	 insofar	 as	 it	 is	 a	 second-order	 reflection	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 of	 our	 experience.	Nonetheless,	 it	 differs	 from	 transcendental	 reflection	 traditionally	 understood	 since	 jikaku	 ultimately	reflects	on	the	very	limits	of	reflection	whereby	the	subject-object	dichotomy	collapses	and	there	is	simply	selfless	experience.	
																																								 																				
84	Cf.	Ueda	2000,	p.	148.	He	says:	“[w]hen	“kaku”	becomes	jikaku	(self-aware),	this	jikaku	is	true	self-awareness.”	Although	
he	is	not	explicitly	referring	to	Nishida	here,	it	is	clear	that	he	has	Nishida’s	jikaku	in	mind.	For	example,	as	he	elsewhere	
says,	“Nishida’s	jikaku	which	has	‘kaku’	at	the	very	basis…”	(1991,	p.	372).		
85	“Ekōhenshō”	(回光返照)	is	a	phrase	that	appears	in	the	Zen	Buddhist	text,	The	Record	of	Linji	(Rinzairoku).	The	meaning	
of	the	phrase	is:	turning	the	light	in	upon	myself.	Sasaki	explains	that	“[t]he	phrase	may	be	said	to	describe	the	essence	of	
Buddhist	meditation	–	to	take	the	mind,	ordinarily	occupied	entirely	with	discursive	thought	and	external	phenomena,	and	
direct	it	inward	toward	the	source	of	the	mind’s	activities”	(Sasaki	2009,	p.	266).	
86	Ueda	1991,	p.	368	(emphasis	added).	
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	 Furthermore,	Ueda	also	writes	that,	for	Nishida,	jikaku	is	ultimately	what	he	later	calls,	“place-like	
jikaku”	(bashoteki	jikaku).87	In	the	previous	chapter,	we	already	saw	how	“place”	is	implied	in	the	notion	of	jikaku.	Namely,	to	be	self-aware	in	the	sense	of	jikaku	is	to	understand	one’s	place	(which	entails	being	disclosed	to	one’s	situated	place).		Nishida’s	later	notion	of	“place-like	jikaku,”	then,	underlines	this	“place”	in	jikaku	but	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	jikaku	is	ultimately	understood	as	the	reflection	of	the	place	itself.	As	 Ueda	 puts	 it:	 “[j]ikaku	 is	 […]	 to	 be	 disclosed	 to	 ‘one’s	 situated	 place’	 (this	 event	 of	 disclosedness	 is	‘kaku’)	and	 to	 see	 the	 self	 in	 the	 reflection	of	 the	 clearing	of	 the	place	 (in	 the	 light	of	 the	 clearing).”88	For	example,	as	a	PhD	student,	I	am	disclosed	to	the	academic	community.	In	such	disclosedness,	not	only	do	I	find	 my	 specific	 role	 as	 a	 PhD	 student	 but,	 if	 my	 awareness	 deepens,	 I	 can	 also	 find	 myself	 as	 the	“reflection”	 of	 the	 academic	 community.	 Put	 differently,	 I	 find	 myself	 as	 the	 self-determination	 of	 the	academic	 community.	 This	 is	 my	 place-like	 jikaku	 as	 a	 PhD	 student.	 Let	 us	 call	 this	 place-like	 jikaku	“chorological	reflection.”	(Here,	I	am	following	Krummel’s	suggestion	that	Nishida’s	basho	is	akin	to	Plato’s	chōra	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 its	 essence	 is	 to	withdraw	 and	make	 room	 for	 things.89)	Chorological	reflection,	
then,	is	the	disclosing	of	oneself	to	one’s	situated	place	and	finding	oneself	as	the	reflection	of	the	place.	Thus,	in	the	jikaku	of	absolute	nothingness,	when	the	self	is	completely	nullified,	one	is	disclosed	to	the	realizing	“reality”	and	finds	oneself	as	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	itself.	To	employ	Nishitani’s	language,	I	find	myself	as	the	“self-realization	of	reality	itself.”90		 Let	 me	 now	 summarize	 the	 way	 in	 which	 Nishida’s	 chorological	 reflection,	 based	 on	 “jikaku,”	transforms	 transcendental	 reflection.	The	 crucial	 point	 is	 the	 self-negating	moment	 of	 jikaku	where	 the	conditions	of	possibility	of	experience	are	revealed	through	the	self-negating	nature	of	consciousness.	It	is	worth	noting	 that	 chorological	 reflection	 is	not	a	mere	 theoretical	method	but	a	kind	of	 self-awakening	that	finds	its	origin	in	the	Buddhist	practice	of	realizing	the	non-substantiality	of	the	self.	 	 Jikaku	 is	thus	comparable	to	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	reflection	in	the	sense	that	they	both	understand	transcendental	reflection	in	terms	of	becoming	wakeful	to	one’s	situation.	Indeed,	in	this	sense,	Nishida	is	engaging	in	a	kind	 of	 hermeneutic	 reflection.	 But	 the	 two	 ideas	 also	 differ	 insofar	 as	 Heidegger	 did	 not	 appear	 to	recognize	 the	 level	 of	 absolute	 nothingness.	 We	 will	 come	 back	 to	 this	 comparison	 at	 the	 end	 of	 this	chapter.	 For	 now,	 let	 us	 continue	 clarifying	 Nishida’s	 chorological	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	reflection.	 In	 chorological-transcendental	 inquiry,	 one	 reflects	 on	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	
																																								 																				
87	Ibid.,	p.	113.	Cf.	NKZ	10,	p.	320.		
88	Ueda	1991,	p.	372.	The	original	reads:	「自覚とは	[…]「自己の居る場所」（自己が置かれている場所）に開かれ
て（開かれるこの出来事が覚）、その場所に照らされて（その開けが光になって）自己が見られることです。」	
89	Cf.	Krummel	2015,	p.	203.	See	also:	chapter	5	(section	3.3	and	note	103).		
90	Cf.	Nishitani	1982,	p.	5.	
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intentional	experience,	say,	of	looking	at	a	flower.	One	then	becomes	aware	of	consciousness	as	the	place	of	its	manifestation.	At	this	point,	consciousness	withdraws	to	make	room	for	the	flower	to	manifest	itself.	To	 be	 self-aware	 in	 such	 a	 mode	 of	 experience	 is	 to	 be	 disclosed	 to	 one’s	 situated	 place.	 But,	 in	 such	experience,	 consciousness	 has	 not	 fully	 negated	 itself.	 It	 is	 still	 a	 relative	 nothingness.	 Thus,	 jikaku	deepens	 further,	 that	 is,	 further	 negates	 itself.	 And	 in	 complete	 negation,	 the	 ultimate	 transcendental	ground	 reveals	 itself	 as	 absolute	 nothingness.	 In	 such	 experience,	 “one”	 is	 disclosed	 to	 one’s	 place	 and	finds	oneself	as	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	itself.		 	From	 the	 above,	 we	 can	 say	 that	 chorological	 reflection	 (or	 place-like	 jikaku)	 transforms	transcendental	 reflection	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 (1)	makes	 transcendental	 reflection	 a	matter	of	 disclosing	oneself	qua	self-negation	and	(2)	ascribes	transcendental	reflection	the	soteriological	role	of	awakening	to	the	absolute	no-thingness	of	oneself.		 	
1.3. Alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world		 Finally,	we	 can	 address	 our	 third	 question	 regarding	 the	metaphysical	 implications	 of	Nishida’s	early	 theory	of	basho:	does	 it	entail	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world?	We	 saw	 in	Chapter	2	 that	transcendental	philosophy	entails	 transcendental	 idealism.	We	also	saw	how	this	does	not	entail	a	 first-order	 metaphysical	 position	 but,	 rather,	 a	 kind	 of	 methodological	 standpoint	 that	 has	 important	metaphysical	implications:	anti-(naive-)realism	and	the	priority	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	In	Chapter	4,	we	 saw	 how,	 despite	 its	 hermeneutic	 transformations,	 Heidegger’s	 project	 in	 BT	 is	 still	 a	 kind	 of	transcendental	 idealist	position.	Most	 importantly,	Dasein	was	still	a	kind	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	Our	 discussion	 in	 the	 first	 section,	 however,	 has	 revealed	 that	 absolute	 nothingness	 cannot	 be	 called	 a	transcendental	 “subjectivity”	 that	 “constitutes”	 the	world	 (though	 it	may	still	be	called	a	 transcendental	ground).	As	such,	Nishida’s	position	 in	his	early	 theory	of	basho	does	not	entail	 transcendental	 idealism	(though	there	is	still	a	kind	of	weak	transcendental	priority	of	absolute	nothingness).	But	if	Nishida	gives	
up	transcendental	idealism,	then	what	kind	of	transcendental	position	is	it,	if	it	can	be	called	that	at	all?	 In	the	 following,	 I	 will	 attempt	 to	 provide	 an	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 by	 clarifying	 the	 metaphysical	implications	of	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho.	I	will	do	this	by	addressing	the	following	two	questions:	(1)	does	Nishida’s	early	 theory	of	basho	 entail	 a	methodological	 standpoint	or	a	metaphysical	position?	 (2)	Does	it	entail	anti-(naive-)realism?			 It	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 the	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	 does	 not	 entail	 a	 metaphysical	 position.	 All	metaphysical	positions,	realism	and	idealism	alike,	are	interested	in	the	first-order	nature	of	objects.	But	
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we	have	already	underlined	how	Nishida	distances	himself	from	all	first-order	inquiries	by	following	the	transcendental	method	of	seeking	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	our	experience	in	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	 Therefore,	 Nishida’s	 early	 theory	 of	 basho	 cannot	 entail	 a	 metaphysical	 position.	 Put	differently,	absolute	nothingness	is	not	a	metaphysical	ground.	So	then,	is	it	a	methodological	standpoint?		 I	 believe	 a	 Nishidean	 would	 be	 rather	 uneasy	 calling	 absolute	 nothingness	 a	 methodological	standpoint.	 Part	 of	 the	 uneasiness,	 I	 believe,	 can	 be	 relieved	 by	 distinguishing	 the	 “philosophical	standpoint”	 from	 the	 “religious	 standpoint”	 as	we	 did	 earlier.	While	 the	 latter	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 very	experience	of	absolute	nothingness,	the	former	is	interested	in	articulating	how	absolute	nothingness	can	be	understood	as	the	foundation	of	all	our	knowledge.	Accordingly,	from	the	religious	standpoint,	absolute	nothingness	 is	non-reflective	 selfless	experience.	 It	 is	 the	awakening	experience	 (“kaku”)	of	 the	 “music”	realizing	itself	in	“me”	and	my	understanding	that	“I”	am	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	the	“music”	 realizes	 itself.	 But	 from	 the	 philosophical	 standpoint,	 absolute	 nothingness	 is	 a	methodological	standpoint	that	clarifies	the	transcendental	ground	of	our	experience	as	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	It	is	not	necessary	to	have	an	awakening	experience	to	employ	chorological	reflection.	In	this	way,	“kaku”	and	“jikaku”	are	not	mutually	implicative.	Yet	at	this	point,	we	may	ask:	but	what	does	it	mean	to	clarify	the	
transcendental	 ground	 of	 our	 experience	 as	 absolute	 nothingness?	 Since	 we	 should	 distinguish	 between	“kaku”	 and	 “jikaku,”	 we	 cannot	 say	 that	 this	 means	 that	 we	 must	 come	 to	 an	 understanding	 by	appropriating	the	fact	that	“we”	are	absolutely	no-thing	but	“reality”	realizing	itself.	Rather,	it	means	that	we	can	understand	(without	appropriation)	what	 is	meant	by	such	phrases	as	 “I	am	 the	music,	and	 the	music	 is	me.”	But	 indeed	 this	 is	not	an	easy	 task.	For	many,	 this	 is	 simply	senseless	or,	 if	not	senseless,	metaphorical.	 In	 such	 experience,	 I	 am	 not	 really	 the	music,	 they	would	 say.	We	might	metaphorically	speak	in	that	way,	but	that	is	not	really	what	the	case	is.	This	is	because	such	a	way	of	understanding	the	world	 and	 ourselves	 is	 radically	 different	 from	 the	 way	 we	 usually	 understand	 ourselves.	 I	 would	therefore	suggest	 that,	 although	chorological	 reflection	does	not	 require	 the	awakening	experience,	one	must	 at	 least	 be	 open	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 such	 experience.	 Indeed,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 chorological	reflection	 is	 essentially	 related	 to	 the	 soteriological	 concern	 of	 self-awakening,	 it	 seems	 that	 one	must	even	hold	this	as	an	ideal	possibility.	Accordingly,	absolute	nothingness	is	a	methodological	standpoint	in	the	sense	that	it	clarifies	the	transcendental	ground	of	our	experience.	But,	to	the	extent	that	chorological	reflection	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 self-awakening,	 it	 is	 specifically	 a	 kind	 of	 standpoint	 that	 impels	 us	 toward	understanding	and	appropriating	the	fact	that	“I”	am	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	itself.	
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	 This	specifically	methodological	character	of	absolute	nothingness	is	somewhat	similar	to	that	of	Dasein’s	 understanding	 of	 being.	 As	 we	 mentioned	 earlier,	 since	 for	 both	 Nishida	 and	 Heidegger	transcendental	inquiry	is	essentially	a	matter	of	becoming	wakeful	to	one’s	situation,	the	“philosophical”	and	 “religious”	 (Nishida)	 or	 the	 “existential-ontological”	 and	 “exitstentiell-ontic”	 (Heidegger)	 are	intricately	bound	together.	For	Heidegger,	the	roots	of	the	existential	analytic	were	said	to	be	existentiell	in	 the	sense	 that	 the	existential	analytic	depends	on	 the	existentiell	possibility	of	Dasein’s	coming	 to	an	authentic	 self-understanding.	This	does	not	entail	 that	one	could	not	engage	 in	an	existential	analytic	 if	one	had	not	already	somehow	come	to	authentic	self-understanding	in	one’s	existence.	Rather,	 it	means	that	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	motivates	one	toward	authentic	self-understanding	in	seizing	upon	it	as	one’s	existentiell	possibility.	Accordingly,	the	“roots”	of	the	existential	analytic	are	existentiell	in	the	sense	 that	 one	must	 understand	 one’s	 own	ontological	 constitution	 in	 one’s	 ontic	 existence	 in	 order	 to	have	a	“proper”	understanding	of	the	analytic.		 Similarly,	 for	Nishida,	we	 could	 say	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 absolute	nothingness	 are	 “religious”	 in	 the	sense	 that	 the	 jikaku	 of	 absolute	 nothingness	 depends	 on	 our	 possibility	 to	 have	 such	 awakening	experience	(i.e.	“jikaku”	depends	on	the	possibility	of	“kaku”).	Again,	this	does	not	mean	that	we	must	have	such	 an	 awakening	 experience	 to	philosophically	 reflect	 on	 absolute	nothingness.	Rather,	 it	means	 that	philosophical	reflection	on	absolute	nothingness	motivates	one	toward	self-awakening.	Thus,	the	“roots”	of	absolute	nothingness	are	“religious”	in	the	sense	that	one	must	have	an	awakening	experience	in	order	to	have	a	 “proper”	understanding	of	 absolute	nothingness.	 In	 this	way,	 the	methodological	 character	of	absolute	 nothingness	 and	 the	 existential	 analytic	 are	 intricately	 bound	 to	 the	 “religious”	 and	 the	“existentiell-ontic”	respectively.			 Let	us	now	turn	to	our	second	question:	does	the	early	theory	of	basho	entail	anti-(naive-)realism?		As	underlined	 in	Chapter	2,	 anti-(naive-)realism	was	one	of	 the	 important	metaphysical	 implications	of	transcendental	 idealism.	Namely,	 transcendental	 idealism	prohibits	 one’s	 natural	way	of	 relating	 to	 the	world,	specifically	taking	the	world	as	existing	independently	of	us.	While	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho	does	not	entail	transcendental	idealism,	it	certainly	has	this	prohibitive	character,	for	one	of	the	important	aims	of	Nishida’s	threefold	theory	of	basho	was	to	show	that	the	place	of	being(s)	or	the	world	of	nature	(i.e.	the	world	of	that	which	is	determinable	as	object)	is	only	made	possible	by	the	self-determination	of	consciousness	 as	 the	 place	 of	 nothingness	 and	 ultimately,	 by	 the	 self-determination	 of	 absolute	nothingness.	In	this	sense,	the	naive	realist	view	of	the	world	as	existing	independently	of	us	is	overcome	from	the	standpoint	of	absolute	nothingness.	
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	 Yet,	 if	 this	 alteration	 is	 different	 from	 seeing	 the	 world	 through	 transcendental	 subjectivity	inasmuch	as	absolute	nothingness	does	not	constitute	the	world,	what	does	the	world	look	like	in	absolute	
nothingness?	Let	us	refer	back	to	Nishida’s	example	 that	Ueda	employs:	“I	am	looking	at	a	flower.	At	this	
moment,	the	flower	is	me	and	I	am	the	flower.”	As	we	pointed	out	earlier,	such	experience	makes	little	(or	only	metaphorical)	sense	from	the	naive	view	of	the	world,	where	I	exist	independently	of	the	flower	and	vice	 versa.	 However,	 when	 one	 completely	 negates	 oneself	 in	 absolute	 nothingness,	 there	 is	 no	 self	(neither	 in	 the	 sense	of	 object	nor	 in	 that	 of	 subject)	nor	 is	 there	 a	 flower	 (as	object).	 Instead,	 there	 is	merely	the	pure	experience	of	looking	at	the	flower.	As	Nishida	would	say,	at	“the	moment	of	seeing	a	color	or	hearing	a	sound	[…],	there	is	not	yet	subject	or	object.”91	The	situation	is	similar	in	the	case	of	complete	absorption	 in	 the	 flow	of	a	piece	of	music.	There	 is	neither	 I	as	subject	nor	music	as	object.	 In	 the	pure	experience	of	listening	to	music,	there	is	simply	the	“music”	realizing	itself.		 As	 these	 examples	 suggest,	 I	 submit	 that	 the	 alteration	 that	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 standpoint	 of	absolute	 nothingness	 is	 one	 that	 radically	 challenges	 the	 substantialist	 view	 of	 the	 self	 and	 the	world.	Instead	of	holding	fast	to	our	common	assumption	that	the	subject	exists	independently	of	the	object	and	vice	versa,	we	are	 led	 to	 return	 to	pure	experience	prior	 to	 the	subject-object	dichotomy.	Or	 rather	 the	awakening	 experience	 of	 the	 beautiful	 “flower”	 or	 magnificent	 “music”	 reveals	 pure	 experience	 as	 the	“sole	reality.”	And	since	pure	experience	is	the	most	direct	kind	of	experience,	Nishida’s	radicalization	of	reflection	is	a	“restoration	of	the	most	direct	[experience],”	to	borrow	Ueda’s	phrase.92	In	this	way,	we	can	say	 that	 absolute	 nothingness	 alters	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 challenges	 the	substantialist	view	of	reality	and	brings	us	back	to	the	most	direct	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.		 Finally,	what	does	 this	 conclusion	have	 to	say	about	 the	specific	kind	of	 transcendental	position	Nishida	 endorses	 in	 his	 early	 theory	 of	 basho?	 As	 claimed	 earlier,	 it	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 a	transcendental	 idealist	 position	 since	 absolute	 nothingness	 is	 in	 no	 way	 to	 be	 understood	 as	transcendental	subjectivity.	Nonetheless,	it	is	still	a	transcendental	ground	of	our	experience.	At	this	point,	we	may	be	tempted	to	resort	to	its	opposite	and	say	that	it	is	a	kind	of	transcendental	realist	position.	But	transcendental	realism,	as	I	see	 it,	 is	an	 inconsistent	position	 insofar	as	 it	maintains	that	transcendental	subjectivity	constitutes	objects	while	somehow	also	maintaining	that	these	objects	exist	independently	of	us.	 It	 is	not	necessary	 to	go	 into	any	detail	about	how	such	a	position	might	be	defended.	For	Nishida’s	position	 undermines	 the	 very	 ground	 of	 the	 transcendental	 idealism-realism	 debate,	 namely	 whether	
																																								 																				
91	NKZ	1,	p.	9/3-4.	
92	Ueda	1991,	p.	368.	
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objects	exist	independently	of	transcendental	subjectivity.	Such	a	question	arises	in	the	first	place	because	the	 distinction	 between	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 and	 objects	 is	 understood	 as	 an	 irreducibly	 basic	distinction.	 However,	 in	 Nishida’s	 standpoint	 of	 absolute	 nothingness,	 there	 is	 absolutely	 no-thing	 but	“reality”	 realizing	 itself.	 Since	 such	 “reality”	 is	 neither	 subject	 nor	 object,	 absolute	 nothingness	 as	 the	transcendental	ground	of	reality	reveals	or	restores	our	direct	experience	of	reality	prior	to	the	subject-object	duality.	Therefore,	Nishida’s	transcendentalism	entails	a	kind	of	“direct	realism.”	To	be	sure,	this	is	not	the	same	as	naive	realism.	Rather,	since	it	calls	 for	an	awakening	to	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	dichotomy,	perhaps	we	can	call	it	something	like	“awakened	realism.”		
2. Nishida’s	chorological	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	in	his	early	theory	
of	basho		 	In	this	chapter,	we	have	been	examining	Nishida’s	engagement	with	transcendental	philosophy	in	light	of	 the	three	criteria	of	 transcendental	philosophy.	 In	 the	course	of	 the	 investigation,	 it	has	become	clear	that	Nishida	is	less	of	a	transcendental	philosopher	than	Heidegger	in	BT.	Unlike	Heidegger’s	project	in	BT,	which	still	stays	close	to	the	core	of	traditional	transcendental	philosophy,	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	
basho	 radically	 transforms	 all	 three	 criteria:	 firstly,	 it	 is	 foundational	 but	 only	 in	 the	 weak	 sense	 that	absolute	 nothingness	 is	 still	 seen	 as	 a	 transcendental	 ground.	 Secondly,	 it	 employs	 transcendental	
reflection	 that	 is	 radically	 transformed	 through	 chorological	 reflection	 to	 disclose	 the	 conditions	 of	possibility	 for	our	experience.	Thirdly,	 it	brings	about	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	 from	our	naive	belief	in	the	independent	existence	of	objects	and	the	world,	to	our	direct	encounter	with	the	world	in	pure	experience,	rather	than	seeing	the	world	through	transcendental	subjectivity.		In	conclusion,	let	us	draw	out	the	essence	of	Nishida’s	chorological	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	in	contrast	to	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	transformation.		 Just	 as	 the	 core	 of	 Heidegger’s	 transformation	 was	 found	 in	 the	 radicalness	 of	 hermeneutic	reflection,	I	believe	we	can	identify	the	core	of	Nishida’s	transformation	in	the	radicalness	of	chorological	reflection.	Chorological	reflection	was	the	disclosing	of	oneself	to	one’s	situated	place	and	finding	oneself	as	 the	reflection	of	 the	place.	 Insofar	as	 it	 is	both	a	disclosing	of	and	awakening	 to	one’s	situated	place,	Nishida’s	 chorological	 reflection	 can	 be	 said	 to	 be	 a	 kind	 of	 hermeneutic	 reflection.	 Accordingly,	chorological	 reflection	 also	 transforms	 traditional	 transcendental	 philosophy	 from	 its	 theoretically	detached	 method	 to	 an	 existentialist	 or	 soteriological	 appropriating	 method,	 one	 that	 calls	 for	 self-awakening.	For	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida,	transcendental	inquiry	is	not	a	second-order	inquiry	that	can	
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be	 detached	 from	 our	 first-order	 engagement	with	 the	world.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 a	 second-order	 inquiry	 that	takes	hold	of	our	everyday	engagements	 to	reveal	our	primordial	way	of	relating	to	 the	world,	which	 is	usually	covered-up.	In	this	sense,	what	Heidegger	said	of	the	existential	analytic	of	Dasein	applies	equally	to	Nishida’s	early	theory	of	basho:	it	is	a	way	of	doing	violence	to	the	everyday	interpretation	of	ourselves.	They	both	have	the	character	of	wresting	it	from	its	covered-up-ness.		 Chorological	reflection	in	the	late	1920s,	however,	was	not	true	to	the	hermeneutic	method	in	the	sense	 that	 it	 did	not	 pay	heed	 to	 the	 facticity	 and	historicity	 of	 our	 being.	Accordingly,	Nishida	did	not	clarify	the	ways	in	which	we	are	historically	and	factically	contingent.	But	this	shortcoming	of	chorological	reflection	in	the	late	1920s	was	not	so	much	an	issue	of	chorological	reflection	itself.	Insofar	as	it	is	a	kind	of	hermeneutic	reflection	that	discloses	and	awakens	to	one’s	situated	place,	it	was	more	a	matter	of	time	before	Nishida	developed	chorological	reflection	to	encompass	our	social	and	historical	engagements,	as	he	did	in	the	1930s	and	‘40s.		 As	 our	 discussion	 has	 shown,	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 paid	 heed	 to	 the	 disclosedness	 and	situatedness	 of	 our	 being.	 The	 basic	 insight	 at	 work	 in	 the	 two	 thinkers	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 we	 are	 not	“subjects”	 with	 an	 internal	 realm	 that	 reaches	 out	 to	 “objects”	 in	 the	 external	 realm.	 For	 Heidegger,	Dasein’s	understanding	of	being	is	essentially	characterized	by	the	disclosedness	of	its	being	to	the	world.	For	Nishida,	too,	disclosedness	to	one’s	place	is	constitutive	of	jikaku.	Consequently,	both	hermeneutic	and	chorological	 reflection	 take	 as	 their	 starting	 point	 our	 essential	 openness	 to	 the	 world.	 However,	Heidegger	 still	 saw	 the	 transcendental	 priority	 of	 Dasein	 over	 the	 world.	 Consequently,	 hermeneutic	reflection	 in	 BT	 revealed	 Dasein’s	 being	 as	 world-disclosing.	 At	 this	 point,	 we	 can	 recall	 how	 Nishida	criticized	Heidegger’s	understanding	of	being	as	an	“insufficient	 jikaku”	 insofar	as	 it	does	not	clarify	 the	deeper	level	of	self-awareness,	namely	absolute	nothingness.	Nishida	was	certainly	right	that	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	 reflection	 did	 not	 delve	 deep	 enough.	 From	Nishida’s	 perspective,	 it	must	 reveal	 the	 pre-reflective	origin	of	transcendental	reflection	not	in	the	pre-ontological	understanding	of	Dasein	but	in	the	non-reflective	experience	completely	devoid	of	the	subject-object	split.	As	Ueda	argues:	“[s]ince	Dasein	is	being-in-the-world,	[…]	Dasein	must	also	be	understood	from	the	direction	of	the	world,	or	the	self	from	the	direction	of	basho.”93	Chorological	reflection,	then,	radicalizes	transcendental	reflection	by	disclosing	its	 pre-reflective	 origin	 in	 the	 selfless	 experience	 of	 absolute	 nothingness.	 Consequently,	 chorological	reflection	ultimately	becomes	the	reflection	of	the	place	within	itself.	And	here	lies	the	true	radicalness	of	Nishida’s	 chorological	 transformation	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 which	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	transformation	 failed	 to	 see.	 When	 one	 follows	 through	 with	 chorological	 reflection	 and	 becomes	
																																								 																				
93	Ibid.,	p.	348.	
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disclosed	 to	 “reality”	 realizing	 itself,	 one	 finds	oneself	as	the	reflection	of	absolute	nothingness,	 i.e	as	the	
place	 of	 absolute	 no-thingness	 wherein	 “reality”	 realizes	 itself.	 Therefore,	 if	 Heidegger’s	 hermeneutic	transformation	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy	 was	 ultimately	 the	 result	 of	 the	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	
facticity	of	our	being,	Nishida’s	chorological	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy	was	the	result	of	the	acknowledgement	of	the	absolute	no-thingness	of	our	being.														
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Conclusion:	Possibilities	of	transcendental	philosophy			 As	 stated	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 comparative	 studies	 of	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 have	 focused	 on	juxtaposing	Nishida’s	philosophy	with	the	later	Heidegger’s	thought	after	the	turn.	The	present	study	was	an	attempt	 to	shed	 light	on	 the	 further	common	ground	between	 the	 two	 thinkers,	namely	 their	earlier	critical	 engagements	 with	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 In	 the	 late	 1920s,	 both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	believed	 in	 the	 possibilities	 of	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 namely	 that	 it	 could	 clear	 the	 way	 towards	overcoming	the	Western	metaphysical	tradition	if	it	were	transformed.	By	way	of	conclusion,	then,	let	us	recapitulate	 our	 findings	 by	 addressing	 how	 their	 hermeneutic	 and	 chorological	 transformations	 shed	light	on	the	possibilities	of	transcendental	philosophy.		 The	three	main	motifs	of	transcendental	philosophy	are:	(1)	transcendental	 foundationalism,	(2)	transcendental	reflection,	and	(3)	an	alteration	of	our	relation	to	the	world	 from	naively	believing	 in	 its	independent	existence	to	seeing	 it	 through	transcendental	subjectivity.	Both	Heidegger	and	Nishida	saw	the	importance	of	seeking	a	kind	of	transcendental	foundation.	For	Heidegger,	the	hermeneutic	priority	of	Dasein	was	understood	in	terms	of	transcendental	priority.	Much	like	the	way	transcendental	subjectivity	constitutes	the	world,	Dasein’s	being	discloses	the	being	of	the	world.	But	the	hermeneutic-transcendental	priority	 of	 Dasein	 clarifies	 how	 Dasein’s	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 is	 primarily	 not	 that	 of	 a	 subject	transcending	towards	objects	but	that	of	disclosedness	to	the	world.	This	 is	why	the	world	is	one	of	the	constitutive	 structures	 of	 Dasein’s	 being:	 Dasein	 is	 being-in-the-world.	 Therefore,	 while	 it	 has	transcendental	priority	over	the	world,	at	the	same	time,	Dasein	cannot	be	without	the	world.	In	this	way,	Heidegger	sheds	light	on	the	essential	disclosedness	and	situatedness	of	transcendental	subjectivity.		 Nishida,	 too,	 understood	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 as	 essentially	 disclosed	 to	 and	 situated	 in	one’s	 place.	 But,	 for	 Nishida,	 this	 disclosedness	 was	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 self-negation.	 The	 self	 is	disclosed	 to	one’s	place	by	negating	 the	 self,	 i.e.	 by	making	 room	 for	 things	 to	manifest.	And	when	one	completely	negates	oneself,	the	subject-object	distinction	collapses.	Amidst	the	complete	absorption	in	the	flow	 of	 music,	 there	 is	 neither	 I	 as	 subject	 nor	 music	 as	 object.	 “I”	 become	 the	 place	 of	 absolute	 no-thingness	 wherein	 “music”	 realizes	 itself.	 Accordingly,	 for	 Nishida,	 the	 transcendental	 foundation	 was	ultimately	sought	 in	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness.	Unlike	Heidegger’s	Dasein,	this	did	not	entail	 the	kind	of	transcendental	priority	we	find	in	Husserl	and	Kant.	For,	at	the	level	of	absolute	nothingness,	there	is	 no	 “seer.”	 There	 is	 merely	 “seeing	 without	 the	 seer.”	 Accordingly,	 absolute	 nothingness	 is	 no	“subjectivity”	that	“constitutes”	objects	but,	rather,	it	is	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	itself.	Put	differently,	there	is	absolutely	no-thing	that	can	be	said	to	constitute	objects.	There	is	
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neither	subject	nor	object.	 In	 this	way,	Nishida’s	 identification	of	 the	 transcendental	ground	 in	absolute	nothingness	 challenges	 the	 idea	 that	 this	 ground	 (“subjectivity”)	 is	 at	 all	 positable.	 Transcendental	“subjectivity”	 (if	 we	 are	 to	 still	 call	 it	 that)	 determines	 “reality”	 (or	 “objects”)	 through	 complete	 self-negation.			 Both	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 agree	 that	 a	 transcendental	 ground	 must	 be	 sought	 by	 a	 kind	 of	second-order	 reflection	 into	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 our	 experience.	 Such	 transcendental	reflection	must	be	distinguished	from	first-order	reflection,	which	thematizes	objects	to	determine	their	real	properties.	Heidegger’s	hermeneutic	reflection,	however,	renders	transcendental	reflection	a	matter	of	 disclosing	 and	 awakening	 to	 the	 contingent	 nature	 of	 one’s	 own	 factical	 situation.	 Accordingly,	transcendental	 reflection	 does	 not	 abstract	 from	 our	 everyday	 way	 of	 being	 in	 the	 world.	 Rather,	 it	discloses	the	transcendental	constitution	of	oneself	in	one’s	situatedness.	Transcendental	philosophy	can	and	must	begin	with	and	return	to	our	facticity	and	historicity.		 Insofar	as	Nishida’s	chorological	 reflection,	 too,	 is	a	kind	of	hermeneutic	 reflection,	 it	also	sheds	light	on	the	importance	of	facticity	and	historicity	in	transcendental	philosophy.	But	Nishida’s	chorological	reflection,	 at	 least	during	 the	 late	1920s,	was	 less	 focused	on	 this	 aspect	 and	more	geared	 towards	 the	soteriological	concern	of	self-awakening.	 It	 thus	renders	transcendental	reflection	a	matter	of	disclosing	oneself	 through	 self-negation	 and	 awakening	 to	 one’s	 absolute	 no-thingness.	 Transcendental	 reflection	can	and	must	begin	with	the	facticity	and	historicity	of	Dasein’s	being,	but	it	must	not	end	there.	It	must	delve	deeper	and	reveal	the	absolute	no-thingness	of	our	being.				 Certainly,	 for	both	Heidegger	and	Nishida,	 the	alteration	of	our	relation	to	 the	world	 is	essential	for	 transcendental	 philosophy.	 Indeed,	 we	 can	 even	 say	 that	 the	 metaphysical	 implications	 of	transcendental	inquiry	are	where	we	find	the	most	important	“possibilities”	of	transcendental	philosophy	in	the	sense	of	what	they	could	achieve.	This	is	so	because,	for	both,	transcendental	inquiry	is	essentially	a	matter	of	becoming	wakeful	 to	one’s	 situation.	 For	Heidegger,	 this	 calls	 for	 an	existentialist	 awakening.	Ultimately,	 one	 should	 seize	 the	 existentiell	 possibility	 of	 authentic	 self-understanding	 in	 one’s	 own	existence.	For	Nishida,	this	calls	for	a	soteriological	self-awakening.	One	should	practice	self-negation	such	that,	at	some	point,	one	may	realize	the	absolute	no-thingness	of	one’s	own	being.	But	the	way	we	come	to	see	 the	world	 upon	 this	 awakening	 is	 radically	 different	 for	 the	 two	 thinkers.	 According	 to	 Heidegger,	transcendental	 philosophy	 challenges	 our	 naive	 realist	 view	 and	 instead,	 we	 come	 to	 see	 the	 world	through	 transcendental	 subjectivity	 (Dasein),	 one	 whose	 ontological	 constitution	 is	 articulated	 as	disclosedness	to	the	world,	factical,	and	is	always	already	projecting	its	possibilities	upon	the	world.	We	come	to	see	the	world	through	Dasein’s	being-in-the-world.	
211	
	
	 For	Nishida,	 the	 outlook	 is	 very	 different.	 Transcendental	 philosophy	 certainly	 challenges	 naive	realism,	but	it	does	not	replace	this	with	transcendental	idealism,	even	when	the	ontological	constitution	of	transcendental	subjectivity	is	understood	as	being-in-the-world.	Transcendental	philosophy	allows	us	to	come	to	see	the	world	through	absolute	no-thingness.	This	is	not	at	all	equivalent	to	saying	that	we	come	to	 see	 the	 world	 as	 absolutely	 nothing	 as	 if	 to	 imply	 a	 nihilistic	 position.	 Rather,	 we	 come	 to	 the	 self-realization	that	“I”	am	the	place	of	absolute	no-thingness	wherein	“reality”	realizes	itself.	In	other	words,	“I”	 come	 to	 see	 the	 direct	 experience	 of	 “reality”	 prior	 to	 the	 subject-object	 duality.	 From	 Nishida’s	standpoint,	then,	the	important	possibility	of	transcendental	philosophy	is	that	it	can	and	must	transform	our	relation	to	the	world	from	seeing	the	world	as	objects	existing	independently	of	us	to	understanding	(and	 ideally	 appropriating)	 the	 self-realization	 of	 the	 “world.”	 The	 most	 enigmatic	 aspect	 of	 Nishida’s	chorological	transformation	of	transcendental	philosophy,	then,	is	that	transcendental	reflection	brings	us	back	in	touch	with	the	non-reflective	experience	prior	to	the	subject-object	split.		 Lastly,	let	us	draw	out	the	stages	of	transcendental	philosophy	in	order	of	the	radicalness	of	their	transformations.	 Namely,	 transcendental	 philosophy	 alters	 our	 relation	 to	 the	 world	 from	 seeing	 the	world	as	existing	independently	of	us	(naive	realism)	to:		(i) Seeing	 the	 world	 through	 transcendental	 consciousness	 (Kant	 and	 Husserl’s	 transcendental	idealism),		(ii) Seeing	 the	 world	 through	 Dasein’s	 being-in-the-world	 (Heidegger’s	 transcendental-hermeneutic	idealism),	and		(iii) Seeing	the	world	through	absolute	no-thingness	(Nishida’s	awakened	realism).		It	 remains	 an	 interesting	 question	 how	 and	 why	 the	 later	 Heidegger	 and	 Nishida	 would	 come	 to	 the	understanding	 that	 the	possibilities	of	 transcendental	philosophy	 they	 sought	during	 this	period	 in	 fact	indicated	its	limitations.				
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Glossary	of	Key	Japanese	Terms			
basho	場所:	place	
basho	no	ronri	場所の論理:	logic	of	basho	
bashoron	場所論:	theory	of	basho	
bashoteki	gentei	場所的限定:	determination	of	place,	placial	determination	
bashoteki	ronri	場所的論理:	logic	of	basho,	placial	logic	
chōetsuteki	jutsugomen	超越的述語面:	transcendent	predicate	plane	
chōetsuteki	shugomen	超越的主語面:	transcendent	subject	plane	
chokkan	直感:	intuition	
chūshōteki	ippansha	抽象的一般者:	abstract	universal	
eichiteki	ippansha	叡知的一般者:	intelligible	universal	
gutaiteki	ippansha	具体的一般者:	concrete	universal	
handanteki	ippansha	判断的一般者:	judging	universal,	universal	of	judgments	
hansei	反省:	reflection	
ippansha	一般者:	universal	
ippansha	no	jikakuteki	gentei	一般者の自覚的限定:	self-aware	determination	of	the	universal	
ippansha	no	jikogentei	一般者の自己限定:	self-determination	of	the	universal	
ishiki	意識:	consciousness	
jikaku	自覚:	self-awareness	
jikakuteki	gentei	自覚的限定:	self-aware	determination	
jikakuteki	ippansha	自覚的一般者:	self-aware	universal,	universal	of	self-awareness	
junsui	keiken	純粋経験:	pure	experience	
jutsugo	述語:	predicate	
kyakkan	客観:	object	
mu	no	basho	無の場所:	the	place	of	nothingness	
noesisteki	chōetsu	ノエシス的超越:	noetic	transcendence	
oitearu	basho	於いてある場所:	the	place	of	implacement	
oitearu	mono	於いてあるもの:	that	which	is	in	the	place,	the	implaced	
shugo	主語:	grammatical	subject	
shukan	主観:	subject,	subjectivity	
tachiba	立場:	standpoint	
u	no	basho	有の場所:	the	place	of	being(s)	
utsusu	写す,	映す:	to	mirror,	to	reflect	
zettaimu	no	basho	絶対無の場所:	the	place	of	absolute	nothingness			 	
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